A Defense of Ricardo
Charles Joseph Smith
[A response to Raymond V. McNally's article, "Three
Theories of Rent," appearing in Land and Freedom,
May-June and July-August 1941. This response appeared in Land and
Freedom, July-August 1941]
By A COMMITTEE OE RICARDIANS
Although we are in accord with Mr. McNally on the importance of the
phenomenon of rent in modern society, we cannot agree with his
theories. We therefore feel obliged to submit this extended comment on
the thoughtful article Mr. McNally has written.
In presenting his analysis of three theories of rent, Mr. McNally
begins with the Ricardian, the "orthodox" conception. After
a statement of the Ricardian law (in the first paragraph under the
heading "The Ricardians"), the author uses the familiar
island illustration to attempt to prove the inadequacy of the theory
(second paragraph). In settling
A on better land and B on poorer, he assumes the need
for A to police his own holding. But the assumption is
unwarranted that A's excess of five bushels is the result of
police protection; it is due to the greater fertility of A's
location. Admitting for the sake of argument that policemen have
enabled A to produce the extra five bushels, and admitting
further that they get the whole excess should we assume that A
gets no other benefit from police protection?
Since we are asked to assume the necessity of protection for the five
(rent) bushels, is it asking too much that the policemen also protect
A in his possession of the remaining five bushels, as well as A's
person in his daily exposure to the thieves and murderers of all kinds
in Mr. McNally's realistic world?
As for Mr. McNally's criticism, (in the fourth paragraph) that the
Ricardian demonstration does not apply to an exchange society, we say:
Not only is the Ricardian theory applicable to an exchange society; it
is not really applicable to any other. The simple conditions used by
Ricardians in illustrating the law of rent are situations of an
exchange economy, with society reduced to a few individuals, for the
sake of simplicity but this is not a "primitive" or
individual economy as opposed to an exchange economy, which Mr.
McNally would have us believe.
In the same paragraph, Mr. McNally attempts to show the inconsistency
of the Ricardian theory by asserting that since B would gain no
advantage in renting A's land for five bushels, rent would have to be
less than five bushels, i.e., less than the excess; the inference
being that if B did not rent A's land there would be no rent. This,
however, is not true. If B does not rent A's land, we have a right to
assume that A will use it himself and collect, out of the produce of
ten bushels, five bushels as rent and five as wages. It may be argued
that A might have more land than he needed for himself and it is this
surplus land which he offers to let for rent. But such an argument
would suppose a case of land speculation. In other words, the
ten-bushel land, of which we have just assumed a surplus, would be the
normal margin, and the five-bushel land an abnormal or speculative
margin. Normal rent cannot be less than the excess productivity,
because the competitive bidding keeps the rent up to the whole of the
excess productivity. When the supply of land is greater than the
demand, that land is marginal and can have no value. If, as in the
case here given, A is willing to take less than the "excess"
as rent (let us say three bushels instead of five), this is proof that
speculative rent had entered the picture, and the acceptance of the
smaller, more normal, rent signalizes that the speculative bubble has
begun to burst, and speculative rent is coming down. The Ricardian law
is still working the margin is raised from five-bushel land to
seven-bushel land.
It is assumed, (in the fifth paragraph) that A and B now exchange
products for products, instead of products for land. B on his inferior
land produces five bushels of potatoes with the same labor that A
produces ten bushels of corn. In the open market, says Mr. McNally, B
would receive twice as much for each bushel of potatoes as A would
receive for each bushel of corn, in which case A would enjoy no
advantage. But this assumes that B's land is the only land on which
potatoes are being produced, and that A's land is the only land on
which corn is being produced. What of a third person, C, producing
either corn or potatoes on still inferior land? In such a case,
wouldn't both A and B enjoy an advantage? And wouldn't that advantage
be due to the superiority of the natural qualities of their land? And
of course it would be quite arbitrary to rule out that on A's land ten
bushels of potatoes might be produced, as against B's five, so that A
need not exchange at all with B on the basis that Mr. McNally has
supposed.
The last paragraph under "The Ricardians" is full of
amazing conclusions. We can agree that no one can profit from natural
advantages when he does not own land, but must instead pay rent for
such advantages. The fact is that landowners always charge for natural
advantages, and such are not equalized through the process of
exchange; they can only be equalized through the process of a tax on
land values.
The statement that A would go bankrupt if he did not own land but
rented it from some one, is puzzling. We fail to find any ground for
this conclusion in the examples previously given. First, (second
paragraph) we are told that there would be no rent. Then, (third
paragraph) that the rent would be turned over to the police. Next,
(fourth paragraph) it is said that rent could not be more than the
excess and might be much less. Finally, (last paragraph) there is
another illustration of no rent. But if the sobriety of this type of
discussion may be moistened with a little levity, we think Mr. McNally
and ourselves are on common ground when he supposes a situation in
which anyone but a landlord is very likely to wind up in bankruptcy!
With all deference, we submit that Mr. McNally misunderstands
Ricardo's law. He seems to think that rent, according to the
Ricardians, is determined by actually measuring the wealth produced on
a given location with that produced at the margin by men of identical
ability. Such a process is impracticable as well as unnecessary. Rent
is determined by demand on the part of many individuals of varying
ability, it may well be for particular locations. It is obvious that
their demand will be determined by the possibilities of the different
locations, and by a knowledge of such possibilities on the part of the
men, with an ability to take advantage of them. The rent of land will
tend to be determined by these possibilities, and this is implied in
Ricardo's statement. Rent can be determined just as easily whether the
bidders be of the same or varying degrees of ability. What each bidder
is willing to pay for land is based upon its superiority over another
location, the value of which in turn can be determined by still less
desirable land, and so on until we reach the poorest location in use,
which has no (exchange) value, and which is the margin. As long as
there is a margin, it will be the final basis of determining the rent
of land. When the margin has disappeared altogether, rent will be
determined by the minimum of subsistence.
Mr. McNally has not disproved the Ricardian law of rent. We reaffirm
our conviction in Ricardo's self-evident proposition: The rent of land
is determined by the excess of its produce over that which the same
application can secure from the least productive land in use.
More time is spent in "Three Theories of Rent" on the
Neo-Ricardians than on the Ricardians. Mr. McNally would have done
well to spend more time on the latter, for his whole superstructure
depends upon a refutation of the Ricardian law of rent, as we shall
see.
The "Neo-Ricardians" is a recent name for those who hold
that rent is due only to social and governmental services and not to
natural advantages. We would like to interpolate at this point that
so-called social services, as distinguished from governmental
services, are nothing more than the activities of people, springing
from the division of labor. If we examine the idea of governmental
functions it will be seen that they are but the result of a
specialization or extension of the ordinary social services, being
different only in degree and not in kind.
Mr. McNally considers the Neo-Ricardians a step in advance of the
Ricardians. However, he has some criticisms to make of their views. In
his second paragraph (under the heading "The Neo-Ricardians")
he criticizes the idea of so-called "stand-by" services as a
factor in rent. Mr. McNally here seems to misunderstand the
Neo-Ricardians in their meaning of "stand-by" services, for
he describes these as consisting of the cost of carrying goods in
stores, or standing ready to render some form of service. But this
cannot be what the Neo-Ricardians mean if they intimate that the value
of stand-by services goes to landowners. No individual service can
increase rent. Goods and services are paid for in the price charged to
the customer, as Mr. McNally correctly states. But the convenience of
being located near the various services rendered is a service over and
above that rendered by individual business men. That is a community
service, caused by the presence and activities of the population, and
is expressed in rent. If the Neo-Ricardians do attribute this service
to the individual businesses themselves, they are in error.
In this next paragraph, Mr. McNally includes proximity to market with
natural advantages. We contend that this is a community advantage.
However, Mr. McNally would eliminate both natural advantages and
social services as factors of rent. His claim is that while they give
utility, they do not give value to sites. Here he places some of his
own philosophy, realism, in jeopardy. For it is not possible that
these advantages and services can give to all sites the same degree of
utility ; some sites are bound to get more than others, and as a
result, must have some value. This is a truly real, as well as a
Ricardian viewpoint. Mr. McNally has not eliminated the market nor,
indeed, any other social advantages as a determinant of rent. Is it
not a matter of common observation that sites near the market command
more rent than sites farther away? Indeed, as the Ricardians maintain,
any factor, in the way of natural or social advantages, that makes
one piece of land more desirable than another, will give to that land
a rent.
In the rest of his discussion of the Neo-Ricardians, Mr. McNally
criticizes their psychology that "rent is a debt due the public."
We can discover nothing fundamentally wrong in this view which he
assails, but since the limitations of space press upon us, we will
proceed to an examination of that concept of rent which Mr. McNally
endorses, and which he calls the "Realist" view.
In the second paragraph, Mr. McNally translates the processes of the
goods market into the transaction of landowners selling public
services. He has sought to eliminate natural and social advantages as
factors in creating rent, and to contend that only governmental or
public services are factors. We have heretofore shown that*
governmental or public services are but items in the larger category
of social advantages, so that we find here another case of "reasoning
in a circle." In his third and fourth paragraph Mr. McNally
further elucidates his conception of the landlord in the market,
selling "public services." He says of the bargaining between
landlord and tenant, "This is democracy at its best." Now it
is obvious that land is needed by labor in order to produce. Those who
do not own land are not on an equitable basis with those who do. Mr.
McNally answers this by saying that land is not a "monopoly";
that the use of land is on a competitive basis. We reply that no
matter how widely diffused is landownership, the fact remains that the
owner has an advantage over the landless man. In countries such as
France where there were a great many holdings split up among a great
number of landowners, tenants were rackrented worse than where land
was the subject of closer monopoly.
The fifth paragraph seems to be the backbone of the Realist view.
Herein we are told that waste in government and bureaucracy calls for
more taxes than would be required for legitimate public services; that
this reduces the value of public services to the site user who
therefore pays less rent. "Landowners," says Mr. McNally, "do
pay the public expenses indirectly when their rent is reduced by the
taxes levied on their tenants." He proposes that all taxes be
abolished, and all rent remitted to landowners, who would then, of
necessity, be the administrators of public services on a competitive
basis. This is indeed cause for rejoicing. All the taxes of which
tenants now complain are not the unmixed evil they think, implies Mr.
McNally; are they not escaping the additional rent which the
landowners would otherwise receive when waste and bureaucracy should
be removed? This is a paradox.
All the blame for our present topsy-turvy system is placed upon
bureaucratic cupidity. The landowner, as the true administrator of the
public capital, says Mr. McNally, finds his hands tied by
restrictions. But, he asserts, "land- owners are no more aware of
their functions and the true nature of rent than are other people."
This is realism indeed, to gratuitously offer landowners a function of
which they have been unconscious all these centuries. If their
predestined duty has made them the guardians of society, they have
been woefully unaware of it. Plunder, aggression, greed, fraud,
disregard of the common rights of others these have been more
characteristic of the lords of the earth throughout the ages rather
than concern with the common welfare and in times before bureaucracy
could be made the scapegoat for all mankind's ills.
Now it is clear why Mr. McNally has endeavored to do away with
natural and social advantages, and to suppose that rent arises only
because of the public services rendered. Manifestly, if rent is due to
nature, or to the mere presence and activities of population, there is
no reason in the world why the landowner should be the administrator
of the rent fund. He is then not rendering any service whatsoever in
making these advantages "available." They are there for
people to come and take, and he is merely standing in the way.
To explain why landowners, rather than the government, should be
administrators of the rent fund, Mr. McNally uses an illustration from
private business, in his sixth paragraph. His conclusions as to the
private business are correct, but we fail to see their applicability
to public services. The analogy is ingenious, but serves no purpose.
Mr. McNally goes on to state that citizens of a country have no
common interest; therefore no common administrator, like the State,
can serve for all of them. He would accordingly turn over the
government to the landowning class. This would be the end of
democracy. The proprietary society advocated by Mr. McNally would be
but the return to the old feudal system, in a new dress.
The Realists, however, believe that under their plan we would only be
extending our free market system. They counter the fear of private
property in land with a fear of common property in land. They believe
that we would be scrapping our exchange system if we allowed the
government to administer the rent fund. To publicly collect rent as a
tax, says Mr. McNally, would make it a compulsory payment, not the
free exchange that a free society demands. We fail to see his
distinction between a landlord and the government, in this respect. If
a person chose to remain on a certain site, the landowner would demand
that the full rent be paid under Mr. McNally's system, as much as the
government would, under the public collection of rent. And under this
latter system, a tenant would have a free choice to move to another
site if he so desired even to a site where there was no rent to be
paid at all the margin.
Mr. McNally further objects to the proposal to force land into use by
the taxation of land values. It is the word "force" that
strikes him as being a bit fascistic. This is a quibble over words. If
the "force" that we advocate will lead to a liberation of
productive enterprise, let us not be concerned about the word's uglier
connotations in the fascistic philosophy.
Mr. McNally has spoken out against the evils of the bureaucracy of
our present democratic processes. We join him in his sincere wish to
be rid of the present corruption of officialdom, and we commend his
able indictment of the arrogance of many of our public "servants."
On the other hand, we feel there is less reason to distrust government
of the people, with all its faults, than the aristocracy of landed
proprietors which Mr. McNally offers as a substitute. We still believe
in democracy, and one day we hope to attain a government of the
people, by the people, and for the people and to replace
high-handedness with high-mindedness. Mr. McNally has said that
landlords have not yet been made aware of their true function in
society. We submit that this observation would have more weight if
directed to the unawareness of our officials and electorate to their
functions and duties. Government can be no better than the
intelligence of the citizens who comprise it.
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by Raymond V. McNally
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