How I -- a Jew -- Came to God
Frank Chodorov
[Reprinted from Analysis, March, 1948]
I AM a Jew. Not that anyone cares, least of all myself, and my abrupt
declaration serves only to introduce the story of an intellectual
experience, not a sermon nor anything suggestive of a purpose. My
excuse for bringing the matter up at this time is that there is some
talk about a "Jewish problem," and the recrudescence of this
phrase, with its socially unpleasant connotations, has again got me to
asking myself what it is that I am when I name myself, or am named, a
Jew. For the better part of a half century I have tried to capture the
invariable positives and negatives of the human being so labelled,
but, so far, my intellectual curiosity has not been answered. I admit
that this curiosity was whetted on the emery wheel of unpleasant
experiences, but it is still lively after the years have turned these
experiences into pleasant reminiscences.
Maybe I would have forgotten the whole thing if some people who call
themselves Christian, which defies definition almost as stubbornly,
did not make it their business to re-fasten the label on me whenever
through forgetfulness I have allowed the edges to become loose. They
seem to care a great deal more than I do. And they show their concern
in ways that are often ingenious and with a sense of delicacy; and
sometimes they are not so nice about it. There's the fellow who
explains, when he invites me to lunch, that he is not taking me to his
club - I did not know he belongs to one - because "there's a
stupid feeling among the members, which of course I do not share, that
might prove embarrassing, and I wouldn't have that for all the world."
Or the one who in a complimentary mood assures me that I am not a Jew
but "like one of us." And the cliche "some of my best
friends are Jews" is definitely used to properly place me. Thus,
by innuendo, inference or direct statement, or even a knowing look, I
am gratuitously reminded that I am what I am whenever the fact slips
my mind. All my years I have been called, and have called myself, a
Jew, and that, according to some authorities, establishes the fact.
But, the question will not down, what do these three letters describe
or define? I've asked the question of many people and have got almost
as many different answers, not one of which squares with observable
fact. Subjectively, I know that "I am"; but as for "a
Jew," I have no consciousness of it at all. It has never been
revealed to me; I have learned it by rote only. Hunger, fatigue,
headache and itch are quite real. There is no mistaking these facts of
consciousness. But never have I experienced a similar perception of
Jewishness. There may be people to whom perceptions of race, religion
or nationality are as definite as the taste of ice cream, but I am
inclined to believe that these ideas are like lipstick or a coat -
something one puts on and takes off. Or has put on, like shackles. Be
that as it may, I am devoid of any sensory perception of Jewishness.
A LEXICOGRAPHERS SEARCH
I LOOK into the mirror and see there the reflection of features
similar to those worn by others called Jews. Yes, my face has a marked
resemblance to my father's, also to my brothers', and my children bear
the same features. Maybe, then, there are certain distinctions of
physiognomy which, if they could be captured in word would settle this
matter of definition. However, I observe features quite suggestive of
my own worn by people who are not called Jews; the exclusiveness
becomes uncertain. My people came from Russia, and I notice that many
Russian Christians, on the basis of their facial characteristics,
could easily pass for blood relations. Then I see Jews with straight,
thin noses, dark skins and slender contours, features usually
associated with Latin peoples; the Jewish girl I married was sometimes
taken for a Spaniard. Again, there is the hooked proboscis of the
German Jew which is equally characteristic of the Aryan faces. The
search for a definition must go beyond features.
I said my people came from Russia, from the southern part, around
Odessa. In the eighth and ninth centuries that part of the world was
occupied by a pagan people known as the Khazars. The record classifies
them as Tartars, but as the territory embraced a transit between the
Black Sea and the Caspian, there is some doubt as to the singleness of
their blood, for in all probability it was tainted with Persian, Hun,
Armenian, Slavonic and whatever other kind came down this path of war
and trade. Now, legend has it that many of these Khazars were
converted to Judaism; some say the entire tribe was. Can it be, then,
that far back among my progenitors I could find an adulterated Tartar?
Perish the thought! Yet we know that marriage is a matter of
propinquity, not of race; and if the Russian Jew bears a likeness to
his Christian compatriot, the idea of consanguinity cannot be put
away. Taking into consideration the fact of biological transmission of
physical characteristics, can we not say that in his matings the
Jewish male, like all other males, has not been scrupulously
race-conscious? And Jewish girls are not hard to look at either. But,
why belabor the point? Solomon, we are told, had three hundred wives
and a thousand concubines. He picked them for their beauty only, and
he went far and wide to get them. So, we Jews got pretty well mixed up
with non-Jews long, long before the dispersion, and have been as
continuously guilty of intermarriage as the people we intermarried
with. It seems, then, that a racial definition, in the sense of a
continuous stream of the same kind of blood, will hardly hold.
Well, then, how about a definition based on religion? And the
rejoinder is, which Jewish religion are you talking about? A while ago
was reading about the ritual in the Holy Tempe at the time of Pontius
Pilate and it occurred to me that a reincarnated high priest of the
time would find himself more at home at a Catholic high mass than in
the modern temple of the "better class" Jew. Imagine the
mortification of a bewhiskered and skull-capped Polish Jew in the
house of worship frequented by his hatless son, where the women's
chests are exposed and where no rail or elevation separates the sexes.
It's as much as to ask him to eat pork chops - which the son does. In
proportion to their numbers, the Jews can probably lay claim to as
many schisms as do the Christians, to say nothing of the many who own
up to no sect.
Then there is the attempt to give the Jew a nationalistic definition.
If I adhere to this idea I say to myself: I am part of a political
entity which lost its physical reality some two thousand years ago;
this nation exists in the record of its past, its cultural continuity
and in its well-advertised manifest destiny. It is a nation without
the physical appurtenances of one. Examining that fancy, I ask myself,
can two thousand years of history be wiped out, as if it never
happened? What warrant have we in nature for the persistence of
national entities? Has not every state carved out its career with the
sword; and when that sword lost its edge did not the state disappear?
It is interesting to read about the ancient Greeks, to study the
records of Aztec culture or the unearthed artifacts of lost empires. I
would like to know why these social integrations disappeared, why such
highly developed civilizations could not maintain themselves. Such
information might help me foretell the course-of the civilization of
which I am a part. But I feel no call to fight for the restoration of
a state which exists only in poetry. Citizenship in a state without
authority is a contradiction. Furthermore, the ideology involved in
the proposed restoration smacks too much of Hitlerian nationalism
based on racial purity, reinforced with claims to divine selection. It
defies the record and is decidedly dangerous.
And so it has been all these years. An examination of the suggested
definitions amounts to a process of elimination, and it is not
surprising that mysticism is resorted to by many; accordingly, the Jew
is endowed with a soul which is
sui generic and undefinable. Maybe so. But I confess to an
incapacity in such super-sensory perceptibility. When things get
beyond the rational I am lost.
And so, I have come to the
conclusion that I am a Jew because I call myself one, and so does
everybody else who cares to classify me, and that is all there is to
it. I have hit upon a description of the Jew which, while lacking the
conciseness of a definition, helps to identify his particularism.
We'll go into that after I have got along with my story.
EARLY BACKGROUND
THE lower west side of New York at the turn of the century was going
through the usual transition of a fine residential section into an
area of low-priced tenements, rooming houses and marginal factories.
The street where I spent my pre-high school days was already entering
the factory phase. A few streets away the vestiges of early New York
aristocracy held on to its brownstone elegance; that was nearly twenty
years before enterprising realtors rescued these anachronisms from
well-deserved demolition. They painted the fronts white and the
shutters green, and invested the section with profitable romance by
reviving its ancient name of Greenwich Village. I never heard the name
when I went to school in that section.
There were two Jewish families besides mine in the neighborhood, and
one moved uptown before I got to high school. Irish, French and
Italian emigrants had taken over, sometimes creating distinct
nationalistic islands on contiguous streets, sometimes getting all
mixed up as they did on my street. Much to the chagrin of my mother,
my associates were not only not of my people, but were inclined to
practices not sanctioned by the
Talmud or any other moral code. The only reason I did not
accompany some of my companions to the reformatory was that I was not
apprehended in the business of selling lead pipe purloined from
partially built or empty houses.
One had to fight to live in this environment, and the "Jew"
epithet was as good a casus belli as any other. But, the
matter rarely came up in a purely descriptive - form, the viciousness
of the accompanying adjectives rather than the word itself being the
real challenge. I was yet to learn the flavor of real anti-Semitism.
The fact that I didn't go to church on Sunday marked me off, but I
recall being envied for that good fortune. I could and would fight, I
was good at the games we played, and when the gang had some collective
purpose to pursue I was expected to do my share. Race consciousness
never entered into our affairs.
I knew I was a Jew. There was no question about that but it did not
bother me. It did bother my mother, of course. She had a rabbi come to
the house to teach me Hebrew. My apostasy began right there and then,
not only because this added education interfered with my ball games,
but also because of my objections to the pedagogical method of the
rabbi. He insisted on my learning Hebrew by sight and sound, rather
than by understanding of the text, and progress was made difficult by
my impertinent interrogations. I began to suspect that these
hieroglyphics hid objectionable ideas.
An incident of this period did much to undermine whatever inclination
I may have had toward the ancient tradition. One very cold night the
rabbi tottered into our house in a pitiful condition; it took a half
dozen glasses of boiling tea to thaw him out. He then told how a
sympathetic "goy" had offered him a pair of gloves and why
he had refused the gift; a Jew must not be the instrument of bringing
a "mitzvah," or blessing, on a non-believer. That was the
first time, I believe, that I came smack up against the doctrine of
the "chosen people," and it struck me as stupid and mean.
The real and permanent education of the child consists in the
fermentation of ideas put into its mind by experience; against that
all book learning is as nothing. For instance, I remember well my last
trip to the synagogue, when I was eleven years of age, on Yum Kippur.
The ritual was of ancient vintage; women and children worshipped in
the balcony, while the shoeless, shawled and skull-capped men on the
main floor faced the walls as they incanted the prayers to the
metronomic swaying of their bodies. Not all of the men followed custom
so meticulously, but the more devout could be so identified. One of
these attracted my attention because he was head of the other Jewish
family on my street. This fellow came by a bad reputation in the
community, for shady business practices, for uncouthness and loudness,
for wife-beating. My folks were hardly on speaking terms with this man
or his family. Well, on this particular holy day our neighbor was
doing his devotions with noticeable intensity, and that started me
thinking and asking questions. Could one day of hard prayer in a
synagogue wash out the sins of a whole year? Is God bought off so
cheaply? My mother parried me for a while and then brushed me off with
"the ways of God must not be questioned." That settled it. I
sneaked off to an important one-o'-cat game on the street.
My mother finally got her wayward son into high school. These four
years were indeed happy ones. Contact with boys more reputable
background weaned me away from docks, warehouses, gang warfare and
trial by fisticuffs. Football helped to reflate the ego which had
somewhat collapsed in this more rarified atmosphere; the acclaim of
the crowd on Saturday afternoons was reassuring. I began to take a
more than perfunctory interest in books. I even became conscious of
marks. I took part in extra-curricular activities other than
athletics, such as the school paper and a literary society, and all in
all enjoyed high school immensely. During these years not once, as far
as I can recall, did the matter of discrimination make its felt.
HIGHER LEARNING
THEN came college. To me matriculation was quite an experience, most
a hallowed event. In those days most boys who went to college did so
because that was in the tradition of their class and matriculation was
like the first shave, something one did because one had arrived. Boys
of my world almost always completed their formal education at
fourteen, a few more put in four years of high school (or less, if
circumstances demanded), and a smaller number whose parents were
ambitious for them got to college. Higher education was hard to come
by; only those who showed special ability, evidenced in competitive
examination were subsidized. Society had not yet taken on the
collective duty of raising its moronic level. Hence, for those of us
who were determined to "work our way through" the mere fact
of having entered was an exhilarating experience.
Nothing happened during the first f weeks to indicate that social
life in college would be much different from what was in high school.
I went out for football, fully confident that I would make the grade.
In my relations with the squad I was difficult, not because of any
race consciousness, but because I felt out of place in an atmosphere
where tradition counted. I was a bit afraid of it. In high school this
lack was brought home to me in poignant way. Through our mutual
interest in literature another lad and I struck up a close
acquaintanceship, and one afternoon he invited me to dine with his
folks. It was not the quiet elegance of the home that most impressed
me, although that was considerably different from the utilitarian
surroundings I associated with home. What struck me with force was the
easy courtesy that graced the relationship between my friend, his
older brother and their mother. It wasn't manners, it was manner. This
was all new to me and I was filled with fear that I might prove myself
out of place. Particularly so when boys came to dinner dressed in
their dinner-coats (which I believed were worn only at class and
fraternity dinners); in not the slightest way was I made conscious of
my non-conformity. I learned then that in social deportment the docks
had taught me little.
A few such experiences put me on my guard. I played hard and left the
matter of companionship to the others, expecting it to come when I
proved myself. One thing annoyed me. In those days of interlocking
interference the ball carrier was part of the ball, and interferers
were expected to pull, push or throw him for an extra foot or inch.
But, nary a hand touched me. I did not understand it, and must have
shown my confusion, for one day the only other Jewish boy on the squad
said to me, "Don't let it get you, kid; it's tough going for a
Jew on this squad, but you've got what it takes and you'll make good."
So, that's what it was! It was my first introduction to the finesse
with which discrimination could be practiced.
My education along these lines progressed rapidly. I had played in
all the freshman games, was considered a first-stringer and fully
expected to "win my numerals" in the final game. When the
coach called out the starting line-up in the locker-room, just before
game time, my name was not on the list, and nobody seemed to think it
odd. I did, of course. What hurt me the most was that there was no way
of openly resenting the affront, without being churlish, and the best
I could do was to take it out on the opposing players when necessity
compelled the coach to put me into the game.
The open attack - the "goddam Jew" - came on Friday
afternoon. The varsity coach - we had no rule barring freshmen those
days - kept me for special instruction; I was being taught the fine
art of throwing my body into mass plays, and for that purpose a
skeleton offense was opposed to me. On the very first rehearsal I felt
a fist on my jaw. It happened again, and the third time the epithet
was thrown with the fist. Whatever polish I had acquired in the past
few years left me completely, and with the choicest language of my
past I sailed into the senior to whom I traced the offense. To my
chagrin, he wouldn't fight. I thought later that the whole thing may
have been a prearranged affair, to test my toughness, for the next day
I was put into the varsity game. But at the time I was burned up.
There were other incidents, on the field and on the campus. One that
sticks in my memory after all these years occurred about three months
after the start of the term. A fellow with whom I had been very
friendly at high school, a member of my fraternity there, passed me as
I was crossing the campus with another friend, without acknowledging
my salutation. I said to my companion: "What's the matter with
Carl, is he deaf?" "No, not deaf, but didn't you see that
fraternity pledge pin on his lapel? He can't be friendly with a Jew
now. That hurt.
Soon I learned that discrimination was not confined to the students.
Some of the Jewish upper-classmen protested openly against the wave of
anti-Semitism that year - I learned later that it was a regular
autumnal phenomenon - and were for doing something about it. They
called a meeting. I would have laughed at such a thing in high school;
but I went to this one. That is something the persecutors do not
understand - that persecution makes a minority; as the professional
Jews well know, if Jews are unmolested they tend to lose all sense of
commonality and go their separate ways; they coalesce in proportion to
the pressure put upon them. At this meeting a committee was appointed
to consult with a Jewish professor, a man of international repute, on
ways and means. "Forget it," advised the professor, "and
it will die down. Let me tell you something. We Jewish members of the
faculty are invited to all faculty functions, but we always decline,
because we are expected to decline."
A MISSION IS BORN
BY THE end of my freshman year I had about soured on college life.
Being husky and pugnacious, I found relief in fisticuffs, whenever the
opportunity presented itself, which was rare, because the affronts
were subtle and intangible; I don't doubt that sensitiveness found
slights where none were intended. It occurred to me later that if I
had developed in my earlier years a sense of comradeship with Jews as
Jews, adjustment to this new world would not have gone so hard. I
could have eased into the discrimination rather than have it pounded
into me. I realized, too late, that I would have done better by myself
if I had not ventured into the sacred temple of footballism. One is
never hurt if one keeps one's place. It must have been particularly
difficult for the rich Jewish boys who tried to buy their way into
forbidden social circles and were despised for it by their own kind,
as well as by the others.
Beginning with my sophomore year I went to college for the sole
purpose of learning a trade, and learning it as fast as possible. So,
in spite of the necessity of earning enough to pay my tuition, I took
on sufficient subjects, and one summer course, to cut my college
career by one year. But, peculiarly enough, my hard introduction into
anti-semitism blossomed into a purpose; I would try to find the cause
for this horrible thing and see what could be done about eradicating
it. Toward that end I selected from the electives as much philosophy
as was allowed to an undergraduate. This idea came to me, I think,
from the numerous references to God and religion which I ran across in
a text book used in one of the philosophy courses; I had already come
to the
a priori conclusion that religion was at the bottom of social
discords. Maybe, then, philosophy would help me solve the riddle.
I remember particularly a course in the history of philosophy. The
sessions were held late in the afternoon for the convenience of
students from the theological seminary. There were also some older
students, specials, with heretical tendencies, and only the diplomatic
skill of the professor prevented the metaphysical battles from
becoming brawls. The post-session arguments in the corridors provided
the real fun of the course; and here the atheists had the best of it,
probably because they were more emphatic. The sharpest of these was a
Jew, a special student about thirty years old, whose deep sincerity
indicated that he had a mission. Before the year was up the God-less
ones had me on their side, and I had a mission too. An emotional
experience had given my intellectual groping a definite direction.
There was no doubt in my mind that I had found "truth."
Having found it, I was in no mood for further questioning, for
contemplative reflection. All I needed now was confirmation of my
discovery, for which I looked to propaganda. I swallowed whole the
agnosticism of Robert Ingersoll and the "Age of Reason"
became my bible against the Bible. The anti-clerical tales with which
seventeenth and eighteenth century literature is full served as
documentary proof of the perfidy of all things religious. Atheistic
literature and a publication, for which I later wrote an article or
two, fed me with phrases that served for reason. It is easy to found a
philosophy upon a half-truth, the easiest thing in the world of
thought. The anti-semitism which had hurt me became only a single
expression of the evil which religion had always wrought, and I linked
the sufferings of the Jews with the slaughter of the Huguenots, the
massacre of Christians by the followers of Mohamet, the Inquisition
and all the persecutions that throughout history had been done in the
name of God. The Borgias can be explained psychologically or
politically; I chose to explain them as the product of religious
mania. Whenever I read of slaughter in the name of "God and
country" I blamed it on God alone. Religion became the cause of
all strife, the church the altar upon which human happiness is
sacrificed, clericalism the embodiment of all evil. The world would
never be a fit place to live in until the whole kit and kaboodle were
wiped out. And toward that wind-mill I tilted my lance.
I sometimes wonder whether reformers are more interested in their
egos than their reforms. My judgment in the matter would be biased. At
any rate, I think I was quite sincere in my anti-God crusade. I sought
converts. In Chicago - where I was employed as an advertising man,
having given up as hopeless for a Jew the ambition of becoming a
professor of English - there was an institution known as the "nut
club." Membership was voluntary, unpaid, and the meetings were
held in a park. Every warm evening or weekend men bent on impressing
their views on one another would proceed to do so without formality.
Two arguers would lock horns and if they tussled well a crowd would
gather about them. No parliamentary rules and very few rules of
courtesy impeded the progress of the debate. Hour upon hour this would
continue, with new protagonists taking the place of the exhausted
ones. This "nut club" was just what I needed to develop my
enthusiasm and I was .a regular member, the protests of my young wife
notwithstanding. I was loyal to my atheism.
MORE EDUCATION
ABOUT eight years after I left college I ran across a book I had
heard something about and had put down on my reading list. It was
Progress and Poverty. A friend had a copy in his library -- he
said he had never read it - and while waiting for him to shave I read
the introduction entitled The Problem. It explored the age-old
social problem of poverty in the midst of plenty and promised .the.
reader an inquiry into the cause. I wasn't particularly interested in
the proposition, although my contact with poverty should have
predisposed me to it, but was struck with the literary style. Here was
something of the cameo clarity of Matthew Arnold, a little of the
parallel structure of Macauley, the periods of Edmund Burke, and with
all this Victorianism a new-world fervor that was catching. I know I
was more interested in how this man Henry George - some fellow who, I
had heard, had run for mayor of New York -- said it than in what he
had to say. Probably a nineteenth century essayist, I surmised, whom I
had missed and the deficiency had to be made up. I borrowed the book
for a week or two.
For six months I read and re-read this book, even to the neglect of
the "nut club." Some technicalities in economics delayed my
progress, and a rather involved discussion of the nature of interest
came near flooring me. There were, too, occasional panegyrics about
God and the natural order which I passed off as nineteenth century
flubdubbery with which the author sugar-coated his decidedly radical
ideas. Through it all there was a cogency in the reasoning that could
not be denied. I became convinced the author had something.
And then came a thought which disturbed my enthusiasm. If Mr. George
was right, that poverty and the fear of it stir up social hatreds,
then bigotry is a mere manifestation and organized religion is not a
basic cause. That tended to upset the case I had built up. Suppose, I
said to myself, I were to level all the churches, put the priesthood
out of business, convince everybody that religion is poison, there
would still be the problem of poverty; there would still be an
environment that makes for tough boys and another that produced
dinner-coated young gentlemen. And maybe, I continued, the troubles
which I had been laying at the door of the conniving pious is in fact
the product of poverty, as Mr. George claimed. Well, at any rate,
there were now two strings to my bow, economics and religion, and I
could vary my diatribes, just for a change.
I tried out my newly acquired theory in the park. The defense of an
idea begets conviction of its correctness. Even before I knew the
answers I managed to parry questions with plausabilities which,
strangely enough, I frequently found corroboration for in the book, to
which I had to refer often. The crowd seemed to be much more
interested in this poverty-in-the-midst-of-plenty argument than in
attacks on the institution of religion, and it might be that this
greater interest had some influence on my intellectual switch; even a
crusader likes to please a crowd, and, in fact, likes a crowd to
please. I gradually gave up on religion and put my reading time to
economics and social problems. These were subjects I had paid little
attention to at college; now they seemed all-important and I began
reading all I could find on them, including, of course, the other
books of Henry George. The thread of piety which ran through his works
I dismissed for years as so much persiflage. Finally, and reluctantly,
it dawned on me that his religious concepts in some way integrated his
economics and his social philosophy. His God and his natural law meant
something to his scheme of thought and I determined to find out what'
it was, even though, having been scorched by pragmatism as well as
agnosticism, I was sure there was nothing to it.
WHAT ABOUT "NATURAL RIGHTS"?
I FOUND in the writings of Mr. George frequent references to the idea
of absolute right. Upon reflection, it occurred to me that though this
idea is definitely metaphysical I had been relying upon it, without
question, in my quarrel with anti-semitism. It is the principle
enunciated in the Declaration of Independence, that in their public
relations all people must be accounted equal, that none have an
inherent claim to prerogatives as against the others. But why? Whence
comes the authority for this principle? It is not a legal matter,
since the implication is quite clear that the business of the law, in
theory at least, is merely to implement this inherent equality. It is
a law above the law, of an invariable which men may not affect even
though they ignore it to their detriment. Nor is this principle a
matter of expediency in social relations, as the pragmatists claim,
since on the ground of expediency argument could well be adduced for
the suspension of equality; as when a nobility or a political party
promote their own ascendancy "for the general good."
The Declaration finds authority for this principle of equality in a
Creator. Here the human mind, finding no other answer to its eternal "why,"
takes recourse to its imagination and invents a first cause. The
atheist rejects this concept as a myth, the agnostic says "I
don't know." But both of them, in attacking the evil practices of
organized religion, look to the "nature of things" for a
moral yardstick. Everybody who objects to injustices does so on the
ground that these practices violate some principle of justice which is
above human will. This is so even when authority for justice, or
equality among men, is found in the "dignity of the individual";
for that phrase is just as metaphysical as the "nature of things."
Reasoning so, I recognized that in spite of my pragmatic leanings I
too had unconsciously premised my social thinking on the assumption of
a "natural order." I saw that this assumption is the essence
of religious thinking, and I reflected how every social philosophy
with which I was familiar likewise fell back on an extra-human pattern
of things. Even the ultra-materialistic socialists, in their doctrine
of historical inevitability, are guilty of transcendentalism.
Admittedly, I reasoned, this is a flight of the finite mind from its
own limitations; it is a search for security in an invariable; it is
mining for bedrock in the infinite; and in so doing it must rely on
its power of imagination. It does so as a matter of necessity. It must
"make sense" of the world in which it lives, since it
revolts at the madness induced by chaos. If it rejects the principle
of essential equality among men, which admittedly it finds only in the
myth of the "natural order," the human mind is led logically
into a mess of obvious incongruities. Thus, if all men are not created
equal, what objection could one make to a master-and-slave status?
That a few enjoy wealth and power at the expense of the many should
occasion no quarrel, since it just happened so and there is no warrant
in reason for disturbing the arrangement. Exploitation, discrimination
or social disabilities of any kind do not exist if the premise of
parity is false. The only justification for a change in the status
would be the force one could apply toward that end. Rejection of any
concept of absolute right makes justice synonymous with power, and
that is an incongruity the mind finds difficult to accept. In its
flight from such madness the human mind finds haven in logical
fiction.
I found, then, that I had built my whole case against minority
disabilities on an article of faith. And there was not way of getting
away from it. Whichever way I turned the argument for equality I came
to the question of "rights," and soon found myself adding
the adjective "natural." The hide-bound realists, with whom,
up to this point, I counted myself, reject the doctrine of natural
rights as untenable; but their scoffing does not prove their case.
While they explain "rights" as political delimitations of
human behavior, they leave unexplained the justification or the
political power to dispense "rights" - unless, indeed, the
only justification for power is power, which is chaos again. If they
adhere to the democratic theory, that "rights" inhere in the
individual and that for practical purposes he turns them over to his
government, they must explain how the individual came by his "rights"
in the first place. The realist's fear of the imagination leaves him
without intellectual rudder.
Thus was undermined my faith in the inutility of faith. Putting aside
organized religion, discounting ritual, rejecting theological
doctrine, there still remained the necessity of establishing an
improvable "nature of things" as the final recourse of
inquiry. Not that the "nature of things" offers an
explanation for anything; but that the human mind must establish it as
the compendium of those invariable forces which, when understood, help
us to explain experience. The exigencies of life require that we go on
looking to nature for its secrets, and maintaining faith that in them
lies immutable law. And that, I believe, is the essence of the
God-idea.
AND "NATURAL LAW"?
THIRTY years ago students of Henry George foresaw the coming of the
New Deal, or something like it. The foresight stemmed from his chapter
entitled "How Modern Civilization May Decline." In this he
reasoned that the tendency of the wage level, regardless of productive
increases, toward the point of mere subsistence, would open the way
for State interference in economic affairs. Frustration and ignorance
would demand it, and the politician, bent on his own purposes, would
come forth with fantastic promises. Since politics is incapable of
raising wages, but can only impose interventions which lower the
productive level from which wages come, the result must be
deterioration. New and more impossible promises would supplant the
discredited ones. To carry them out the politician would ask for
additional powers, including, of course, new tax levies. Political
liberty would be put on the counter and offered at the bargain price
of a mess of pottage. The eventual outcome would be a dictatorship-he
called it, in 1879, an "imperatorship" - completely
dominating all things economic, as well as political and social.
The preventive, he said, lay in dissolution of the
poverty-amidst-plenty incongruity. For guidance we must look to the "natural
law" of political economy. Along with the classical school from
which he stemmed he held that political economy is a science,
concerned with the study of positive principles, completely impervious
to legislative tinkering. That philosophy o economics had been going
out of fashion Sprouting wings in those days was the economic planner,
who began by denying the classical tenet, and dedicated himself to the
idea that economics records and studies the experience of traditional
and legalized institutions; from such study it is possible to
ascertain day-to-day corrective of economic dislocations. In economics
(the name which supplanted the raw embracing subject of "political
economy" there are no constants, the embryonic planners said, no
invariable principles. Thus they laid the basis for the statement made
by President Roosevelt in 1933 that "there is no science of
economics."
It is not germane to this story to go into the economic theories of
Henry George. What I had to encompass, and what I think is the basic
economic issue of the present, is the doctrine of natural law.
Briefly, this is the doctrine: nature has its own ways of applying
means to ends, which are made known to us by critical observation; we
observe in nature the constant recurrence of certain sequences, and
because of that constancy we ascribe to the sequences a
cause-and-effect relationship; we describe this presumably causal
relationship in words or symbols, which we call natural law. The
function of the "law" is to help us predict, to apply
nature's means to our own ends. Thus, when we observed that water
always seeks its own level - a natural law - we were able to place our
plumbing so as I bring about desired results.
Now, it is a certainty that nature does not ring a bell when we have
hit upon one of her laws, and it is also a certain that we have "discovered"
some that subsequent investigation has shown up to be frauds. For
these reasons the pragmatists reject the doctrine of natural law out
of hand; there ain't no such animal, they say. They describe the
constant sequence as probabilities; what has always happened, as far
as we know, will probably recur in the future, but there is no
assurance that it will. Natural law is a figment the imagination, and
so is causality.
Between the pragmatist and the transcendentalist there will never be
more than a truce. Each represents a subjective attitude so
deep-rooted that no objective meeting ground is possible. I believe I
took to the natural law doctrine because of an inherent distrust of
leadership; omniscience was too much to expect of the human and his
integrity was equally questionable. I knew what faith in their wisdom
has done to the priest and the politician, and students could be led
astray if they took their professors to heart. Even in my college days
I had fought it out with the socialists, before I knew the economic
answers, on the ground that man's management of man is presumptuous
and fraught with danger. I would rely on some thing less frail,
something free of foibles, something impersonal. That something could
be nothing else than nature. True, she is a rather elusive one,
difficult to de scribe, let alone to handle, and philosophy could
argue her non-existence. Nevertheless, she had proven herself a
helpful fiction, if that is her real character, in the progress of
mankind. I would trust her more than any man I ever knew or read
about.
The difficulty, however, was that acceptance of the natural law
doctrine called for faith in an order of things outside man and his
works; and faith and I had been on the cuts since I first laid all
social difficulties at the door of religion. I had fortified myself
against the God-idea implied in the natural law doctrine. In my study
of philosophy I met transcendentalism with a knowing smile. Youth
admits of no unconquerable ramparts of thought and attacks every
unknown with complete confidence in its offensive powers. That is the
proper function of youth, for from the vigor of its self-assurance our
fund of knowledge does profit. But, when maturity comes to check up on
youth's achievements the sum-total looks too much like spit and
polish. The basic enigmas which youth inherits it passes on.
And so, I came to the God-idea because my rejection of it put
rational thinking on a merry-go-round; there was no way of measuring
the validity of an idea except by itself. The emotional storm which
anti-semitism had stirred up caused me to throw overboard the anchor
of reason. I had confused the organization which presumed to
monopolize religion with religion itself, which is merely faith in the
possibility of an explanatory pattern of constancies. If nature cannot
provide any guide to orderly thinking, any roles for an overall
harmony, then man's eternal search for one is silly. Must we look to
parliaments for guidance? We might as well resign ourselves to
wandering about in a maze of contradictions and quit trying to make
sense of experience.
SO, WHAT IS A JEW?
WHEN I was convinced that the primary cause of social discord is
economic, I gave thought again to the so-called Jewish problem.
Admitting, I said to myself, and to those who cared to listen, that
some people delight in disliking Jews or any other minority, the
matter would not come to violent hatred if everybody were always fully
occupied at making a living and enjoying life. There would be no time
for that sort of thing. And if it were realized that under proper
conditions every pair of hands, even Jewish, add to the general fund
of wealth, the dislike might be replaced by a healthier emotion.
Oftimes, however, the getting of a living under our socio-economic
arrangement is attended with frightening difficulty. At all times,
except when war or its anticipation keeps us busy, there seem to be
more willing to work than our economy can employ, and the competition
for jobs is disheartening; not only are some forced to go without but
those who are employed get relatively little out of it. This is bad
enough in itself, but it looms still worse when the evidence of
existing plenty is all too strong. To the discomfort of going without
and the exasperation of futility is added a feeling of injustice; the
unfairness is more maddening than the lack.
At this point in human affairs the pagan custom of locating a culprit
comes upon us. Divinity is not immune from this habit of mind, for it
is proclaimed, and proven with figures, that there are more mouths
than nature can provide for, regardless of the pair of hands which
accompany each mouth. The surplus population must be got rid of, one
way or another. That's the answer of the pragmatic literate, who go on
to say that nature's way of balancing accounts is some form of mass
slaughter. To the unlettered unemployed, however, a more specific
culprit is necessary. Who took my job, who robbed me of my trade and
my business? Peculiarly enough, the blame is always put on somebody
who is least capable of defending himself from the charge or from any
action that might be taken. In Texas it may be the Mexican; in
California all economic troubles came from Oriental competitors; in
New England, after the Civil War and even into this century, it was
the Irish. The ex-slave has been an especially easy target, and then,
of course, there is the Jew. There must be a culprit, as every
reformer knows; would socialism have some as far as it has without the
help of bosses, capitalists, bourgeois and fascists?
It is a very ancient custom, this business of scapegoats. According
to the record, the Philistines served the Israelites in that capacity,
while all the troubles of the Roman plebian came out of Carthage. The
peculiarity of the Jew is that he has served as scapegoat number one
for nearly twenty centuries throughout the world. Other minorities
have been picked on at times, but wherever the Jew has made his
presence felt in numbers he has held the lead role with little
competition. The pogrom has been standard procedure whenever economic
difficulties burst into social disaffection. Admitting the evidence of
history on this point, there still remains this question as to why the
Jew has been so consistently singled out.
We cannot dislike a people until we are convinced that these people
are essentially different from us. It is easy then to establish
inferiority. Our military men found, for instance, that hatred of the
Germans was difficult to arouse, simply because it was difficult to
establish an essential difference between the New Yorker and the
Berliner, and tortuous argument had to be resorted to; with the
Japanese the problem was quite simple for anybody so different from us
in appearance must be inferior to us in capacities, to say nothing of
character. Similar rationalization supports the disabilities put upon
Orientals, Mexicans and Negroes in this country. The Jew, however,
makes things difficult by offering a minimum of physical differences
from his tormentor; his particularism had to be established.
This problem of identification was made easy by the Jew. He made
himself a "different" kind of person long years ago. He
accumulated a culture in the ancient days and has carried this
culture, like necessary baggage, throughout his peregrinations. There
is no doubt that where they hare not suffered from segregation, or too
confined segregation; Jews have added the culture of their neighbors
to their own, sometimes to the point of self-submergence.
Nevertheless, the indicia of their culture -which is the sum-total of
those habits of language, tradition, religion, knowledge and
mannerisms which an integrated people acquire - have left their mark.
The mark becomes less visible as less notice is paid it, and more
pronounced as persecution forces them back into themselves, for mutual
protection and solace. It will be recalled that when Hitler began his
anti-semitic campaign many a German Jew had to learn what it is to be
a Jew; the culture was foreign to him.
One item in this culture needs to be emphasized at this time; I
believe it is the one that has got the Jew into difficulties. That is
the tendency toward self-expression which we call individualism. It
may be that this characteristic stems from his ancient education (see
the Hebrew Prophets), and it may be that it was brought on by
necessity. At any rate, the Jewish child has drilled into him almost
from birth the importance of self-improvement through self-help. Never
is the individual taught that group excellence is more important than,
or different from, individual excellence. It is he, the unit of the
tribe, that makes it. Undoubtedly, this training shows up in an
inordinate self-respect which, in a weak character, becomes irritating
self-assertion. The point I wish to make is that Jewish culture is
definitely not socialistic, even though tribal adherence has always
been emphasised as a matter of self preservation. That many Jews have
advanced socialistic ideas is true, but I believe this can be
explained as an inclination to protect against injustices, which is
characteristic of the individualist. Karl Marx, it must be remembered,
was an anti-statist, advocating the peculiar notion of abolishing the
state through an interim dictatorship. Among the Old Bolsheviks were a
number of Jews, more than their proportionate population would entitle
them to; but it is significant that very few of them escaped the
Stalinist purges; the Jew is too individualistic to be tolerated by
the collectivism he sometimes urges.
Be that as it may, the differentiation "which marks the Jew is
cultural. A friend of mine, a scholar and an aesthete, deplored the
urge toward assimilation on the ground that the best in this culture
would thereby be lost to mankind. However, it is his cultural idioms
which identifies the Jew as a "different" sort of person,
thus qualifying him for the role of minority scapegoat. Whether
assimilation can completely eradicate these idioms is a question that
cannot be decided until a long period of non-discrimination has
permitted assimilation to take its course. So long as the institutions
which bring about a scarcity economy are in force, the Jew will not
divest himself of his historic role. The so-called Jewish problem,
then - and this is true of all minority problems - is at bottom
neither racial nor religious, but economic. Its eradication is
dependent on the solution of the poverty-amidst-plenty problem. Maybe
natural law can show the way; surely, the makeshifts of political law
have failed.
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