The Single Tax and Economists
Robert Bruce Brinsmade
[Reprinted from The Bulletin of the American
Economic Association, April, 1911. A paper presented at the
twenty-third annual meeting of the American Economic Association, St.
Louis, Missouri, December, 1910]
I wish first to pay a tribute to the frank and very able paper of
Professor Davenport. I only wish that his paper, along with the
supplemental criticisms of Professors Carver and Robinson, could be
published in every trade-union paper of the United States, for I feel
sure it would do much to counteract, in trade-union circles, the
distrust of professional economists as helpers in the great movement
for social reform and industrial equity. Professor Davenport, however,
is evidently unfamiliar with the practical proposals of the
single-taxers in his inference that they consider chiefly agricultural
land values. Such a rendering, I believe, has no basis even in Progress
and Poverty, and if one reads Natural Taxation and the
A. B. C. of Taxation, the works respectively of T. G. Shearman
and C. B. Fillebrown, the practical textbooks of the reform, the
mistake is yet more evident.
Single-taxers propose to raise revenue from land value alone, but as
they include in their term "land" not only farms but
forests, mineral deposits, town sites, and public utility franchises
(for the use of land and waterways and resources), I believe they
cover all the sources of Professor Carver's "findings" (or
legitimate unearned increments ) except patents. The practical method
of assessment of these various types of land value is suggested in my
article entitled "Natural Taxation of Mining and Timber Land",
published in Conservation for May, 1909, and in the Miming World for
November 20, 1909.
The gains from monopolistic patent rights can be justified as both a
return to the inventor for his brain work and as an inducement for him
to record, for the benefit of society, his discovery, which, if kept
secret, might otherwise die with him. On this basis undoubtedly our
patent law has been abused, but it can be easily amended at any time
to make it conform to practical justice. Land rent, however, on the
other hand inevitably arises in any competitive society, and the only
question before the social reformer is, who shall be allowed to absorb
it? Shall it all go to society or shall individual land holders get
the whole or part of it? If one had heard today only the paper of
Professor Adams and its criticism, he would have thought that taxation
was a mere matter of fiscal adjustment. When one considers, however,
that our present national and local governments spend about two
billion dollars annually or at least one tenth of our total wealth
production, it may be seen that taxation has become probably the chief
factor in deciding how wealth shall be distributed among the different
classes of society. Professor Davenport thinks that a direct
land-value tax might be a social danger, but could anything be more
demoralizing than our present indirect national taxation? In the many
communities in which I have resided, the idea of the average voter of
the chief purpose of a federal congressman is that he should act as a
sluiceway to divert the stream of national expenditure into his local
community. Would there be such a pressure on a congressman for public
buildings, river and harbor works, pensions, etc., if his constituents
understood that they were paying for them? Now, most voters think that
a national grant is like money from home or a legacy from grandmother.
How the single tax would alter for the better the development of our
natural resources can only be appreciated by a practical producer. For
fifteen years I have been in practice as a mining engineer in many
countries. I have been everywhere astounded that our laws still permit
land-gamblers to hold up would-be developers to an extent now feasible
in few foreign states. The conservation movement is but the first step
toward the restoration of our land to the people. The long tolerance
of present taxation absurdities by our producers is due to their
ignorance of economic science. When the significance of Professor
Davenport's paper becomes once known generally, there will be some fur
flying among speculators, monopolists, and their dupes and lackeys.
As to Professor Robinson's idea that society has a right only to the
future unearned increment, I wish to dissent. It is probably true that
it would be impractical to recover the land rent paid in the past, but
the recovery of that to be paid in the future (which is capitalized as
the present selling value of land) is quite a different matter.
The abolition of the private appropriation of economic rent is
analogous to that of chattel slavery. The latter was abolished in
Brazil, without money payments to slave owners, by the device of
gradual emancipation during a generation. In the same way, Mr.
Fillebrown proposes to increase the land value tax 1 per cent annually
for thirty years, while decreasing other taxes proportionately. This
would suffice to throw the whole burden of government upon land
values, raising the 20 per cent of rent now absorbed by taxation to
the 50 per cent required for the whole expense of government. This
would still leave 50 per cent in the hands of the land holders, which
might be considered partly as a commission for rent collection, partly
as a bonus for the risk of land development, partly as a margin
covering incorrect assessment, and partly as a reserve available for
society, through additional taxation, in case of sudden emergencies
like earthquakes, famine, pestilence, or war. It is probable that all
rent, beyond that needed to cover the actual requirements of the last
paragraph, will gradually be absorbed by the future single tax society
to cover the increased expenses of a developing social integration.
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