Review of the Book
Anarchy, State, and Utopia
by Robert Nozick
Robert De Fremery
[Reprinted from Land & Liberty,
November-December, 1979]
Robert De Fremery analyses Anarchy,
State, and Utopia, a thought-provoking book by Robert Nozick,
Professor of Philosophy at Harvard. Nozick proclaims the sacredness
of the rights of individuals. His analysis of the right to property
is of particular significance. Nozick depends to a great extent on
John Locke, whose theory of property was analyzed by Herbert Spencer
in 1850. This critique of Nozick, Locke and Spencer indicates that
Nozick is a Spencerian rather than a Lockean without being aware of
it.
In the introduction to John Locke's Of Civil Government - Second
Treatise, Russell Kirk said:
... we are beginning to see what
Locke took for granted, that freedom of every sort is founded upon
the security of private property.[1]
Yes, and one of the main threats to freedom stems from our
unawareness of the inadequacy of Locke's theory of property. Nozick's
treatment of this subject[2]
is a good example of this, as will become apparent. Locke's theory is
stated thus:
Whether we consider natural
reason... or Revelation... 'tis very clear that God... has given the
....... to mankind in common.
It follows, therefore, that every mars has an equal right to the
earth and its natural produce. Locke agreed:
... all the fruits it naturally
produces, and beasts it feeds, belong to mankind in common, as they
are produced by the spontaneous band of nature: ...
But this gives rise to the problem of determining the best means of
assuring the efficient use and cultivation of the earth and its
produce without violating the aforesaid rights. Locke's solution:
Though the earth and all inferior
creatures be common to all men, yet every man has a property in his
own person; this, nobody has any right to but himself. The labour of
his body and the work of his hands we may say are properly his.
Whatsoever, then, he removes out of the state that nature bath
provided and left it in, he bath mixed his labour with, and joined
to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his property.
It being by him removed from the common state nature placed it in,
it bath by this labour something annexed to it that excludes the
common right of other men. For this labour being the unquestionable
property of the labourer, no man but he can have a right to what
that is once joined to, at least where there is enough, and as good
left in common for others. (My italics).
That part of the last sentence is obviously essential to Locke's
theory. It is called "the Lockean proviso." He relied
heavily on it, and referred to it again and again. For example:
Nor was this appropriation of any
parcel of land, by improving it, any prejudice to any other man,
since there was still enough and as good left; and more than the yet
unprovided could use (My italics).
Nozick also stressed the importance of not violating the Lockean
provisio:
The crucial point is whether
appropriation of an unowned object worsens the situation of others."
"Locke's proviso that there be 'enough and as good left in
common for others' is meant to ensure that the situation of others
is not worsened.
Once it is known that someone's ownership
runs afoul of the Lockean proviso, there are straight limits on what
he may do with (what it is difficult any longer unreservedly to
call) 'his property'." ... an owner's property right in the
only island in an area does not allow him to order a castaway from a
shipwreck off his island as a trespasser, for this would violate the
Lockean proviso.
But -- important as is the proviso to Locke's and Nozick's theory of
property -- a theory which underlines most of our existing laws
dealing with property and the taxation thereof -- it is hopelessly
inadequate. Nozick himself expressed some doubts about it:
Why does mixing one's labour with
something make one the owner of it? Perhaps because one owns one's
labour, and so one comes to own a previously unowned thing that
becomes permeated with what one owns. Ownership seeps over into the
rest. But why isn't mixing what I own with what I don't own a way of
losing what I own rather than a way of gaining what I don't? ... Why
should one's entitlement extend to the whole object rather than just
to the added value one's labour has produced?
Those are all very provocative and important questions -- far too
important to be ignored. Yet Nozick, after raising them, proceeds to
remove them from his mind by making the surprising statement:
No workable or coherent
value-added property scheme has yet been devised, and any such
scheme presumably would fall to objections (similar to those) that
befell the theory of Henry George.
The fact is that Herbert Spencer,[3]
faced with questions similar to those of Nozick's regarding Locke's
theory of property, did precisely what Nozick asserted has never been
done. He devised a "workable or coherent value-added property
scheme" - one that is infinitely more workable than that devised
by Locke and endorsed by Nozick.
Spencer attacked Locke's theory of property mercilessly:
If inclined to cavil, one might
in reply to this observe, that as, according to the premises, 'the
earth and all inferior creatures' - all things, in fact, that the
earth produces - are common to all men,' the consent of all men must
be obtained before any article can be equitably 'removed from the
common state nature bath placed it in.' It might be argued that the
real question is overlooked, when it is said, that, by gathering any
natural produce, a man 'bath mixed his labour with it, and joined
to it something that is his own, and thereby made it his property,'
for that the point to be debated is, whether he had any right to
gather, or mix his labour with that, which, by the hypothesis,
previously belonged to mankind at large. The reasoning used in the
last chapter to prove that no amount of labour, bestowed by an
individual upon a part of the earth's surface, can nullify the title
of society to that part, might be similarly employed to show that no
one can, by the mere act of appropriating to himself any wild
unclaimed animal or fruit, supersede the joint claims of other men
to it may be quite true that the labour a man expends in catching or
gathering, gives him a better right to the thing caught or gathered,
than any one other man; but the question at issue is, whether by
labour so expended, he has made his right to the thing caught or
gathered, greater than the pre-existing rights of all other men put
together And unless he can prove that he has done this, his title to
possession cannot be admitted as a matter of right, but can be
conceded only on the ground of convenience.
Further difficulties are suggested by the
qualification, that the claim to any article of property thus
obtained, is valid only 'wben there is enough and as good left in
common for others.' A condition like this gives birth to such a host
of queries, doubts, and limitations, as practically to neutralize
the general proposition entirely. It may be asked, for example - How
is it to be known that enough is 'left in common for others'? Who
can determine whether what remains is 'as good' as what is taken;
How if the remnant is less accessible? If there is not enough 'left
in common for others,' how must the right of appropriation be
exercised? Why, in such case, does the mixing of labour with the
acquired object cease to 'exclude the common right of other men'?
Supposing enough to be attainable, but not all equally good, by what
rule must each man choose?
Spencer then put forward his own theory -- a theory that made it
possible to justify each man's right to the wealth he produced while
at the same time protecting each man's equal right to the earth. His
solution was simple and straightforward: he agreed with Locke that Cod
gave the earth to mankind in common. Therefore, he said, every
landholder should pay into a public fund to be used for public
purposes the rental value of the land he holds.
..... in doing this, he does no
more than what every other man is equally free with himself to do -
that each has the same power with himself to become the tenant --
and that the rent he pays accrues to all. Having thus hired a tract
of land from his fellow-men, for a given period, for understood
purposes, and on specified terms - having thus obtained, for a time,
the exclusive use of that land by a definite agreement with its
owners, it is manifest that an individual may, without any
infringement of the rights of others, appropriate to himself that
portion of produce which remains alter be has paid to mankind the
promised rent He has now, to use Locke's expression, 'mixed his
labour with' certain products of the earth; and his claim to them in
this case valid, because he obtained the consent of society before
expending his labour; and having fulfilled the condition which
society imposed in giving that consent -- the payment of rent --
society, to fulfil its part of the agreement, must acknowledge his
title to that surplus which remains after the rent has been paid.
The significance of Spencer's theory can not be overestimated. What
he did was to show the interrelationship and interdependence of our
natural rights. By acknowledging mankind's equal right to the earth,
we can protect each man's right to keep and enjoy -- free of taxation
[4] -- all the results of his
productive activity. By acknowledging and protecting our common right
to that which mankind did not create (the earth), we can protect each
man's right to that which he does create. By acknowledging and
protecting that which is rightfully common property (land), we can
protect that which is rightfully private property (labour and
capital). If we fail to protect the first right, governments --
lacking an adequate means of support -- will have to violate the
second right by taxing labour and capital. The two rights are
interdependent.
Spencer's method was modified 21 years later by Henry George.[5]
Instead of having the Government involved in the leasing of land,
George suggested having taxes on land increased to the point that they
equalled the rental value of 'Nature's gift' and remove all taxes on
labour and capital --- thus protecting the right to private properly
in that which man creates. In other words, tax -- or make common --
that which ought to be common property (the rental value of land), and
refrain from taxing that which ought to be private property (the
wealth produced by man). Then, and only then, would we have a tax
system that would be consistent with an ethical theory of private
property.[6]
George's more practical application of Spencer's theory of property[7]
resulted in a growing clamour for reform. Repercussions were
inevitable.
Spencer's carefully reasoned theory of property rights were so
clearly stated and so irrefutable that George's followers reproduced
it in large quantities to aid the reform movement. But the man who in
earlier years had said "Equity sternly commands that it be done"[8]
changed his position without giving any justification for so doing.
The resulting attack on Spencer was very distasteful to him. Albert
Jay Nock -- in a footnote to the introduction to Spencer's The Man
Versus The State -- commented on this change of heart:
In 1892 Spencer published a
revision of Social Statics, in which he made some minor changes, and
for reasons of his own -reasons which have never been made clear or
satisfactorily accounted for -- he vacated one position which he
held in 1851, and one which is most important to his general
doctrine of individualism. It is needless to say that in abandoning
a position, for any reason or for no reason, one is quite within
one's rights, but it must also be observed that the abandonment of a
position does not in itself affect the position's validity. It
serves mainly to raise the previous question whether the position is
or is not valid. Galileo's disavowal of Copernican astronomy, for
example, does no more, at most, than send one back to a
re-examination of the Copernican system. To an unprejudiced mind,
Spencer's action in 1892 suggests no more than that the reader
should examine afresh the position taken in 1851, and make his own
decision about its validity, or lack of validity, on the strength of
the evidence offered.[9]
Nozick presumably knew about Spencer's attack on the Lockean proviso,
his tightly-reasoned theory of property, his later recantation and
Nock's comments about it, because he listed Spencer's first edition of
Social Statics and the Caxton edition of Spencer's Man Versus The
State in his bibliography.
Yet he did not consider Spencer's original position worthy of
refutation. Why not? Was it because of his (Nozick's) stated belief
that "any such scheme presumably would fall to objections
(similar to those) that befell the theory of Henry George"? If
so, that is not adequate. That would be making the unwarranted
assumption that the objections to George's theory were valid.
If that is actually what Nozick thinks, one wonders how well
acquainted he is with George. Not one of George's books is listed in
Nozick's bibliography. Has he ever made a serious attempt to
understand George? Or did he make the mistake of accepting the verdict
of other scholars whom he respected? If the latter is true, what about
Nock,[10] whose razor-edged
mind and passion for individualism are well-known to all libertarians?
And what about such intellectual giants in their field (economics) as
Alfred Marshall, A.C. Pigou, and John R. Commons? They all agreed
George was right but they thought it was too late to do anything about
it. Too late? Too late for men to establish a state that protects
their rights? That is what they said. But surely a philosopher cannot
take such a position?
The most puzzling thing of all about Nozick's position becomes
apparent when he makes the following statement, which is consistent
with Spencer's theory of property and George's practical application
of that theory:
Someone whose appropriation
otherwise would violate the proviso still may appropriate provided
he compensates the others so that their situation is not thereby
worsened; unless he does compensate these others, his appropriation
will violate the proviso of the principle of justice in acquisition
and will be an illegitimate one.
Is that not precisely what Spencer and George said? Spencer would
have each landholder pay rent to society as a whole. George thought it
would be simpler to have each landholder pay taxes equal to the rental
value of the land he wished to use. In either case society -- all of
us -- would be compensated by every landholder and no person would
have his situation worsened by the private use of part of our common
heritage.
How does Nozick propose to compensate the others? He says it must be
done. Of course it must. But how is he going to do it? Can he suggest
a simpler way than that which George suggested? And if Nozick doesn't
wish to have his minimal state recover -- via taxation -- the rental
value of our common heritage for public purposes, what happens to our
equal rights to that heritage? Will they not be violated? Spencer
showed how to avoid violating those rights. If Nozick does not like
the Spencer-George solution, what does he suggest as an alternative
that will still protect those rights? How else can we make a reality
of the Jefferson principle "Equal rights for all -- special
privileges for none"?
Consider what has happened as a direct result of our failure to
protect our equal rights to our common heritage. A class of privileged
landholders came into existence that are able to live off the ground
rents charged others for the use of "their" land. The sums
paid for the use of valuable sites can be enormous. Can anyone
seriously claim that such payments are in exchange for a service? Does
Nozick call this "distributive justice"? If not, what does
he propose to do about it?
I hope I have not been to harsh in my criticism of a very small part
of Nozick's book. It is a great book in spite of what I have said. I
admire the thoughts of this deep-thinking individualist - particularly
his repeated emphasis on the importance of not violating the Lockean
proviso and his defiant attitude toward any state that violates men's
rights. That shows his keen sense of justice. That his theory of
property needs tightening is a minor thing by comparison. And I feel
certain that when he re-examines Spencer -- as Nock suggested -- he
will find the coherent, workable value-added scheme he badly needs to
strengthen the philosophical foundation of his minimal state.
NOTES AND REFERENCES
- John Locke Of Civil
Government -- Second Treatise, Chicago: Henry Regnery Company,
1955, p. xi.
- Robert Nozick Anarchy,
State, and Utopia, New York: Basic Books Inc., pp.174-182
- Herbert Spencer Social
Statics, New York: D. Appleton and Co., 1870, first published
1850.
- William Penn suggested the
same thing in 1693. He said: "If all men were so far tenants
in common to the public that the superfluities of gain and expense
were applied to the exigencies thereof, it would put an end to
taxes,..." See Penn, Fruits of Solitude, Part II,
p.222.
- Henry George, Our Land and
Land Policy, 1871, later expanded to become Progress and
Poverty (1879)
- For the benefit of
libertarians who look upon all forms of taxation as legalised
robbery committed by the state, it should be pointed Out that a
distinction needs to be made between a tax on the rental value of
raw land and a tax on wealth produced by man.. The former is
really a quid pro quo -- not a tax. It is a payment to all of us,
through the government, for the right of exclusive use of part of
our common heritage. Such a payment is necessary to prevent what
would otherwise be the robbery of all citizens by a few, i.e., the
private pocketing of the rental value of our common heritage.
- To avoid any misunderstanding
I should point out that George did not appropriate Spencer's
theory of property. He arrived at it independently. There were
also many others who arrived at the same principle long before
Spencer. See George R. Geiger, The Philosophy of Henry George,
New York: Macmillan, 1933.
- Spencer, op. cit., p.144.
- Spencer, The Man Versus
the Slate, Caldwell, Idaho: Caxton, 1946, p. VII.
- Nock looked upon Spencer's
theory of property and George's adaptation thereof as "irrefutable".
Of George's second "missionary journey" through England
and Scotland he wrote: "On this whirlwind tour of incessant
propaganda, he had two maln objectives in view. The first was to
make unmistakenly clear his attitude towards al1 the works and
ways of collectivism. He did this in so aggressive and workmanlike
a style that one wonders anew at Spencer's ludicrous error in
classing him with the collectivist. He preached straight
individualism by day and by night, in and out of season. On the
Marxians, led by the brilliant and able Hyneman, he declared open
war, no quarter, and no prisoners taken. Socialists and
near-socialists of whatever breed or brand went into debate with
him only to die a horrible death under torture of the rack and
thumbscrew. Never was he worsted, never forced to a tactical
retreat. Never had the world seen such a powerful, popular
exponent of uncompromising individualism, nor has it seen another
like him since his day." Albert Jay Nock, Henry George,
William Morrow and Co., 1939.
- Nozick, op. cit. p.178.
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