

INTRODUCTION

by Elisabeth Mann Borgese

Some of those who gathered at San Francisco in June, 1965, to celebrate the twentieth anniversary of the United Nations were old enough to remember the commemoration of the twentieth birthday of the League of Nations. This is an ominous recurrence. For the League lived twenty years: 1919-39. Before that anniversary, there was Corfu, Abyssinia, and Spain. The Fascist powers had defected; and civil wars and phony wars were escalating into the holocaust of World War II.

The twentieth birthday of the United Nations was marked by a similar atmosphere of crisis. The war in Vietnam was acquiring more tragic dimensions with every day that passed. Santo Domingo was under United States occupation. Indonesia had walked out of the United Nations, raising the threat of a Communist-dominated rival organization. Finances were desperate, the Security Council a shambles, the Assembly paralyzed.

But history, thank goodness, does not repeat itself. If it took a world in ruins for the League to rise, transformed, as the United Nations Organization, the transformation of the United Nations may be a different phenomenon altogether. Nobody—or hardly anybody—had the courage, back in the Thirties, even to dream of the possibility of transforming the League. The League was falling to pieces, and that was all. Today responsible statesmen everywhere recognize the need for a strong United Nations Organization to govern the affairs of the world in peace. And if the

United Nations is to be strong it must be reformed: it must be transformed. This is a fundamental difference between 1935 and 1965.

At the "Pacem in Terris" Convocation called by the Center in New York in February 1965, Secretary-General U Thant candidly admitted that the Charter of the United Nations is obsolete. The composition and rules of the Security Council, he said, were conceived twenty years ago in a totally different historical and political setting. They presupposed complete agreement among the victorious Big Five. They aimed at the threat of a military re-emergence of the Axis powers. Rules conceived to meet such a situation obviously can no longer function today. Add to this that the General Assembly has changed past recognition by more than doubling its membership and totally altering its "balance of power." It is evident that such a body cannot form any consistent policy and, therefore, raise the funds to finance it. The fact that the Charter is obsolete is at the root of the present crisis, U Thant said. "We are witnessing the beginning of the great debate." An attempt must now be made "to secure a fair, equitable, and clearly defined distribution of functions of the two principal organs of the U.N."

General de Gaulle's proposal for a meeting between Washington, Moscow, London, Peking, and Paris to "return" to the spirit that animated the Charter twenty years ago was not entirely coherent. It caused a stir, nevertheless. Another Frenchman, Henri Laugier, former Assistant Secretary-General of the United Nations, drew the logical conclusions: "Before the Conference proposed by the President," he wrote, "the problems he suggested will not remain the only ones on the table. Rightly, all the problems of international cooperation raised by the evolution of history will be

put on the table. It is to be hoped that a new Charter will be drafted on this basis — even though this one too may be merely temporary — and that it will rise from the free debate in an atmosphere of peace, and not in the wake of the ravages and turmoil of another war. It is probable that the Charter reform that must be accomplished will be much more sweeping, and much more fertile, than the one suggested, in a spirit of juridical formalism, by General de Gaulle.”

Luis Quintanilla, Mexican delegate at the United Nations Conference in San Francisco, went far toward spelling out the kind of reform the Charter would need to make the United Nations viable in the face of the present crisis. His “Fourteen Points” essentially propose that the voting strength of the United Nations Assembly must be made in some way proportionate to the population of the various members; that the Security Council must be enlarged; that the United Nations could learn and profit from the regional, political, and economic organizations like the Organization of American States, the Common Market, the Organization for African Unity; that membership in the United Nations must be universal; and that the United Nations must have a monopoly of force — “a permanent force to impose decisions when the peace of the world is actually broken.”

THESE ARE impressive testimonies. The crisis is deep. It goes to the very roots of the organization. Palliatives will not do. The price to be paid will be substantial. A world of antiquated ideas will have to be demolished to save the world of reality from demolition.

It is in this context that the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions decided to take a new look

at a document first published almost twenty years ago, the *Preliminary Draft of a World Constitution* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948). Among the many attempts that have been made over the past two decades to improve the structure of the United Nations, this has remained the most systematic, the most revolutionary in its implications, and yet the one that might offer practical solutions to immediate problems. The *Preliminary Draft*, Scott Buchanan recently said, embodies a whole systematic theory. Not unlike Hegelian or Kantian or Marxian theory, it opens new ways to read history. It offers a standard by which to appraise the actions of national governments and international organizations. It may provide a focus for the yearnings of the younger post-national, post-atomic generation for new means with which to create a new kind of world community.

Most of the proposals to improve the United Nations have limited their attention to the elimination of war. This is not a mean purpose, but war is not something separate that can be added to or subtracted from the total weave of the social, political, and economic life of peoples.

Pope John's encyclical, "Pacem in Terris," which has given a new, unprecedented impulse to the search for peace and world order, states that "the public authority of the world community must tackle and solve problems of an economic, social, political or cultural character which are posed by the universal common good. For, because of the vastness, complexity and urgency of those problems, the public authorities of the individual states are not in a position to tackle them with any hope of resolving them satisfactorily."

The *Preliminary Draft* embodies the same theory. It holds that an international or supranational organiza-

tion aiming merely at the maintenance of world security is both impossible and undesirable. Impossible, because it could never gather the consensus of a majority of the world's nations and populations "with a billion Asiatics subscribing to racial discrimination and the uncounted starving millions made happily law-abiding by the 'security' that, sheltered by the world government from aggression and war, they may tranquilly starve further." Undesirable, because even if it could be enforced over the opposition of the majority of people, such an organization would be a police state, for an arms monopoly without political control based on democratic representation would amount to a police state. A police state, on the other hand, would not be apt to promote peaceful change and democratic development. Where democracy still exists, it would be stifled and smothered by a world police state. The history of the last fifty years has taught us that a political democratic order cannot be pegged to an undemocratic social and economic sub-structure. The history of the first ten years of a world police state would easily demonstrate that democratic government cannot survive in an undemocratic super-structure. It we want to be democratic at home we must be democratic on the international level.

IN THE autumn of 1945, some members of the Faculty of the University of Chicago proposed to Chancellor Robert M. Hutchins the creation of an Institute of World Government to parallel the Institute of Nuclear Physics already established. "The intellectual courage that split the atom should be called to unite the world," they wrote. Their proposal resulted in the Committee to Frame a World Constitution, under the chairmanship of the Chancellor. The Secretary-General and main author of the text, as fi-

nally adopted, was the late G. A. Borgese, an exile from Fascist Italy and author of a definitive book on the rise of fascism. Of the Faculty of the University of Chicago, the following joined the Committee: Mortimer Adler, whose rigorous sense of logic and structure steered the Committee through many a meeting and can be traced in many of the provisions finally incorporated in the text; Richard McKeon, who until his resignation toward the very end of this labor counterpoised the "maximalism" of the majority with his rather skeptical "minimalism," thus keeping alive the dialogue within the Committee; the late Robert Redfield, the great anthropologist who contributed his knowledge of non-Caucasian forms of social organization and his uncompromising straightforwardness; Wilbur Katz, who gave the benefit of his legal training; and Rexford Tugwell, who brought to bear his unique experience in governmental economic planning, reflected in a number of constitutional provisions dealing with this set of problems.

A few others joined from other universities: historian-philosopher Stringfellow Barr (St. John's College), Albert Guérard (Stanford), and Erich Kahler (Princeton) brought with them their European experience; Harold Innis (Toronto) represented the Commonwealth; and Charles McIlwain (Harvard) contributed his knowledge of constitutions ancient and modern.

The Committee was assisted by a staff of research associates: young people of the most diverse backgrounds and origins, Americans of different ethnic groups and different training; Russians, Germans, Japanese; writers, political scientists, student of constitutional law; and representatives of the organized world federalist movement.

For over two years this group of legal scholars, social scientists, and political philosophers and their assistants

conferred, proposed, criticized, and revised. The result of their labor is embodied in the *Preliminary Draft of a World Constitution*, in the four volumes of the monthly magazine *Common Cause*, and in more than 2,000 pages of mimeographed and microfilmed research documents.

The main problems the Committee had to deal with are outlined in the article "One World and Seven Problems" included in this pamphlet.

To explore these problems in depth, the Committee and its associates ventured into many fields. The articles, essays, surveys, and reports that make up the four volumes of *Common Cause* cover, indeed, the whole range of social, economic, and political evolution.

LOOKING AT this material almost twenty years after its publication, one must conclude that some of it was ephemeral, abstract, or divorced from reality. But the bulk of the material has maintained an amazing currency. The political analysis was correct, and many of the predictions based on it turned out to be prophetic. Take, for example, *Common Cause's* discussions on Europe.

There were many at that time—twenty years ago—who predicted that economic cooperation would be the only and the right way toward political cooperation, eventually in the framework of a political confederation or federation. But the economic problem would have to be solved first. There were others who predicted that it would be impossible to arrive at the degree of supranational economic cooperation necessary to cure Europe's economic ills without a constitutional-political framework: that political renovation and economic renovation had to go together. *Common Cause* sided with the latter.

The Schuman plan, the Common Market, certainly, were steps in the right direction—and *Common Cause* dealt with these developments extensively. They could not stop a revival of nationalism in Europe, however, which, in turn, lamed the progress of economic cooperation.

There were those—twenty years ago—who claimed that a European federation necessarily would have to precede the formation of a world state. Historical evolution moves from the city state through the national state through the regional federation to the world federation. World government now, they said, is utopian. The next step inevitably is the regional federation.

There were others who pointed out that technological and economic evolution had outrun this leisurely historic process of maturation. The regional federation would be obsolete by the time it was born. The issues that had to be settled before a European federation could be created were world-wide in their implications. The Committee sided with this latter point of view.

One of the problems was Germany. No durable European organization was possible as long as Germany was divided. But the reunification of Germany presupposed a world-wide settlement between East and West. Another was England. No durable European federation was possible without England. But England meant the Commonwealth. A European federation including the Commonwealth was a world state. A third issue was posed by the relations with the colonies and ex-colonies. These, too, could not be handled bilaterally between the former exploiters and the former exploited. They must be regulated in the context of an effective world organization.

All this was written and published twenty years ago: long before the building of the Berlin wall, before the

long and inconclusive discussions between successive British governments and the organs of European cooperation about Britain's role in Europe; long before the Algerian war and the rise of Gaullism. Many of those articles actually seem to have been written today.

If European federation turned out to be impossible, the die-hard Europeans would say, well, too bad: let us turn back the clock and go back to nationalism. Effective world organization is that much further off.

But there are no returns.

A regional articulation of world society—along economic, cultural, and ethnic lines—seems indeed something useful, desirable, workable. The regions would be less numerous, more equal in size, more viable culturally and economically, than the nation states, of which in recent years there has been a veritable burst: like a burst of particles, of indefinite contours, repelling and attracting one another chaotically. Individually these hardly make a satisfactory basis for a common law.

The *Preliminary Draft of a World Constitution* takes an entirely new and constructive attitude toward the problem of regional development. Its entire structure is based on potential regions, without, however, having to wait for their political realization. Regional development thus is encouraged, even taken for granted, provided that the problems involved in the political realization of each region are solved in the context, and in the spirit, of world organization.

WOULD IT BE too daring to imagine that the United Nations General Assembly could be transformed into the *Preliminary Draft's* Federal Convention, with representation not "to some extent," but entirely proportional to population? For that every man has the same right before the world government

and therefore, basically, the same voting strength would seem to be a law that cannot be tampered with without violating human dignity.

The United Nations General Assembly is not a legislative body. It is a debating society. The Federal Convention of the *Preliminary Draft* is not a legislative body either. It is an *electoral body*—a *world model*—with as much debating as may be useful and desirable.

The World Council as established by the *Preliminary Draft*, a small, well-balanced body representing the regions and twice removed from national prejudices, would correspond to an enlarged U.N. Security Council. The proposal is not even as radical as it looks on the surface. The U.N. Security Council originates from the General Assembly just as the World Council originates from the Federal Convention. And the Permanent Members of the Security Council—or those who should be the permanent members—actually *are* regions: the U.S., the U.S.S.R., China, probably the British Commonwealth. During a transitional period these “regions” might even maintain the veto, if this were deemed essential. In this case the great powers would maintain it as heretofore, whereas the smaller powers, such as the European nations or the African states, could exercise it jointly. (Since every region would have nine votes, all major nations, even second- or third-class nations, would be represented on the Council.)

This Council, then, could be more efficient than the currently paralyzed Security Council. It could function as a legislative body: unicameral, in accordance with world-wide trends, while assisted, not blocked, by advisory bodies such as the House of Nationalities (like a present-day meeting of Foreign Ministers) or the Syndical Senate (meeting of Non-Governmental Organizations affiliated with the United Nations), etc.

If, in certain respects, the World Council can do more than the present Security Council, it can probably do less in other respects: being more numerous, it is probably less apt to act swiftly in an emergency. In this event the Chamber of Guardians proposed by the *Preliminary Draft*—note, in the *Draft*, the painstaking provisions aimed at preventing such a body from becoming tyrannical—could take over this part of the Security Council's responsibilities.

WHAT CAN BE the real meaning of the statement that the world organization or world government must be "democratic" when the word "democracy" has assumed a different sense in every one of the member nations and is in crisis, in one way or another, in most of them?

There are three areas in which the *Preliminary Draft* proposes new solutions to the problems that began to emerge at the time of the *Draft* in 1947 and have grown more complex since. These proposals touch the very roots of democracy. They imply a re-examination of its structure, a re-evaluation of its content in the light of its universalization.

1. It is generally held that democracy, on the world level as on the local level, means universal suffrage, the political equality of all citizens, equal participation of all citizens in the exercise of popular sovereignty through the right to vote. If the world republic is to be truly democratic, the vote of every person, no matter what his language or color, must have the same weight. Is this really so? Why? Is the principle "one man, one vote" really essential to democracy? Is it really universal? Or is it not perhaps an expression of Western individualism, rooted in peculiarly Western

historical circumstances? Granted that in the town meeting each freeman's vote carried the same weight. But with the development of the representative system in the larger modern Western democracies, the principle got into trouble. Conceivably it cannot be universalized. Home economy or private economy, Keynes has taught us, obeys laws that are different from, even opposite to, those governing public or state economy. The state is not a big family. The world state is not a big national state. It is conceivable that the basic rules governing the one are not applicable to the other.

This, however, does not mean that we must retrogress, groping for principles that have been discarded on the national and local level as undemocratic or obsolete, such as weighting the vote in proportion to national income or education or Gross National Product, all of which are synonyms for wealth, and apply them on the world level. It means that we have to look for new principles, for new syntheses.

The solution to this problem proposed by the *Preliminary Draft* safeguards the equal participation of all citizens in the exercise of popular sovereignty through the right to vote. But the principle of representation is detached from the principle of the equality of the electoral vote. Who or what is represented at the end of the process? Not the nation, not even the "region," but the world. A relatively simple mechanism has been devised, creating the largest possible number of probabilities for an efficient government to arise from the basis of universal suffrage. This is the new and universalized concept of the roots of democracy.

2. Democracy, on the world level, must be reconciled with the existence of different political regimes, constitutions, and institutions.

The *Preliminary Draft* deals with this problem area in two ways: one negative, one positive—one by omission of specifications, the other by commitments to certain principles, presumably universal and intrinsic to democracy. In fact, the *Preliminary Draft* contains nothing that would exclude states ruled by monarchies or other forms of non-democratic government from membership. The internal structure of member states is not touched upon. Even the mode of selection of delegates to the Federal Convention is not determined by the *Draft*. The only specification is that they must be "elected directly by the people of all states and nations." This may happen according to proportional law, according to districts, from one-party slates, by secret ballot, by acclamation, by lot—there is no reason why any country on earth should not be able, without regard to its internal structure, to comply with this provision.

If there is nothing in the *Draft* that would impose an internal democratic structure in the Western sense, or the renunciation of loyalty to whatever internal structures the delegates may feel bound to, a certain spirit, emancipated as it were from its Western historic origin, is in fact imposed. This is embodied in the Declaration of Duties and Rights, at the very beginning of the Constitution, which guarantees to every citizen of the world republic "protection . . . against subjugation and tyrannical rule, racial or national, doctrinal or cultural, with safeguards for the self-determination of minorities and dissenters." The enforcement of this law is entrusted to the organs of the world government, especially to the Tribune of the People.

It has been objected that the Declaration of Duties and Rights would rule out, from the very outset, the participation of the Communist half of the world or of other totalitarian regimes. Is this necessarily so? A dec-

laration of rights, whether American, Russian, Chinese, universal, or religious as the one proposed by "Pacem in Terris"—and all of these, surprisingly enough, agree rather closely on the basic rights of man—is a declaration of faith: the acceptance of a goal. None of them has as yet been fully enacted.

There is nothing, on the other hand, in the *Preliminary Draft's* Declaration that could deter any Communist state from professing to be a "people's democracy" and to believe in the eventual "withering away of the State." The goal set, the aim stated, by this Declaration is not in conflict with the aim stated by any Communist government. The rest must be left to historic evolution and to peaceful change.

The Declaration of Duties and Rights outlaws violence in any form. This does not mean that it abets the *status quo*. It does not even mean that it outlaws revolution. It means that it posits a new theory, a new philosophy of revolution, based on nonviolent resistance.

The *Preliminary Draft* was, in fact, dedicated to the memory of Gandhi, the prophet of the revolution of the atomic era. This era, which makes the abolition of war mandatory, cannot brook violence on either the national or the local level, for all levels are interconnected. And the distinctions between revolution, revolutionary war, civil war, and international war are obsolete. With parties, interests, and ideals cutting across national frontiers, every local rebellion is potentially a world war, with interventions inseparable from aggression and aggression escalating into ultimate catastrophe.

War is not intrinsic to human nature any more than slavery was. Violence is not intrinsic to revolution. Internal change may take different forms just as the external relations between states are bound to change.

The abolition of interstate violence, in the wake of

the atomic revolution, may be the great contribution of Western society to the social and political evolution of mankind during this century. The abolition of intra-state violence is the great Eastern contribution.

In accordance with the teachings of Gandhi and Pope John XXIII alike, both of whom renounced the time-hallowed distinction between just and unjust wars, denouncing as unjust any kind of war and violence, the *Preliminary Draft* provides that the world authority shall intervene *against* individuals or groups who, in defiance of these teachings, resort to antiquated means of physical violence for the attainment of change. It shall intervene *against* local tyrannical governments which resort to violence to suppress the non-violent resistance of those aspiring to change.

3. Democracy, on the world level, certainly cannot mean Western, political, parliamentary democracy. This was clear even twenty years ago. The world—or as much of it as was relevant to the conduct of world affairs—was then neatly and simply divided into two “blocs”: the “Western” or “political” or “parliamentary” democracies on the one hand, the “people’s” or “social” or “economic” democracies on the other. Democracy on the world level had to provide for both.

The late Piero Calamandrei, the constitutional lawyer who was responsible for the drafting of the new Italian democratic constitution, which had to accommodate the West’s largest Communist party, was not unfamiliar with this problem. In the *Preliminary Draft* he found an acceptable synthesis of both concepts of democracy. The *Draft*, he wrote in his introduction to the Italian edition in 1949, “does not contain a single paragraph that would run counter to socialism. There

are, on the contrary, a number of paragraphs which seem to recognize the universal reasons for its existence. In the Declaration of Duties and Rights the Constitution guarantees to every citizen the right to 'release from the bondage of poverty and from the servitude and exploitation of labor, with rewards and security according to merit and needs.' Land and what is below it, water, the high seas, energy, furthermore, are the common property of the human race, i.e., belong to the world government. Their use, even if entrusted temporarily to private management, is subordinated to the common good."

But it is in the Preamble, in the opening to this whole structure, Calamandrei notes, that the stress on *social* democracy is strongest. "Peace and justice stand or fall together,' the Preamble states. And it is unmistakably clear that justice, in this context, means above all social and economic justice."

During the past twenty years the difficulty of creating a synthesis of "political" democracy and "economic" democracy has diminished in the measure in which the dialectical opposition between "individual" and "community" has become obsolete. The ever accelerating development and universalization of technology, culminating in automation, point in exactly the same direction of increased state control and state planning, both East and West.

In other respects the picture is far more complicated today than it was twenty years ago. The crisis of Western parliamentary democracy has broadened and deepened. In Western Europe democracies are dominated by what practically amount to party dictatorships, which stay in power through the decades, with the symptoms of corruption and degeneration inherent in such situations. France, where Western democracy had

the deepest roots, has gone one step further, reducing the dictatorship of one party to that of one man. Party interests are outgrowing national interests and beginning to cut across national frontiers. International parties of a new character are rising.

Even in the English-speaking nations parliamentary democracy has changed its character. The dialogue, the great debate between the two parties, has ceased. A bipartisan policy, more administrative than ideological, has superseded it, vitiating especially the ever more important sector of foreign affairs. Sporadic attacks from radical but chaotic fringes on the left and on the right remain without practical consequences. At the same time, the progress of technology and the impact of science are swelling and bureaucratizing the executive branch of government: it is altogether a new and changing picture.

Western democratic theory, from the days of Mill to our own, has always been concerned with internal affairs. Foreign affairs, or diplomacy, are intrinsically and historically undemocratic. They are the prerogative of the executive, who is the heir to the monarch. Diplomacy thrives on methods, such as secrecy, that are profoundly undemocratic or anti-democratic. The great heroes of diplomacy, Talleyrand or Metternich, represented absolute monarchies, not democracies. Diplomacy and democracy grow in inverse proportions: the one waxes where the other wanes.

As long as internal affairs outweigh foreign affairs, democracy can survive, probably to the detriment of foreign affairs. When foreign affairs, the crushing issues of war and peace in a technologically shrinking, increasingly interdependent world, begin to outweigh internal affairs, and domestic policy becomes largely determined by foreign policy, the democratic process is

doomed to be stifled and choked. To be rescued, to survive even on the domestic plane, the democratic process must be carried over from the internal to the international sector. Foreign policy must be internationalized and carried out, not by diplomats representing the executive, but by representatives of the people in international bodies of deliberation.

Thus Western parliamentary democracy has been exported out of its own time. It has been exported out of its space, too. New countries are trying it, year after year, coming to this twentieth century post-individual political order out of the clannish or feudal or tribal order of pre-individual epochs. The stress on "individualism" characteristic of our recent past and rooted in our particular Western history, holds no appeal for them. Gropingly, their ideologists turn to Marxism, whose promise of collective economic well-being seems to be more "humanistic" and to correspond better to their own world views.

What is to become of parliamentary democracy, exported out of its time and space, universalized?

On the world level, democracy must be shorn of everything that is ephemeral, accidental, or Occidental. Only what is essential is capable of universalization. The *Preliminary Draft* attempts to achieve just that. Many of the time-hallowed principles of Western parliamentary democracy are overridden. There is no strict separation of powers. Traditional electoral and representational schemes have been abandoned. A unicameral legislature in a federalist system is certainly a novelty. The whole idea of federalism, as it has evolved in Switzerland, in the United States, in Canada, Australia, and elsewhere, has been transformed, streamlined, in an attempt to make the mechanism both flexible and efficient.

WHEN THE *Preliminary Draft*

was first published in 1948, two sorts of criticism were leveled against it. One was empirical; the other, so to speak, ideal.

The empiricists said: the idea may be good, but the times are not ripe. It is a waste of time, a waste of energy, to play with constitutions for future world governments when the fuse of war has been lit, and after the blow there may be no world fit to be governed. All that matters is to help cut the fuse and tread out the sparks.

The fuse was longer than those critics thought twenty years ago. But the criticism has remained the same. It is bound to be leveled against this work again now that it is being republished, even by the most well-meaning, even by those who are most genuinely devoted to the cause of peace. The work may be discarded as an irritating piece of "escapism."

But what is the alternative? Is it really enough to shout "stop fighting in Vietnam" and "get out of Santo Domingo"?

Suppose we did stop. Wearied by monsoons and sabotage, harassed by bad conscience and the fear of ultimate, unimaginable catastrophe, suppose we bogged down and stopped shooting. What next? The problem in Vietnam is not the Vietnamese. The problem in Vietnam is that China is not duly represented in the United Nations, which makes the Security Council a farce, atomic control a chimera, and peace in Southeast Asia a mirage. Our problems in Southeast Asia can never be solved bilaterally, and never by force of arms. Their solution implies profound changes in the structure of the United Nations.

Similarly, the trouble with Santo Domingo is not the Dominicans. To "get out" will not rebuild the past.

Nothing, in fact, will. The fact is that the Monroe Doctrine will not work any longer; that the system of "spheres of influence" is obsolete; that new forms of democracy are bound to evolve in Latin America with which we must coexist in the framework and under the guarantees of an international organization capable of composing the differences. "*U.N.O. si, O.A.S., no!*" "The United Nations, yes, the Organization of American States, no!" is the "rebels'" slogan. And this, indeed, is significant.

When an incurable disease is epidemic, there have to be field nurses on the spot to alleviate suffering and palliate symptoms, at the risk of their own lives. No one in his senses, however, will blame the scientist who sticks to his laboratory to discover the cure for the disease. No one in his senses will tell him, "You dodger, you mental escapist, you play with molecules and viruses while human beings are suffering and dying."

If the scientist's work on the incurable disease involves the transformation of time-hallowed concepts such as life and death, or body and soul, he will be attacked for that; he may even be excommunicated. Most people don't want death to be tampered with. And yet, all hope depends on him.

THE DRAFTERS of this blueprint for an international charter found themselves tampering with time-hallowed concepts such as sovereignty, nation, war, democracy. This does not make them evaders of reality any more than the scientist who works on the elimination of an incurable disease.

This takes us to the second objection, raised from an ideal point of view. Objectors of this type said, and will say again, that the whole thing is utopian: not in the sense that it cannot find its *topos now*, but that it can-

not find it ever. More than audacious, the scheme is blasphemous. This attitude, Thomas Mann stated in his introduction to the German edition in 1949, was characteristic "of certain *homines religiosi*, especially Protestants, who see in it a tower of Babel, of human temerity and humanistic hybris." The answer given to these critics by Thomas Mann almost twenty years ago still holds:

"Is it sure that these men have the right idea of sin? Sin, in my opinion, is to live against the spirit and against truth: to live as if we did not live the present hour but an hour passed long since. Sin is to cling with stupid tenacity to what has been surpassed by time, to what is inadequate, clearly repudiated: sin is to turn a deaf ear to the will of God. The abyss that is gaping between that which still dares to call itself reality and, on the other side, the truth—that is, the goals reached long since by the spirit—this abyss is simply a religious scandal: a blasphemy screaming for deluge, fire and brimstone. And fire and brimstone will not fail to come. No one is more aware of this than the authors of this project for a universal, renovating law, which is at the same time fully realistic inasmuch as it adheres to the facts given by reality. The authors know full well that their ordering proposals may be taken into consideration only after the cataclysm—if anything will have remained to be ordered.

"They have done their duty, at any rate, and prepared a plan: May its time arrive. The readiness is all."

The present publication is conceived as the first in a series. Others will follow, using the *Preliminary Draft of a World Constitution*, as Scott Buchanan has suggested, as a new instrument by which to read history, as a standard by which to appraise the actions of national

governments and international organizations. World events should be examined in the light of the *Draft*, and the *Draft* in the light of world events. It will then be left to the reader, and to public opinion, to judge how much of it remains valid as a blueprint for a world society to come, how much should be amended to meet the challenges of the changed and changing situation, and how much of it could be proposed to national governments and to the United Nations for immediate adaptation toward a solution for the pressing problems of today.