MAJOR UNIVERSAL PROBLEMS OF LIVING

(INTRODUCTORY PAGES)

A NEW APPROACH TO INFORMATION

by

RALPH BORSODI

author, and founder of
The School of Living
1936, Suffern, New York

On sabbatical study, 1950-1956, at Vidyanagar University, Gujerat, India, Ralph Borsodi suggested that Gandhian faculty and students help moderate Indian zeal to duplicate Western industrial civilization.

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Gandhians asked him to outline a huamized pattern to guide a curriculum for their study.

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By the same author :

THE CHALLENGE OF ASIA

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EDUCATION AND LIVING

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*

PROSPERITY AND SECURITY

*

FLIGHT FROM THE CITY

*

THIS UGLY CIVILIZATION

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THE DISTRIBUTION AGE

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*

THE EDUCATION OF THE WHOLE MAN

*

THE DEFINITION OF DEFINITION

Preface

This book is the outgrowth of a study begun over thirty years ago, in 1935, at the School of Living in Suffern, N. Y. It was then that I became disillusioned about economics and the other social sciences as means for dealing with the tragic problem which America faced in the great depression which began in 1929.

Some of these studies have been published in part, particularly in *Education and Living,* published in America in 1948, and *The Education of the Whole Man,* published in India in 1963. But that I would be ever able to publish even such a summary as is contained in this book was something which I gave up hoping until my visit to India in 1958. Originally I hoped to be able to publish separate books dealing with each problem. But that was when I believed that there were only eleven which had to be studied. I hoped that further study might actually reduce the number of problems. When I discovered that there were at least seventeen, my hopes entirely expired.

Thanks to the encouragement I received in India, particularly during my long stay at the University in Vallabh Vidyanagar in Gujarat, I started on a summary which the University planned to publish as a text book. But the breakdown of my health in 1960 stopped that work and I did not start again until after my recovery here in the United States.

I must express my appreciation for the fact that three Chancellors of the University kept up their interest in what I set out to do when Vice-Chancellor Bhailalbhai D. Patel invited me to stay at the University and start work on this book. I want to take advantage of the opportunity to make a permanent record of my appreciation for the interest taken in my work by Vice-Chancellors Bhailalbhai D. Patel, Babubhai J. Patel, his successor, and Ishwarbhai J. Patel, the present Chancellor. Though all have the same surnames, this no more means that they are related to one another than three men with the surname Smith in America must be. Vice-Chancellor I. J. Patel I wish to particularly mention because it is he who has made possible the publication of the Indian edition of this book.

Two other friends must be mentioned, Gordon Lameyer, of the University of New Hampshire, for reading the manuscript so carefully, and Porter Sargent, the publisher of the American edition of this book. It is unusual for an author to express appreciation to a publisher. But Porter Sargent has not only taken a personal interest in the ideas for which I stand, he has also helped in the promotion of one of the movements which is an outgrowth of my studies.

Since the book is being published jointly in India and America, the two greatest Republics of the modern world, I have some hope that it will receive the hearing to which I have the temerity to hope that it is entitled.

Ralph Borsodi
Exeter, N.H., U.S.A.
August 6, 1967

My work with Gandhi and with Ralph Borsodi confirms the similarity of Gandhi's non-violent revolution and Borsodi's re-education of Western culture. I think of Borsodi as an American Gandhi. His Major Problems of Men and Society can keep humanity busy for a thousand years-- Dr Ralph Templin, Dir. of School of Living, 1940-45

I most certainly value an outline of Borsodi's Seventeen Problems of Living if I had one. I'd be using it in my teaching at Pace University. We're publishing an article on Borsodi's Problems in Vera Lex --Virginia Black, Pace, Uni., Pleasantville, N. Y.

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PART III

THE NINE BASIC PRACTICAL PROBLEMS OF MAN & OF SOCIETY : AN INTRODUCTION TO PRAXIOLOGY

COMINITIARE

The Most Important Problem in the World

> Dr. Pell was wont to say that in the Solution of Questions, the Maine Matter was the *well-stating of them;* which requires mother-witt & Logick....; for let the question be but well stated....it will work almost of itself: as for example, the most Difficult Probleme, being thus stated; the working of it becomes very easie.—John Aubrey, *Brief Lives.*

The most important problem in the world is not the economic problem, as Marxists believe; it is not the sexual problem, as Freudians believe; it is not the religious problem as Christians and Mohameddans and Brahmans and Buddhists and the believers in any of the other supernal religions of the world believe.

The most important problem in the world today is the problem of the philosophy by which men live and the philosophy by which society is animated. This, however, is just another way of saying that the most important problem in the world is the educational problem. For this in practice is the problem with which education deals; it deals with the whole process by which not only the rising generation but also older generations are imbued with the philosophy all are supposed to practise and which the whole social life of the community is supposed to reflect. Fortunately there is a technical term *ethos* which designates precisely what I have in mind when I speak of a "philosophy for society": the *essential* character, sentiment, and disposition of a people, of a community or country, a society or culture; the *spirit* which animates its manners and customs, its practices and institutions, and which is reflected in its ideals, and especially in its values—in its ethical and esthetic, its economic and teleologic attitudes and practices.

We do not, unfortunately, have a technical term for what I have in mind when I speak of a "philosophy of education" nor for what is usually called a "philosophy of living," in contradic-

tion to the academic philosophy included in our present curriculums for the humanities. What I mean by a "problem-centered philosophy of education" and a "philosophy for man and for society" should become clear, if I am lucky, in the course of this summation of the twelve thousand pages of manuscript and notes which I have accumulated upon this subject.

* * * *

The educational and philosophical problem has peculiar cogency at this time. Not merely because what all men are and what they do, both individually and socially, is determined by their educations and their philosophies but because at this time in the world's history mankind is not just drifting but is being driven into an age of material barbarism, a new kind of dark age in which the darkness and the barbarism will not be religious but philosophical and ideological. As the shining promise of the free world fades away, what Horace said during the decline and fall of Rome has peculiar cogency for us:

> **Our fathers, viler than our grandfathers,**
> **begot us who are still viler,**
> **and we shall bring forth progeny even viler still!**

* * * *

I am a dreamer, but I am also a very practical man. In practical terms I think of the crisis which mankind faces today as a problem neither in polity nor in economy. In practical terms it is to me a problem in education. Though the educational problem is the last one I shall discuss in this book, if man is to live like a man and not like a mere two-legged animal, and if he is ever to organize a society which is both rational and humane, the educational problem must be recognized as his first, his continuous, and his last problem in life.

Education, however, should not be confused with schooling. For every man is an educated man; no man can avoid acquiring an education of some kind.

Who, however, can avoid mis-education?

Who can be certain that he has been rightly educated?

The educational problem is therefore two-fold: the determination of what is right-education, and the re-education rightly of

at least the determining number* of men and women in society.

But unless they be rightly educated both emotionally and intellectually, unless both their conscious and their unconscious minds have been rightly educated, mankind will never deal rightly, except accidentally, with the problems which confront it.

The failure of mankind to deal with both personal and social problems as they should be dealt with has its source in one great mistake: acceptance of solutions to the basic problems of man and of society before all the basic problems have been adequately defined and therefore before it is possible to recognize the proper solutions of any of them.

Solutions that are right—sufficiently right—for each and every one of the basic problems of mankind already exist. But until mankind's education is problem-centered instead of solution and subject-centered, the truth about them will not be recognized and no consensus among thoughtful and concerned men and women about what to do about them will emerge.

* I owe the concept of "the determining number of people in society" to Hillaire Belloc. Belloc spoke of those who determined social action and who shaped society at any given time as "the determining minority." They are undoubtedly a minority. But I prefer to speak of them as the determining number. Who knows? Enough individuals may some day join the minority to transform it into a majority!

The Four Basic Noetic Problems of Man and of Society

> To know what you know and know what you do not know is characteristic of one who knows.—Confucius.

Man deals with all his problems—and cannot avoid dealing with them—on the basis of assumptions which he believes to be true. It is upon the basis of these assumptions that he postulates, unconsciously for the most part, all his thinking, feeling and action. When all the problems which lead to the formulation of these basic postulates are reduced to their lowest common denominators, four problems seem to emerge which can be considered basic:

The riddle of human nature, the problem of the nature of man's own nature, the problem I think of as the anthropoic problem—Problem I;

The riddle of the universe, the problem of the nature of the world in which man finds himself, the problem I think of as the ontoic problem—Problem II;

The riddle of histriography; the causes of the events which constitute the history of the world and of the individual experiences constituting every biography; this I think of as the etiologic problem—Problem III; and

The riddle of communication; the problem of distinguishing between truth and error and of verifying and validating and communicating what is true; this I think of as the epistemic problem—Problem IV.

The fact that most of mankind takes the answers provided by custom and tradition to all four for granted does not make their study less important. For what man believes about them is not purely a matter of belief; what he assumes to be the truth about them is reflected in everything he wants, everything he does, and every institution he creates. The formulation of these

four basic noetic problems (and the evaluation of solutions of them) cannot, therefore, be too rigorous.

* * *

Because his solutions of these problems underlie the manner in which he deals with all his problems, consideration of these noetic problems logically comes first in any study of the basic problems of man and of society.

The bitter conflicts in the past and the bitter conflicts still taking place as a result of dogmatic religious and ideologic insistence that particular solutions of these noetic problems must be accepted make it clear that all solutions should be subject to the reservation that they are true "to the best of existing knowledge and belief." It is easier, as a matter of fact, to arrive at conclusions about what is not true about them than what is true. Some of mankind's most widely accepted solutions have subsequently been proved patently mistaken. When these mistakes are recognized, ground is cleared for the recognition of what is nearer to the truth about them.

All beliefs, all values, all actions, and all institutions then **tend to become more rational and more humane.**

Working with Borsodi was a challenge --even at 80 he was always ahead of us. eager to get the job done. But always patient with the thousand questions we brought him. He was the first to launch a currency to measure goods in a stable standard of value. No one but Ralph could have pulled it off. Now that he has left us, we must carry out his legacy of an honest money Daily I reflect on his query, "What have you done for posterity today?" and ponder his conclusions. "Without a solution to the land and money monopoly, no real social reform is possible."--Robert Swann, Forest Land Trust. RD 3. Great Barrington, Mass

PROBLEM I.

The Riddle of Human Nature: Psyche or Soma?

> A balanced science of man....must be expected to establish a view of the human person as lucid and reliable as the discoveries of Galileo, Kepler, and Newton, and as acceptable as the religious gospel of love. The consensus will thus express the first scientific synthesis having the force of religion, and the first personal and social religion carrying the authority of science. Nothing less powerful can restore the intellectual, moral and spiritual order.—L. L. Whyte, *Everyman Looks Forward.*

After a lifetime of devotion to the building of a Socialist world, Max Eastman finally gave up all faith in Socialism and wrote a book about his complete change of heart which he called *Reflections on the Failure of Socialism.*[1] In this book he makes the following significant statement:

> A false and undeliberated conception of what man is lies at the bottom, I think, of the whole bubble-castle of Socialist theory. Although few seem to realize it, Marxism rests on the romantic notion of Rousseau that nature endows men with the qualities necessary to a free, equal, fraternal, and a family-like living together, and our sole problem is to fix up the external conditions. All Marx did about this with his dialectic philosophy was to change the tenses in the romance: Nature will endow men with all these qualities as soon as the conditions are fixed up. Because of his stress upon economic conditions, Marx is commonly credited with the cynical opinion that economic self-interest is dominant in human nature. He believed that human nature is a function of the economic conditions, commonly variable and capable of operating, once these conditions are "ripe," on the divinely rational and benign principle: "From each according to his abilities, to each according to his needs." It was to protect this optimistic dogma about human nature that the Stalin government felt obliged to stamp out the true science of genetics. According to that science, traits acquired during the lifetime of an organism are not appreciably transmitted in heredity. Only by selective breeding, whether artificial or natural, can profound changes be made in the nature of any species. While men's acquired characters may, and undoubtedly do, change with changing economic (and other) conditions,

the underlying traits of human nature remain the same. There is little doubt that Marxian bigots in the Kremlin were moved by this consideration in liquidating the world-famous geneticist, Avilov, and supporting the Charlatan, Lysenko, in popularizing a belief in the wholesale heredity of acquired characteristics. Without such belief, the whole Marxian myth that economic evolution will bring us to millenium falls to the ground.

Could anything make the importance of what is thought about the nature of human nature—about what in this study is being called the anthropoic problem[2]—clearer?

The need for Borsodi's counsel and guidance was never greater than today. Great and momentous changes will take place. We more and more need Borsodi's vision.--A. P. Thomson, RD 2, Front Royal, Va.

When I once said to Ralph Borsodi that I wished he would do more to spread Flight from The City, he said rather than propaganda he was more interested in the truth. A good point, but also a pity, since Flight is not propaganda at all ; it is both provocative and inspiring.--Henry Geiger, Manas, Los Angeles.

Borsodi was a true philosopher: he made real and specific abstract visions of "the good, the true, the becutiful". His Seventeen Problens is a classic--an integration of knowledge and wisdom too often neglected by professionals.--Americ Averedo, Ph. D., San Francisco

PROBLEM II.

The Riddle of the Universe: Chaos or Cosmos?

> To be surprised, to wonder...is the sport, the luxury special to the intellectual man. The gesture characteristic of his tribe consists in looking at the world with eyes wide open in wonder. This faculty of wonder...is the one which leads the intellectual man through life in the perpetual ecstasy of the visionary. His special attribute is the wonder of the eyes. Hence it was that the ancients gave Minerva her owl, the bird with ever-dazzled eyes.—José Ortega y Gasset.

The second of the basic noetic problems is what Haeckel (in the year which marked the dawn of the twentieth century) called the riddle of the universe. Three facts out of innumerable, indisputable facts are sufficient to make clear why mankind has from the very beginning felt it necessary to find some sort of answer to what I now think of as the ontoic problem.

1. The first fact is that man is not only confronted with the world[1] but, unlike all other animals, is conscious of the fact. He cannot, therefore, take its existence for granted. He cannot, because of the plasticity of his instincts, rely upon them as animals do and merely accept the world's existence. He has to find some sort of explanation for it and for the multiplicity of objects, including human beings, of which it is composed.

2. The second is that his reactions to life and how it should be lived are determined by whether he believes the universe to be a chaos or a cosmos; whether he believes it a world of infinitely small atoms and electrons and infinitely large objects, like the galaxies, scattered meaninglessly and at random throughout space, or a world in some enigmatic sense orderly and designed making it necessary for man to believe in a God like Jehovah, the Creator, or in some other supernatural First Cause to account for its existence.

3. The third fact is that the life of every man is profoundly affected by the explanation of the nature of the world which he accepts as true. If he believes in the existence of any kind of supernal world (the indescribably ecstatic Heaven of Christianity or the Paradise of Islam), and particularly if his enjoyment of it in an after life is dependent upon the salvation of his soul, his first concern here on Earth will be *what he should do to attain salvation* (pray, worship, propitiate) and how to destroy everything (false churches, false doctrines) and everybody (idolaters, heretics) that threatens to undermine his faith in it. If, in addition, he believes in the existence of a supernal Hell (Christianity, Mohammedanism) or a supernal world of darkness (Paganism, Judaism), he will fear and struggle to escape from having to suffer eternity in it.

If he does not believe in it, if he only believes in the existence of the objective world in which he finds himself living for the short period of his lifetime, he will devote himself to a purely secular (non-religious) and temporal (here and now) life, making the most of what it offers as Secularists and Humanists, and Materialists and Hedonists, do.

What makes this a pressing and important problem and not a mere academic study is that over and over again in the history of mankind the believers in some supernatural explanation for the existence of the world have been willing to kill and to persecute for the sake of their beliefs (Christians *versus* Mohammedans; both *versus* Gentiles); that men are still willing to persecute (Russian Atheists persecute Christians) and to kill (Muslim Pakistani *versus* Brahmanical Hindus, and vice versa) those who will not accept their explanations for the creation of the world.

* * * *

What must be taken into account in dealing with the riddle which the existence of the world created for mankind?

The ontoic problem[2] is so easily and so generally confused with the first and the third of these basic noetic problems that, if it is to be adequately dealt with, consideration of it must distinguish between *what exists* and *what occurs*,[3] between existing entities on one hand (the riddle of the universe—our present problem) and the subjective aspect of man's nature on the other (the

riddle of human nature—our previous problem). It is equally important to distinguish between the problem presented by the spectacle which the universe presents to man (our present problem) and the problem created by the fact that he is an unavoidable participant in its activities (the riddle of historiography—the next of the noetic problems which we shall consider).

* * * *

The world can be said to consist of entities, of which the world itself is one and all the other objects (atomic and astronomic), scattered about on the Earth and throughout the vast reaches which astronomers explore. Unfortunately, this scientific (this Naturalistic and Materialistic) conception of the nature of these entities is not the only one which has to be taken into account. There is a religious (and Supernatural) conception which maintains that not only physical but spiritual entities exist, and that there are two worlds and not one with which man must come to terms.

The Naturalistic and Materialistic conception of the nature of our problem assumes that the only entities with which we have to deal are either (1) physical objects (like the Earth and the human beings who inhabit it), things which can be seen and heard, which can be "sensed," and which we know exist as a result of immediate sense-perceptions, or (2) hypostated entities like the "State," objects which are inferred, mental constructions the existence of which can be objectively demonstrated. (Yet real and tangible as both these kinds of entities seem to us, for thousands of years, and still today, millions of Hindus and Buddhists believe the natural world to be nothing but *maya*, nothing but an illusion. And part of the problem with which ontoics must deal is created for us by the depth of the convictions of those who believe in *maya varda*).

PROBLEM III

The Riddle of Histriography: Events and Experiences, Causes and Effects, Challenges and Responses. A Study of the Etiologic Problem

> Nature will be reported. All things are engaged in writing their history. The planet, the pebble goes attended by its shadow. The rolling rock leaves its scratches on the mountain; the animal, its bones in the stratum; the fern and leaf, their modest epitaph in the coal. The falling drop makes its sculpture in the sand and stone. Not a foot steps into the snow, or along the ground, but prints, in charters more or less lasting, a map of its march. Every act of man inscribes itself in the memories of his fellows, and in his own manners and face. The air is full of sounds; the sky, of tokens; the ground is all memoranda and signature; and every object covered over with hints, which speak to the intelligent.... this self-registration is incessant.—Ralph Waldo Emerson, *Representative Man.*

We are living in one of the most challenging periods in all history. It is trite to say that upon the response we make to the challenge this creates for us is dependent the happiness of mankind. But it happens to be true. For upon that response is dependent the future course of history, whether events in that future will revivify and perhaps realize the vision of a really free world, or whether we will continue to sink into the blackness of a secure but regimented totalitarian world.

Crisis such as these are not novelties. It has not been unusual for mankind to be challenged by crises as grave as this one, nor has it been unusual for the responses made to them to be the wrong ones. In a sense we are continuously confronted by such challenges. The problem is a perpetual and a universal one. Because of the nature of this one, it might well have been the first

problem I should have considered in this study. Only my desire to present these basic problems in a strictly logical order has made me consider this one third, rather than first.

Like the two previous problems we have considered, this is first of all a noetic problem—a problem created for us for mental resolution by the many alternative explanations offered for the etiology of history.[1]

As we explore community, freedom, politics, ethics and other fundamental questions, we would welcome a day-long seminar with students of Ralph Borsodi and the School of Living. --Grace Lee Boggs, Nat. Org. for an American Revolution, Detroit.

After 30 years, I'm re-reading Borsodi's Challenge of Asia. With his usual precision he clears up that ill-fate term, competition. In our predatory Western system, competition is bound to result in unfairness and injustice. But were we to arrange for equal opportunity (especially to land and credit), what Borsodi calls fraternal competition would give everyone his due. --Eleanor Allen, Yucaipa, Cal.

PROBLEM IV

The Riddle of Communication: Verification and Validation

> Pilate saith..."What is truth?"—The Holy Bible: St. John 18:38.
>
> *Revelation*: "How do I know about the world? Inward light!"—Lao Tze
>
> *Sensation*: "Man...can do and understand so much, and so much only, as he has observed in fact...of the course of nature; beyond this he neither knows anything nor can do anything."—Francis Bacon
>
> *Ratiocination*: "Men of superior minds busy themselves first in getting at the root of things, and when they have succeeded in this, the right course is open to them."—Confucius

None of the great noetic riddles of mankind presents us with greater difficulties than does the riddle which Pilate posed when he asked, "What is truth?"

In philosophy the problem is dealt with academically in the so-called science of epistemology. As I see it, the philosophers have made no science out of it; it is still the same old problem doing business at the same old stand—the problem I think of as the epistemic[1] problem. This is the problem of how to discover, formulate, and communicate the truth; how to verify the beliefs and to validate the values on the basis of which man deals with every problem with which life confronts him. It is both an intensely practical and an enormously important problem, because every man, consciously or unconsciously, acts and lives his life on the basis of assumptions and communications (articulated sometimes, but most often inarticulated), about the right way of dealing with every problem about which he must make a decision.

A hundred facts, of which these five seem to me the most important, make it necessary for mankind to make some sort of answer to Pilate's famous question:

1. The fact that man is confronted with problems and, in the effort to dispose of them, acts on the basis of what he believes to be true.

2. The fact that none of the problems with which he has to deal can be dealt with rationally and humanely without distinguishing between truths and errors.

3. The fact that, because of the plasticity of his instincts and his inability to rely upon instincts to dictate to him what he should do and feel and believe, he cannot take what he believes about anything for granted.

4. The fact that he tends to feel so strongly about what he *believes* to be true, that when he is mistaken he not only suffers but often suffers willingly the most useless hardships; he not only inflicts but deliberately inflicts unnecessary hardships on others; he not only has killed but has deliberately killed millions on the basis of *beliefs* which are in fact demonstrated or demonstrable errors—Christian crusades, Mohammedan jehads, Holy Roman Catholic inquisitions, the fratricidal Catholic Protestant persecutions, Hitler's slaughter of six million Jews because he *believed* in the superiority of the Teutonic race, Stalin's slaughter of seven million kulaks and countless other millions, because he *believed* that the way to the salvation of mankind required revolutionary extermination of the bourgeoisie and revolutionary conquest of non-Communist nations by fire and sword.

5. Finally, there is the fact which makes the problem especially acute at this time, that modern science has by its discovery of the relativity principle, the uncertainty principle, and the probability principle made modern man lose his confidence both in the certainties of traditional religion and the various time-tried common sense methods in which he used to believe and upon both of which he used to rely to establish the truth of what he believed he knew. Modern man is profoundly skeptical; he no longer believes what his instincts tell him is true, what his senses tell him is true, what his feelings tell him is true, not even what his reasoning tells him is true. The determining number of peo-

ple in the modern world believe there are neither absolute truths nor absolute errors; they believe that the most completely demonstrated truths are nevertheless irremediably relative and subjective in nature; that it is impossible to verify satisfactorily anything known or to validate satisfactorily anything considered morally and artistically right. For modern man there are no standards, no norms, no ideals. He is not only a Skeptic but a Solipsist; he is not only a Relativist, he is a Cynic.

Since the problem has always existed, and since man has had to do something about it implicitly in his way of living and explicitly after he became aware of the problem's existence, solutions of some sort have always existed. But when we turn to the accumulated knowledge and wisdom of mankind, we find not one solution about the validity of which everybody is in agreement, but dozens of solutions, each of which we are told by some group of enthusiasts is the only solution upon which ultimate reliance should be placed. About none of them nor any combination of them is there any consensus among modern skeptics.

In considering what might be done and what has already been done about the problem (there are solutions not only in science and philosophy but also folklore and religion), two aspects of the problem should be taken into account—the distinction between man's subjective experiences and his knowledge of objective events, and the distinction between the form in which a truth is expressed and the substance of what is said about it.

Four Basic Problems in Values: An Introduction to Axiology

> Life has a value only when it has something valuable as its object.... We may affirm absolutely that nothing great in the world has been accomplished without passion and without values.—George Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Introduction to *The Philosophy of History.*

The most important and the most neglected of all sciences is axiology.

Axiology is important because values are the key to the riddle of human nature and to the riddle of human history; they are important because every human action is the reflection of an individual value and every human institution the outgrowth of a social value. Every reaction to human experiences and every reaction to the events with which human beings are confronted—no matter what the race or religion, the nationality or the culture, the society or civilization, the class or the ideology involved—is conditioned by personal and group values. It is impossible, therefore, to avoid the influence of values. The only question is whether the values are valid or invalid.

* * * *

The Plasticity of the Instincts in Man—All values are acquired. No one is born with a set of values; no values are inherited; all values are acquired after birth. They should not be confused with man's instinctual drives. These are racial endowments, not values. He is born equipped with a set of autonomous responses to the stimuli of his experiences, but in man these responses operate in a manner entirely different from those of all other animals. They are really *tendencies to respond* in a certain manner, rather than *invariant responses,* as in all other animals. The actual manner in which he responds is determined by his values. In all other animals the responses consist of physiologically dictated reflex actions; they are invariant reflex

actions. In man, because his instincts are malleable and plastic, they consist of acquired, psychologically inspired reactions. In animals, reactions are inelastic (except insofar as man himself interferes with the manner in which they normally function). It is this plasticity of his instincts which makes it possible for man to respond not merely physiologically but psychologically to axioc stimuli.

* * * *

For 40 years I have seen School of Living effectively disseminating decentralist ideas. Borsodi's critical assessment of values and crucial questions offer challenge to decentralists in the years ahead. --George Yamada, Toronto, Canada.

I'm continually amazed at how clearly Ralph Borsodi delineates and deals with our major problems of living. My friends and neighbors find stimulating help in both practice and principle.--Al Couch, Hiram, Ohio

Ralph Borsodi and Alfred Adler have been my chief educators--dealing with the double problem of individualism and society. Dr. Adler shows how each person can become a true individual. Borsodi leads us on into using that self in improving the environment and institutions around us --to create a human society.--Mabelle Brooks, St. Petersburg, Fla.

PROBLEM V

Convictions and Prejudices: The Problem of Telic Values

> So much does the soul require an objective at which to aim that when it does not have one, it will turn all its powers upon itself and create false and fantastic problems in which it does not even believe, rather than not have something toward which to work.—Montaigne

It is the pervasive part which man's purposes play in his life, and the enormous value he often attaches to them, which justify consideration of what I think of first as the telic problem.[1]

Nine facts create the problem:

1. The fact that the essential purpose[2] to which he devotes his life and what he does from day to day to realize it (without regard to whether it is a purpose which he has accepted unquestioningly or whether it is a purpose which he has deliberately adopted) involves not only himself but his family, his group, his nation, and sometimes humanity as a whole; ("No man is an Island intire of it selfe").

2. The fact that he cannot escape (no matter how completely he accepts the prevailing purposes in personal living and in dealing with social and religious, political and economic problems) from doing something about what those with strong convictions insist he should do with his life. To do what they would have him do is doing something about his purpose in life, but to fail to do what they would have him do is also doing something about it.

3. The fact that sometimes the convictions he adopts or those which he unconsciously accepts about his purpose in life are valid (William Lloyd Garrison and the Abolitionists: "Slavery is wrong"), but sometimes they are not (the Southerners: "Slavery is justified"). Sometimes they are so demonstrably true that

everybody is justified in thinking of them as convictions, but sometimes they are so demonstrably mistaken that everybody should think of them as prejudices.

4. The fact that mankind attaches its emotions so strongly not only to beliefs which can be validated ("cigarette smoking is harmful") but also to beliefs which are in fact erroneous ("cigarette smoking is harmless").

5. The fact that, while all human purposes are of two kinds, *ultimate ends* and *means for their realization,* there is usually confusion between means and ends. There is confusion when means are dealt with as if they were ends, confusion when means are used which are inconsistent with the ends being sought, and confusion when the ends themselves are so poorly understood as to be identified with ends entirely inconsistent with them.

6. The fact that no man is moved to realize any important purpose (if its realization is difficult) unless he has strong convictions or prejudices about it, unless he has a strong emotional attachment to it which he believes is justified.

7. The fact that he so often acts not upon the basis of purposes he publicly avows but upon the basis of values to which he is subconsciously attached. Unless a purpose avowed is the same as the value attached to it, it is a mere mask behind which he moves toward the purposes he really values.

8. The fact that none of the problems about which he is moved to do anything can be rationally and humanely dealt with without validating what he does about them, without distinguishing between purposes based upon what is true (which alone justify his having convictions about them) and purposes which are in fact mistaken (which inevitably invalidate his convictions).

9. Finally, the fact that he cannot rely upon his instincts and his impulses, as can all other animals, to provide him with purposes which are appropriate to *Homo sapiens.* To provide him with purposes which are rational and humane, no; to provide him with purposes which are irrational and inhumane, yes. But irrational purposes are for apes, not human beings, and inhumane purposes are for tigers, not mankind.

PROBLEM VI

Good and Evil: The Problem of Ethical Values

> It is not the life of knowledge, not even if it included all the sciences, that creates happiness and well-being, but a single branch of knowledge—the sciences of good and evil. If you exclude this from the other branches, medicine will be equally able to give us health, and shoe-making shoes, and weaving clothes. Seamanship will still save life at sea, and strategy win battles. But without the knowledge of good and evil, the use and excellence of these sciences will be found to have failed us.—Plato, in "Charmides."

Seven facts create for mankind the problem of good and evil[1], facts which make it clear that Plato was right and that without scientific knowledge of what is good and what is evil, all the other sciences "will fail us":

1. The fact that mankind reacts to human behavior, sometimes with approval (one is greeted courteously); sometimes with disapproval (someone spits near one offensively); sometimes with deep admiration (as for the work of an Albert Schweitzer); sometimes with indescribable horror (as to the slaughter at Auschwitz and Buchenwald).

2. The fact that from time immemorial man has thought of his felt-judgments about the acts of which he approves as "good" and about the acts of which he strongly disapproves as "evil".

3. The fact that not only the individual but society makes judgments of the same kind about various kinds of human behaviour.

4. The fact that these socially made group-judgments become embodied in law.

5. The fact that those who breach the law are penalized for violating it.

6. The fact that the strong feeling about breaches of the moralities and the punitive sanctions attached to breaches of the law are attached not only to ethical judgments which have been adequately validated but also to ethical judgments which have been clearly proved invalid. (Yet, in spite of this, we continue to punish behavior which is clearly not immoral as if, in fact, it were immoral and criminal).

7. Finally, we come to the fact that man cannot rely upon his instincts to tell him how and how not to act; man cannot take the way man behaves for granted. This is the fact which underlies all the basic problems of mankind: because of the plasticity of his instincts, he cannot rely upon them to tell him what is good and what is evil.

* * * *

Before exploring what is available for use in dealing with the ethical problem, certain ancillary problems will have to be mentioned. Ten will be briefly touched upon: man's psychologic irritability, the plasticity of his instincts, the validation of his ethical values, the nature of good and evil, the validation of laws, the nature of rights and obligations, the treatment of delinquents and delinquency, the nature of penalization and ameliorization, and the inculcation and dissemination of ethical values.

The Problem of Man's Psychologic Irritability—The nature of what I call psychologic irritability has been discussed at some length in Problem I, but attention must be called to the part it plays in creating the ethical problem.

Animals do not invent religions; they do not write scriptures. They do not enact codes of laws; they do not establish states with police forces, courts, and jails to see that the laws are obeyed. They are not troubled, as man is, by the problem of what to do about sin, about evil, about crime. They are born with instincts which take care of the problem of what to do when any other animal frightens them, including what to do about the most fearsome of all animals, man. Man is not born with instincts which tell him how to react when he is "irritated"; he suffers from (or is blessed with) two kinds of irritability, one biological which he inherits and the other psychological which he acquires.

PROBLEM VII

Beauty and Ugliness: The Problem of Esthetic Values

> A thing of beauty is a joy forever
> Its loveliness increases;
> It will never pass into nothingness;
> but still will keep a bower for us,
> and a sleep full of sweet dreams, and
> health, and quiet breathing.
> Therefore, on every morrow, are we breathing
> a flowery band to bind us to the earth;
> Spite of Despondence; of the inhuman dearth
> of noble natures;
> of gloomy days; of all unhealthy and o'er-
> darkened ways made for our searching:
> Yes, in spite of all, some shape of beauty
> moves away the pall from our darkened
> spirits.—John Keats, ***Endymion.***

No philosopher, no scientist, and no art critic has ever packed as much truth about the esthetic problem into a whole book as Keats did into these ten lines from his *Endymion.* We shall see, before we are through with our consideration of the esthetic problem, that what a poet had to say upon the subject not only combined knowledge with wisdom but also said what he had to say so movingly as to stimulate the cultivation of man's much neglected esthetic conscience.

This cultivation is very badly needed today. Never before has there been such a challenge to the classic conception of the beautiful as at the present time. There have been, of course, many periods of artistic decadence, but never before has there been an age dominated by a deliberate movement, promoted by recognised art critics and professors of art, and often supported by technically competent poets and writers, painters and sculptors, composers and architects, in which what seems like inartistic nonsense is being justified. The underlying philosophy and the essential principle of those who are rationalizing abstract formlessness, ugliness in painting and sculpture, atonal music, functionless archi-

tecture, pointless poetry and plotless drama (the theatre of the absurd) seems to be that clear communication and clear representation have no place in the arts.

As a result, never before has there been more confusion about esthetic values. If the dominant esthetic movement of our own times is either to be vindicated or revealed as a colossal delusion, it is of the utmost importance that clarity be introduced into the discussion of the esthetic problem[1].

Four facts make the esthetic problem not just a problem for those interested in the arts, but a basic, universal, and perpetual problem for all mankind:

1. The first is that men react to everything they see or hear or sense. Sometimes they react with pleasure (a landscape), sometimes with distaste (roadside litter), sometimes with awe and rapture (Beethoven's *Eroica*), sometimes with deep disgust (a drunk vomiting). In physiological terms these reactions are sensations, in psychological terms perceptions[2]. The first are hereditary reactions to man's biological "irritability," the second his acquired and learned reactions to his psychological "irritability." The polar opposites in his physiological reactions are what have been called pleasures and pains; in his psychological reactions to the arts the poles are beauty and ugliness.

2. The second fact is that men do not react to the same object (a painting) and to the same event (a concert) in the same way. For instance, hearing a first-rate symphony orchestra play the *Eroica* or hearing a popular band play *rock-'n-roll*, one man will be uplifted by the *Eroica* and irritated by *rock-'n-roll* and another irritated by the *Eroica* and transported by *rock-'n-roll*. In other words, they cannot, like mere animals, rely upon their unconditioned instincts to make judgments about beauty and ugliness (because of the plasticity of their instincts and their variability from man to man and in the same man from time to time).

We have startling contradictions to account for: Why does the art of one period move people and the same art utterly fail to move people of a later period, or perhaps move them to consider it ugly instead of beautiful? Why is the art of one culture considered beautiful by that culture and the same art considered ugly by another? Why does the art of one artist, or the art of

one school of art, move some art critics to ecstasy and move others at the same time and same place to disgust?

3. Third, is the fact that all individuals (laymen and patrons of the arts, art critics and art authorities, and artists themselves) make esthetic judgments and cannot help having feelings about what they like and dislike, about what is art and what is not art, about what is beautiful and what is ugly.

4. Finally, there is the fact that man cannot rely upon his "instincts"—upon his "blood" as Lawrence liked to put it—to validate his artistic judgments. Animals can rely upon them in dealing with any of their problems; man cannot remain man and do so. He cannot discard his long inheritance of disciplined self-expression in the arts without abdicating his emergence from animal-like and child-like subjection to caprice and impulse—D. H. Lawrence and James Joyce, Pablo Picasso and Salvador Dali, Constantin Brancusi and Henry Moore, Hindemith, Schoenberg and Schulberg to the contrary notwithstanding.

What these facts create for us is what I think of as the problem of esthetic values—an ultimate problem which seems to me best stated as follows: granted that esthetic values are subjective, and inescapably subjective in nature, is there any objective basis for distinguishing between beauty and ugliness? Is there any objective basis for evaluating both objects of art (clothing and decor, painting and sculpture) and artistic performances (cooking and gardening, singing and dancing?).

* * * *

PROBLEM VIII

Wealth and Illth: The Problem of Economic Values

> Often when Socrates was looking on at auctions he would say; How many things there are which I do not need.—Diogenes Laertius.

When the Gibbon of the future writes the history of "The Decline and Fall of the Free World," nothing will be more ironic than the fact that he will have to date the beginning of the fall from the year in which the first great modern republic was born. He will have to date it from 1776, because that was the year in which the first modern text dealing with economics, Adam Smith's *Enquiry into the Wealth of Nations,* was published. What has been wrong with the long list of economic texts published since that time (which unfortunately have played so real a part in creating the conditions which are destroying the free world), is that having begun with the wrong questions, they came up with wrong answers.

That man has wants they all took for granted. But this is precisely what they should not have done; the question with which they should have begun was not *how the people in a nation satisfy their wants* but *what human beings should want;* with the question not of what to do about economic wants but what to do about economic values. To deal with the question they did ask (within the limitations of pure economics), they assumed that they had to deal not with man as he in reality is but with a hypostatic man, an economic man, a man who always bought as cheaply and always sold as dearly as he could. But *Homo economicus* (Adam Smith's and Karl Marx's man) is no more like man than *Homo sapiens* (the Enlightenment's hypostatic reasoning man) or *Homo sexualis* (Sigmund Freud's hypostatic sex-mad man). True, zoologists continue to call man *Homo sapiens,* but he is actually much more emotional than sapient; it would be truer to fact to call him *Homo emotus.* It is the fact that they ignore man as he is, the most

complex of all living creatures (for me, *Homo complexus*), which vitiates the whole elaborate science which they have built upon half true, half mythological foundations. The root is man, as Dwight MacDonald puts it. If the man they assumed they had to deal with had not been half true, the error would long ago have been recognized. Half-truths are always more dangerous than complete mistakes; it is almost impossible to catch up with them.

True, economists devote endless time to the discussion of value-theories, but here they are not talking about values but about prices, about some thing which can be quantitatively measured. Of all the schools of economic thought, the Utilitarians built their solutions of man's problems upon the most ridiculous caricature of man; Jeremy Bentham and his followers thought that all his needs and desires could be measured in pounds and shillings.

For purposes of analysis, it is valid to consider man, as he was considered in Problem V from the standpoint of his telic values only, in Problem VI, from the standpoint of his ethical values only, in Problem VII from the standpoint of his esthetic values only, and as we shall now consider him from the standpoint of his utilitarian or economic values by themselves. But in dealing with any one of them, we must never forget that all of them are inextricably interrelated.

It is ridiculous to talk about the wants of J. Pierpont Morgan, who came from a wealthy banker's home, and of Jesus, who came from a poor carpenter's home; of the wants of John D. Rockefeller, who came from a poor pedler's home, and of the wants of Gautama, who came from a prince's palace—as if they were essentially alike and could all be measured in dollars and cents. It is just as ridiculous to talk about any man as if all his wants were of a utilitarian nature. All men, even the commonest of men, have non-utilitarian wants, and all of them sacrifice utilitarian wants for non-utilitarian values (sex, religion, patriotism, prestige, art, science). Let us not forget this.

Nine Basic Practical Problems: An Introduction to Praxiology

The saying "practice is everything" is Periander's.—Periander 6.

Praxiologic problems deal with the means to which man has to resort in trying to realize his purposes; they deal with the things which man has found necessary if he is to implement his values.

Praxiologic sciences, when their importance is finally recognized and their development really undertaken, will be normative rather than technical sciences; they will describe how mankind does things only insofar as this is necessary to prescribe how they *should be* done by rational and humane human beings. Praxiologists (we have many scientists who are in fact praxiologists even though they do not yet think of themselves in that way) will not be able to separate what they do in their studies and their laboratories from what their moral consciences tell them they should be doing outside of them.

The primary concern of the practical sciences today is not what human beings should do to live like rational and humane human beings; their primary concern is the development of the techniques which profit the group or class or nation which supports them, without regard to how stupid or how injurious the result in fact is.

We owe the development of poison gas, of bacteriological warfare, of atomic bombs to present day practical scientists, we owe the development of an agriculture which led Paul Sears to write *Deserts on the March*, the development of preservatives for the food industry which led Weston Price to write *Nutrition and Degeneracy*, we owe the invention of the toxic pesticides which led Rachel Carson to write *Silent Spring*, to practical scientists who are clever technicians but moral imbeciles.

They are not all of them by any means as bad as this makes them appear, but the good suffer from the plethora of short-

sighted stupidity and moral indifference and timidity of the majority.

There is an art which ought to be an applied "science" today called the Law, another which is called Criminology, and still another called Penology. The first came into existence because mankind had been driven to create codes of law to try to deal with the problems of its discords, the second because mankind wanted to catch its criminals, and the third because it wanted to punish them. That all three are stupid and injurious pseudosciences is made clear by the fact that Socrates was convicted for a crime under Athenian law; Jesus was convicted of a crime under the laws of the Roman Colony of Judea; Galileo was convicted of a crime under the Canon Law of the Papacy; Thoreau was convicted of a crime under the laws of the State of Massachusetts; Mahatma Gandhi was convicted of a crime under the statutes of the British Dominion of India; and a woman who had all her life lived blamelessly was convicted of a crime under the statutes of the United States, because she had failed to surrender gold coins which were her legitimate property in exchange for paper money in which she had lost her faith.

Untold hundreds of thousands have been convicted throughout the history of mankind, and tens of thousands are now being convicted, for the same sort of pseudo-crimes at the very time when millions who are guilty of serious breaches of the Moral Law are utterly ignored. As the study of the ethical problem should have made clear, a moral order and a sane society calls not for a pseudoscience such as the Law but for a real science of Nomology; not a pseudoscience such as Criminology, but a true science such as Pejorology (which would deal not only with criminal but also with all kinds of delinquents); and not a pseudoscience such as Penology but a real science such as Meliology might become.

What we need are properly organized and properly developed sciences which deal with the real (I call them basic) problems and not with the academic problems of mankind. What we need is to integrate existing sciences around these basic problems (around such a problem as the occupational problem); to create and develop missing sciences (a science dealing with the possessional problem); to revive undeveloped and virtually stillborn

sciences (like Plato's "science of good and evil"); and to discard sciences (like economics) which merely confuse mankind and which should be relegated to the limbo into which thaumaturgy and astrology have been relegated by humane, rational, and scientifically trained human beings.

When the leaders and teachers of mankind begin to recognize this, praxiology as I envision it will come into its own.

* * * *

The nine basic problems of man and of society which I think of as praxiologic are listed here. They are numbered to correspond with the chapters in which they are discussed.

Problem IX, The Psycho-Physiologic Problem—Men need to be mentally and physically healthy not merely to survive but to be enabled to realize their highest potentialities. They ought to breed to make this possible, and none should be bred which make this impossible. Medicine ought to deal with the whole of this problem scientifically but it does not; medicine deals only with mental and physical ailments; it does not deal with the real problem of making mankind physically and mentally healthy.

Problem X, The Occupational Problem—Men and women cannot avoid spending time in each of the nine ages in man's life-cycle; what they should do and how they should spend their time in each age is a distinct major problem of its own. But we have no science or group of sciences which deals with the problem in spite of its obvious importance.

Problem XI, The Possessional Problem—Men need to use and to have access to many different categories of things. They need to acquire moral titles to things (not merely legal titles to them); they need to own or to hold things, the possession of which can be morally justified. They need to be able to transfer things and to have things transferred to them in transactions which can be morally vindicated. We ought to have a science to deal with this problem; all the material needed to develop such a science already exists scattered about in ethics, in law, in economics, and in political science, but until it is properly integrated, what is right and wrong in existing solutions of the problem will never become clear.

Problem XII, The Organizational Problem—That the enterprises on which men embark need to be organized if they are to realize their purposes is self-evident. We have a science of business management which concerns itself with the organization of business enterprises, but no science which concerns itself with the principles involved in the organization of all the different categories of enterprises which men need if they are to live rationally and humanely.

Problem XIII, The Production Problem—Like organization, production is a self-evident need of mankind. As it is dealt with today, in part in economics and in part in political science, the most significant aspects of the production problem are lost in the jumbling together of subjects which deal with at least five distinct basic problems.

Problem XIV, The Distribution Problem—Here again a self-evident need of mankind is involved—the need to deal with the claiming and the allocating of shares in the goods and services produced in each enterprise and by the enterprises of nations as a whole. In our modern monetized world we are in desperate need of a clear statement of the problem involved in distributing shares, in the form of money, of the total incomes of each enterprise and of the nation's enterprises as a whole to the claimants who are properly entitled to them. And here again, as in the case of the production problem, modern economics deals with the problem in such a state of confusion that the most significant aspects of it are entirely overlooked.

Problem XV, The Political Problem—The political problem is a basic problem not because of the problem which party rivalry and even international rivalry creates but because (even if there were no political parties and even if there were no States at all) mankind would have to do something about the violence with which individuals and groups treat one another. It is the fact that man has dealt with violence by organizing States which creates the problem in the form with which it confronts us today. Political science takes the State for granted; it usually begins with an exposition of the organization of one particular State, the State to which the political scientist and his students belong. The significance of the problem of violence and counter-

violence tends to be lost in the insignificancies with which both the scientists and the student find themselves preoccupied.

Problem XVI, The Institutional Problem—This basic problem arises because from time to time man finds it necessary or desirable to conserve, to reform, to abolish, or to establish social institutions which will make his survival less difficult, the pursuit of happiness possible, and the maintenance of social sanity a fact. We have no science which deals with this problem today. In the sciences which touch upon the problem, the significance of the problem is obscured. The bits and pieces of knowledge about the problem which belong to such a science are scattered about in sociology and anthropology, in economics and political science, in history, and in the proposals of social reformers of the past and the present. It is high time that the importance of the problem and the need for its systematic study be recognized.

Problem XVII, The Educational Problem—This problem, which should be first as well as last in any analysis of the basic problems of mankind, does not arise because man needs schooling (which is what our schools of education and the enormous literature dealing with education assume). It arises because he cannot rely upon his instincts, as all other animals can, to tell him what he should do and how he should do it. A real science of education would concern itself not merely with intellectual and technical, vocational and avocational education, but with the much broader problem of the education of the whole man; it would concern itself fully, and perhaps even more fully with emotional and axiological education in the home, in society, and in the school, than it now does with equipping the beginners in life with the knowledge and the techniques they will need to earn their livings and "get by" in the society to which they belong. The main concern of education, if this conception of the educational problem is correct, ought not to be juvenile but adult education. For it is always adults and never the young who, in the final analysis, deal with the real problems with which life confronts both old and young.

PROBLEM IX

Mental and Physical Health: The Psycho-Physiological Problem

> Health is indeed a precious thing, to recover and preserve which we undergo any misery, drink bitter potions, freely give our goods; restore a man to health, his purse lies open to thee.—Robert Burton, *Anatomy of Melancholy*.

Consideration of the basic practical problems which confront mankind—the problems about which man must "do" something instead of just "thinking" about them—might well begin with the psycho-physiological problem, the problem of mental and physical health. Three facts create the problem and make it necessary for mankind to do something about it:

1. The first is that sheer survival—man's sheer existence individually and as a species—is ultimately dependent upon his health.

2. The second is that real satisfaction with life in a world in which anguish and suffering, pain and death, are inescapable is possible only to those who enjoy mental and if possible physical health.

3. Finally, unlike all other animals, man cannot rely upon his untutored instincts—because of their plasticity—to determine for him how to deal with his psycho-physiological problem. This fact forces him to use his reason in dealing with it, and, if he does not feel equal to the study which this involves, at least to use it in selecting the teacher (or the authority) to whom to turn in dealing with it.

This last fact has an especial significance so far as the psycho-physiological problem is concerned. Animals can rely upon their instincts to tell them what to eat and where to nest, when to mate and how to procreate, how to protect themselves and enable their young to survive; man cannot. Animals when sick can rely

upon their instincts to tell them what to do (if anything at all can be done about it). Instinctively they purge their systems, instinctively they fast, instinctively they slink off to a quiet and secure spot and let nature either restore them to health or kill them off as painlessly as possible. *Homo alalus* was still equipped with inbuilt mechanisms to determine for him how he should live; *Homo sapiens,* however, cannot rely upon the vestiges of them which he still inherits to determine for him what he should do. *Homo sapiens* must decide for himself what he should do to maintain his health and what he should do when suffering from sickness and accidents.

If all that we know not merely in medicine but scattered about in every field of knowledge (including the primitive lore of mankind) is carefully analyzed, it becomes clear that the following facts must be taken into account in dealing with the problem:

Human Life—Like all life, human life manifests itself in alternate discharges of anabolic and catabolic energy[1]; it manifests itself in the metabolic[1] pulsations of its cells and organs; finally it manifests itself in man's life-cycle which begins at birth, is followed by growth, and when growth ends is succeeded by decay and death. Every living organism, from the simplest cell to the most complex, pulsates; each cell expands and contracts alternately; every multi-cellular organism consists of complexes of cells each of which pulsates cyclically in a manner analogous to the pulsations of the simplest cells. When man (who should never forget that he is such a multicellular organism) functions normally, he really lives and enjoys living. When for any reason his cyclical activities do not function normally, he is sick. And when any of the cyclical activities which are essential to life (breathing, for instance) cease to function entirely, he does not die, he is already dead.

PROBLEM X.

Labor and Leisure: The Occupational Problem

> It was a favorite saying of Theophrastus that time was the most valuable thing that a man could spend.—Theophrastus. 10.

Eight inescapable facts create what I think of as the occupational problem;

1. First is the fact that life inescapably involves the spending of time.

2. Second, the spending of time inescapably involves an occupation of some kind, even when the occupation consists of doing nothing.

3. Third, not only are occupations different (they call for different talents, they gratify different desires) but human temperaments[1] are also different.

4. Fourth, not only do temperaments vary from person to person, but they vary in the same person from age to age (a child has certain needs and capacities, a youth others, an adult still others).

5. Fifth, not only are occupational aptitudes[2] different, but occupational necessities[3] and occupational desires[4] are also different.

6. Sixth, because of the two-fold variability of aptitudes and necessities[5], both aptitudes and necessities must be taken into account if physical health is not to be injured by the wrong kinds of occupations, if mental ill-health and alienation are to be avoided, and if the fullest development of the potentialities of the person is to be realized in occupations of the right kind.

7. Seventh, since desires, aspirations, and ambitions vary in the same person from time to time, and training, experience, capabilities, and necessities do not and sometimes cannot vary correspondingly, the need for reconciliation, adjustment, and accommodation of desires and realities confronts every man continuously. This problem is further rendered difficult by the fact that

there are so many solutions of the problem, either prescribed by the culture, the group, or family to which the individual belongs, or chosen individually by him, some of which are individually and socially wholesome and others which are individually and socially destructive.

8. Finally man, because of the plasticity of his instincts, cannot rely upon them to dictate to him what he should do and how he should occupy himself; he can neither rely upon his instinctual impulses nor trust to chance and accidents to solve this problem for him. On the contrary, he is inescapably confronted by the necessity of making choices about the occupations to which he should devote himself from time to time as he goes through the "seven ages of man."

* * * *

PROBLEM XI

Trusterty and Property: The Possessional Problem

> For why? Because the good old rule sufficeth them, the simple plan that they should take, who have the power, and they should keep, who can.—William Wordsworth, "Rob Roy's Grave."

Five facts with which every man and every society is confronted create what I think of as the possessional[1] problem:

1. The fact that mankind in order to live must consume things (food, clothing), must use things (houses), must have access to the natural resources of the Earth (fields, forests, landsites, the seas).

2. The fact that so often two or more individuals or two or more groups or classes or tribes or nations want to use or consume the same thing, or to have access to the same natural resources at the same time to the exclusion of others.

3. The fact that in the effort to eliminate violent conflicts about the possession of things, every society adopts some system for establishing titles to things, some method of defining tenure in them, and some means for the orderly transfer of things from one person or party to another.

4. The fact that the failure to recognize the significance of the distinction between property and trusterty[2] is responsible for some of the worst as well as the most insidious forms of exploitation of man by man (slave by master), of class by class (the poor by the rich), of subjects by the State (Proudhon, Kropotkin, Tucker, Djilas).

5. Finally, the fact that resentment of exploitation, which has so often erupted into bloody revolution and so often been followed by bloody repression, is based upon a completely mistaken conception of the real nature of exploitation.

Exploitation—There are four conceptions of the nature of exploitation which it is essential to distinguish if the importance

of the possessional problem is to be realized, (1) *Delinquent Exploitation,* (2) *Disaster Exploitation,* (3) *Legalized (Political) Exploitation,* and (4) *Economic Exploitation.* Exploitation itself, as the term is here being used, refers to what the dictionary defines as the act of basely and illegitimately using another person to one's own advantage or profit. This is a good enough description of the process for our present purposes. What this makes perfectly clear is that exploitation, no matter how it takes place, is always a delinquency. No matter how respectable those who practice it, no matter how acceptable to custom, no matter how completely it is statutorily sanctioned, it is a breach of morality—a delinquency as that term has been defined in our statement of the ethical problem. It is always either a personal or an institutional evil, and very often both.

No decent human being excuses exploitation when it is practiced nakedly, greedily, and ruthlessly. But most quite decent human beings favor many subtle forms of it when it is rationalized and its real nature hidden. No form of it is pretty the moment it is stripped of its disguises and the reality they hide completely exposed. What is worse is the fact that so complete is our mis-education at this point that millions of people (and not only the rich) indulge in exploitation without the slightest realization of the fact that what they are doing is morally indefensible.

That a racketeer, who collects tribute from his victims, is engaged in a form of exploitation, everybody recognizes. That an employer, who takes advantage of his workers' fear of unemployment and underpays them, is engaged in another form of exploitation, almost everybody will recognize. That a dealer or a speculator during a time of great scarcity (during a war or a famine) who charges all that the traffic will bear (profiteers) is engaged in still another form of exploitation, almost everybody will also recognize. But that the members of a powerful labor union who take advantage of the monopoly of labor they enjoy and exact higher wages than they legitimately earn, or who furnish less than an honest day's labor for an honest day's pay, are also engaged in exploitation (and engaged not nearly as much in exploiting their employers as in exploiting the consuming public), is much more difficult to recognize. And such is our mis-education that a land-owner who takes advantage of the legal privilege

which ownership of land confers upon him and pays less than its economic-rent in taxes, or a land-speculator who sells his land and pockets the unearned increment this furnishes him, is also engaged in indefensible exploitation, is recognized only by a handful of the followers of Henry George.

The principle of *caveat emptor* is morally indefensible and should in any decent society be popularly recognized as immoral and in any decent State statutorily prohibited. No man has the moral right to sell anything to another and take advantage of the other's ignorance when he does so. If this sort of so-called economic exploitation is justifiable, as Social Darwinists maintain (in the dog-eat-dog world which they accept as inescapable), then stealing is equally acceptable, because that too is merely a form of dog-eat-dog. Neither is it justifiable in the Marxist conception of the world as a class-eat-class world. If taking advantage of the ignorance and gullibility, the weakness and the helplessness of the masses by the classes (the proletariat by the bourgeoisie) is unjustifiable, then wholesale instead of retail Social Darwinism is also indefensible. Yet this kind of Social Darwinism is being practiced in all Communist States as their Planning Commissions systematically exploit the peasantry for the benefit of industry and the whole population to promote the State's interests in destroying its rival Capitalist world. Co-existence by the Communist and the Capitalist world is a stratagem; it is a mere stratagem practiced by Communist States, and practiced by them with ruthless disregard of the economic exploitation of their own people which this makes necessary.

Disaster Exploitation—What I am calling disaster exploitation is, like all exploitation, possible in any kind of society or State, but it differs from other forms of exploitation in that in free economies it seems like economic exploitation. Any kind of exploitation of a personal or a social mishap—of a calamity, cataclysm or catastrophe[4]—in which any person or persons take advantage of the victim or victims of a disaster of any kind, even though it has the appearance of a voluntary transaction or of a contract freely entered into, is not only immoral but should be illegal. Its immorality has been long recognized (the story of Isaac and Esau) and under certain circumstances its illegality has also been quite often recognized—during a declaration of a state

of emergency (as a result of a catastrophe such as a flood), or during a famine or a war (when government rationing or price-fixing is authorized). Statutory law lags for the most part far behind popular recognition of the essential immorality of this kind of exploitation (it has been called profiteering to distinguish it from ordinary profit-taking). Unfortunately, it takes place whenever any individual is greedy enough and ruthless enough to take advantage of the misfortunes of people in emergencies of a disastrous nature.

Legalized Exploitation—Albert Jay Nock is entitled to the credit, I believe, for making a distinction between what he called the political means of making money and the economic. The distinction is a cogent one but its meaning is not clear, because it does not in its very terminology make clear what is meant by "political means" and because his dichotomy omits recognition of the enormous importance of the concepts (and the facts to which they refer) which I call delinquency and disaster exploitation. What he calls the political means, I call legalized exploitation. What he calls the economic means includes not only legitimate means of making money but also delinquent and disaster exploitation.

Legalized exploitation (the political means of exploitation) is made possible, and only possible, by grants of special privileges or monopolies legalized by the statutes or constitutions of States. Not only do States legalize exploitation in this way, but it confers upon the exploiters (along with the legal right to exploit) the right to call upon the State for its power to force recalcitrant victims of their exploitation to "render unto Caesar" what they are legally entitled to receive.

Because it is legal, and because what is legal is identified with what is right, everybody (including the exploiters themselves) are taught by our educational system that these institutionalized forms of exploitation are beyond legitimate criticism.

Economic Exploitation—All profit-takers, all interest-takers, all rent-takers, all those Capitalists (petty as well as mighty) who in any way retain any of what Marxians call the surplus-value of production, are engaged in what they call Capitalist expropriation. This, of course, is nonsense; it has no basis when factually

considered if by expropriation is meant what I am calling economic exploitation. Economic exploitation, as distinguished from legalized exploitation, is not involved in normal profit-taking provided the source of the income is in itself earned and not unearned, (as we shall see when we come to Problem XIV—the Distribution Problem). So-called Economic exploitation begins only when profit-taking is abused, as it is (1) when it comes into existence as a result of the possession of a legal grant; (2) when it comes into existence as a result of non-productive (really delinquent) speculation, (by what used to be called regrading, forestalling, and engrossing); and (3) when it comes into existence by taking advantage of the scarcity created by a catastrophe—by war, famine, by fire and flood.

But the very concept of profit-taking is a misnomer; what is thoughtlessly called *profit-taking* is actually *profit-and-loss taking.* In an approximately free economy, the excess of profits over losses amounts to not much more than what is earned from undertaking enterprises in which entrepreneurial capital and entrepreneurial labor is employed and risked. For this entrepreneurs are entitled to a return (profit) which, in a genuinely free economy, competition limits and prevents from becoming exploitative.

But whether called expropriation or whether called economic exploitation, the conception itself is a mystique; it refers to something which does not exist, has never existed, and cannot exist. It is a fiction taken for fact because exploitation or expropriation of this kind is always in reality either legalized, disaster, or delinquent exploitation. No man can take advantage of another in any kind of economic transaction unless either the law permits or authorizes him to do so, he cheats his victim, or he takes advantage of his victim's ignorance or misfortune. And no class can exploit another class "economically" unless the law again permits it and the State authorizes it to do so. What we have then is not a free economy but a corrupt and servile State.

Exploitation, however, (which is the doing of something which is always immoral but which is not always illegal), takes place in any kind of society and every kind of State, Capitalist or Communist, whether open or closed, servile or free, partly tainted or entirely corrupt. Perhaps the Anarchists are right; perhaps

all States, including Capitalist and Communist States, are like that!

In so-called free economies, exploitation frequently has all the appearance of economic exploitation when in fact it consists of a breach of morals and frequently a breach of law. When there are no statutes which forbid a particular kind of exploitation, it is a mistake to call it economic exploitation; what it is in fact, is the exploitation of a defect in the legal code or the indifference or corruption of public officials. There is, for instance, inexcusable exploitation today here in America in the manner in which people are fooled by business (including the biggest of businesses) and by special interests with advertising and salesmanship about the quality, the purity, and even the quantity of goods they buy, (dairymen in colouring "butter," labor union members in "feather bedding," business in adulterating or in selling positively harmful products cosmetics, detergents, pesticides, chemical fertilizers, cigarettes, drug preparations).

Exploitation and Law—In terms of moral law, exploitation, no matter what its form, is immoral; technically it is what I have called a delinquency. In common and statutory law it is in fact what today is called a tort or delict. A tort is an offence for which the offender can be sued for redress and damages by his victim; it is considered a private, in contrast to a public crime. Perpetrators of torts are not subject to arrest and prosecution as are criminals. But there is often no substantial difference between the damages suffered by the victims of so-called economic exploitation and the damages suffered by the victims of judicially recognized torts.

The fact that the perpetrators of recognized torts are subject to suits at law exerts a definite restraint upon those who are tempted to perpetrate them. If the victims of so-called economic exploitation could similarly sue the perpetrators of such delinquencies, an army of lawyers would begin to sue exploiters and very soon a powerful restraint upon the temptation to exploit would develop. There have been, of course, a few cases of this sort; recently one of the victims of cigarette smoking who was dying of lung cancer sued for damages the cigarette manufacturer whose brand he had smoked all his life. But in all such cases the courts have uniformly held in favor of the exploiters without giving any consideration to the interests of the exploited.

That of course has been due to the fact that the legal concept of torts and delicts goes back to the common law and back to the time when the law was primarily interpreted in the interests of the haves rather than the have-nots. Today it is blind adherence to precedent which prevents courts of equity from recognizing the truism that exploitation of any kind is in fact a tort.

Granted that it may be difficult, as in the case of exploitation of the cigarette smoking public's ignorance, to determine the damage inflicted upon a particular victim. But the fact is that that would be no more difficult than is the case today in determining the damages suffered by women in breach-of-promise cases.

The law, some cynic said, is an ass.

* * * *

Negative versus Positive Possessions—Something in the nature of an addendum is required before leaving the subject of exploitation. And this addendum should be borne in mind in reading the definition of the concept of possession which follows.

There are such things as negative possessions. An individual —a man or an enterprise—may not only possess nothing, but may be the possessor of negative possessions. Debts are the most obvious of negative possessions but by no means the only kind.

Debtors are natural subjects for exploitation. But those debtors (installment buyers, mostly, in the United States) who find themselves possessing negative possessions of this kind because of their own folly are not entitled to much sympathy at our hands. It is the masses of hard-working propertyless peasants throughout the world (including those in the Communist world), who are helpless victims of the institutionalization of negative possessions, who are entitled to sympathy and concern at our hands. There are, of course, many other kinds of institutionalized and legalized negative possessions. It is the exploitation made possible by the legalization of unjust systems of land tenure, unjust money-systems, and usually both, which enables landlords and money-lenders in the non-Communist world and dictators and bureaucrats in the Communist world to exploit both the landless peasant and the landless farm worker. Of course not only the landless farmers and farm workers, but also the landless surplus laborers in our cities (Marx began the business of calling them

the proletariat) are victimized by the fact that they are impoverished by their negative possessions.

In reading the definition of the concepts of property and trusterty below, the concept of negative possession should therefore be kept in mind—the negative possessions of those who have had accidents and disasters; those who are the victims of their own greed, folly, and miseducation; those who are exploited by ruthless business men, bureaucrats, and racketeers, and not only the negative possessions of those who are the victims of legalized and institutionalized evils. All these are handicapped by their negative possessions, as those, in contrast, are advantaged who possess the positive possessions which will now be described.

* * * *

Property versus Trusterty—The possessional problem has a terrible urgency at this time. Two conflicting ideologies about how it should be dealt with, *both of them wrong,* have split the world into two conflicting blocs, Communist and non-Communist, which have already plunged the world into wars and revolutions and which threaten to keep on doing so for an indefinite time. For if the four-fold definition of exploitation which I have submitted is valid—if it fits the realities involved—then the Communist solution is patently immoral, and the solution which prevails in the rest of the world is equally (if not so patently) immoral.

Unfortunately both of them "work." By the pragmatic test, both of them are valid. But there is nothing new in that. As a solution of the labor problem, slavery we now see is patently immoral, but it worked, for slavery provided the labor which built not only most of the awe-inspiring structures of the earliest civilizations (the Pyramids and Temples of Egypt, the Acropolis in Greece, the Forum in Rome) but also provided most of the labor which sustained mankind until a few hundred years ago. What this proves is only that the pragmatist's test of what is true and what is valid, by itself, is not nearly as reliable as its proponents believe.

Back of both of these mistaken solutions of this great basic problem is the failure of so-called social scientists and social reformers to make an adequate study of the nature of possessions. Instead of using the scientific method in determining what posses-

sions in reality are, both have taken them for granted and jumped to mistaken conclusions about them, the classical economists maintaining that everything should be treated as private property, and the Marxian economists that nothing should be. Possessions, however, fall into two ultimate categories, one of which has been properly called property, the other of which has not even been named but treated as if it too were property. This second basic category I have for years called trusterty. As long as this distinction is ignored by custom, by law, by education, and by social scientists and social reformers, the present confusion will continue, and the present threat of revolution and war continue to harrow us. When finally the truth about the distinction is recognized, right solutions of the problem too will be recognized.

* * * *

All discussion of the problem as it is at present conducted is rendered absurd by the simple failure to recognize that the problem is not a Monistic but a Pluralistic one; that there is not just one kind of possession, (which economists call wealth) but at least eight kinds, five of which are property and three trusterty. The law nowhere today recognizes this distinction, and economics adds confusion to the existing mischief by its failure to classify possessions of all kinds systematically and scientifically—by its failure to treat scientifically the very thing about which the quarrel between Communists and Capitalists rages.

Property—The five categories of possessions which are clearly property include:

1. *Consumption Goods* (food, clothing, shelter);

2. *Capital Equipment* (factories and machinery, barns and livestock, raw materials, merchandise);

3. *Claims* (coins, paper money, notes, mortgages, bonds, accounts receivable);

4. *Creative Assets,* the intangible assets consisting of inventions, literary compositions, formulas, good-will (created by the satisfactory conduct of an enterprise or a professional practice), and other assets of the same essential nature;

5. *Inherent Assets,* characteristics of human beings which are inherent—strength, skill, diligence, integrity, craftsmanship, artistic and professional ability.

Because all five of these categories of things are basically created or produced by individual human labor, individual human initiative and individual human thrift, they are all things to which it is possible to establish a morally valid title; they are the only things which can be morally treated as property. But this is not true of many things which either come into existence as a by-product of the activities of societies as a whole or are not created by man at all, things which are in effect the gifts of nature to all mankind.

* * * *

Trusterty—The three category of possessions which cannot be morally treated as property and which I think of as trusterty include:

6. *Human beings* (children, wives, husbands, serfs, slaves);

7. *Natural Resources* (land, the atmosphere, rivers, lakes, seas, natural forests, the mineral resources of the Earth);

8. *Legal Grants* (some legitimate in nature, others illegitimate); they include all grants of land and other natural resources (patents and deeds to land, to mines, to forests, to the atmosphere, to the seas); the right to eminent domain (franchises to railroads, power companies, telephone companies and other public utilities); benefices, honors, sinecures, licenses, monopolies, tariffs, quotas, import and export permits, permits for foreign exchange and other special privileges.

Because none of these three kinds of possessions come into existence as a result of human labor, they cannot be morally owned; they can only be granted in trust and held in trust—if they can be honestly granted at all. They remain what they actually are, trusterty, even though treated today as property by law and considered property by people generally. Many of these grants are morally indefensible; the State should neither have made them nor legalized ownership of them; they are acts of malfeasance morally no matter how legal in terms of positive law. In terms of the moral law they are stolen property; the State stole them first (read the history of how the United States acquired title to the land it has been granting by patent to the people of the United States since it originally obtained title to them by "the law of conquest"). No matter how honest subsequent transfers of the

titles to land from those to whom they were first granted, they remain stolen property. The Indians, even when they signed treaties granting title to "their" land at the point of the white men's guns, insisted they had no right to "sell" the land. "Land," they said, "cannot be sold; it is the gift of the Great Spirit given to them and to their children to use, not to sell."

Few things in the sad history of States have been responsible for more shameless inhumanity by man to man than the history of some of these possessions acquired by "discovery" and "conquest."

If the great vision of a free society (Paine's, Jefferson's, Acton's, Gandhi's) finally disappears, as it is fading from the consciousness of mankind from day to day, one of the reasons for it will be the gross mis-education of mankind about the possessional problem.

The problem is really three-fold; it has to do with *title,* the ownership of property, real or personal, and the right to its enjoyment to the exclusion of others; *tenure,* the terms on which property or trusterty can be held; and *transfer* by the owner from himself to another, including the right of donation and bequest. But the clarification of the problem of title, reduces the problems of tenure and transfer largely to questions of technique.

* * * *

Man has had to do something about the possessional problem from the moment the first man found something (nuts, fruit), killed something (animals, fish), captured something (cattle, horses, prisoners), or made something (axes, baskets, pottery, clothing) which other men wanted. If all the solutions of the problem are classified systematically and scientifically in accordance with our only three sources of ultimate knowledge, three basically different types emerge; the Supernal solutions I think of as Covenantal ideologies (covenants between God and man); the Objective solutions as Power ideologies (doctrines of might), and the Intellectual solutions as Probital ideologies (doctrines of right).

PROBLEM XII.

Enterprise and Adequacy: The Organizational Problem

> What is organization but the connection of the parts in and for a whole, so that each part is, at once, end and means.
> —Samuel Taylor Coleridge.

Three indisputable facts about living make the organizational problem a universal problem:

1. It is impossible now, and has always been impossible, to adequately and effectively satisfy man's needs and desires (both those of a material and those of a spiritual nature) without organizing enterprises to provide them.

2. Man has certain basic inborn needs, and failure to provide adequately and effectively for them is not only destructive of his happiness but, when the deprivation is great enough, destructive of his very will-to-live.

3. Man alone in the animal kingdom transforms these basic needs into highly complex aspirations, and failure to provide for his aspirations and desires as effectively and adequately as for his needs are similarly destructive of his happiness and ultimately of his will-to-live.

* * * *

Because the full significance of this problem has not been recognized, because it is now and has always been a basic problem of man and of society, and because no science of organization has been developed (as sciences have been developed to deal with much less important problems such as shooting men out into space), the definition of the principal factors involved in organization is essential. Without adequate definition of (1) purpose, (2) enterprise, (3) constitution, (4) operation, (5) transaction, and (6) control, the justification for attaching such importance to the conception does not become clear.

Purpose—Man has four basic inborn drives and an unlimited number of acquired aspirations into which he pours them. It is impossible for him to embark upon any project or any enterprise without finding that its purpose reflects one or more of these basic drives. No matter what the ostensible and the particular purpose for which he organizes his enterprises, they all fall into one or the other of these categories: *survival purposes*—homes and homesteads[1], farms and factories, buildings and highways, communities and States[5], police and military establishments,—the United Nations survival enterprise[6]; *genetic purposes*—homes, families, marriages, obstetric services and maternity hospitals, pediatric and psychoanalytic services, (in a real sense sexual undertakings of all kinds are genetic purposes); *cultural purposes*—schools and churches, libraries and theatres, artistic and scientific undertakings of all kinds; finally, if he is frustrated in satisfying the deep needs these enterprises are supposed to supply, he finds himself patronizing enterprises devoted to *necrotic purposes*—bars and narcotic dens, indulging in crimes and riots, wars and revolutions, and, when life is sufficiently frustrated, resorting to suicide and patronizing cemetries and crematories.

Man cannot organize any enterprise, and cannot even conduct the enterprise represented by his life, without a purpose, a purpose either implied by the way he lives and the sort of enterprises he patronizes, or expressed in the charters of associations and corporations he organizes to realize them.

PROBLEM XIII.

Efficiency and Waste: The Production Problem

Bad work follers ye ez long's ye live.—
James Russell Lowell

Five facts create what I think of as the production problem:[1]

1. The fact that mankind cannot satisfy its needs and desires without producing the goods and providing the services which fulfill them. Not even the lowest of all unicellular forms of life can avoid this problem; they have to find what they eat. Primitive man had to hunt and fish and herd and gather fruits and nuts and roots and grubs; modern man with his multiplicity of wants has the same old problem multiplied a thousandfold.

2. The fact that man discovered long ago that it was possible to produce many things and provide himself with many services more easily and more efficiently if two or more men cooperated in their production. Adam Smith called this the division of labor, but primitive man discovered it long before Adam Smith was fascinated by the factory system.

3. The fact that because this proved to be true in the factories which began to appear in the 18th century, all of Smith's followers have assumed that because it was true of the production of some things (pins, for instance), it was also true of the production of everything.

4. The fact that virtually everybody today assumes that since large-scale production always seems more efficient than small-scale, production on the largest possible scale would be the most efficient way of producing everything.[2]

5. The fact that they assume, since centralized production also seems more efficient than decentralized local production, that if all the production in a nation (and ideally in the whole world) were centralized in one planned and controlled enterprise (a world-State owning all the means of production and distribution), goods could be produced and services provided most efficiently and at the lowest possible cost.[3]

There are three aspects of the production problem calling for consideration: (1) the ultimate problem, that of selecting and adopting methods of production which are in fact the most efficient; (2) an ancillary but enormously important problem, that of proper cost accounting, and (3) a direct problem, the question of which scale of production (local or centralized) is most efficient.

1. *The ultimate problem* is that of the selection and adoption of proper methods of production; this is so obvious that elaborate discussion of it is unnecessary. Rational and humane human beings will all agree that the method of production which should be adopted is the method which will provide the best in quality, provide all the goods and services wanted, provide them without waste of labor or of materials, and provide the most wholesome working conditions for those producing them.[4]

Something, however, must be said about the quality of goods and conditions of labor, because these are subjects which economists and apologists for things as they are have swept under the rug. I discussed them at length in *This Ugly Civilization* and *Flight from the City*. Here it is necessary to make two flat and positive statements about both, since the wealth of evidence available to establish the truth of them cannot be included in this condensed study. The first is this: It is not true that industrially produced goods are always or necessarily better than custom-made or home-made goods. Some unquestionably are—I would hate to use home-made electric wire; I hate to think of the fire hazards that would involve. But most (this is the fighting word) of the goods and most of the services we consume can be better provided home-made or custom-made than factory-made. When any factory will make as good and as wholesome pies as my wife bakes, I will retract these words.

There is an addendum to this. As we shift from home-production and custom-production (they both mean local production and face-to-face relationships between producer and consumer), we shift from a situation in which the consumer determines not only the quality to be produced but also what is to be produced, to a situation in which the factory (with its advertising and salesmanship) creates the demand for the goods it wishes to make. In shifting the initiative from the consumer to the manufacturer, it is the factory which determines the quality which is most profitable to

it (with many foods, for instance, the quality is deliberately damaged, because preserving food for indefinite periods of time makes it necessary to use chemicals); but the factory also decides what things are to be produced, things which already include many which should not be produced at all no matter how profitable to the factory nor how numerous the jobs created (cigarettes and poisonous pesticides, for instance, as well as atomic bombs and moon-shots).

The second flat statement is this: the conditions of labor in the industrial world (and the urban world which industrialization creates) are inferior to the conditions of labor which would prevail if production were made truly efficient. In terms of production this means a world in which everything which should be home-made is home-made (including both goods and services); everything which should be custom-made on a small-scale in a local shop, is made that way; everything which should be produced or raised on family-farms is produced that way (including dairy products, poultry, live-stock, fruits and vegetables, hay and grain), and only those things which should be factory-made (iron and steel, electric wire and electric light bulbs) are in fact factory-made.

2. *Cost Accounting*—Though only ancillary to production, an understanding of the part which cost accounting should play in determining the relative merits of the conflicting claims about the efficacy of large and small-scale production is essential. All the costs, and not merely those recorded directly in the books-of-account of enterprises, must be taken into consideration. There are two kinds of these costs both of which must be taken into account: immediate costs, and social costs. There is still another kind, the distribution costs, but this we will consider later.

Cost accounting deals not with the operations of a specific industry or of the economy as a whole but only with the operations of specific enterprises. It divides the aggregate cost of materials, of labor, and of overhead—enterprise by enterprise—by the number of units of the goods or services each produces (in technical terms, by the number of units of time, or place, or basic or form utilities an enterprise produces).

Social cost accounting, on the other hand, is a concept of cost accounting which includes, in addition to the direct or immediate costs of the units of an enterprise's products or services, the costs their production creates and shifts from the enterprise to others outside the enterprise. This cost is never recorded on the books of enterprises, Communist or Capitalist. The reason privately owned Capitalistic enterprises do not take them into account is obvious. Not so obvious is the reason why Communist enterprises do not—they do not because the Communist enterprises would have to include among their social costs the cost of maintaining their "iron" curtain, their "bamboo" curtain, and in East Germany their infamous "Berlin Wall" to prevent the escape from their enterprises of technicians and workers into the freer world.

The whole debate between Decentralists and Distributists on the one hand, and Megalorean[5] Capitalists, Socialists, and Communists on the other, hinges on the distinction between direct and social costs. Moreover, the bloody and terrifying war which the Communist World has been waging on the non-Communist World has its roots in the fact that Karl Marx was no cost accountant; economists of all kinds, including professional and academic economists, are notoriously poor at book-keeping; perhaps they have their minds on more important things. For that matter, neither Scientific nor Utopian Socialists, both of whom are determined to socialize everything either cooperatively (voluntarily) or compulsorily (by revolution), know anything real about the importance of cost accounting. About direct costs they know almost nothing; about the social costs their knowledge is at worst sentimental and at best humanitarian; in either case they do not know enough for them to speak with scientific authority.

Capitalist cost accounting is better than Socialist or Communist cost accounting (for one reason, it pays Capitalists to keep accurate cost records; there is no real incentive to keep such records in enterprises where no individual can profit from them). But it is not inclusive enough; it leaves out too much; it was what the early Capitalists excluded from their costs that enabled them to rationalize the horrors of the Industrial Revolution. It is their ignorance of what is involved in the right kind of cost accounting which prevents Capitalistic economists today from seeing what is economically wrong with modern industrialism.

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Avaricious Distribution Doctrines

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PROBLEM XIV

Acquirers, Claimants, and Apportioners: The Distribution Problem

> Now after a long time the Lord of those servants returneth, and maketh a reckoning with them.....
>
> And he.....that hath received one talent came....and said "Lord.....lo, thou has thine own talent back."
>
> But his Lord answered him and said unto him, "Thou slothful servant, thou knowest that I reap where I sowed not, and gather where I did not scatter. Thou oughtest therefore to have put my money to the bankers, and at my coming back I should have received back mine own with interest.
>
> "Take away therefore the talent from him.....
>
> "For unto every one that hath shall be given, and he shall have abundance; but from him that hath not, even that which he hath shall be taken away."—Matthew 25:19.

Economics is still a pseudo science, or perhaps I should say a bastardized science. It was born a bastardized science when Francis Quesnay in France and Adam Smith in England laid the foundations for the science which was first called political economy; then it was a mixture, apparently dealing with two problems, economics and politics. But today, what we call economics is a much worse mixture than that: it actually shuffles together at least six basic problems in such a way that the significance of each is completely lost. The problems, so unfortunately mixed into a hodgepodge, are the problems of values, of possessions, of organization, of production, of distribution, and of politics. Finally some of the most influential of all economists (Adam Smith a little and Karl Marx a great deal) mixed in the institutional problem so as to make the muddle even worse.

(I say all this about this so-called science in spite of the fact—or maybe because of the fact—that I practiced in New York City as a consulting economist for some of the largest corporations in the country for a long part of my life).

What we shall now consider is one problem in the economic souffle, the distribution problem, probably the most "economic" of the basic problems with which economics as we know it today deals.

* * * *

The distribution problem is created by two facts:

1. The fact that every enterprise, no matter how small (a single laborer earning his own living) or how large (the whole economy of a nation), acquires an income, and

2. The fact that the distribution of this income among those who claim a share in it has been from time immemorial a matter of dispute between the apportioners of it and the claimants for it.

* * * *

It is necessary first of all to distinguish between income, the acquisition of income, and the distribution of it.

Income—The concept of income must not be over-simplified; it does not consist only of money. Ultimately real income consists of four things: (1) the use of the natural resources of the Earth—the land and sea and everything on and in the land and in the sea which has been entrusted to man and to his descendants for use (entrusted and not given, as we mistakenly assume); (2) the consumption of goods—both goods like food and clothing which he consumes rapidly and goods like furniture and houses which he consumes slowly; (3) the utilization of services—the services rendered by doctors and lawyers, by engineers and laborers, by singers and ministers, by plumbers and cooks; and finally (4) the enjoyment of experiences—experiences which I think of as the major and minor ecstasies of life—sunsets and seascapes, a garden in bloom, a ride on a horse, foliage in autumn, songs and dances, poetry and books. For the most part experiences lie outside of the area with which economics concerns itself, but it is an indubitable fact that they are income and that some enterprise provides them—a country home, for instance—as by-products if not as main-products (though in the case of the right kind of country-home it is an injustice to call it a by-product).

What is important is to recognize the distinction between monetary and non-monetary income. An enormous part of all income even in our monetized world today is still non-monetary. In one of my books I tried to estimate its magnitude, and it looks to me, taking the world as a whole, as if it might be well over half of everything mankind produces.

Every meal produced in a home, in fact every bit of food and clothing produced and every service rendered in the home, from that of washing clothes to that of rearing babies, is non-monetary income. When to this is added what remains of barter in the most primitive regions of the world. the aggregate amount becomes enormous. Yet it is almost wholly disregarded by economists, just as are those experiences which for every truly cultivated person are often the most highly treasured of all forms of "income."

But the distribution of non-monetary income almost takes care of itself. Within the family, each contributes what the family expects him to contribute, and each receives (is apportioned) what the family thinks he needs.

Like the apportionment of non-monetary income, the distribution of experiences also takes care of itself; no apportioner at all is needed, except in so far as they are dependent upon "self-apportioning." Most of them are free, of course; only when some entrepreneur can shut off access to some wonder of nature does economics enter into the picture. Perhaps because these kinds of experiences are for the most part free, most of mankind consider them far inferior to the meretricious delights to be purchased in the big bazaars of modern metropolises.

The distribution problem is a problem for economists only insofar as they differ about how and why the money-income of the whole economy of the nation[4] is allocated among the basic factors contributing to its production. The real problem—how it *should be* allocated and not just how and why—they leave to social reformers as outside the scope of science. As the problem will be here discussed, it will deal with the actual problem with which actual human beings find themselves wrestling—the problem of how the money-income of actual enterprises of all kinds, including the whole economy of which they are a part, should be allocated among the actual claimants for it.

PROBLEM XV

Violence, Counterviolence, and Nonviolence: The Political Problem

> Medicine, to produce health, has to examine disease, and music, to create harmony, must investigate discord.—Plutarch.

We are about to enter the Augean stables; we shall have to prepare ourselves for something like the dirtiest of the labors of Hercules, for we are now to explore the problem created for mankind by politics and politicians.[1]

* * * *

It is possible to say that one fact, human violence, creates the political problem. But this oversimplifies the matter. Four facts at least must be taken into account if the actual nature of the problem is to be understood:

1. The first fact is violence;[2] the fact that man's treatment of man, individual by individual, individual by group, and group by group, is so often violent.

2. The second fact is that from the time the first State[3] was established, man began to substitute organized counterviolence —the use of military, police, or civil power[4]—for impulsive and improvised retaliatory violence.[5]

3. The third fact is that counterviolence[6] at its very best produces outer and never inner order. It can regiment; it cannot harmonize human behavior.

4. The final fact which creates the problem seems to me to be the fact that the State (the enterprise mankind has come to accept as the only one authorized to counter illegal violence with legalized counterviolence) cannot avoid abusing its authority, because that authority always has to be exercised by human beings, and human beings cannot avoid abusing it because of the corrupting nature of power itself. According to two schools of political thought which we are ignoring at our peril (the *Libertarians*:

Jefferson, Thoreau, Acton, Bastiat; the *Anarchists*: Tucker, Kropotkin, Proudhon); we cannot afford to take the State for granted; we cannot afford to assume that because *it is* (just because it exists everywhere), it must be considered a good.

So the problem remains for us as it has remained with each generation of mankind from the beginning, "If not counterviolence, what?"

* * * *

The wars for which warriors and dynasts, theologians and ideologs, special interests and nationalists have been responsible prove only this, that no solution of the political problem tried so far has been adequate. That there should be differences and therefore contests—serious contests and deep differences—between individuals and between nations is to be, and should always be, expected. But that resort to war is necessary to resolve them would be to assume that man is an animal which cannot humanize itself.

Counter-war, however, should not be confused with wars of belligerence and aggression. There is a real difference between defense and offense, between the maintenance of order and the resort to violence. Police action—even if it involves the use of counterviolence—is one thing, criminal violence is another.

The wars which dot the pages of history, and the wars which we continue to wage today, have either been struggles between two sets of criminals or madmen, or between madmen and criminals on one side and men on the other who are trying to defend themselves and trying to stop criminality and madness. Political science ought to be the study of how to deal with this kind of criminality and madness.

* * * *

If the actual nature of the problem is to be understood, at least seven aspects of it must be discussed.

1. *The Problem of Formulation*—The first of the seven has to do with the formulation of the problem itself, with the frame of reference in which it has to be discussed. This calls for the definition of the four basic concepts—violence, authority, liberty, and harmony—without which the problem cannot be properly formulated at all.

Violence—Violence is not a simple but a very complex concept. Though all violence involves individual or gregational use of physical force (or the capacity and the willingness to use physical force) to injure or kill persons or to damage or destroy property, there are eight enormously important kinds of violence based upon four distinctions which must not be confused: the distinction between *illegitimate violence* (rape, mayhem; rioting, belligerence) and *legitimate violence* (self-defense, national defense); the distinction between *individual violence* (murder, burglary) and *gregational violence* (war, revolution); the distinction between *overt violence* (arson, war) and *constructive violence* (extortion, exploitation, taxation, confiscation); and finally the distinction between *legal counterviolence* (policing, imprisonment, execution), *justifiable (disciplinary) violence* (self-defense, defending others). *Nonviolence* is in theory a substitute not only for revolutionary violence, but also for what I have called legal and justifiable violence.

By nonviolence I mean (as Gandhi meant) the resort to measures which involve no violence of any kind in dealing with problems ordinarily dealt with by resorting to violence or counterviolence—that is, by resorting either to war, to violent revolution, or to police or military counterviolence. Nonviolence in this sense does not refer to mere non-action but to action; to actions resorted to to solve problems created by war and the threat of war, by exploitation (as for instance in both chattel slavery and wage slavery), and by oppression by governments or by government officials. As the concept has come to be used since it was vivified by Gandhi, it refers not only to measures which are legal (marches and demonstrations) but also to measures which are illegal (refusal to obey laws prescribing segregation, tax evasion to avoid supporting war, gold smuggling—in fact smuggling of all kinds—to evade protective tariffs, and other forms of both commercial and conscientious civil disobedience).

The issue which resort to nonviolence creates is both moral and political. Morally it raises the question of whether each particular kind of illegal nonviolence is a breach of the moral law (some kinds may be, some undoubtedly are not); in fact, whether the prevailing doctrine that it is not only criminal but also immoral to break any kind of statutory law, is true or false. If Thoreau was right, and I believe the evidence indicates that he was, the true

doctrine is that it is obligatory to breach any statute which prescribes what is a violation of moral law. The issue politically considered raises the question of whether it is efficient enough—whether it may actually be impractical—as compared with the efficiency of resorting to violence (as in revolution) and of resorting to counterviolence (as in police and military action in dealing with war, with revolution, and with crime).

All legalized official violence, without regard to whether it is morally legitimate (as in suppressing a riot) or morally illegitimate (as in suppressing the teaching of evolution), is by law justified; any kind of violence can be made legal by statute. A staggering amount of all legal violence has been, and is, immoral and illegitimate. Slavery is an example of the legalization of immorality in the past; the suppression of sterilization, abortion, and birth control are modern examples of the same thing.

Authority—Authority is a much simpler concept than violence. The essence of political authority in dealing with individuals, in the absence of submission, is the willingness and ability to use physical force for coercion and compulsion; in dealing with other nations, to use it for the defense of the nation or for the conquest of other nations. Authority and power are like Siamese twins. The State has authority if it has power and is willing to use it. If it is unwilling to use it, and this becomes known, it not only loses authority, it ceases to be a State. So long as violence is used by the State to police and to protect individual freedoms or to defend the nation when attacked, its exercise is legitimate; the moment it is used to curtail the liberties of individuals or to subjugate other nations, it becomes illegitimate and immoral, despotic and tyrannic, and its dictates morally null and void.

Liberty—Liberty is a much more complex concept than is generally realized. There are three readily distinguishable kinds, civil liberty (which we are presently considering), economic liberty (see the Distribution Problem), and social liberty (see the Organizational Problem). In spite of the differences between them, the characteristic essential to them all is the right of every man and every group, small or large, to do anything which every other man and all other groups can do without creating violent discord between them.

PROBLEM XVI

Conservation and Reformation: The Institutional Problem

> Either some Caesar or Napoleon will seize the reins of government with a strong hand; or your republic will be fearfully plundered and laid waste by Barbarians in the Twentieth Century as the Roman Empire was in the fifth—with this difference, that the Huns and Vandals who ravaged the Roman Empire came from without, and that your Huns and Vandals will have engendered within your country by your own institutions.—Thomas B. Macaulay in a letter to H. D. Randall, May 23, 1857.

The facts which create what I think of as mankind's institutional problem include:

1. The fact that for mankind social institutions are biologically and psychologically necessary. Man's sheer survival is dependent upon them. But even more, without them the maintenance of sanity is impossible. Man cannot live alone. He began a gregarious animal and he remains one. His development of Individualism has proved not a substitute for his gregariousness, but an addition to it.

2. The fact that from the very beginning some of his social institutions have ministered to his well-being, mental and physical while others have been positively injurious to him.

3. The fact that he is confronted with conflicting prescriptions about what should be done about existing institutions, not only about those he considers good, but also those he considers evil. Most of these prescriptions (if we include those felt but not expressed) call for the maintenance of existing institutions just as they are (conservation); some call for the return to institutions which have been changed or abandoned (reaction); some for the establishment of entirely new ones (revolution); some

merely for the correction of what are claimed to be defects in existing institutions (reformation).

The most radical conservative prescriptions call for the maintenance of all of them unchanged; the most radical reactionary prescriptions call for the abolition of all new institutions and the re-establishment of those which have been abandoned; the most radical revolutionary prescriptions for the destruction of all existing institutions and the substitution of entirely new ones. Reform, on the other hand, is essentially Pluralistic; it can logically be for the reformation of some institutions, the conservation of others, and the return to some which have been abandoned; it can even be for some sort of reform or improvement in all of them. But it assumes that unless some of them, and perhaps most of them, were in their essentials valid, man, in spite of his long history, would have made no progress at all and might not have even survived.

4. Finally there is the fact that the question of *whether* to change and *whether* to maintain an institution tends to be confused with the question of *how* they should be reformed or conserved. Whether an institution should be changed or maintained calls for consideration not in terms of what I think of as the institutional problem, but in terms of the particular basic problem with which each institution deals. It is the question not of whether but of *how* to change existing institutions, *how* to create and substitute entirely new institutions, *how* to maintain existing institutions in the face of proposals for their change or abolition, and *how* to restore institutions which have been abandoned, which created the basic problem which I am here trying to outline.

The institutional problem, it is true, is a problem purely of means and methods, of techniques and practices. But since the means which can be used, and which are used, range between the most peaceful and nonviolent, to the most horrible and violent conceivable, it is impossible to exaggerate its importance.

* * * *

PROBLEM XVII

Instruction and Cultivation: The Educational Problem

> I am done with great things and big things, great institutions and big success, and I am for those tiny invisible molecular moral forces that work from individual to individual, creeping through the crannies of the world like so many rootlets, or like the capillary oozing of water, yet which, if you give them time, will rend the hardest monuments of man's pride.—William James.

The first and last of the basic problems of man and of society is undoubtedly the educational problem. As Henry Adams said, "Education is from the cradle to the grave." I have often said that there is no one of these basic problems of which it could be said, "This is the first problem; this problem is the most important." But when pushed to the wall by someone who insists upon getting an answer to the question, I have said, "Begin with the educational problem; it is difficult to understand any basic problem in its fullness without knowing something about all of them; all the problems are equally important, but begin with the educational problem because it is the 'most equal'."[1]

* * * *

Four facts—four indubitable and indisputable propositions, in my opinion—create the problem, and explain why man must do and always has done something about it:

1. The first is that he is not only born, like all animals, with what the biologists call biological irritability, but that immediately after birth he begins to acquire what I call psychological irritability. When confronted with his sensations[2], his nerves, sense organs, brains and muscles react to them; this is what the biologists call biological irritability. But when he perceives, inceives, or conceives[2] anything, it is his mind rather than his brain which reacts to it; his muscles are frequently not involved at all.

2. The second fact is that man, unlike all other animals, is not born with a set of instinctual drives strong enough to tell him how to deal with either his sensations or his perceptions, inceptions, and conceptions. He is born with instincts, it is true, but these are in his case so plastic that he cannot rely upon them to tell him what to believe, what to value, and how to put into practice what he values and what he believes; he cannot rely upon them to furnish him with directives with which to control rationally and humanely the impulses which spring up in him constantly from his unconscious mind; *he has to learn,* willy-nilly; he cannot escape from the necessity of acquiring some sort of "education" (without regard to how much mis-education it includes); otherwise he cannot avoid reverting to animal behavior, dealing with his problems irrationally and inhumanely as animals do, and acting on his animal impulses alone.

3. The third is that he has to acquire (he has to learn; he is not born with) the traits—the beliefs, the values and the practices—of the culture into which he is born. Unfortunately some of the beliefs of every culture are mistaken, some of the values invalid, some of the practices harmful; too often they dehumanize rather than humanize him; too often they prevent rather than help him to realize the highest potentialities of *Homo sapiens.* Enculturation up to a point is necessary if he is to be adjusted to life in his own culture—instruction[3] of the kind he receives today not only in school but from his experiences in his home and outside of it in his community. But while this is necessary up to a point, a system of education which does no more than this is a system not of right-education but of mere indoctrination.

4. Finally there is the fact that only by a process of cultivation[4] can he learn how to deal with the problem of enculturation and adjustment as he should; only cultivation can teach him to see his own culture not only from within but also from without, impartially and objectively, as if it were a valley which he was examining from a mountain top.

* * * *

The most important ancillary problems which must be taken into account in dealing with the problem as a whole fall into six

groups: (1) conception and definition (the semantic difficulties in education are bad enough, but the proper conception of education as an activity is a complex problem of its own); (2) the various kinds of education needed to equip men and women to live in a highly developed society; (3) the organization of the curriculum; (4) the methods of teaching; (5) the education system as a whole; and finally (6) the problem of the conflicting solutions of the problem among which a choice must be made. It becomes perfectly plain, when the problem as a whole is considered, that the naive notion that the problem can be disposed of by sending our own children to the right kind of schools is just that, naive in the extreme.

* * * *

1. *Conception and Definition*—Since the purpose of this book is to outline rather than to discuss fully all the basic problems with which mankind is confronted, only the most essential aspects of the educational problem can be discussed, and even more unfortunately, for the most part only defined.

The Educatee—Since the educational problem has to deal not only with students but with everybody, the word student becomes almost a misnomer; it is the educatee[3] whose nature must be understood, and since the educatee is every man, the problem of the educatee's nature is really the problem of human nature. Without knowing the nature of the educatee, how can the educator possibly prescribe what is really right-education for him? If this aspect of the problem is ignored, what the educatee will get is what I believe he is getting everywhere where the lessons to be learned from Grundtvig, Montessori, Freud, Pavlov, and Patanjali[4] are not properly taken into account.

If the educator adequately understands infant and child nature, adolescent and adult nature, and the difference between male and female nature at each age in the life-cycle, what is right and what is wrong in existing education (in the school and outside of it) becomes clear, and means to substitute right-education for it become apparent. The problem of the educatee has been outlined in Problem I in discussing the nature of man; it does not need to be repeated here. But one thing which emerged from that study must again be mentioned: the importance of values,

If axiological education is left out of the curriculum (as it is today), what is given as education will in fact be miseducation.

The Educator[5]—In most discussions of education, it is taken for granted that the educator is a professional teacher. This is true enough if education is equated with schooling, but what the study of education as a basic problem makes clear is that there is no warrant for doing this. There are as a matter of fact two kinds of educators; the professional teacher; and a host of non-professional teachers, in the lower echelons of which unfortunately we find the modern parent (who has virtually resigned this role as far as is possible to the professionals in the schools), and in the higher echelons of which are the politcians and publicists, the salesmen and advertising men. These are the real educators of modern man, and until the educators in the school face the problem of what to do about preparing the parents for the role which they should play in education and what to do to prevent politicians and publicists, salesmen and advertising men from playing the role in mis-education which they are now playing, no matter what is done in the schools, the mis-education of the educatee will continue.

2. *Education*[6]—This is not only schooling; schooling is only one part of education. It is the whole process by which the educatee acquires his beliefs, his values, and his practices.

Mis-Education—This is what the educatee gets when he receives instruction but not cultivation; when he is adjusted to his own society only; when he is intellectually or technically educated, but not rightly educated emotionally; when he is made into a specialized and not a whole man.

Right-Education—This is education planned "from the cradle to the grave," and planned not merely to make the educatee a competent but a humanized man.

Humanization—In *Education and Living* I discussed at length the concept I there called normalization. Man, I maintained, cannot be expected to behave normally, he must be normalized educationally. Since he cannot rely (as can other animals) upon his instincts to behave as members of the species normally shouuld, he often tends to behave worse than he should, or, as in the case of geniuses like Marx and Wagner, his behavior in one area of

living is far above average and in others far below it. *Supernormal* behavior in one area usually means subnormal behavior in others: *subnormal* behavior in one area does not mean supernormal behavior in others—it may mean subnormal behavior in all areas; *normal* behavior in one area does not necessarily mean normal behavior in all of them.

The masses, on the other hand, behave not normally, as humane and rational human beings should, but as members of a herd, conforming to herd values and responding as most herds of human beings do to whatever leadership happens to grip them emotionally from time to time. They can be fired to actions of great nobility and supreme self-sacrifice, as when masses of Americans responded to the leadership of Lincoln, and masses of Indians to the leadership of Gandhi. But too often in the tragic history of mankind, they have been fired to behave worse than the most feral of animals, to behave as masses of religious fanatics behaved under the infectious leadership of Omar and the Mahdi, of St. Louis and Richard the Lion Hearted, and as masses of fanatic Communists and Fascists behaved under the leadership of Stalin and Mao, of Hitler and Mussolini.

Normalization and humanization cannot be taken for granted. If it is to become, as I believe it should, central in curricular planning both in intramural and in family and social education; if right-education is in fact impossible without it, then it must be precisely defined. It must not be confused with average, as it usually is. Because animal behavior, other than man's, is instinctually determined, the average animal—no matter what the species to which it belongs—behaves normally. Average, on the other hand, in the case of man merely means in accord with the customs or fashions of the group or culture to which the individual happens to belong. Normal behavior is something entirely different.

The concept calls for definition scientifically. The behavior of man is subject to scientific study just as is the behavior of tigers. If tigers are deprived of their normal diet and instead compelled to eat the herbivorous diet of cattle, they sicken—they react and behave—abnormally. If man is mis-educated, as he is today, his tendency to behave abnormally should be no matter for surprise. If he is conditioned, as education today conditions

most men, to live in megalopolitan rabbit warrens and to endure the stresses and strains of industrialized work, industrialized food, and industrialized play, he too sickens mentally even more than physically, and reacts and "behaves" abnormally. Alienation is one name for the abnormality this inflicts upon him.

Normal behavior for man, as for every animal, requires the use of all his faculties of mind and body (not just some of them as in most specialized vocations) in activities and in occupations which use them harmoniously to their fullest potentialities. In the case of man, unlike that of other animals, this calls for no uniformity of behavior but for a range of behavior within the area of the normal. Within this normal range the diversity is so great that normality should not be equated with mediocrity.

And since all of man's distinctively human behavioral traits are acquired and not inherited, the task of equipping him with and instilling in him normal behavior falls into the jurisdiction of education.

Re-Education[7]—Since every educatee has already received an education of some kind, right-education presents special problems; it calls not only for right-education but for re-education. something which it is enormously difficult to do with the emotions, as every psychoanalyst knows. If the distinction between mis-education and right-education is not only realized but felt, the fact remains that, since everbody gets some sort of mis-education from birth to death, the only hope is education of the right kind "from the cradle to the grave."

3. *The Curriculum*—The problem of the curriculum is not the problem with which the school system is struggling from school to college; it is not that of providing as effectively as possible the sort of instruction which will enable the educatee to earn a living in the culture into which he is born; *it is that of organizing a curriculum which will produce properly cultivated whole men and whole women.* As it is, we are producing plenty of intelligent men, plenty of specialized competent men, plenty of successful men; but because of our failure to include in the curriculum the education in values which I have tried to show is so important, we are also producing plenty of cynical men, plenty of venal men, plenty of ruthless men, plenty of neurotic men, and plenty of

prejudiced and fanatical men. We need not more but fewer cynics. A well-educated cynic is the worst of all cynics; the better his education, the more harm he can do. Madison Avenue is populated with cynics of that kind; so are the editorial offices (and for that matter the rest of the staffs) of our modern newspapers; so are our impressive TV establishments in their palatial offices and studios; and now that our schools of political science are turning into vocational schools for politicians and bureaucrats, so are the public officials who are running both our States and our Republic.

What we are doing is producing altogether too few genuinely moral and genuinely wise human beings.

Some of my experiences in India make me feel that more wisdom[7] is to be found among the illiterate peasants in the villages of the underdeveloped nations of the world than is to be found among the graduates of the schools and universities of which we in the West are so proud.

My own particular obsession so far as curriculum is concerned is my conviction that it should be problem-centered and not subject-centered; all the subjects included should be organized in terms of the light they throw on the basic problems with which mankind has to deal in the form in which the problems present themselves today. Subject-centered education produces specialists; problem-centered education should produce whole men and women. If whole men and not mere specialists are to be produced, men and women must be equipped with at least some inkling of the various valid and invalid ways in which it is possible to deal with both the personal and the public problems with which life confronts them.

If the curriculum is to make possible the education of the whole man, it must deal not only with the problem of educating his conscious mind (providing instruction in the three "r's" and related subjects, and training him vocationally and professionally), but also with the problem of educating his unconscious mind; it must deal with both his intelligence and his emotions.

Summa Summarum :

The holiest temple is not a church but a school. The holiest man is not a priest but a teacher. The holiest book is not a bible but a dictionary. The holiest study is not science, not art, not philosophy, not religion, but the study of the truth about how to live, how to treat our fellow men, and how to use what has been entrusted to us like decent and honest, sensitive and concerned, cultivated and considerate human beings.

What the study of the truth teaches us—the study of the holiest of all holies—is that Man[1] is holy, the Earth is holy[2], the Sunshine is holy, the Rain is holy; that all Matter, all Energy, all Nature is holy; that the Procession of the Sun above us and the Seasons here on Earth is holy; that Evolution—beginning with the Evolution of the Rocks and ending with the Evolution of Man —is holy; that the painful History in the course of which Man has lifted himself from primitive bestiality and savagery to civilized life, and from the crude craft and artistry of Aurignacian **Man to the** artistry and science of Confucius and Aristotle, of **Gautama and Plato**, of Shakespeare and Newton, of Goethe and **Galileo**, of Darwin, Freud, and Einstein; from the painting of Altamiras to the painting of Mona Lisas, from the carving of Lingans to the carving of Pietas; from the music of the tom tom to the music of Eroicas; from the architecture of Stonehenges to the Architecture of Taj Mahals, is the holiest of all Historiography[3].

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What the study of the truth about how to live teaches us is that the Rights of Man are only earned by observing the Obligations of Man; that the four great duties which constitute the Obligations of Man are (1) the obligation of conservation and economy, (2) the obligation of creation and beauty, (3) the obligation of harmony and morality; (4) the obligation to realize Man's highest potentialities. Without unreserved commitment to behavior on the basis of these values, Man can be a human animal but cannot become human in fact.

Without the practice of conservation and economy; without the practice of art and craft, of poetry and beauty; without the practice of what Plato called "the science of good and evil" and Confucius the "moral law," Man seems to be but is not in fact a human being.

Finally, without making the supreme purpose for which we live our lives the enduring satisfactions which are existentially possible for mankind—and not the sensate gratifications of the moment nor the future salvation of our souls in some sort of paradisiac immortality—we shall fail to make ourselves into normal human beings.

* * * *

What the study of how to live, how to treat our fellow human beings, and how to use the resources of the Earth entrusted to us like decent and honest, sensitive and concerned, cultivated and considerate human beings finally teaches us is the ultimate importance of right-education. It bids us never to forget two things: that we come into the world innocent and ignorant but that we are, like every man, the heir of the ages.

By all those who have lived before us, we have been dowered with all that we have today of what is true, what is good, and what is beautiful. Only by rightly educating ourselves can we equip ourselves to honor those who have, in the long history of mankind, bequeathed to us all their art and science and all their painful labors and heroic sacrifices. What has been entrusted to us, we must multiply, and with it endow those who follow after us.

Upon what the thoughtful and concerned men and women of the world do to help those teachers and those institutions dedicated to right-education are dependent not only the young but also the mature for right-direction, right-guidance, right-discipline, right-instruction, and right-values.

And this is the beginning and end of right-education:

Wisdom, not novelty; courage, not cupidity; right-feeling, right-reasoning, right-speech, right-action, right-purposes.

Of all these products of right-education, neither courage alone nor wisdom alone are quintessential. For without courage, wisdom becomes a sharp tool in hands afraid to use it, and without wisdom, courage an equally sharp tool in hands which do not know the uses to which it should be put.

Wisdom cherishes nothing merely because it is old, and nothing merely because it is new.

Wisdom cherishes only that which makes for the development of the highest potentialities of Man.

And courage, if it cherishes wisdom, shinks neither from defeat nor from victory.

Only with courage and wisdom can mankind deal with ignorance, with folly, with greed, with violence.

Only with wisdom and courage can mankind be saved.

RALPH BORSODI

Exeter, N.H., July 2, 1966.

My wife and I renew membership in School of Living and look forward to bringing a class to your center for observation and discussion.--Dr Houston, Dept. Economics, Dickinson College, Carlisle, Pa.

Commentary on Summa Summarum

Without some explanation it will seem to many thoughtful people fantastically unrealistic to affirm that "Man is Holy, the Earth is Holy, History is Holy." But if what can be very properly meant when the words "Man," "the Earth," and "History" are used, their use in this affirmation will have been vindicated.

1. If by Man is meant *man as he is* (the overwhelming masses of mankind), the proposition that he is Holy becomes absurd. But it is not absurd if by Man is meant man as he is potentially capable of becoming, and as many men and women at their best have over and over again demonstrated that he can be. It is not Man as he is but the Schweitzers, the Einsteins, the Spinozas, and the Gautamas, the Cornelias, the Hypatias, and the Florence Nightingales that Shakespeare was thinking of when he wrote what would be called nonsense by the Cynic:

> What a piece of work is man! how noble in reason! how infinite in faculty! in form and moving how express and admirable! in action how like an angel! in apprehension how like a god!

Supernaturalists will consider the statement "Man is Holy' blasphemous; for fundamentalist Christians he is a contemptible worm, born in sin, capable of salvation only by the grace of God; not Man, but God and His Angels alone are Holy. Materialists on the other hand will hoot at the notion that Man is Holy, but they will have their eyes fixed on his potentiality—and his history—for viciousness. They will see only his obvious stupidities, vulgarities, and bestialities; they will see only the obvious fact that he is the most cunning of the primates and that he is fashioned out the same kind of materials as are all other animals. Entranced Supernaturalists, on the other hand, see only his Soul and pin their faith and hope in the fact that he is capable of achieving eternal felicity in Nirvana or Paradise.

The Philosophical Rationalist, defending the attempt to make men conscious of their potentialities for good and not only for

evil, is justified in retorting that to say that "Man is Holy" is to indulge in a poetic expression of an inspiring aspiration; they can say to the Supernaturalist that if there is a God he needs no inspiration from Man, but that Man does; and to the Materialist, that however true it is that the statement is merely allegorical and metaphorical, the central maxim of Materialistic Cynicism—"Eat, drink, and be merry, for tomorrow we die"—would make man no better and almost certainly make him a worse Egotist than he already is.

2. As to my eulogy of the Earth, I know of nothing better than a reading of Liberty Hyde Bailey's *The Holy Earth*. Bailey was no professional poet; he was the most realistic of all realistic agricultural scientists, yet for him, as for all nature lovers like him, the Earth is Holy.

3. To understand my eulogy of Historiography, one must turn one's face from the long and bitter record of man's beastliness as it appears on page after page of his history, and contemplate instead how often he has tried to build a rational, a beautiful, and a humane social order in spite of the fact that the Earth on which he is trying to do so is the graveyard of civilization after civilization.

* * * *

Finally, to understand my eulogy of truth-seeking, and my belief that it may be the highest of all values (a eulogy which will be easier for most of my readers to accept than some of the other eulogies), I can do no better than quote Gandhi:

> **I used to believe that God was Truth;**
> **I now know that Truth is God.**