

beyond the frontier? At any rate, the bitter experience of Europe in these matters is not unworthy of study by future Chinese frontier officials.

P. M. ROXBY.

12*. THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF SUN YAT SEN : an Exposition of the *San Min Chu I*. By Paul Myron Anthony Linebarger, Ph.D. 1937. (Baltimore : Johns Hopkins Press ; Oxford University Press. 8vo. xiv + 278 pp. 12s. 6d.)

It is hardly possible, as Dr. Linebarger points out at the beginning of his useful and interesting book, to have any real understanding of political events in China, in which so deep an interest is taken in Europe and America, without some knowledge of Chinese political thought. But owing chiefly to the immense difficulties that attend any serious study of the subject, this has remained up to now, so far as Western scholars are concerned, an almost unexplored region. Dr. Linebarger's present contribution is a study of the political thought of Sun Yat Sen, which, though it may comprise only one corner of the whole field, is yet of great importance, by reason of the immense influence of Dr. Sun Yat Sen on the minds of his fellow-countrymen and on the political and constitutional developments of the last few decades in China. Dr. Linebarger devotes an opening chapter to an exposition of the Confucian background from which Sun Yat Sen emerged; and we are thus at the start brought up against the difficulties of interpretation and translation that confront the student in this field. The type of society which grew up at a very early period in China had no counterpart elsewhere, and accordingly gave birth to a whole range of ideas not easily apprehended by the Western mind. The Chinese also evolved a method of expressing their ideas—the Chinese written character—that is wholly different from our system of writing; and the combined effect of these two factors is to make it all but impossible to express Chinese thought in any Western language. It is necessary, for example, to grasp the meaning of *jên* before one can understand the Confucian doctrine, for the root of all Confucian and ethical thought is *jên*. But how is *jên* to be translated? "Benevolence," "sympathy," "humanity," "to have a common purpose with and fellow feeling for mankind," "consciousness of one's place and function in society," "social consciousness," "expression of fellowship among men," "society mindedness"—these and other expressions represent each only one aspect of the full meaning of the word, and Western writers accordingly generally find it best to leave it untranslated. When men have *jên*, their behaviour conforms to *li*, which the dictionaries tell us means rites or ceremonies, but the word also means "appropriateness of relationships," "behaviour in accordance with virtue and propriety." *Li* is the mass and individual behaviour pattern and *yueh* is the emotional pattern. A ruler of superior penetration will feel, without recourse to electoral machinery, whether the *yueh* is good or bad. *Yueh* enables rulers to ascertain the general sentiment of the people, and it cultivates a type of individual attitude that is most harmonious with the environment. "The joint work of *li* and *yueh* would produce social harmony and social happiness—which is the ultimate aim of the State." *Yueh* is commonly translated "music" or "harmony," but, as Dr. Linebarger observes :

"Nothing like *yueh* can be found in Western political thought. However significant it may have been in China, any attempt to deal with it in a Western

language would have more than a touch of futility, because of the great chasm of strangeness that separates the two intellectual worlds at so many places."

Confucius believed that a group exists as a group because it has a common ideology, the character of the group being determined by the nature of the ideology. Applying this doctrine to society as a whole (and avoiding the use of the term nation, for what Confucius envisaged was a world society), he believed that ideology was all-important, and that the function of the statesman was that of an educator rather than an administrator. The ideal society was one where the same body of moral ideas was generally prevalent, and where there was consequently no disagreement in outlook and no disharmony in thought and behaviour. The Confucian Utopia was "a society where the excellence of the ideology and the thoroughness of conformity to ideology had brought perfect virtue, perfect happiness." In such a society there would be no necessity to enforce conformance to the generally accepted criteria of conduct, and the State, to borrow a Marxian phrase, would wither away.

The Chinese World Society of Eastern Asia that grew up under the all-pervading influence of these teachings is described in pages 36 to 47 of Dr. Linebarger's book. It was a society where political control was reduced to a minimum, and where ideological control over the individual was maintained by the irresistible pressure of the family, the village, the district and the *hui* (association). It was indestructible because it had no one nerve-centre, and the Confucian ideology continued in spite of invasions, famines and insurrections. Imperial China consisted of some half-million cities, towns, villages and hamlets, each of which was to a high degree autonomous. The Government supervised and exhorted, but took no direct initiative and did not interfere.

The important facts about this society are that it was to a very high degree homogeneous, welded together by the Confucian ideology, and that it was a world-society. The peripheral societies were all barbarians who looked up to China in awe as constituting the civilised world, and who, before invading, settling down in and being absorbed by China, had already been subdued by Chinese culture and the Confucian ideology. This is the source of the superiority complex that crops up in the writings of Sun Yat Sen and is reflected in unguarded moments in the attitude of most modern Chinese politicians. It seems slightly ridiculous in Western eyes, but that is because the Western mind, even when aware of, finds difficulty in grasping the fact that China for some 2000 years did apparently constitute the whole civilised world.

The impact of the West in the nineteenth century brought the Chinese up against an aggressive culture that not merely ignored and despised the Chinese culture, but was able, by reason of its superior powers of organisation and greater military strength, to enforce its claim to superiority. This happened just when the virtue had gone out of the ruling dynasty: it was no longer able to fulfil its rôle in the Confucian system, and the time for a rebellion was ripe. The structure of Chinese society, political, economic, social and cultural, was shaken to its foundations, and the whole Chinese world was smitten with fear and uncertainty. The hold that Sun Yat Sen gained on the imagination and in the affection of his fellow-countrymen is due to the fact that he pointed out the road by which the goal of regeneration was to be reached and himself blazed the trail. And he did both in a manner that appealed irresistibly to their deepest and most cherished instincts and to

their newest and most passionate prejudices. Sun Yat Sen was not only a preacher and a thinker, but also an active revolutionary. The most serious criticism to be made of Dr. Linebarger's work is that, inspired by filial piety and devotion to the memory of Dr. Sun, he has failed to realise that his activities in the latter capacity were guided by an expediency hardly compatible with the rôle which he aspired to fill in the former capacity.

So long as China was a world-society there could be no such thing as a national consciousness; but when the nations of the West came crowding and jostling on to the Chinese scene, Sun Yat Sen perceived that China was now no longer unique, but one of several nations: if she was to survive she must become conscious of herself as a nation and, after driving out the dynasty, must discover a form of government adequate for her new environment and capable of enabling her people to resist the encroaching foreigner. This was the origin of the famous Three Principles usually translated Nationalism, Democracy and Socialism. A better name for the last is perhaps economic well being, but Dr. Linebarger prefers to leave it untranslated as *Min Shêng*. Dr. Sun's skill as a revolutionary and propagandist may be seen in the form in which he served up this very sound political thinking for the assimilation of his fellow-countrymen. Nationalism, which of course had never existed, and could never have existed, in China, was represented as something of which the Chinese race-nation had been deprived by the wicked Manchus. The Manchus must be driven out and China become conscious once more of being a nation. Similarly, democracy, in the sense of democratic institutions (the Chinese had always been strongly egalitarian in sentiment), was represented as something which the ancient sages had desired, but had never been able to attain. China, while becoming a nation, must yet somehow retain the virtues of the old-world society. Sun was a revolutionary only as regards Manchus and foreigners. For his own people he was a reconstitutory. China was to find regeneration by a return to the old morality and the ancient learning. On these were to be superimposed Western skill in physical science.

Dr. Linebarger's discussion of *Min Shêng*—Sun Yat Sen's third principle—suffers most from the inhibitions hinted at above, and is the least satisfactory part of his book. He does not face up to the necessary implications of the contradictions and confusion in Sun Yat Sen's pronouncements on economic matters. He explains away the episode of the wholesale plagiarism from Maurice William in the lectures on *Min Shêng*, but it is difficult to believe that, if Sun Yat Sen had had any well-thought-out message of his own to deliver, he could not have clothed it in language of his own, instead of plagiarising wholesale from the work of an obscure American author which had only just come into his hands and of which, but for this plagiarism, little would ever have been heard. Dr. Linebarger also takes at its face value the extraordinary programme—utterly divorced from realities—set out in Sun Yat Sen's *The International Development of China*. In this book written just after the end of the Great War, Sun Yat Sen propounded the view that another world war could only be avoided by a scheme for the International Development of China. The nations should convert their billions of dollars worth of war industries into peace industries under the control of an International Organisation, which would on the one hand arrange to dump the products of these industries into China, and on the other hand, after winning the confidence of the

Chinese people, conclude a loan agreement with the Chinese Government to enable the said products to be used in the industrial development of China. 'The workshops that turn out cannon can easily be made to turn out steam rollers for the construction of roads in China.' If competition for the trade of China is ended by this plan, 'this will root out probably the greatest cause of future wars' and the plan will, Dr. Sun is sure, 'culminate to be the keystone in the arch of the League of Nations. A more detached observer than Dr. Linebarger might have seen in this proposal no more than a resurgence of the 2000-years-old superiority complex which makes it so hard for Chinese to remember that China is no longer a world civilisation surrounded by a ring of humble and admiring barbarians.

JOHN BRENT.

13*. POLITISCHE GEOGRAPHIE DES AUSTRALASIATISCHEN MITTELMEERES. By Kurt Wiersbitzky. [*Petermanns Mitteilungen*, Ergänzungsheft Nr. 227.] 1936. (Gotha: Perthes. 4to. 126 pp. Map. Bibl. *Rm.* 16.)

14. DAS JAPANISCHE KAISERREICH. By Herbert Rosinski, forming parts 14 to 17 of the *Handbuch der Geographischen Wissenschaft*. (Potsdam: Akademische Verlagsgesellschaft Athenaion.)

THE areas described in these two publications respectively are dealt with in accordance with the German *geopolitische* method. In the case of Mr. Wiersbitzky's work, this implies the working out of the relationship between geographical characteristics and political conditions and developments. Dr. Rosinski's treatment of Japan is more on the lines of an encyclopædia.

Mr. Wiersbitzky's "Australasiatic Mediterranean" is the archipelagic region bounded on the north by a line stretching from Siam to the Philippine Islands and on the south by the arc of the Netherlands East Indies from Sumatra to Timor. The author first enumerates the essential characteristics of each separate part of the region, and then proceeds to a comparative study of certain important features including situation, size, shape, boundaries and political relations. Under this last heading he deals with the point of view and interests of the various colonial empires (the area is, of course, predominantly "colonial"), and he makes special reference to native movements and communism. The particular interest of Mr. Wiersbitzky's monograph lies in his presentation of the "Australasiatic Mediterranean" as a single unit with many common problems as seen from the point of view of the student of international politics.

Dr. Rosinski provides a reference book of no small value to the student of conditions in the Far East. His book gives a brief historical outline of the Japanese empire, followed by a comprehensive and thorough analysis of its physical characteristics, racial features and economic development.

Both authors have made use of specially prepared maps and charts, the illustrations in the *Handbuch* being particularly valuable and including some half-dozen attractive coloured reproductions of paintings of typical landscapes.

G. E. HUBBARD.

15*. A SHORT HISTORY OF ANGLO-JAPANESE RELATIONS. By Chozo Muto. 1936. (Tokyo: Hokuseido Press. 8vo. iii + v + 83 pp. 4s.)

THIS short survey of early Anglo-Japanese relations was designated