

charge, Atwater points out that a major step in the growing trade dispute was taken by the United States in May 1970 when the House of Representatives began to consider a trade bill that included ways of imposing quotas on textile and shoe imports. Suddenly, all of the protectionist sentiment that had been building up in the country broke loose. During the hearing on the bill a total of 377 witnesses gave 4,600 pages of evidence which included pleas for special help by everyone from bicycle manufacturers to mink ranchers, from mushroom growers to candlestick makers. But as one Common Market official said to Atwater, "If the United States does not phase out some of its chronically troubled industries you will find some day that you have protected marginal industries at the expense of the economy as a whole."

This commentator at least has no illusions about the future. With the EEC economy headed by Germany

growing at a fast pace and with industrial Japan a major force to reckon with, the United States will find the going very tough if it seeks a protectionist role. Retaliation is bound to follow and as Atwater concludes: "Now is the time for the US to take the lead in pushing for a new break-through in international trade. Otherwise, the States and their trading partners may learn to their sorrow a hard but unavoidable fact: in a trade war there are no winners only losers."

Now is the time for the US to instigate another Kennedy Round type of discussion to see how far the major trading nations are prepared to lower or terminate completely their tariff barrier and quotas. Even if this is not feasible the best course of action for the US at the moment would be to take a unilateral step towards freer trade. After all, no US housewife would complain about cheaper goods in the stores in a period of rising prices.



Collapse of Stout Party

DAVID MILLS

"THE DECLINE of the Liberal Party was not due to the inescapable logic of history, or the inapplicability of Liberal remedies to the issues of the day, but to avoidable mistakes made by Liberals themselves. What failed was not Liberalism but Liberals."

So writes Dr. Douglas of the major theme of his book*, the astounding story of the twenty-five years from the General Election of 1906 to that of 1931. The secondary theme, the persistence of the Party since then in defiance of "the usual rule that an institution must either advance or retrogress" brings the story up to the present day.

In fact the Liberal collapse occurred over the ten years between the outbreak of World War I, when a Liberal Government was in office, and the General Election of 1924, which returned a mere forty Liberal M.P.s of whom only seven had won their seats against both Conservative

and Labour opposition. 1929 was better, but at the time of the Slump the last of a series of disastrous splits sundered the Liberal Party, and its representation in the House of Commons has never been numerically significant since.

The book is what it says it is, the history of the Liberal Party. Because "we are here concerned primarily with the effect of events upon Liberals rather than with the effect of Liberals upon events" it is of great advantage for the reader to have some acquaintance with the general history of the present century. Nevertheless, sufficient information on the principal developments and major issues is supplied, through at least until 1933, for the main flow of events to be appreciated too. In fact, the book is most lucidly and tightly written, and the material admirably arranged and presented. Thus, the reader is surely and knowledgeably guided through the divisions and alliances, groupings and counter-groupings, splits and reunifications, which are the story of the Liberal Party from 1916 to 1926. This is the period of Asquithian and Lloyd

Georgeite factionalism, the period when, electorally, the Party collapsed, but the seeds of that disaster had already been sown before World War I broke out.

In what is perhaps the most important chapter in the book. Dr. Douglas traces the relationship of the Liberal Party with the Trades Unions, the Labour Representation Committee, and, eventually, the Labour Party, in the period up to the outbreak of war in 1914. It is an astonishing story which unfolds. Although Lord Rosebery had issued a warning as far back as 1894, consistently down to 1914 and even afterwards, "the Party Whips fought those people who contended that the existence of a separate Labour organisation would at best split radical votes and at worst threaten the existence of the Liberal Party." Thus electoral arrangements were concluded favouring the Labour candidates, no effort was made to prevent the Miners' Federation from switching its allegiance, and no resistance was offered when the Labour Party insisted that Lib-Lab M.P.s defend their seats as Labour. None of this need have proved fatal in the long run, though, if the Trade Union Act of 1913, described by Dr. Douglas as "perhaps the most disastrous measure which the Liberals could possibly have set upon the Statute Book," had not made provisions for a separate Union political fund, which by definition could not be used for industrial action or for

**The History of the Liberal Party, 1890-1970* by Roy Douglas, published by Sidgwick and Jackson, Ltd. £5 hard cover edition, £1.75 paper back edition.

general welfare purposes, and which inevitably therefore made its way in large part into Labour Party coffers.

If the Liberal Party's collapse is attributable primarily to what Liberals themselves did, or did not do, it is a good deal less easy to explain why the Party has been able

to maintain for the last thirty-five or forty years its small but frequently vigorous hold on life. The author suggests a number of possible reasons, but the most likely one seems to be "that the Liberal persistence has been due to different things at different times." Has the Party a future?

Dr. Douglas thinks so, though he does suggest that an internal danger faces Liberals if they continue to ignore traditional Liberalism in the way they have done in the 1960s.

Here is a stimulating, well-researched, and, above all, a thoroughly readable book.

Self-inflicted Blight—A challenge to St. Louis

PERRY PRENTICE

Mr. Prentice was for 25 years Vice-President of Time, Inc., and was formerly editor of *House and Home*, the world's largest building trades magazine. From an address to the Chamber of Commerce of Metropolitan St. Louis, Mo.

AROUND New York the Regional Plan Association found that it cost \$16,850 of 1966 purchasing power or, say, twenty thousand of today's dollars just to pay the proportionate capital cost of the added community facilities—new roads, new streets, new water supplies, new sewer lines, new schools and colleges, new hospitals, new police and fire facilities, etc., needed to make one added residence reachable, livable and saleable. Across the country the Southern California Research Council came up with a figure only \$1,000 or so less for Los Angeles, so your added community costs per added residence in the St. Louis area must be somewhere in that same range.

Are you prepared to face all these added costs out in the county instead of taking maximum advantage of the enormous community investment you have already made inside your city?

And this brings me back to the question—why are you letting, what the Center for Community Change calls an urban ghost town, pre-empt the very heart of what must be one of the most accessible and therefore most desirable and potentially most valuable urban locations between the Alleghenies and the Rockies?

I've been asking that question ever since I agreed to come here to talk to you and I've been given two half-answers that nobody I've spoken to here seems to have put together to make a whole.

The first half-answer was spelled out nineteen years ago in the Chamber of Commerce magazine by the

then chairman of your Industrial-Commercial Re-development Committee: he said, "Industry and commerce find themselves land-locked in the city without the means of acquiring land at a reasonable cost to permit expansion. 'Such', he said, 'is the crisis confronting St. Louis.' And last week the general manager of the Chamber repeated the same explanation to me in simpler terms: 'The major problem in the City of St. Louis', he wrote me, 'is that land is not available for expansion.'"

Now I don't question for a minute that what he wrote me is true, but it is just plain preposterous that it should be true. Here is a city that has lost nearly a third of its population, a city that has lost hundreds of industrial plants, a city that is described as further down the road to total abandonment than any other city in the country, and still you tell me—and tell me truly, I am sure—that land is not available!

This is the paradox to end all paradoxes.

At a density much lower than the density New York is now subsidizing for urban renewal, there is room enough in your city for nearly ten times your city's present population to live and work and shop and enjoy almost every indoor and outdoor recreation except hunting and par-4 golf.

I would be the last to suggest that you should now replan and restructure your city for anything like that many people, but I can assure you without fear of informed contradiction that if you would take advantage

of today's new tools and capacities to start planning forward for tomorrow instead of planning backward for yesterday, all the people who now live sprawled over 564 miles of your county could find plenty of room to live pleasantly, economically, and spaciouly inside the city line and walk to work past plenty of greenery in less time than it takes them now to get to work by car or bus.

In brief, what you have here in your city is not a shortage of land, but a very costly and unnecessary waste of land.

And that brings me to the second half of the answer—the second half that explains why so much of the land in your city is wasted that you seem to have no land available to grow win.

I found the second half of the answer in the Chamber of Commerce promotion booklet that spelled out proudly how low your real estate tax is, and I got that second half of the answer confirmed in detail in Roy Wenzlick's research. Out of 91 cities covered by his study there are only fourteen cities—most of them very small—whose real estate tax is as low as yours!

You seem to think this low tax is good for your city. On the contrary, as now applied, I am afraid it is very bad. You have been taxing unused, and misused land so lightly that you have harnessed the profit motive to leaving it unused, underused, or misused instead of putting tax pressure on its owners to release it at a reasonable price to someone who would put it to fuller and better use. You have, in effect, been subsidizing blight, decay, slum formation, and land waste by undertaxation.

When you give the owners of unused, misused, and underused land an annual undertaxation subsidy like that, is it any wonder the owners of that unused, misused, and underused land have decided they might