A Response to W.R.B. Willcox
on the The Law of Rent
Charles Joseph Smith
[Reprinted from Land and Freedom, July-August
1939]
The rent of land is determined by the excess of its produce over that
which the same application (of labor and capital) can secure from the
least productive land in use.
The foregoing is known as Ricardo's law of rent. Henry George says of
it "Authority here coincides with common sense, and the accepted
dictum of the current political economy has the self-evident character
of a geometric axiom." This is not to say, however, that George
was unaware of the exceptions which had been taken to it by some
economists. For that matter, George himself, as a result of
independent analysis, pointed out the error of Ricardo in limiting the
application of the law to the extractive mode of production. He showed
that it held as well in the case of industrial, commercial and
residential sites as in the case of farming and mining lands. He also
exposed the fallacy in the reasoning which supported the so-called
derivative law of diminishing returns in agriculture. But the
fundamental character of Ricardo's principle he deemed
unchallengeable, "its mere statement having all the force of a
self-evident proposition."
In an article appearing in the March-April issue of LAND AND FREEDOM,
a correspondent, Mr. W. R. B. Willcox, offered what he believes
constitutes a new refutation of Ricardo's law. He contends that it is
based on a false assumption, viz., that "since the processes of
nature are independent of human exertion, mankind acquires the results
of these processes independent of human exertion." Mr. Willcox
continues: "This of course is not true. Mankind's acquirement of
these results 'costs' human exertion; and rent, which is compensation
for the human exertion required to provide social and governmental
advantages cannot be a free gift of nature." To quote him further
"Under a scientific economic system, rent would not be an
'unearned increment,' a 'free gift of nature,' either to individuals
or to mankind. Rent would consist of compensatory payments made by
individuals to society, through the latter's agent the government, for
the advantages of social and governmental contributions to the utility
of provisions of nature."
The writer has given Mr. Willcox's definition a careful study, but
finds that at best it is no more than a restatement of the Ricardian
version, containing nothing fundamentally new. My reaction was as
follows: Mr. Willcox speaks of social and governmental advantages
(with seeming emphasis on the latter). I take it that by governmental
advantages he means the result of those services which are
administered by an organized political state, and by social advantages
he means the benefits which flow from the unconscious cooperation of
the individuals comprising society.
If we examine the idea of governmental functions, it will be seen
that they are but the result of a specialization or extension of the
ordinary social services, being different only in degree and not in
kind, and represent what might be termed a conscious cooperation of
society. It would therefore seem that in the definition offered by Mr.
Willcox, only the concept of "social advantages" is
significant. As for "governmental advantages," i.e., such
things as public schools, streets, fire, police, and sanitary
departments, they merely derive from that economy which comes from the
principle of cooperation and the division of labor. In truth,
governmental advantages are included in the classification of social
advantages.
It is perfectly possible to have rent in the absence of governmental
services. I can easily imagine a time when all the individuals in
society might engage private tutors, and singly or in neighborhood
groups, lay their own streets and hire their own watchmen and fire
brigades. Indeed, there is a growing body of opinion that in a better
society many of our governmental functions would be replaced by
private management, thus putting them in the category of social
services, as distinguished from governmental services, if we use the
terminology of Mr. Willcox. The essential thing to remember is that
despite their desirability or undesirability, governmental services in
the ways spoken of are not strictly necessary, and as a matter of fact
there have been innumerable instances where a community started
without them.
The presence or absence of governmental services, per se, have
nothing to do with the concept of rent. In the settlement of the
savannah, for instance, in "Progress and Poverty," there was
rent just as soon as two immigrants looked longingly on the same piece
of land, before government of any kind had been established. Whether a
government is available to collect it in such cases is beside the
point, for a philosophic conception of rent recognizes its existence
irrespective of any agency for its collection. That is not to say,
however, that no one would pay rent except under authority of the
police power, inasmuch as ethics and justice would be available, even
as now, to equalize the differences in natural opportunities. I merely
wish to refute the logic of that part of Mr. Willcox's statement which
supposes as necessary the existence of government in order to equalize
the benefits of social and "governmental" advantages. The
agency for allocating rent is purely adjective. It has no proper place
in a substantive consideration of rent.
Rent is a social product, being the "excess of its produce,
etc.," as per Ricardo's definition. Of course this social product
is brought about by "the advantages of social and governmental
contributions to the utility of provisions of nature," as Mr.
Willcox so effectively, even though unwittingly, paraphrases Ricardo's
law.
It would appear, however, that our friend does not recognize any such
thing as a "social product." That is unfortunate. To me,
society means something more than a mere arithmetical summing up of
men, women and children. For it is not just aggregation, but
integration, that breathes life into its body. As a separate
existence, society has its own peculiar attributes, duties and
rewards, notwithstanding its only claim to existence is the greater
welfare of the citizens who comprise it. Nor should it be difficult to
imagine society as one of the parties to production. This concept once
grasped, it follows that society actually adds to the production of
the wealth of its individual members. To hold otherwise is to fuse two
separate existences into one. The idea of an identity, however,
connotes a failure of perception to recognize things as they are.
If then, society and social advantages are the important concept,
nothing essentially new has been added by Mr. Willcox to Henry
George's treatment of Ricardo's law of rent. George repeatedly points
out in "Progress and Poverty" that it is the amount and
quality of social activities that make valuable the land to which they
come, giving rise to the differential or "excess of produce,"
which we denominate rent. This differential is the resultant of the
social activities.
Nor can rent be kept apart from the various sites to which it
attaches. I mention this latter phase for the reason that some
Georgeists insist that land has nothing to do with rent. But the
moment we try to keep rent apart as a thing unto itself, the thought
arises, "Rent of what?" and of course the answer must be,
the rent of land.
Is rent a gift of nature? This is a matter of words. I am inclined to
agree with Mr. Willcox that, from a strictly scientific viewpoint, the
expression is an unhappy one. To the writer, however, there should be
no objection to its employment in an allegorical sense. I can see no
purpose in laboring this trivial point.
Is rent unearned? When retained by the individual, it most certainly
is. Unearned increment, if an ethical view may be imported, is the
immoral gain resulting from the pocketing of society's rent by
individuals. Henry George made it clear that rent is a social product
and belongs therefore to the social body whose activities produce it.
If perchance he failed to add that society earns its rent, we can
cheerfully supply the omission.
I am not overlooking the basic production of the individuals
comprising society. And with respect to the individual's own labor, I
allow that he is entitled to the maximum return made possible by the
increased knowledge or power which comes to him by reason of a
progressive civilization. But over and above the wages of the
individual (leaving aside capital and interest), he receives, when
above "marginal" land, an additional return depending on the
social advantages brought to his location. The sum total of the
returns to the factors in the production of wealth will ordinarily be
collected, for the moment at least, by the wage earner. But so much as
is due to the advantages of the site, he is obligated to return to the
social body which created them, i.e., he must return so much of the
social product as was delivered to his land. The amount to be thus
returned will be determined by the intensity of the demand for the
various sites. In that way will the inequalities of opportunity for
production be ironed out, and each wage earner in addition to his own
production, will receive, in common with the rest, his just share of
the social product, rent. For of course society, as such, has no
interest in or enjoyment of the rent save as it is employed for the
betterment of the members composing the social body.
Mr. Willcox states that under the existing economic system rent "would
be an unearned increment to society if the latter did not compensate
those whose individual labors are expended in making the social and
governmental contributions." There is no quarrel with that. It
accords with the thesis of George, that in producing and exchanging
their goods and services, the individuals so engaged receive a gross
income consisting of a return to their own labor and to the social
advantages at their several locations. Continuing, Mr. Willcox says "However,
under a scientific system, rent would not be an unearned increment ...
to any one, either to individuals or to mankind." This statement
itself lacks scientific accuracy. For rent is rent, whether manifested
under a "scientific" system or not, now or in the future.
In speaking of what would happen under a scientific system, however,
it is well to point out that "potential" rent would tend to
disappear. The collection by the community of the entire annual land
value would soon force the holders of idle land to relinquish or use
it. In the latter case, true economic rent would be .earned by society
to the extent of its contribution to the total production thereon. In
the former case, if the land were relinquished and remained out of use
because no one was willing to pay society for its use, it would fall
into the category of marginal land. "Potential" rent is a
pathological symptom of present day society. Under normal conditions
it would disappear.
In conclusion, let it not be thought I am criticising any rephrasing
of the law of rent if by so doing we can expedite the acceptance of
our philosophy. There is no doubt that some people can be more easily
reached by presenting it in a different dress here and there. Mr.
Willcox is probably doing very effective work with his method of
approach. His and our version of the law of rent is the difference
between tweedledee and tweedledum. To my mind "Progress and
Poverty" still provides the perfect formula for the cure of the
problem we are most interested in', the abolition of poverty.
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