Occupancy and Use Versus the Single Tax
Benjamin R. Tucker
[Excerpted from the book Individual Liberty:
Selections From the Writings of Benjamin R. Tucker, Vanguard
Press, New York, 1926. Kraus Reprint Co., Millwood, NY, 1973]
In December, 1894, Mr. Steven T.
Byington, still a Single Taxer, started a discussion with the
editor of Liberty (Mr. John Beverley Robinson and
Miss Katharine J. Musson participating) on certain factors in
the land tenure and rent problems. Mr. Byington, an expert
mathematician, carried the discussion into quite an intricate
maze of figures, which are rather hard for the reader to
understand without complete reproduction, here impossible. But,
since Mr. Tucker's replies embodied some very pertinent and
valuable explanations and arguments, it has been attempted to
give as many of these as will be coherent without a full
presentation of the other side. The discussion extends over a
period of more than a year: |
It is not my purpose to lose myself in the mathematical maze
through which Comrades Robinson and Byington are now gropingly
threading their way. But I may point out to the latter, anent the
dire perplexities in which he has involved 111 coal miners, that
political economy knows not only a law of diminishing returns, but a
law of increasing returns as well, and that he has ignored this
branch of the law in the operation of his second mine.
In the first mine, where 100 men are already at work at the time
of Mr. Byington's hypothesis, it may fairly be supposed that the law
of diminishing returns begins to apply; but in the second mine,
where not even one man works until there are 110 at work in the
first, it is equally fair to suppose that the law of increasing
returns will be in force until here also there are 100 workers. In
that case the second mine, instead of yielding (as Mr. Byington
presumes) one workman $900, two $1790, three $2670, etc., would
yield one workman $900, two $1810, three $2730, etc. This little
fact brings a wonderful change over the spirit of Mr. Byington's
dreadful dream. For no sooner will his 111th miner have begun to
work the second mine alone than he will be joined by the 110th, and
the 109th, and the 108th, and the 107th, etc., etc., each new
accession having a tendency to increase the earnings of the 11 men
and to reduce the swollen incomes of the original 100, and the
movement as a whole achieving, if not a restoration of absolute
equality, at least a considerable approach to it. Which again impels
me to recall the remark of Bastiat that there are things that we see
and things that we don't see.
Again: the hypothesis is unwarrantably violent in predicating the
existence of but one first-quality mine. As a matter of fact, there
would in most cases be a number of superior mines nearly on a level
in point of quality, and as the demand for coal increased, these
mines would compete to secure extra labor, the competition forcing
them to pay for this labor as much as could be paid without reducing
the $1000 income enjoyed by each of the original occupants.
Still again: absolute freedom being the condition of the
hypothesis, these mines would compete for this labor, not only with
each other, but with all the other branches of industry newly opened
or increased in activity by free money, free land, and free
conditions generally, which would make it still less possible to
obtain labor without awarding it its full product.
And further: it is assuming too much to say that a fair
interpretation of the terms occupancy and use could exclude all but
100 men from the mine in question. Here the economic problem becomes
complicated with engineering problems which I am incompetent to
discuss; but it is not at all sure that the theory of occupancy and
use would enable any hundred men to get the grip on subterranean
riches that is here presumed.
And - last consideration of all - mining is but one, and the
smallest, of the four great classes of labor, and the others are not
relieved in the same degree from the equalizing influence of
competition; so that, were a considerable inequality proven a
necessity of mining, it would not follow that there would be as
great inequality, or necessarily any at all, in agriculture,
manufactures and commerce.
Thus you see, Mr. Byington, that, do your little sum as nicely as
you will, there are still a few other things to be thought of.
It must not be supposed, however, that I share Mr. Robinson's view
that economic rent is not a reality. I believe that economic rent
exists now, and would continue under freedom, but then with a
tendency to decrease and a possibility (though not a probability) of
ultimate disappearance. In any event, taking the worst view of the
matter, it would be distributed among actual occupants and users, -
a vastly greater number than now enjoy it, - which would be
much better for all than to distribute it among those who
benefit by political jobbery, or among the people themselves through
the agency of a State landlord, which would speedily become, by
successive grants and usurpations of power, a State money-lord, a
State industry-lord, a State education-lord, a State religion-lord,
a State love-lord, and a State art-lord.
Equality if we can get it, but Liberty at any rate!
By compelling Mr. Byington to recognize the law of increasing
returns in both mines instead of in one alone, I at the same time
compel him to assume, in order to overcome the tendency of this law
toward equality, a far greater and more improbable inferiority in
the quality of the second mine than he attributed to that mine in
his first hypothesis. And, as these sudden drops in quality are not,
as a general thing, typical of the actual fact, Mr. Byington's new
figures greatly weaken his argument.
It is not altogether a question of how much these laborers are
worth to employers engaged in coal-mining. Their worth to employers
in other lines must be taken into account. Under freedom, when the
availability of capital will furnish new avenues for labor, Mr.
Byington's 111th man who goes to work in the second mine for $900
instead of accepting offers of $1000 from men in other lines of
business will be a fool who deserves his fate.
But, says Mr. Byington, the demand for coal finally making it
worth while to pay the 111th man $1000 to go to work in the second
mine, this demand and consequent rise in price will correspondingly
increase the reward of the operators of the first mine, and the
inequality will be as great as ever. Which means, at the worst,
that, while none are paid any less than formerly, some are paid
more. Dreadful thing! As Mr. Donisthorpe has pointed out in a way
that evidently appeals with force to my Christian friend, Mr.
Byington, the accidental benefiting of another is, "in the
present state of Christian fraternity, a consummation to be
carefully shunned."
Whether the neighboring farmers should sink shafts themselves or
part with their land to others wishing to do so, in either case
there would be an introduction of a new competitive factor tending
toward equality. The article to which Mr. Byington now replies was
one calling his attention to factors in the rent problem which he
seemed to neglect. The liability of access to the first coal vein
through a new shaft was one of these factors, and Mr. Byington's
answer does not get rid of it. His nearest approach to it is a
suggestion of the Malthusian argument, to which I can only respond
that, if Malthusianism be true, it militates as strongly against the
single tax as against any other reformatory proposal. I may add -
though this matter is not strictly pertinent to the present
discussion, but an engrafting upon it of an old discussion - that I
would not, under any ordinary circumstances, oust an occupant and
user to get either mining land or a right of way thereto. But I can
conceive of circumstances, not only in the relations of men to the
land, but in the relations of men to each other, where I would, for
the moment, trample ruthlessly upon all the principles by which
successful society must as a general thing be guided. I would advise
Mr. Byington to consider for a while whether he himself is superior
to necessity before too confidently assuming that there is any
single rule to which he can always conform his conduct.
I know of no domain that occupies a higher eminence than that
occupied by the domain which says to every user of land: "Hand
over to me all that your land yields you over and above what the
most barren of wastes yields to your most unfortunate fellowman, or
else I will throw you neck and heels into the street." The "eminent
domain" that I believe in, if Mr. Byington insists on so
denominating it, would assume no rights in any land whatsoever, but
would simply decline to protect the dominion of any one over land
which he was not using.
To block up a narrow passage not regularly occupied and used for
purposes of travel is one thing; to barricade an improved, claimed,
and constantly used highway is another thing. Admission of the
former requires no reconciliation with denial of the latter.
The value of land under the present system of land tenure has no
bearing whatever on my assertion that under freedom the equalizing
influence of competition is felt less in mining than in other
branches of labor. If A has a mine in which his day's labor will
yield him ten percent. more coal than B's day's labor will yield B
in another mine, A will derive ten percent more from the sale of his
coal than B will derive from the sale of his, because all the coal,
assuming it to be of equal quality, will bring the same price per
ton, so far as the mine owner is concerned. But commercial
competition in cities is a different matter. In the lower and busy
section of New York city there are perhaps a hundred drug stores
occupying sites which may vary slightly in suitability for the drug
trade, but all of which are excellent. In the upper parts of the
city there are other drug stores, most of which occupy vastly
inferior sites. There is always a stiff competition in progress
between the downtown druggists, but, in spite of this, the high
rents which they have to pay prevent them from putting their prices
much below the prices prevailing up town. Now, if the present system
of land tenure should be changed to one of occupancy and use, what
would happen? Why, the downtown druggists, relieved of the burden of
rent, would lower their prices in competition with each other until
all or nearly all the rent which they now pay landlords would be
flowing into the pockets of their customers. The profits of the
downtown druggist doing a large business at low prices could be
little or no more than normal wages, and those of the uptown
druggist doing a small business at high prices could be little or no
less. In this typical commercial example competition under freedom
shows a strong tendency to take from the occupants of superior sites
their advantage. The occupants of inferior commercial sites can in
most cases obtain for their goods prices proportionately higher, but
the owner of a mine yielding are inferior quantity of coal can get
no more per ton for his product than can his more fortunate rivals.
This is the difference that I pointed out to Mr. Byington, and his
remark regarding the present value of city land is no answer.
Certainly no land, except the very poorest, will be free under the
single tax, for every occupant of land that is good for anything
will have to pay tribute to the State. Evidently free land is one
thing to Mr. Byington and another thing to me. I consider a potato
patch whose cultivator pays no rent free land, even though it be a
city corner lot; and I should consider the same piece of land not
free, but monopolized, if it were occupied by a confectioner obliged
to pay tribute either to an individual or to the State.
The man who plants himself in a passageway simply takes up vacant
land and becomes an occupant thereof in good faith for ordinary and
legitimate purposes, and not with a view to unnecessarily and
maliciously embarrassing and crippling others. But, though the
intent were not malicious, if the result were not merely
inconvenience for others but complete imprisonment, I should regard
the emergency as sufficiently critical to warrant a violation of
principle. Not for gods, devils, society, men or principles would I
allow myself to be imprisoned, completely crippled, and virtually
killed, if I could in any way avoid it. But I would suffer a great
deal of embarrassment in order to avoid the violation of a principle
the general observance of which I consider essential to the closest
possible approximation to that social harmony which I deem of high
value to myself.
By all means kick for your full product, Mr. Byington, and kick
hard. I wish you to get it if you can, as I too wish to get mine.
But I am not willing to pay too much for it. I am not willing to
part with my liberty to get my full product, unless that part of my
product which I do get is insufficient to keep me from starving. And
even then I personally might prefer death; I do not know. Besides,
Mr. Byington does not fairly represent his fellow Single-Taxers. He
wants his own product, but their chief worry is because
their product goes in part to a neighbor whom they hate, - the
landlord; and they will be abundantly satisfied when it shall be
taken from this hated neighbor and given to another whom they love,
- the tax-collector.
Mr. Byington said that, whatever relief might come from the
opening of new mines, the needs of civilization would soon press
upon the limits of these mines. This is simply a form of saying
that, whatever new opportunities may be opened for labor, the
tendency of population to outstrip the means of subsistence is sure
to ultimately neutralize them. That is Malthusianism; and, if it is
true, all economic reforms, including the Single Tax, are a delusion
and a snare.
I have not urged that society should make any exceptions in favor
of the man who commits an invasion under circumstances that go far
to excuse him. This would be a matter entirely for the jury. If I
were on a jury to try the case of a man who had stolen bread when
starving, I would vote in favor of a formal penalty, too light to be
burdensome, and yet sufficient to stamp the act as invasive.
The simple fact is this, - that necessity, and only necessity, may
excuse the coercion of the innocent. Now, necessity knows no law,
and it knows no "aims"; it does not inquire whether the
coercion to be exercised will be direct or indirect, incidental or
essential; it just coerces, whether or no, and because it cannot do
otherwise.
I believe that all vacant land should be free in Mr. Byington's
sense of the word, - that is, open to be freely occupied by any
comer. I believe that all occupied land should be free in my sense
of the word, - that is, enjoyed by the occupant without payment of
tribute to a nonoccupant. Whether the achievement of these two
freedoms will tend to reduce rental values we shall know better when
Mr. Byington has "seen about those drug-stores."
In this sense [evicting occupants contrary to the principle of
liberty, under the plea of a higher law of necessity] I declare my
willingness to stand for eminent domain. But I insist that Mr.
Byington does not, as he claims, get rid of eminent domain, but on
the contrary gives it the most rigorous and universal application,
when he proposes to exact from each land-occupant a portion of his
product under penalty of eviction.
I accept Mr. Byington's amendment. I think myself that it is
better to exclude the matter of good faith. It is simpler and truer
to say that any man who uses his land for the commission of a
plainly invasive act may be dispossessed and treated as a criminal.
If the act committed is of a doubtful character, then the same rule
applies here that applies to all other doubtful cases: that is, the
troublesome party should be given the benefit of the doubt, either
until his course becomes clearly invasive, when he should be
dispossessed as an invader, or until it becomes a peremptory menace
to the community's safety, when he should be dispossessed in the
name of necessity, though it be still doubtful whether he is an
invader.
I deny that the thing fundamentally desirable is the minimum of
invasion. The ultimate end of human endeavor is the minimum of pain.
We aim to decrease invasion only because, as a rule, invasion
increases the total of pain (meaning, of course, pain suffered by
the ego, whether directly or through sympathy with others.) But it
is precisely my contention that this rule, despite the immense
importance which I place upon it, is not absolute; that, on the
contrary, there are exceptional cases where invasion-that is,
coercion of the non-invasive-lessens the aggregate pain. Therefore
coercion of the non-invasive, when justifiable at all, is to be
justified on the ground that it secures, not a minimum of invasion,
but a minimum of pain. The position, then, which Mr. Byington seems
to take that coercion of the non-invasive is allowable only as an
unavoidable incident in the coercion of invaders, and not allowable
when it is an unavoidable incident in the prevention of impending
cataclysmic disaster not the work of invaders, is seen at once to be
inconsistent with my fundamental postulate - to me axiomatic - that
the ultimate end is the minimum of pain. If Mr. Byington believes
that the minimum of invasion is always desirable, I summon him to
deal specifically with the case cited by me in my discussion with
Mr. Yarros, - the case, that is, of a burning city which can be
saved from total destruction only by blowing up the houses on a
strip of territory inhabited by non-invasive persons who refuse
their consent to such disposition of their property. If Mr. Byington
thinks that these houses should not be blown up, I ask him to tell
us why. If, on the other hand, he admits that they should be blown
up, I ask him if such action would not be "injury to
non-invaders without the resistance of invasion," - a policy to
which he declares himself opposed under any circumstances. Can he
maintain his abstract proposition in face of the concrete
illustration? Moreover, the illustration, though not framed
originally for this discussion, is a most happy one for the purpose,
since here it is the innocent act of land-occupancy which
constitutes the obstacle to social welfare. I hold, then, to my
claim that occupancy and use as the title to land is not vitiated by
the fact that it is a rule which, like all others, must sometimes be
trodden underfoot.
Either Mr. Byington has not understood me, or I do not understand
him. His answer to me seems to be based on an assumption that my
previous answer to him was just the opposite of what it really was.
He had put to me this question: "If A builds a house, and rents
it to B, who thereupon lives or works in it under the lease, will
you regard A or B as the occupier and user of the land on which that
house stands?" I answered: "I would regard B as the
occupant and user of the land on which the house stands, and as the
owner of the house itself." To this Mr. Byington rejoins: "Then
houses will be rented under your system just as now, and the sum
charged for rent will include the rental value of the land as well
as payment for the use of the house." A most remarkable
conclusion, surely! To my own mind the logical conclusion is
precisely the contrary. It is perfectly clear to me that A will not
build a house to rent to B, if he knows that the protective
association will recognize B as the owner of both land and house as
soon as he becomes the occupant. I utterly repudiate the idea that
unused land, if usable, would remain idle under an occupancy-and-use
regime. How could it, when any one would be free to take it
and would not be forced to pay rent for it?
As a result of the misunderstanding, Mr. Byington has failed to "see
about the -drug-stores." All his present remarks upon them are
mal a propos. Under an occupancy-and-use system all
ground-floor druggists - that is, all retail druggists - will be
owners of both land and store, and competition will proceed among
them with the effect described by me, and my argument that "competition
under freedom shows a strong tendency to take from the occupants of
superior sites their advantage" remains intact. Mr. Byington
will have to try again. First, however, let me answer his puerile
question: "Why does not the man who now pays no rent because he
is on his own land now undersell his rent-paying competitors."
For precisely the same reason that the man who pays no interest
because he is using his own capital does not under-sell his
interest-paying competitors. Is Mr. Byington really unaware that the
man who uses that which he could lend to another for a price insists
on getting as much profit from it (in addition to the reward of his
labor and enterprise) as he would get if he should lend it?
Mr. Byington may understand that the man who builds a cage over
the sleeper is an invader. The man who blocks up an improved,
claimed, and constantly used highway is also an invader. The man who
takes possession of an unoccupied, unimproved, unused passage is not
an invader, and does not become one simply because, afterward,
somebody else wishes to make a highway of it. Such a man is not to
be dispossessed except in one of those rare emergencies when
necessity, which knows no law, compels it.
Regarding protection of occupancy, I answer Mr. Byington that
undoubtedly the protective association would insist on registration
of all titles to real estate as a condition of protection. Then, in
case of dispute between claimants and a failure of the jury to
agree, the protective association would regard as the occupant the
party whose registration of title it had already accepted.
The picket note to which Mr. Byington alludes was a criticism upon
Miss Katharine J. Musson. The paragraph being short, I reproduce it:
The statement that a State can have no rights except those
delegated to it by individuals is singular doctrine on the lips of a
Single Taxer. Miss Musson acknowledges the right of the State to
collect rent from every land-occupant, this rent being in her eyes
the just due of all individuals, since all have an equal right to
the use of every part of the earth. It follows from these two
positions that the State, if it collects my share of this rent,
commits an act of usurpation, for I have not delegated to it the
right to collect my rent. And yet I have not heard that Miss Musson
or any other Single Taxer would limit the State, in the exercise of
its rent-collecting function, to the collection of only such portion
of the total rent as is properly due to the persons who have
appointed the State their rent-collector. It follows further that
all individuals who, like myself, have not appointed the State their
rent-collector may, if they choose, go about, each individually,
from one land-occupant to another, collecting their respective
shares of the rent due. According to this, I have the right to at
once start on a tour among my neighbors (or even among all the
land-occupying inhabitants of the earth) and demand of each the
delivery into my hands of that greater or smaller fraction of a cent
which each owes me for the current quarter. Or, if I find this
course too expensive, all those who ignore the State may unite in
appointing a private force of rent-collectors to collect their share
of the total rent. Does Miss Musson accept these logical inferences
from her position?
Mr. Byington admits that the State is a usurper if it collects my
share of rent without getting from me a power of attorney. He claims
neither for himself or for any other person or for any association
of persons the right to collect my share of rent without
authorization from me. Accordingly he expresses a willingness to
enter into an arrangement with me for the collection of our rents;
that is, he invites me to give a power of attorney. I must admit
that this is very accommodating on Mr. Byington's part;
nevertheless, I churlishly decline. If any part of the money in the
hands of land-users belongs to me (which is the hypothesis just
now). I prefer to leave it where it is. Now, Mr. Byington, what are
you and your Single-Tax friends going to do about it? I do not call
upon you to determine my share; so far as I am concerned, it may
remain undetermined. But, if you are going to collect your share,
you will have to determine first what your share is. At any rate, I
bid you take good care not to touch mine. By your own confession you
Single Taxers are entitled to collect only such rent as is the
rightful share of the Single Taxers, all others refusing to delegate
their rights. Do you tell me that such a task is insuperably
difficult and intrinsically absurd? Very well, I answer; that fact
is not my fault; it is simply the misfortune of the Single-Tax
theory.
The collection of rent by each individual from all land-users on
earth, which Mr. Byington accepts so complacently, is an absurdity
which Miss Musson cannot stand. So she attempts to dispute my
conclusion. I am not debating with her now regarding the Single-Tax
theory. For the nonce I am accepting it; I am supposing that I have
a right in certain funds now in the hands of land-users. So never
mind the Single-Tax theory. Then she tells me of the dreadful things
that would happen if, under an occupancy-and-use regime, I
should refuse to delegate my right. But I am not discussing
occupancy and use either. Miss Musson is supposed to know nothing of
my opinions on the land question. I present myself to her simply as
the individual, Tucker, who declines to delegate his rights, just as
I might have presented a hypothetical individual, Smith. But, argues
Miss Musson, you have no separate right to rent. Very well; we will
not dispute about that either. The only thing that concerns me at
present is Miss Musson's specific declaration, in the last sentence
of her article, that I have a share in the aggregate right to rent,
and that I can delegate this to the State. Here I have all
that I want, - all that is necessary to the main purpose of my
original criticism. Delegation of rights is an act of pure volition,
and, as such, implies the power to refuse such delegation. Then, if
I can delegate to the State my share in the aggregate right to rent,
I can also decline to delegate it. Now, I do so decline. But Miss
Musson has previously and fundamentally declared that a State can
have no rights except those delegated to it by individuals.
Therefore, since I refuse to delegate to the State my share in the
aggregate right to rent, the State has no right to take my share in
the aggregate right to rent. Q. E. D. And there is no escape from
the demonstration. Miss Musson may as well "acknowledge the
corn" first as last, and make her choice between individualism
and the Single Tax. The two are incompatible.
I can readily forgive Mr. Byington for mistaking B for A in my
answer to his question. Such a slip the most careful man may make at
any time. But his more fundamental misconception of what the
occupancy-and-use doctrine really is I find it more difficult, if
not to pardon, at least to account for. Certainly in no writing of
mine have I given him warrant for supposing me to hold that a man
should be allowed a title to as much of the earth as he, in the
course of his life, with the aid of all the workmen that he can
employ, may succeed in covering with buildings. It is occupancy and
use that Anarchism regards as the basis of land ownership, - not
occupancy or use, as Mr. Byington seems to have understood.
A man cannot be allowed, merely by putting labor, to the limit of
his capacity and beyond the limit of his personal use, into material
of which there is a limited supply and the use of which is essential
to the existence of other men, to withhold that material from other
men's use; and any contract based upon or involving such withholding
is as lacking in sanctity or legitimacy as a contract to deliver
stolen goods. As I have never held that freedom of contract includes
a right to dispose of the property of others, I do not, in denying
such right, "yield the sanctity of contract," as Mr.
Byington puts it. Yes, the object of Anarchism is, sure enough, to
let every man "control self and the results of self-exertion";
but this by no means implies that a man may store upon another's
land the results of his self-exertion. If a man exerts himself by
erecting a building on land which afterward, by the operation of the
principle of occupancy and use, rightful becomes another's, he must,
upon the demand of the subsequent occupant, remove from this land
the results of his self-exertion, or, failing so to do, sacrifice
his property right therein. The man who persists in storing his
property on another's premises is an invader, and it is his
crime that alienates his control of this property. He is "fined
one house," not "for building a house and then letting
another man live in it, but for invading the premises of another. If
there were nothing in the "Beauties of Government" to beat
that, then indeed would government be a really beautiful thing.
The objection advanced by Mr. Byington that adherence to this
principle must cause a degree of embarrassment to persons desirous
of using an entire edifice for a period too to nobody, be forced to
lower his prices also in order to retain his trade, - a thing which
now he does not have to do because his rent-paying competitor cannot
lower his prices? It is as clear as daylight.
The man who builds a cage over a sleeper prevents the sleeper from
exercising his unquestionable right to step off of premises
that belong to another, and therefore is an invader. The man who
becomes by occupancy and use the owner of a previously unoccupied,
unimproved, and unused passage, and in the exercise of his ownership
blocks the passage, simply prevents other men from doing what they
have no right to do, - that is, step on to premises that
belong to another, and therefore is not an invader.
Mr. Byington's answer to my contention that there may be
circumstances under which it is advisable to do violence to equal
freedom amounts in its conclusion to a statement that no evil can be
as disastrous as an act of invasion; that justice should be done
though the heavens fall, for a precedent of injustice would lead to
a worse disaster than the falling of the heavens; and that, if he
were the guardian of a city most of whose inhabitants found
themselves under the necessity of a choice between death by fire on
the one hand and death by drowning on the other, he would not
relieve them from this choice if he could do so only by violating
the property rights of a portion of his fellow-citizens. Discussion
is hopeless here.
In May, 1895, Mr. Louis F. Post delivered a lecture at
Cincinnati on the Single Tax, in which he made the statement that
occupancy and use was really the only true title to land. After the
lecture, in reply to a question from one of his auditors, he
explained that his advocacy of the Single Tax was as the best method
of reaching the occupancy-and-use title. When Mr. Tucker's attention
was called to Mr. Post's statement, be hailed it as very
significant, since the other prominent champions of the Single Tax
denied that the land belongs to the occupant and user and affirmed
that all land belongs equally to all the people; and he stated that,
if Mr. Post had not been misunderstood, the latter had taken a
position which involved the rejection of the Single-Tax theory and
pledged him to the Single Tax only as a measure of expediency and as
a stepping-stone. Mr. Post replied that he did not mean to imply
that he advocated the Single Tax as a stepping-stone in the sense of
a temporary expedient, but as the only way of obtaining and
maintaining the title of occupancy and use. That explanation called
for the following from the editor of Liberty:
Mr Post admits the utterances attributed to him, and then proceeds
to emasculate them. It appears that the phrase occupancy and use is
used by Mr. Post simply as an equivalent to the right of possession.
In that case it is nonsense to talk about the Single Tax or any
other measure as the best method of reaching the occupancy-and-use
title, for in Mr. Post's sense that title already exists. Today the
occupant of land is its possessor, in right and in fact. The
aim of the occupancy-and-use agitation is not to secure for the
occupant a possession which is already his, but an ownership and
control which in most cases is not his, but his landlord's, - an
ownership and control which shall end when occupancy and use end,
but which shall be absolute while occupancy and use continue.
In another part of his letter Mr. Post virtually denies the
equivalence of occupancy with possession by declaring that
landlords, even those who rent land and buildings in their entirety,
are occupants and users. If this be true, then the Astor estate is
occupying and using a very large portion of the city of New York.
But to assert that the Astors are either occupants or possessors is
an utter misuse of language. Besides, if the Astors are occupants
and users, and if the Single Tax will virtually compel the Astors to
relinquish their lands, then the Single Tax, instead of being a
means of getting to an occupancy-and-use tenure, will be a means of
destroying such tenure. Mr. Post's position bristles at every point
with inconsistency and absurdity.
It is so long since I read Mr. George's book that I do not
remember whether Mr. Post is right in denying that Mr. George
teaches the doctrine of equal ownership of land by all the people.
One thing, however, is certain, - that the equal right of all
people to every piece of land is asserted by many of the
foremost Single Taxers, some of whom are on the national executive
committee of the party. And it is on the strength of this that the
Single Tax is defended. How often we hear Single Taxers deploring
the name by which their idea is known! "It is very unfortunate,"
they will tell you, "that our plan is called a tax. It is not a
tax at all. We believe in the utter abolition of taxation. Taxation
is robbery, - a taking from the producer of his product. We do not
propose to rob; in collecting rent we take only what is ours, for
that which comes, not from labor, but from land, belongs, not to the
laborer, but to us, the people." If occupancy and use is not a
title to land, then this position is sound; on the other hand, if it
is a title to land, then the Single Tax is robbery. Mr. Post cannot
escape from this dilemma.
If there must be Single Taxers, I prefer those of the Philadelphia
sort, who attack occupancy and use with hammer and tongs,
maintaining that it is unscientific and diametrically opposite to
their fundamental principles. Relieve me, pray, of opponents like
Mr. Post, who, using my own phraseology in a distorted sense, strive
to make it appear to the people that their ideas are mine. Let
Anarchists be on their guard. Don't bite at phrases.
In considering the letters of Mr. Alexander Horr, I notice at the
outset that they betray a singular contradiction. In the first we
are told that the occupancy-and-use theory of land tenure "has
not risen to the dignity of respectable empiricism." In the
second we are told that of the four systems of land tenure now
advocated there are two which "deserve the most careful
consideration," and that one of the two is the
occupancy-and-use theory; The question arises: why does that which
has not risen to the dignity of respectable empiricism deserve to be
considered with care?
Mr. Horr complains of the indefiniteness with which the advocates
of the occupancy-and-use theory explain it. My opinion is that the
larger share of the indefiniteness regarding it that exists in his
own mind is due to a failure on his part to weigh and understand
what has been said in defense of the theory. In a recent
conversation with me, Mr. Horr naively assumed the ownership by an
Astor of the whole of Manhattan Island, and the renting of the same
in parcels to tenants, as a possibility quite consistent with the
occupancy-and-use theory and one which the theory's advocates would
so regard. Such an assumption on his part showed beyond question
that he has failed to consider the positions that have been taken in
Liberty as to the nature of occupancy and use. These
positions have been stated in English plain enough to be definitely
grasped. If Mr. Horr had taken pains to understand them, he could
not interpret the occupancy-and-use theory in a manner squarely
contradictory of them. There will be no motive for Liberty
to attempt a completer exposition of its doctrine for Mr. Horr's
benefit, until he understands the perfectly definite things that
Liberty has already said.
Agreeing to my claim that equal freedom is not a law, but simply a
rule of social life which we find it expedient to follow, Mr. Horr
asks me why, if it is expedient to enforce equal freedom in other
things, it is not also expedient to enforce equal rights to the use
of the earth. As appropriately might I ask him why it is not
expedient to enforce equal rights to the use of brain power. Equal
freedom as defined and advocated in Liberty covers
only the control of self and the results of self-exertion. "Equal
rights in other things" is a phrase of Mr. Horr's coinage. I
uphold equal freedom, as I define it, because it secures
individuality, the definition and encouragement of which are
essential to social development and prosperity and to individual
happiness. I oppose Mr. Horr's policy loosely described as "equal
rights in other things" because it tends to obliterate
individuality. The enforcement of equal rights to the use of the
earth, for instance, by a single tax on land values means a
confiscation of a portion of the individual's product, a denial of
the liberty to control the results of self-exertion, and hence a
trampling upon individuality. If an equal distribution or common
ownership of wealth, with the accompanying destruction of
individuality, is a good thing, then let us become Communists at
once, and confiscate every excess, whether its source be land value,
brain value, or some other value. If. on the other hand, the
protection of the individual is the thing paramount and the main
essential of happiness, then let us defend the equal liberty of
individuals to control self and the results of self-exertion, and
let other equalities take care of themselves.
An instance of the peculiar manner in which Mr. Horr interprets
his opponent's utterances may be seen in his comments on Mr.
Yarros's statement that, while voluntary taxation of economic rent
might not be a good thing, "the use of force to bring it about
would be extremely unwise." Mr. Horr thinks that this statement
is "not quite clear." It is true that it is not quite
exact. Mr. Yarros had better have said "the use of force to
effect it," or, more simply still, "the enforcement of it,"
than "the use of force to bring it about." But even from
the sentence as it stands it seems to me that no intelligent reader
should have failed to extract the evident meaning that, though men
might well agree to pay rent into a common treasury, no man should
be forced to do so. Yet Mr. Horr takes it to mean that force should
not be used to collect rent in special and abnormal cases. I do not
see the slightest warrant for this extraordinary and senseless
construction of Mr. Yarros's words.
Mr. Horr defends State collection of rent on the ground that, if
equal rights to land be admitted, "all men have a right to
collect rent from those who use better than free land, because each
individual would collect such rent himself, if he had the power."
Logic does not warrant the inference. I showed clearly, in my
discussion with Miss Musson, that, even granting Single-Tax ethics,
still State collection of every individual's share of rent, without
delegation by each individual of his right to collect, cannot be
advocated consistently by any individualist. The fact that an
individual would collect the rent rightfully due him, if he had the
power, does not warrant another man, or all other men, in proceeding
unauthorized to collect this rent. There are some creditors who
believe that the State should not collect debts. Would Mr. Horr
claim that the State is entitled to collect the debts due these
creditors, regardless of their wishes in the matter? Now rent is
nothing but a debt, under Single-Tax ethics. Consequently any
parties who contract for the collection of their rents in common
must see to it that they collect only their own shares of the total
rent due. If they collect other people's shares, even the Single
Taxer, if he be an individualist, is bound to consider them thieves.
All that Mr. Horr has to say about the difficulty of sustaining an
occupancy-and-use system by jury decisions is based on silly and
gratuitous assumptions. In the first place, it is pure assumption to
say that juries will be recruited solely from taxpayers. No believer
in the original form of jury trial as explained by Spooner ever
advanced such a proposition. In the second place, it is pure
assumption to say that, when taxation is voluntary, only land-owners
will pay taxes, because they alone benefit by the expenditure of the
taxes. It is not true that they alone benefit. Every individual
benefits whose life, liberty, and property is protected. In the
third place, it is pure assumption to say that juror!! do not, in
the main, render verdicts in accordance with their own conceptions
of equity and social living. A jury of thieves is quite as likely as
a jury of honest men to convict a prisoner justly accused of theft.
Now, no advocate of occupancy-and-use tenure of land believes that
it can be put in force, until as a theory it has been as generally,
or almost as generally, seen and accepted as is the prevailing
theory of ordinary private property. But, when the theory has been
thus accepted, jurors may be relied on, in the main, to render
verdicts in accordance therewith, no matter what their status or
situation in life. Were it not so, no society would be possible.
Mr. Horr finally defends the Single Tax, against the objection
that under it the land occupant is at the mercy of the community, by
claiming that "changes due to social growth which are just as
inevitable as any other phenomena of nature must be submitted to."
I suppose, then, that, because I must submit to the tornado that
destroys my crop, I must also submit to the depredations of people
who choose to settle in my vicinity and then rob me of a part of my
crop by what they call a tax on my land value. Well, of course I
must, if my fellow-citizens all turn thieves, - that is, Single
Taxers. Consequently I am trying to persuade them to be honest.