

PHILOSOPHY

BY

NICHOLAS MURRAY BTUTLER

PRESIDENT OF COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY
MEMBER OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF ARTS
AND LETTERS

THIRD THOUSAND



New York

THE COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS

1911

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Set up and electrotyped. Printed May, 1911.

Norwood Press
J. S. Cushing Co. — Berwick & Smith Co.
Norwood, Mass., U.S.A.

PREFACE

THIS lecture was delivered as one of a series, the purpose of which was to present in summary and compact form a view of each of several sciences and of philosophy as these exist at the present day. In outlining philosophy, its subject-matter and its method, it was the purpose of the lecture clearly to differentiate philosophy from science, and to cut away the odd and unfitting scientific garments in which some contemporary writers have sought to clothe philosophy. Some of the passing forms of so-called philosophic thought are wholly below the plane on which philosophy moves. They are not philosophy, nor yet philosophies; they are travesties of both.

No one who has not grasped the distinction between the three orders of thinking, or ways of knowing, can hope, I think, to understand what philosophy is or what the word philosophy means. To call something philosophy is not to make it so.

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PHILOSOPHY

ONE of the most famous books ever written, and one of the most influential — the *Metaphysics* of Aristotle — opens with this sentence, “All men by nature are actuated with the desire of knowledge.” This desire of knowledge and the wonder which it hopes to satisfy are the driving power behind all the changes that we, with careless, question-begging inference, call progress. They and their reactions upon man’s other wants and needs have, since history began, wholly altered the appearance of the dwelling-place of man as well as man’s relation to his dwelling-place. Yet the physical changes are insignificant, great and numerous as they are. The Alps that tried the endurance of Hannibal are the same

mountains that tested the skill of Napoleon. The sea that was beaten by the banked oars of the triremes of Carthage, presents the same surface and the same shores to the fast-going, steam-driven vessel of to-day. But the air, once only a zephyr or a hurricane, is now the bearer of man's silent message to his distant fellow. The crude ore once deeply hidden in the earth, has been dug and drawn and fashioned into Puck's girdle. The words that bore the deathless verse of Homer from bard to a group of fascinated hearers, and with whose fading sounds the poems passed beyond recall, are fixed on the printed page in a hundred tongues. They carry to a million eyes what once could reach but a hundred ears. Human aspiration has cast itself, chameleon-like, into the form of noblest verse, of sweetest music, of most moving oratory, of grandest painting, of most splendid architec-

ture, of serenest reflection, of freest government. And the end is not yet.

The forces — the desire for knowledge and wonder — that have so moved man's world, and are so moving it, must be treated with at least the respect due to age and to great achievement.

The naïve consciousness of man has always told him that the existence of that consciousness and its forms were the necessary framework for his picture of himself and his world. Long before Kant proved that *macht zwar Verstand die Natur aber er schafft sie nicht*, man had acted instinctively on the principle. The world that poured into his consciousness through the senses, Locke's windows of the soul, was accepted as he found it, and for what the senses did not reveal man fashioned explanations in the forge of his imagination.

The unseen powers of heaven and earth, of air and water, of earthquake and thunderbolt, were like himself, but greater, grander. They had human loves and hates, human jealousies and ambitions. Behind the curtain of events they played their game of superhuman life. Offerings and gifts won their aid and their blessing; neglect or disdain brought down their antagonism and their curses. So it was that the desire for knowledge and the wonder of man made the mythologies; each mythology bearing the image of that racial facet of humanity's whole by which it was reflected. The *Theogony*, ascribed to Hesiod, shows the orderly completeness to which these mythologies attained.

The mythologies represent genuine reflection and not a little insight. They reveal man's simple, naïve consciousness busying itself with the explanation of

things. The mythologies were genuine, and their gods and their heroes were real, by every test of genuineness and reality known to the uncritical mental processes which fashioned them.

Change and decay, growth, life and death, are the phases of experience that most powerfully arouse man's wonder and stimulate his desire to know. Where do men and things come from? How are they made? How do they grow? What becomes of them after their disappearance or death?—these are the questions for which an answer is sought. The far-away Indian in his Upanishads cried out: "Is Brahman the cause? Whence are we born? Whereby do we live, and whither do we go? O, ye who know Brahman, tell us at whose command we abide, whether in pain or in pleasure!" To these questions the mythologies offered answers which

were sufficient for long periods of time, and which are to-day sufficient for a great portion, perhaps by far the greater portion, of the human race.

An important step, far-reaching in its consequences, was taken when man first sought the cause of change and decay in things themselves and in the laws which appeared to govern things, rather than in powers and forces outside of and beyond them. When the question was first asked, What is it that persists amid all changes and that underlies every change? a new era was about to dawn in the history of man's wonder and his desire to know. Thales, who first asked this question and first offered an answer to it, deserves his place at the head of the list of the Seven Wise Men of Greece. After Thales the wise men of Greece left off telling tales and busied themselves with an examination of experience and with direct reflection upon it.

It is to be noticed, however, that the evidence of the senses is no longer accepted at its face value. With Thales something new comes into view. It is the systematic search for the explanation of things that appear, with the assumption that the explanation lies behind the appearances themselves and is concealed by them. But as yet, man's gaze was wholly outward. The relation of the nature that he observed to his own consciousness was implied, but unquestioned. Consciousness itself and the knowing process remained to be examined. To turn man's gaze from outward to inward, to change the center of gravity of his desire to know, of his wonder, from nature to man himself, was the service of Socrates. That man is a reasoning animal, that knowledge must be examined and tested by standards of its own, and that conduct must be

founded on rational principles, are the immortal teachings of Socrates, as much needed now as when he first unfolded them. They mark him forever as the discoverer of the intellectual life. Of Socrates it may truly be said, in the stately verse of Æschylus:—

I brought to earth the spark of heavenly fire,
Concealed at first, and small, but spreading soon
Among the sons of men, and burning on,
Teacher of art and use, and fount of power.

(Prometheus Vincitus, 109.)

The maxim, “An unexamined life is not worth living,” is the priceless legacy of Socrates to the generations of men who have followed him upon this earth. The beings who have stood on humanity’s summit are those, and only those, who have heard the voice of Socrates across the centuries. The others are a superior kind of cattle.

The intellectual life, once discovered, was eagerly pursued by the two men who have done most to shape the thought of the Western World. For two generations the brilliant insight and noble imagery of Plato and the persistently accurate analytic and synthetic powers of Aristotle poured out for the use of men the rapid results of wide observation, profound reflection, and subtlest intellectual sympathy. For nearly two thousand years the scholars of the world could find little else to occupy them than the problems which Plato and Aristotle had proposed and the solutions which they had offered. The weight of their authority was so great that it prevented the spirit of new inquiry from rising to its feet for a period longer than half of all recorded history.

In a general way, different types of problem were marked off from each other

during the whole of this long period of development and study, but the lines of distinction that seem clear to-day were not often noticed or followed. Questions as to an unseen and superior power, as to logical processes, and as to natural objects and laws were curiously intermingled. Astronomy, mathematics, mechanics, and medicine broke off one by one from the parent stem, but it was a long time before the other separate sciences that we moderns know, were able to follow them. Both Plato and Aristotle had indicated the distinction between the different orders of human thinking which is all-controlling, but neither they nor their most influential successors maintained the distinction consistently by any means. So it happened that what we call science, what we call philosophy, and what we call theology were for a long time inextricably mixed.

Not

To no inconsiderable extent they remain so to-day. To disentangle them is the first step toward comprehending what philosophy is and what part it has to play in the intellectual life.

There are three separate stages or orders of thinking manifested by man. At the first stage, the human mind sees only a world of separate and independent objects. These objects are grouped in certain roughly marked visible and audible ways, or by the pleasure or pain, the comfort or discomfort, that they cause; but their likenesses and unlikenesses and their possible interrelationships are of very subordinate importance. These in no wise limit, alter, or interfere with the separateness of the objects themselves or with what is called their reality. Each elm tree seems a real object, an integer, an independent thing.

A falling apple suggests not a universal law of nature, but a means of gratifying an individual appetite. Such relations as one of these separate things appears to have, are looked upon as quite secondary, even if they are apprehended at all. This is the stage of naïve, uncritical knowledge. It lies below the horizon of the intellectual life. It is characteristic of the child and of the countless millions of unreflecting adults. It has been dignified by the name common-sense, but its proper designation is common ignorance. This common-sense is not, of course, the good, sound judgment which is often characterized by that name; it is merely the unreflecting and unanalyzed opinion of the ordinary man. The intellectual life begins when this kind of common-sense is left behind.

At the second stage or order of thinking the world appears as something quite

different. Instead of a world of fixed and definite objects whose interrelations are unimportant, the mind now sees that everything is in relation to every other thing and that relations are of massive significance; indeed, that they are controlling. The elm tree, far from being a simple and single unit, is now recognized as an organic form of being, a congeries of cells, of atoms of carbon, of oxygen, of hydrogen, no one of which the unaided human eye can see, much less the untutored human mind grasp. A falling apple no longer suggests merely the gratification of an appetite; it illustrates the laws which bind the universe into coherent unity. So-called common-sense is staggered by the revelations that this higher form of knowing presses upon it and insists that it accept, with or without comprehension. It is now seen that no object is independent. Each depends on

every other, and dependence, relativity, is the controlling principle of the universe. Under the guidance of Newton, reënforced by the discoveries of a Helmholtz and a Kelvin, this stage or order of knowing now goes so far as to say that dependence, relativity, is so absolute, that if even the slightest of objects be disturbed in position or altered in mass, the outermost rim of the material universe will be affected thereby; and measurably so, if only our instruments of precision were able for the task. The point of view, the method, and the results of this second stage or order of knowing are science.

It can now be seen how little truth there is in Huxley's much-quoted dictum that science is organized common-sense. That is precisely what science is not. Science is a wholly different kind of knowledge from common-sense, and it contradicts common-sense at almost

every point. To common-sense, the sun revolves about the earth ; to science, the contrary is established fact. To common-sense, a plank is still and stable ; to science it is a huge group of rapidly revolving centers of energy. To common-sense, water is a true element ; to science, it is a compound of atoms of the familiar hydrogen and oxygen. To common-sense, the Rosetta stone is a bit of rock covered with more or less regular markings, probably for a decorative purpose ; to science it is the key to a forgotten language and the open door to the knowledge of a lost civilization. Even when common-sense recognizes certain simple relations of dependence, it has no realization of their meaning, and it is without the power of analysis needed to climb to the higher plane of science. Here rule the stern laws that scientific knowing has discovered in its objects. The laws of

cause and effect, of the persistence of force, of the indestructibility of matter — these and their derivatives bring the known world of relations and related objects under their sway. Anxiously, eagerly, untiringly, one field of intellectual interest after another is added to the domain of science, familiar facts are explained by strange and unfamiliar laws, the obvious and the apparent are traced back to hidden and indeed invisible causes. The human mind, as intelligent, glows with pride at the glad discovery that the nature which invites and tempts it is intelligible, that it is made in the mind's own image.

At the third stage or order of knowing, the world or cosmos appears in still another aspect. It is now seen as Totality. When the world is viewed as Totality, there is obviously nothing to which it can be related, nothing on which it can be de-

pendent, no source from which its energy can be derived. We pass, therefore, at this stage of knowing, from the plane of interdependence, relativity, to the plane of self-dependence, self-relation, self-activity. Self-active Totality is the source or origin of all the energies and forces and motions which in one manifestation or another are observed in their interrelations and interdependences by the stage or order of knowing which is science. The unrefuted and, I venture to think, the irrefutable arguments of Plato in the Tenth Book of the *Laws* and of Aristotle in the Eleventh Book of the *Metaphysics*, supported by twenty-five centuries of human experience and the insights of one great thinker, poet, and spiritual leader after another, are the foundation on which this third stage or order of knowing rests. Its habit of mind, its standpoint, and its insights are philosophy.

Just as science is marked off from common-sense and raised above it by analysis and the laws of relativity, so philosophy is marked off from science and raised above it by further analysis and the laws of self-relation. In proceeding from common-sense to science we exchange a chaos of separate units for an ordered whole of interdependent parts; in proceeding from science to philosophy we exchange the working hypotheses of the understanding for the guiding insights of the reason.

There are those, however, who offer stubborn resistance to the proposal to pass from the second stage or order of knowing to the third, from science to philosophy. They protest that they are invited to pass from clear daylight into a fog, from accurate and easily tested knowledge to participation in a mock battle with meaningless words. They

recall the sterility of science until observation and experiment were set free from the trammels of authority and tradition, and they are fearful lest new and still more irksome bonds will somehow be put upon them. Yet these objectors are not worried about the Infinitesimal Analysis or the Calculus of the Infinite. They allow the mathematician to speak unmolested of the "eyeless observation of his sense-transcending world." They view without alarm the statement of the physicist that "the ether, electricity, force, energy, molecule, atom, electron, are but the symbols of our groping thoughts, created by an inborn necessity of the human mind which strives to make all things reasonable." To this the student of philosophy says Amen!—and rests his case.

That inborn necessity of the human mind which strives to make all things

reasonable creates both science and philosophy. To think the world as Totality is a necessity of clear and adequate thinking about anything. To deny this, does not escape from philosophy. It is only to substitute a certainly bad philosophy for a possibly good one. To refuse to admit Totality is merely to adhere to a concept of Totality which is negative.

It is also urged that science is false to itself if it admits a region or realm into which it does not or may not penetrate, that to exclude science is to enthrone mystery. Just so the naïve human consciousness might urge, for the finality of its point of view, that the elm tree is a real unit, that the sun does move around the earth, that water is a genuine element, for the senses tell it so, and that to refuse to believe the evidence of the senses is to throw down the one sure barrier between the real and the unreal. The answer of

science is simple enough. It replies that it does not deny the evidence of the senses, but only inquires what is really involved in that which the senses report. So philosophy, far from being at war with science, accepts its point of view and its results, and only asks what these involve and imply. There is certainly no region or realm into which science does not or ought not to aim to penetrate *on the plane in which science moves*. Its error is when it imitates the protest of the naïve consciousness against itself, and appeals from a higher court to a lower one. Science will grow in power and in influence over the minds of men, and clear thinking will be greatly advanced, as full realization is had of the meaning of the profoundly impressive words of Lotze: "The true source of the life of science is to be found . . . in showing how absolutely universal is the

extent, and at the same time how completely subordinate the significance, of the mission which mechanism has to fulfil in the structure of the world."

In other words, science is a subordinate category. When science offers itself as the final stage or form of knowing, it is guilty of a false quantity, in that it puts the accent, which belongs elsewhere, upon the penultimate.

The history of man's intellectual development is in no small part a record of the relations and interrelations between scientific and philosophic knowing, between science and philosophy. Both had a common historic origin, both had received massive contributions from the same minds. Each has tried in vain to supplant and to dispossess the other. No exercises of the human understanding are so futile as those to deduce or construct an explanation of

natural phenomena as interrelated, with eyes and mind alike tight-closed to observation and experiment. This is the meaning of Bacon's much-quoted aphorism: *Natura enim non nisi parendo vincitur*. On the other hand, no exercises of the human understanding are so pathetically incompetent as those to make the laws governing the interrelated parts serve for self-related Totality.

The fact that the heavy hand of authority made use of philosophy as a weapon to combat science and its pretensions, as science began to grow into self-consciousness, explains much of the antagonism between science and philosophy which has marked the past five hundred years. The fact that men of science have not infrequently regarded philosophy as an outworn form of human superstition, gives ground for an understanding of the contempt for science which repre-

sentatives of philosophy have sometimes permitted themselves to express.

To-day, however, he who wishes may see clearly that each, science and philosophy, has a field of its own, that both are necessary to the completeness of the intellectual life, that the sure advance of either is a source of strength to the other, and that the more stupendous their achievements the more impressive the rationality of the universe is seen to be.

Philosophic thinking presents difficulties peculiar to itself, because by its very nature it must dispense with the aid of images or mental pictures. It deals with concepts. Much irrational criticism of philosophy and not a little bad philosophy are directly traceable to the confusion of images and concepts, of imagination and conception. The statement that a given thing is inconceivable, that it cannot be

grasped in thought, will usually be found to mean that it is unimaginable, that it cannot be pictured. Herbert Spencer falls into this error at a critical point in his argument. This initial error and his unquestioning acceptance, through lack of knowledge of Kant, of Hamilton's and Mansel's grotesque application of a portion of Kant's teachings, cause Herbert Spencer's splendid work for the coördination and synthesis of the sciences to fall short of being philosophy at all. The more acute-minded Bishop Berkeley made the same error in regard to images and concepts, and thereby failed to advance philosophy as his great natural powers so well qualified him to do.

The beginner in the study of geometry is taught the distinction between the concept of a triangle and its image or picture. He uses in his demonstration

of the properties of a triangle only those characteristics of the particular figure that he draws or makes, which are common to all triangles. Neither the length of the sides nor the size of the angles is taken into account. His demonstration would hold good if a triangular figure of any other sort or size were substituted for that which he is using. The particular figure or image is only a symbol of the concept triangle; it has no significance of its own. The concept, triangle, is the essential thing. It is the rule or definition according to which all particular triangles, or images of triangles, are made, whatever the length or disposition of their sides or the size of their angles. To grasp this distinction between concepts and images and to comprehend the relation between them, is essential to philosophic thinking of any sort. For example, the image, water, is a mental picture of

some particular appearance of water. It may perhaps be the rolling and turbulent ocean, a placid lake, or a tumbling mountain brook. The concept, water, includes the rising of moisture from earth or sea, its gathering into clouds, its condensation into falling rain, its pools, its streams, its great lakes and seas; its hardening into ice at one temperature, its passing off in steam at another; its composition of hydrogen and oxygen; its every manifestation and characteristic. The concept brings to mind that process, that transforming energy, which restlessly reveals itself now in one form or mass of water, now in another. It deals with that which persists when any given form or manifestation of water passes away. The concept represents the process, the energy, which is at hand whenever and wherever water appears; the image represents a particular and transitory appearance.

When this point is reached, the student of philosophy is really beginning to think. He has laid the foundation for a standard of values, for judgments of worth as distinguished from judgments of fact. He has caught sight of the real difference between the permanent and the transitory.

Philosophic knowing, like scientific knowing and the uncritical knowledge of the child, is compassed about by the forms of consciousness, and its results, like those of science, are cast in these forms. Above and outside of these forms no knowing can by any possibility go. The suggestion is sometimes made in serious fashion that before consciousness was developed, the nature and appearance of the world were of a certain kind. The statement is not only unimaginable, but inconceivable as well. The words mean nothing. An instant's reflection shows

that consciousness, which had supposedly not yet been developed, is peeping from behind a curtain in yonder cloud to see how the world is getting on without it. The world is in and for consciousness, and no possible juggling with words can shake this final foundation on which all our knowing, of every kind, is built. Put consciousness out of the door and it is instantly back through the window. This explains why philosophy interprets in terms of will — the name for the only energy that consciousness knows directly — the energy which so abundantly and so marvelously manifests itself on every hand in nature and in history. The conscious effort of moving the hand, the head, the eye, is the type and norm by which we interpret, as the results of energy, the changes of position and of mass which we so incessantly observe.

The concepts of force and energy are

of necessity referred to the concept of will as their explanation. Moreover, in the course of the development of the forms of life we find irritability, a form of energy which we must interpret in terms of will, long before we find anything approaching a manifestation of intelligence. Intelligence appears either as a later development out of will, or as a graft upon it. A weighty group of modern physicists believe that matter itself, in its ultimate state, may be analyzed into energy, which again is only humanly explainable as will.

A strong, and, in my view, the dominant, tendency in philosophy, powerfully supported by the results of scientific knowing, is that which sees Totality as energy, which is will. Perpetual motion is clearly impossible, from a mechanical point of view, at the scientific stage of knowing. Just because of this fact, all mechanical motion can only be explained as having

originated as will-force. This will-force is self-active Totality. The ethical and the metaphysical, as well as the theological results and implications of this conclusion, are of the first order of importance.

There is, I venture to think, no ground for the ordinarily accepted statement of the relation of philosophy to theology and religion. It is usually said that while philosophy is the creation of an individual mind, theology or religion is, like folk-lore and language, the product of the collective mind of a people or a race. This is to confuse philosophy with philosophies, a common and, it must be admitted, a not unnatural confusion. But while *a* philosophy is the creation of a Plato, an Aristotle, a Spinoza, a Kant, or a Hegel, philosophy itself is, like religion, folk-lore and language, a product of the collective mind of humanity. It

is advanced, as these are, by individual additions, interpretations, and syntheses, but it is none the less quite distinct from such individual contributions. Philosophy is humanity's hold on Totality, and it becomes richer and more helpful as man's intellectual horizon widens, as his intellectual vision grows clearer, and as his insights become more numerous and more sure. Theology is philosophy of a particular type. It is an interpretation of Totality in terms of God and His activities. In the impressive words of Principal Caird, that philosophy which is theology seeks "to bind together objects and events in the links of necessary thought, and to find their last ground and reason in that which comprehends and transcends all—the nature of God Himself." Religion is the apprehension and the adoration of the God Whom theology postulates.

If the whole history of philosophy be searched for material with which to instruct the beginner in what philosophy really is and in its relation to theology and religion, the two periods or epochs that stand out above all others as useful for this purpose are Greek thought from Thales to Socrates, and that interpretation of the teachings of Christ by philosophy which gave rise, at the hands of the Church Fathers, to Christian theology. In the first period we see the simple, clear-cut steps by which the mind of Europe was led from explanations that were fairy-tales to a natural, well-analyzed, and increasingly profound interpretation of the observed phenomena of Nature. The process is so orderly and so easily grasped that it is an invaluable introduction to the study of philosophic thinking. In the second period we see philosophy, now enriched by the

literally huge contributions of Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics, intertwining itself about the simple Christian tenets and building the great system of creeds and thought which has immortalized the names of Athanasius and Hilary, Basil and Gregory, Jerome and Augustine, and which has given color and form to the intellectual life of Europe for nearly two thousand years. For the student of to-day these developments have great practical value, and the astonishing neglect and ignorance of them both are most discreditable.

The student of philosophy is more fortunate than some of his contemporaries in his attitude toward the period called the Middle Ages.

The very use of the name Middle Ages to describe a group of ten centuries is sufficient evidence that those centuries are neither understood nor appreciated. The modern world at the time of its

beginnings reacted so sharply and so emphatically against the methods and ideals which had guided the civilization of the centuries that went before, that for the time being the laws of evolution were forgotten and the attempt was made to break completely with the past and to begin the history of civilization anew. The student of philosophy, however, finds in the so-called Middle Ages a rich field for study and contemplation. He sees there the mind of modern Europe at school. It is learning to think and to use the tools of thought. It is sharpening and refining language, and the nations that are to be are making each a language of its own. The view of life which Christian theology then taught with marvelous uniformity was working its way into the consciousness of those Northern peoples who had both overthrown the Roman civilization and been

overwhelmed by it, and was the controlling power in their lives.

To suppose that such an age as this can be properly described as dark, is only to invite attention to the limitations of one's own knowledge and sympathy. No age was dark in any true sense that witnessed the assembling of scholars at the feet of Alcuin and Hrabanus Maurus; that saw the rise of universities, of guilds and of cities; that was fired by the enthusiasm and the zeal of St. Dominic and St. Francis; that gave birth to the story of the Cid, of the Holy Grail, of the Nibelungenlied, and the divine comedy of Dante; that witnessed those triumphs of Gothic architecture that still delight each eye that rests upon them; or that knew the Constitutions of Clarendon, the Magna Charta, and the legal Commentaries of Bracton. Such an age as this is perhaps not one with which any century

since the seventeenth stands in close sympathy, but it is neither a dark age nor a middle age. It has significance and value of its own. It witnessed the preparation of the mind of Europe for what was to come, and it is not poor, but rich, in evidences of culture and reflection. This is particularly true in the domains of philosophy and of literature. The student of philosophy does not overlook this fact.

Any study of philosophy that is worthwhile will lay strong emphasis on a knowledge of the historical development of philosophic thought. It will dwell upon the influence of philosophy upon the activities of men, from the time of its crude beginnings by the shores of Virgil's

Salis placidi vultum fluctusque quietos

to the crowded, hastening, electric-bound world of to-day. For the history of

philosophy is, in fact, as Professor Ferrier once said it was, "philosophy itself taking its time, and seen through a magnifying glass." Against the background of the centuries man's efforts to grasp and to explain Totality, of which he is a part, stand out in splendid illumination. The two greatest and most enduring achievements are easily seen to have been the work of the Greek and the German minds. The cosmological method of the one and the psychological method of the other, when brought together in synthesis, offer us the deepest insights of which humanity has yet been capable. The Greek and the German languages are the most adequate to the expression of philosophic thinking, for the reason that these languages mirror the powers and characteristics of the racial groups that brought them into being. In making their weighty con-

tributions to philosophy, the Greek and the German peoples evolved language-forms competent to give expression to their profoundest thoughts. Their four chief representatives — Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Hegel — tower, like mountain peaks above the plain, over all others who have given voice, in systematic form, to man's highest intellectual aspirations. St. Augustine, St. Thomas Aquinas, Spinoza, and perhaps also Descartes, follow a little distance behind. No others have climbed so far up the Hill Difficulty as these.

To grasp in fullest significance the movement of contemporary thought, and to pass judgment upon it with some approach to a proper sense of proportion, the student must know his Kant. Max Müller's phrase was a good one: "Kant's language is the *lingua franca* of modern

philosophy." It is not too much to say that without an understanding of Kant the door to a just appreciation of modern thought is closed. The reason for this judgment is that the adequacy of most modern thinking is to be tested primarily by the method it pursues, and Kant is the great reformer of philosophical method. One may watch the justly emphatic Empiricism of Bacon march straight forward to its logical conclusion in the almost unlimited Skepticism of Hume. On the other hand, one may see clearly enough how the rationalistic method which commended itself to Descartes developed of necessity into the full-fledged and all-inclusive Dogmatism of Christian Wolff. The two conflicting methods, Empiricism and Rationalism, resulted, at the end of something more than a hundred years, in two mutually contradictory sets of conclusions, Skepti-

cism and Dogmatism. Each might abuse the other, but neither could refute the other. An absolute deadlock was presented by the thought of the eighteenth century as it found expression on the one hand chiefly in England, and on the other hand chiefly in Germany. To break this deadlock there was need of some new method which could mediate, so to speak, between the extremes of Empiricism and Rationalism. That method is the critical method of Immanuel Kant. The story of his own intellectual development, the steps by which he climbed up from one point of view in philosophy to a higher and more inclusive one, until finally he produced the *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, is one of the most instructive and illuminating in the whole history of human thinking. The student who has really come to an understanding of Kant, his method, and his contribution to

philosophy, is ready for any task that reflection can put upon him.

It is said of Kant that he used to tell his students at Königsberg that he sought to teach them, not philosophy, but how to think philosophically. This view of the teaching of philosophy, which I hold to be the correct one, is the reason why students of philosophy, particularly beginners, should concern themselves with the works of the genuine masters of philosophic thinking, and not waste their time and dissipate their energies upon the quasi-philosophical and the frivolously-philosophical writing, chiefly modern and largely contemporary, which may be not inappropriately described as involving Great Journeys to the Homes of Little Thoughts!

The clever intellectual posing and attitudinizing of Nietzsche, whose body and

mind alike were sorely stricken with illness, is only a travesty upon philosophy. The curiously barren efforts of Haeckel, when he leaves the field of science in which he is an adept, are but little better. Even the form of philosophy called Pragmatism, for which the great names of Oxford, Harvard, and Columbia are academic sponsors, and which when unfolded to the man in the street leads him to howl with delight because he at last understands things, should come late and not early in a student's philosophical reading. A background of considerable philosophical knowledge will aid in giving to it a just appreciation. There are critics who have the fear that Pragmatism, in its attempt to be both profound and popular, may, forgetful of the ancient warning of Plautus, suffer from attempting to blow and to swallow at the same time.

The English and American student of philosophy is in no small measure handicapped by the fact that there is so little genuinely first-class philosophical writing in the English language. The Anglo-Saxon and Anglo-Celtic people have expressed themselves in much noble poetry and in political institutions of the greatest value and importance, but their positive contributions to constructive philosophical thinking have been meager. They have at times offered the obstacle of sharp criticism and unsatisfied skepticism to the progress of obscure, extreme, and unsound tendencies in philosophic thinking, but the stones that they have laid upon the permanent structure of philosophy are few. Of writers in English during the last decades of the nineteenth century, the two Cairds, the two Wallaces, Green, and Harris stand almost alone in their ability to reach really ex-

ceptional heights in the task of philosophic criticism and interpretation. They have all enjoyed the advantages of what is so conspicuously lacking in most contemporary writing on philosophy, namely, broad and deep philosophical scholarship. After the human race has been at work on its chief problem for thousands of years, the man who ignores all that has been accomplished and is consumed with an ambition to be original, is pretty certain to end by being simply queer.

It would be a grateful task, did opportunity offer, to point to some of the conclusions of philosophy which seem to me to be the surest: to show that nothing less than an eternal moral order will satisfy our deepest human needs or our loftiest human aspirations, an eternal moral order which is the final test of all theories and explanations; to urge the significance of the testimony of the human

heart to our dependence on a higher power, testimony voiced alike in the opening verses of the poem of Lucretius written while Cæsar lived and Tully spoke, and in the sweet and tender music of Cardinal Newman's *Lead, Kindly Light*, of Lord Tennyson's *Crossing the Bar*, and of Rudyard Kipling's *Recessional*, testimony recorded boldly and ineffaceably in the countless sainted lives that have been lived on this earth; to read the lesson of man's unconquerable optimism, his

— trust that somehow good
Will be the final goal of ill

which, despite all temptations, has thus far kept him from framing any scheme for education, politics, or society upon the hypothesis that the influences making for evil in the world will finally conquer; to make plain the full meaning of the dictum of Hegel that "the whole philoso-

phy is nothing but the study of specific forms or types of unity," and to illustrate the principle of Spinoza that "a thing has only so much reality as it possesses power"; to bring evidence to prove the fact that philosophy does for the thought which combines and unifies things what science does for the facts or things combined and unified; to trace the hand of philosophy in architecture, in painting, and sculpture, in poetry and in the political and religious institutions that mankind has made; to follow down the course of events in the Western World and to illustrate how true is the saying of Thucydides that history is philosophy learned from examples; to indicate the close relations between philosophy and the logic which is mathematics, relations felt or suspected by Pythagoras and Plato, by Descartes and Spinoza, by Leibnitz and Kant, and to

suggest ways in which mathematics can and does lead from science to philosophy and binds them together; to reveal the laws of evolution as significant and vital principles in philosophy long before the sciences of nature discovered and proved the existence of the same or similar laws in their own sphere; to throw light upon the deepest cleavage known to history — that between Orient and Occident — by contrasting the civilization based upon a philosophy that cannot account for or explain independent individuals, that holds any appearance of such to be Maya, illusion, and that longs for return to, and absorption in, Nirvana, with that civilization which is based upon a philosophy that does account for and explain independent individuals, and that calls on them to exert and develop themselves to the utmost in order to approach nearer to

intellectual and moral perfection. All this, and much more, philosophy endeavors to teach.

More than seventy years ago De Tocqueville expressed the opinion that in no country in the civilized world is less attention paid to philosophy than in the United States. At that time he was right, but, fortunately, he is right no longer. Philosophy is now vigorously prosecuted among us. Wordsworth's "years that bring the philosophic mind," are bringing it in some measure to us. We must cultivate and encourage that philosophic mind, for we are sorely in need of it to bring unity into our knowledge, to install securely principle in the judgment-seat before which conflicting practices are the contentious litigants, to gain a sense of proportion and a point of view in the study of history and of nature, and to set final foot on the head of

the dragon Philistinism that everywhere assails worth in the name of "that which works." Perhaps we may venture even to cherish the hope that, in Victor Hugo's well-known phrase, *Ceci tuera cela!*

We need philosophy, too, to aid us to gain that even mind in things severe that Horace counsels, and to help us to see life steadily and see it whole, as Matthew Arnold sang of Sophocles. The modern world has sat at the feet of the ancient world for a long time, but it has not yet learned all that the ancient world has to teach.

To carry into science and philosophy the presuppositions of uncritical knowledge is to lead ourselves into curious vagaries and contradictions, unless we can rise above or outgrow such presuppositions. Education is in no small measure preparing the way for the intel-

lectual life and pointing to it. Those who cannot enter in at its gates are doomed, in Leonardo da Vinci's words, to "possess neither the profit nor the beauty of the world." For them life must be short, however many its years, and barren, however plentiful its acts. Their ears are deaf to the call of the indwelling Reason, and their eyes are blind to all the meanings and the values of human experience. Where there is no vision, the people — and the university — perish!

UNIV. OF MICHIGAN

FEB 16 1912



