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Sadat's Negotiations with the United States and Israel: *Camp David and Blair House*

By ADEL SAFTY*

ABSTRACT. The outcome of the negotiations between the *Egyptians* and the *Americans* and the *Israelis* reflected the balance of power between the negotiators in the period 1974–1979. But a realistic assessment of the forces at play at the beginning of negotiations in 1973 could have facilitated a far more effective utilization of the *Arab* coalition power that was successfully marshalled for the 1973 military operation and for the brief political battle which ensued. *Anwar Sadat* based his strategies on a highly personalistic assessment of the relevant policies of Israel and the United States, and of their respective relative power. Sadat's decision-making and his ability to make concessions was facilitated by the authoritarian character of his rule. The documentary record suggests that Egyptian decisions and negotiating strategies from *Sinai* to *Camp David* fundamentally reflected President Sadat's psycho-political perceptions and his highly personalized approach to diplomacy.

I

Camp David

SADAT came to Camp David after he had given up practically all his bargaining chips. He came after signing the second disengagement agreement, breaking with the Arabs (the sixth power in the world), severing all ties with the Soviet Union, and acquiescing in American secret commitments to significantly enhance Israel's strategic and military capabilities. Sadat faced an Israel militarily and strategically more powerful than ever, still in physical occupation of an important part of the Egyptian territory, and demonstrably able to influence American foreign policy. He relied on an American President who confessed his impotence vis-à-vis his recalcitrant ally and continued to have faith in Washington in spite

* [Adel Safty, Ph.D., is assistant political science professor, Dept. of Language Education, the University of British Columbia, 2125 Main Mall, Vancouver, B. C., Canada V6T 1Z5.] This is the second article with the same general title. The first appeared in the 1991 issue of this *Journal*. It began the account here concluded under the sub-title "From Sinai to Camp David." The author wishes to thank Minister Mohamed Ibrahim Kamel for his help in going over the Camp David negotiations.

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of clear indications that the American/Israeli strategic and political relationship was too powerful a combination to defeat by a President who had little to offer except the removal of his country from the conflict. Sadat was in a precarious position. It is not clear how he and his delegation, including the Foreign Ministry professionals who had a good grasp of the issues, intended to accomplish their stated goals. Mohamed Kamel, Egypt's Foreign Minister who disagreed with Sadat's concessions at Camp David, made a remarkable observation that gave a hint of the frame of mind of the Egyptian negotiators. He wrote: "the Egyptian 'Framework for Peace' project was not intended as the basis for a negotiating position subject to bargaining. Had we had bargaining in mind, the project would have been based, for instance, on the partition resolution. In that case Israel would have been required to return all the territories it had annexed by force from the territories allocated to the Palestinian state by the terms of the said resolution from 1949 to 1967. Rather the project depended on the strict implementation of Resolution 242, which contained the basic elements for a settlement of the conflict."¹

It is not clear what the Egyptians had in mind if not bargaining. Nor is it clear why their project was not based on the 1947 UN resolution which partitioned Palestine. This resolution recognizes the legitimacy of the Palestinians' right to self-determination and national independence, whereas Resolution 242 treats the Palestinian question as a humanitarian rather than a political issue. In addition, in requiring Israel to withdraw only to territories occupied since 1967 and requiring the Arab states to recognize Israel's sovereignty and territorial integrity, Resolution 242 was in fact legalizing the Israeli occupation of the territories of Palestine seized by Israel in 1948-49 in excess of the area of the Jewish state as defined by United Nations partition resolution of 1947. This violates resolution 242's own preamble which reaffirmed the principle of "the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war". That is precisely why the Israelis insisted that any negotiations be based on Resolution 242 and not on anything else.

The Egyptians were also told about Carter's inability to pressure Israel. The negotiations at Camp David confirmed Carter's own warnings in that respect. He did make some unconvincing attempts at getting Menahem Begin to agree to the officially stated American position, but to no avail. According to an Israeli account, Carter said at a meeting of the American and Israeli delegations that he intended to bring up the issue of the national rights of the Palestinians. "Out of the question," Begin replied. Carter raised the question of a freeze on new settlements, the Israelis objected immediately. When the discussion came to Resolution 242 clause about the "Non-acquisition of territory by force" Begin strongly affirmed: "We will not accept that (clause)." "Mr. Prime Minister,"

Carter replied, "that is not only the view of Sadat, it is also the American view—and you will have to accept it" . . . "Mr. President," Begin said tersely. "No threats, please."² In fact, it seems that it was Begin who was able to use threats against Carter. Towards the end of the conference, Dayan warned the Americans that if President Carter insisted on "setting out in detail the American position on East Jerusalem, Begin would simply pack his bags and go home," Vance wrote: "We were very angry. Carter furiously demanded to know if Israel meant to tell the United States it could not even publicly state its own national position."³ That is precisely what happened. The United States was not able to explicitly state its own position in the letter dealing with Jerusalem.

It is surprising that the Egyptians were astonished when Carter told them that he would submit an American project for a settlement based on the Israeli idea of self-rule. To make it acceptable to the Egyptian Foreign Minister whom Carter knew to be less eager than Sadat, the American President hinted to Kamel at the benefits that would flow to Egypt from the strategic alliance between the US, Israel and Egypt: "were Egypt, Israel and the United States on the same side," he said, "then no power outside or inside the area would dare oppose them."⁴ It also should have come as no surprise to Foreign Minister Kamel when the Americans stated that they could not treat the Egyptians and the Israelis equally, as the Egyptians seem to have expected. Ambassador Eilts told Kamel, who was expecting to receive the American project for consideration: "I am sorry, Mohamed, but . . . Begin has produced a written pledge to the Israeli government, signed by Kissinger in 1975. This commits the United States to abstain from presenting any project on the settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict without prior consultation with Israel. Consequently, we shall be unable to give you a copy of the project we have prepared."⁵ In effect, the Americans were admitting that every "American project" presented to Egypt would in reality be an "American" project marked by "consultations" with Israel.

According to Secretary Vance, "The Israelis had crossed out all the language in the preamble drawn from Resolution 242; in particular the language dealing with the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war. They also deleted references to the 'Palestinian people' . . . They eliminated reference to a peace treaty to settle the final status of the West Bank and Gaza . . . (and they) flatly refused to discuss our proposed language calling for a freeze on settlements while negotiations were in progress"⁶ The Israeli Foreign Minister recognized that "there were so many Israeli amendments to the American proposal that it was changed beyond recognition."⁷

When the Egyptians met to discuss the "American" project, it soon became apparent that Sadat was determined to forge ahead regardless of the opposition of his entourage. The Egyptian Foreign Minister expressed his opposition to

the "American" project and pointed out, that among other things, it referred to Egypt taking over Jordan's responsibility should Jordan refuse to take part in the negotiations. Sadat candidly admitted that this was the case: "That is correct: I cannot have the initiative depend upon the humor of King Hussein." Sadat elaborated on his remarkable strategy by adding that if Jordan refused, he would take over that role, and if the PLO objected, "I shall send Egyptian troops to the West Bank. I am aware that we shall lose some men, but they will kill ten men of the organization (PLO) for every Egyptian who is killed."⁸

Sadat followed his usual habit of having private meetings with Israeli and American leaders and making unilateral decisions, often without his entourage knowing what decisions were made. Thus, Sadat met privately with Weizman and did not disclose to his Foreign Minister what transpired or what was decided at the meeting.⁹ According to Weizman, Sadat told him that he (Sadat) was entitled to conclude a separate treaty, and if no other Arab leader joined the negotiations, he would carry on alone. Weizman felt reassured by this "encouraging sign." In accordance with the Israeli game plan of isolating Sadat, Weizman worked to isolate the Egyptian President from his entourage, particularly from the Egyptian Foreign Ministry group whose "ideological convictions did not permit them to accommodate new ways of thinking."¹⁰ Determined to exploit Sadat's "new ways of thinking," Weizman urged Sadat, on at least two reported occasions, to meet with Dayan alone. Sadat agreed. Given the documented record, it seems likely that Sadat's meeting with Dayan was the *coup de grâce* that finished Sadat by taking the Israeli game plan to its next logical step of exposing to Sadat the helplessness of his position.

Dayan reportedly said to Sadat that "he was courageous and forthright, and so he (Dayan) would be blunt with him. *It was Sadat's belief that the problem centered around the solution to the Palestinian question, whereas the solution to this was easy when compared with the problem of the Israeli settlements and airfields in Sinai.* He must know that neither Begin, Perez nor any other leader could under any circumstances relinquish them. . . . Sadat had asked him. . . . 'Do you imagine . . . that it is possible for me to conclude any peace treaty with you which did not include the removal of the settlements and airfields and the restitution of Sinai with full sovereignty?' Dayan had informed him that, in that case, 'We shall continue to occupy Sinai and pump oil,' Whereupon Sadat wanted to know why he had not said so from the beginning, instead of wasting Carter's, Dayan's and his (Sadat's) time. Dayan had answered: 'We did say so from the start, but you chose not to believe us.'"¹¹ And indeed, the Israelis had stuck by that position from the very beginning. But Sadat, with no tangible indications to the contrary, and every sign pointing to the Israeli game plan, chose not to include this fundamental factor in his assessment.

Sadat decided that he had made a mistake and ordered his delegation to prepare to return home. At this point, Vance came to convince him to stay. Sadat complained about the many concessions he had made and, to the surprise of his Foreign Minister, made the following revelation: "There is a tendency to put our signatures to what has already been agreed, but to do so would oblige me to sign away concessions I would never have agreed to were it not that I wished to help Carter by ensuring that the failure of the Conference would not be attributed to him. . . . It should be understood that the concessions I have made were for the sake of the United States and President Carter personally."¹² Carter came and, as usual, Sadat had a private meeting with him. After the meeting Sadat told Kamel that he would stay and sign the accord after all. When Kamel objected, Sadat replied: "I shall sign anything proposed by President Carter without reading it."¹³

Kamel tried one last time to dissuade Sadat from signing and urged him to return to the Arab fold. Sadat rejected his Minister's plea and told him: "President Carter has affirmed to me that when he is re-elected for another term, he will be in a very strong position and will be able to put pressure on Israel."¹⁴ Sadat had all along placed greater faith in President Carter than in his own Ministers and advisors. This assessment is corroborated by Vance who wrote: "Right to the last moment, some of Sadat's advisers were still arguing that the agreement was slanted toward Israel's positions. But Sadat trusted President Carter and gave his consent."¹⁵

Sadat agreed to make one last concession and he did so in his characteristic style. Weizman came to see him and told him that he wanted to enlarge the Israeli force stationed in the small demilitarized zone on the Israeli side of the border. "How many battalions do you want?" Sadat demanded. "Three battalions of our border guard," I replied. "All right, Ezer," Sadat said. "For you—four battalions."¹⁶

Disappointed and reportedly dejected, Sadat had come to recognize the limitations of his achievements, but continued to place hopes in Carter. When a member of the Egyptian delegation said that the agreement did not guarantee self-determination for the Palestinians, Sadat replied "It was not possible to do otherwise. President Carter confided to me that this phrase would, in his words, 'cost me my job.'"¹⁷ When Nabil El Araby, Director of the Legal Department, explained to Sadat that the letters Sadat accepted on Jerusalem were of no legal value, Sadat angrily replied: "You people in the Foreign Ministry are under the impression that you understand politics. In reality, however, you understand absolutely nothing. . . . I am a man whose actions are governed by a higher strategy which you are incapable of either perceiving or understanding. . . ."

Now be so good as to leave and do not come back to waste my time with futile legal arguments!"¹⁸

After Sadat's last private meeting with Carter, "every hour brought reports of further concessions."¹⁹ "The real problem at Camp David", wrote the Egyptian Foreign Minister, "was President Sadat himself. He had capitulated unconditionally to President Carter who, in turn, had capitulated unconditionally to Menahem Begin."²⁰ Kamel handed his resignation to Sadat and refused to attend the signing ceremonies at the White House.

The guiding principles for "a just, comprehensive, and durable settlement of the Middle East conflict," and for the resolution of the Palestinian problem "in all its aspects," were essentially based on Begin's home rule plan. They excluded both Palestinian self-representation and self-determination, bypassed the principle of non-acquisition of territory by force, spoke of "redeploying" the Israeli forces, and thus jettisoning the principle of withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza. The other document negotiated at Camp David provided a framework for a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel. It led to the Blair House talks which started in October 1978.

II

Blair House and the Egyptian-Israeli Treaty

AT THE BLAIR HOUSE TALKS, the Egyptians demanded, but were unable to obtain, linkage between the implementation of the Egyptian-Israeli treaty and progress on arrangement for the West Bank and Gaza. The Israelis insisted on, and obtained, a separate peace. Israel also successfully demanded that Egypt's treaty with Israel be given priority over Egypt's prior commitments to the Arab states.

During the negotiations, Begin started reneging on the Camp David agreements and announced plans for expanding the West Bank settlements. Vance wrote that "This step was contrary even to Begin's version of the Camp David accords. We were very angry," all that the American Secretary of State could do was to issue a "statement of regret." Vance also deplored the fact that "the Israelis denied that there would ever be a referendum in which the Palestinians would participate, even though the Camp David accords explicitly provided that the agreement on the final status of the West Bank-Gaza would be submitted 'to a vote by the elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza.' . . . Similarly, Begin now denied that there need be any withdrawal of the Israeli Defense Forces from the West Bank, although the Camp David accords specified that some Israeli forces would be withdrawn and the rest redeployed into a limited number of security locations."²¹

Although the Israeli statements and actions should have raised doubts in Sadat's minds about the wisdom of making more concessions, Sadat decided to accept American entreaties for more. On 10 December Vance went to Egypt to present to Sadat some Israeli demands with regard to the Blair House Talks. Secretary Vance wrote: "Sadat and his senior cabinet advisors believed that they had already gone beyond what was politically wise in meeting Israel's concerns. . . . I stressed that we must find a way to close off the issues quickly. . . . Finally, Sadat said he would accept the treaty text as written, thus overruling his cabinet. Further, he agreed to our interpretive statements and the letter on the priority of obligations. On the West Bank and Gaza side letter, Sadat again reversed a previous cabinet decision and dropped his demand."²²

Sadat also agreed to terminate the state of belligerency between Egypt and Israel and to the establishment of peace while Israeli troops were still occupying Egyptian territory. He accepted the Israeli demand that the process of normalization between the two countries start while Israel was still in occupation of Egyptian territory. He gave in to demands to severely limit Egyptian forces in all of the Sinai, even in the zone closest to the Canal. Former Egyptian Foreign Minister Ismail Fahmy noted that "nowhere in Sinai was Egypt free to exercise its full sovereignty. . . . In effect the treaty surrendered Sinai's vital strategic value to Egypt and our first line of defence has been transferred from our frontier to the Suez Canal." Sadat also agreed to other limitations on Egyptian sovereignty by permitting the multilateral forces patrolling the demilitarized zone to be stationed on the Egyptian side of the border where Egypt itself can keep no troops. Israel refused such limitations on its side of the border. Sadat also agreed "as a favor" to his American friends to construct a new road through Sinai linking Jordan, Israel, and Egypt near Elat. The road was likely intended for future use by the American Rapid Deployment Force. Most significantly, Sadat agreed to repudiate Egypt's prior commitments and historic solidarity with the Arab world by agreeing to the priority of obligations clauses in article VI. This Article VI (5) of the Treaty was deleted from the text of the Treaty published in Egypt. It reads as follows: "Subject to Article 103 of the United Nations Charter, in the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Parties under the present Treaty and any other obligations, the obligation under this Treaty will be binding and implemented." This compromised Egypt's ability to abide by its prior commitments to the Arab countries and completed its military removal from the conflict even though Arab territories were still occupied by Israel.²³

In addition, the United States provided Israel, but not Egypt, with political and military commitments. It signed with Israel a Memorandum of Agreement at Camp David which stated: "The United States will provide support it deems appropriate for proper actions taken by Israel in response to such demonstrated

violations of the Treaty of Peace."²⁴ Mushapha Khalil, then Egypt's Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, launched an immediate protest when he received a copy of the agreement only twenty-four hours before the signing ceremony of the peace treaty. Khalil wrote to Secretary Vance on March 26 complaining that: "The American-Israeli Memorandum assumes that Egypt is the side liable to violate its obligations. The United States is supposed to be a partner in a tripartite effort to achieve peace and not to support the allegations of one side against the other."²⁵ Khalil sent two protest letters to Vance, who must have informed Sadat, who apparently "dismissed (the letters) as unimportant, reflecting Khalil's personal views rather than the stand of the Egyptian leadership."²⁶ Vance never answered the letters. The peace treaty was signed on 26 March 1979, and so was the Memorandum of Agreement. The rest of the Egyptian delegation were reportedly "extremely unhappy about Sadat's attitude and his willingness to make concessions to the Israelis" and his tendency to ignore the opinions of his delegation and take decisions single-handedly.²⁷

III

Conclusion

SOON AFTER THE SIGNING of the treaty, the consequences of Sadat's decisions and negotiating approach came to haunt him. Sadat saw that in the triangular relationship between the U.S., Israel and Egypt, American aid was subordinated to Egypt's acquiescence in Israeli actions. Egypt was, observed Herman Eilts, former U.S. ambassador to Egypt, "judged by Washington on how it conducted itself toward Israel."²⁸ U.S. Aid imposed guidelines on Egypt that subordinated Egyptian internal needs to peace with Israel and oriented programs and researchers in the direction of "normalization" of relations between Israel and Egypt. Israel felt unrestrained and its behavior added to Sadat's isolation and public humiliation. For instance, shortly after Egypt signed a protocol for cultural cooperation with Israel making it a criminal offense in Egypt to oppose Camp David, Israel annexed Arab Jerusalem. In February, 1981, the Socialist Labour Party, the major opposition party in Egypt, withdrew its support of Camp David and raised the Palestinian flag on its headquarters.

On June 7, 1981, only two days after his meeting with President Sadat, Israeli Prime Minister Begin sent his airforce to bombard the Iraqi nuclear reactor. In July, Israel launched a massive air raid against residential West Beirut, in which 300 civilians were killed and 800 wounded. The Camp David constituency in Egypt was rapidly eroding. Many Egyptians, observed an Egyptian intellectual, "perceived their president either as a fool or as a traitor."²⁹ After the electoral defeat of his friend Carter, Sadat's hopes and expectations for more support

from the United States were dashed. After his first meeting with the new American president Ronald Reagan,—who was unabashedly committed to the use of Israel as a strategic asset—Sadat went back to Cairo reportedly dejected and despondent. Unable to translate peace with Israel into stability in the region and prosperity in Egypt, wielding no influence with his American and Israeli allies, and isolated in the Arab world, Sadat faced mounting opposition at home. He responded with what he called “a purge.” In September 1981, he arrested and threw in jail 1500 opposition leaders, intellectuals, writers and religious leaders, all opposed to Camp David.³⁰ On 6 October, Sadat was assassinated by members of a militant Islamic group.

On June 6, 1982, Israel launched a full-scale invasion of Lebanon. Few in Egypt could speak in defence of Camp David and peace with Israel. Many blamed Sadat’s policies which led to the isolation of Egypt, and allowed Israel to wage war against the Arabs, and to consolidate its occupation of Arab territories. Anis Mansour, one of the most prominent Egyptian writers who had defended Camp David, wrote: “There is not a single voice in Egypt that has not disavowed its previous faith in the possibility of total peace with Israel. . . . We had reconciled with Israel looking forward to the possibility of comprehensive peace. . . . It turned out to be a mistake.”³¹

The two Egyptian-Israeli disengagement agreements of 1974 and 1975 started Sadat on the road to the American-sponsored peace, the price of which Sadat must have known to be the establishment of an Egyptian-American-Israeli strategic alliance at the expense of Egypt’s traditional role in the Arab world. Having accepted this outcome, Sadat allowed his alternatives to narrow and bargaining power to diminish until it almost exclusively and entirely rested on what the United States and Israel were prepared to offer. To the extent that Henry Kissinger’s overall strategic goal was to separate Egypt from Arab and Palestinian aspirations and further isolate the “radical” forces in the region, thus weakening Soviet influence and paving the way for a settlement acceptable to Israel. The American negotiator achieved his goal, with hardly any opposition from Sadat. In fact, in his eagerness to accelerate his admission into the American camp, Sadat adopted a negotiating style and made concessions which surprised the Americans themselves.

The outcome of the Egyptian-American and Egyptian-Israeli negotiations reflected the evolution of the balance of power between the negotiators in the period between 1974–1979. But a realistic assessment of the forces at play at the beginning of negotiations in 1973 could have facilitated a far more effective utilization of the coalition power successfully marshalled by the Arab countries for the 1973 military operation and for the brief political battle which ensued. Although Sadat understood the significance of Arab unity and its potential as

“the sixth world power,” he took his own and Egypt’s leadership role for granted. When his assessments and the strategic decisions which flowed from them elicited little support among the Arabs, he decided to sacrifice the tangible assets of Arab power for the uncertain hope that the perspicacity of his strategy would be vindicated. His strategy was based on a highly and singularly personal assessment of the relevant policies of Israel and the United States and of their respective relative power. He made widely optimistic calculations of the impact of his so-called “strategic thinking” which essentially consisted of de-Nasserizing Egypt internally and externally and realigning its foreign policy along American objectives in the region, which gave primacy to guaranteeing Israel’s existence and to having unimpeded access to the region’s strategic resources. In enthusiastically espousing these objectives, Sadat hoped that Washington would reward him by implementing its declared official policy of a comprehensive settlement in the region on the basis of Israeli withdrawal from the occupied Arab territories. But he overestimated Washington’s ability and willingness to pressure Israel and underestimated the tenacity of Israel’s commitment to hang on to its conquests. Surprisingly, he entered his new alliances bereft of regional and international allies, thus ensuring that the weakness of his position would be used exploitatively. Significantly, Sadat’s decision-making, and therefore ability, to make concessions undisturbed by the opposition of his ministers, was facilitated by the authoritarian character of his rule. Had he been accountable to Egypt’s political institutions or to the professional and bureaucratic elites who supported him, it is likely that he would have been unable to separate Egypt from the Arab camp and pursue a course of actions that facilitated Israeli’s attempts to make permanent its occupation of Gaza, the West Bank, the Golan Heights and Arab Jerusalem.

Sadat’s background helps explain the unorthodoxy of his negotiating behavior. His modest peasant background and his closeness to his native village Mit Abu-Kum were recurring themes in his political speeches. They help explain his personal warmth and his openness and generosity with his foreign guests and negotiators. Many Western leaders whom he hardly knew were elevated to the status of “dear friend” and “brother.” He thus quickly came to have “complete trust” in Henry Kissinger, and “total faith” in Jimmy Carter, largely on the basis of nothing more tangible than personal affinities. His peasant background may also help explain his super-patriarch approach to Egypt which he viewed as one big family and to the Egyptians whom he frequently called “my sons.” The Egyptian people were personified in the figure of the President and therefore the President’s opponents became enemies of the people. Sadat also used to pride himself on his military background and thought of himself as a strategist, and often indirectly compared himself to Churchill. His belief in the superiority

of “strategic thinking,” of the kind that he and Kissinger presumably engaged in, helps explain his disdain for, and his dismissal of, the traditional methods of conventional diplomacy. Sadat also invoked his “strategic thinking” to explain to his critics the difference between his unpopular tactical decisions and his ultimate strategic goals. Sadat’s readiness to commit his country to making concessions for the sake of Jimmy Carter was partly the result of the strong affinities Sadat felt for Carter who, like Sadat, was a pious man from a farmer’s background, and partly the result of Sadat’s fascination with the American political culture. This fascination was not based on any serious knowledge or study of American history, or the American political process, but rather on the images and symbols propagated by the popular culture. Thus Sadat admitted that he watched many American Cowboy-and-Indian movies and learned from them, as he put it: “I am not going to be an Indian to whom General Custer once told: ‘You are doomed.’”³²

In contrast to Begin and the Israelis who expressed firm commitments to positions from which they did not budge, Sadat’s positions were elastic, flexible, and often contradictory. His decision-making and negotiating strategies involved deceptions and manipulation but generally vis-à-vis his own ministers and Arab allies. Whereas Begin, Dayan and Weizman avoided making commitments by saying they had to have cabinet approvals, Sadat often made decisions on the spot, alone, in private with Israeli and American negotiators. When his Ministers were not kept in the dark and objected to a particular decision, he ignored them. When the Americans asked for more concessions he obliged “as a favor” to his friend Carter and unilaterally reversed previously established policy decisions agreed upon by Cabinet.

Certainly, the operational environment in 1978–79 had placed considerable constraints on the kind of agreements Sadat could get. But the documentary record leaves little doubt that Egyptian decisions and negotiating strategies from Sinai to Camp David fundamentally reflected the preponderance of President Sadat’s psycho-political perceptions. These were largely based on a highly personalized and unrealistic assessment of the forces at play, unwarranted faith in a distant ally, a mistaken analysis of the relative power of the negotiating parties, ill-conceived negotiating strategies, naively generous concessions, and a political culture that allowed an authoritarian approach to decision-making.

Notes

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4. Kamel, p. 312.
5. *Ibid*, p. 325.
6. Vance, pp. 220–21.
7. Weizman, pp. 364–366.
8. Kamel, pp. 334–335.
9. *Ibid*, p. 321.
10. Weizman, pp. 349–350.
11. Kamel, p. 351.
12. *Ibid*, p. 355–356.
13. *Ibid*, p. 357.
14. *Ibid*, p. 366.
15. Vance, p. 226.
16. Weizman, p. 374.
17. Kamel, p. 371.
18. *Ibid*, pp. 274–75.
19. *Ibid*, p. 372.
20. *Ibid*, p. 358.
21. Vance, p. 238.
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The State

. . . Whoever has a right to take part in the judicial and executive part of government in any state, him we call a citizen of that place; and a state, in one word, is the collective body of such persons, sufficient in themselves for all the purposes of life.

ARISTOTLE