

Can a Nation Have a Religion?
by Lyman Abbott / December 1890

Can a nation have a religion? This is the question to which in this paper I invite attention.

It is not the question whether the state should have a church. That the church is stronger for whether the separation of church and state involves also the separation of the nation and not being supported by the state, that the state is purer for not being dominated by the church, will not be doubted by any considerable number of American readers. For Americans the absolute separation of church and state may be regarded as settled, at least in theory. We have yet something to do to make our practice consistent with our theory; but the theory is not open to discussion. Nor is it the question whether the state should have a theology; whether a creed, however simple, should be incorporated in the Constitution, as for example a declaration of belief in the Bible, or in Christ, or in God. This is indeed proposed by some of our fellow-citizens, and has recently been approved, I believe, by one of our political parties. But this is not the question which I desire here to discuss.

Without discussing it, it is legitimate to say that I do not think the Constitution of the United States is a proper place for the insertion of a system of theology or even an article of religious belief, however simple. The function of a constitution is to define and limit the powers of the various departments of the government, not to declare the religious belief of the people who constitute that government. Nor is it the question whether the individual citizens who constitute the nation should be religious individuals; whether they should possess religious beliefs, be inspired by religious motives, and controlled in their actions by religious principles. It is not the question whether in their political action as citizens they should be governed by the same religious considerations by which they are governed in their domestic, their business, and their church lives; whether they should carry their religion into their politics. This will not be a question to any one who really believes in religion at all. Religion is nothing if it is not a rule of life and of the whole life; a man is not religious at all if he is not religious in every part of his nature, at all times, and in all circumstances. The question which I wish to put before the readers of *The Century Magazine* is whether the nation, as a nation, should have a religion; or whether the separation of church and state involves also the separation of the nation and religion. A pamphlet of a modern writer lies before me, which contains the following declaration:

Religion is a matter of individual conviction or of individual belief; it must therefore, like all matters of conviction, be left to the individual.

This is plausible; is it also true? Has a nation a religious life — to be influential in determining national questions, to be controlling in determining national policy, to be expressed in national legislation? Or is a nation, as a nation, a purely unreligious organization? There are not a few persons who entertain this latter opinion, partly because they have not thought deeply on the subject, and have confounded religion with theology (that is, with the philosophy of religion), or with the church (that is, with the instituted forms of religion); partly because they do not see how it is possible that a nation made up of individuals of such various, and even antagonistic, faiths as the American people can yet possess one religion; partly because they see the curse which has fallen on other nations, who either have been separated into hostile camps by hostile religious faiths, as Ireland into Roman Catholics and Orangemen, or have been oppressed by the despotism of a hierarchy, as Spain in the fifteenth century by the power of a Papal priesthood, or Massachusetts in the seventeenth century by the power of a Protestant autocracy. They believe that religion is the inspired guide of the individual, that it should govern the citizen, that it is the bond of the family, that in his religious rights the person should be protected by the state, but that the state itself not only need not be but cannot be religious; that to treat all religions with impartiality it must ignore religion altogether. There are, however, some considerations which should at least give pause in accepting as an axiom that “religion is a matter of individual conviction” exclusively; and should lead one to think twice before accepting the conclusion that the American nation should be or ever can be a purely secular — that is, an unreligious — organization.

I. The questions which confront the American people are largely religious questions. That is, they are questions to be determined by religious considerations, and upon religious principles. They are not questions of experience, but of moral principle. Events ask the nation not What is wise? but What is right? and the nation must answer. And in answering, it formulates to that extent a religious faith and incorporates that faith in its organic law. Such a question addressed itself to the colonies in 1776, and the first sentence of the immortal Declaration of Independence was emphatically a declaration of religious faith: “We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.” There are no rights that are not duties. The Declaration of Independence was not justified if it was not obligatory. The War of the Revolution was treason if it was not a defense of a sacred trust. This was the declared faith of our fathers — that God had intrusted to them certain rights which they could not alienate without dishonor, and thus their faith was as emphatically a religious faith as that of the Council of Nicea or that embodied in the Athanasian Creed. The great questions which confront the American Republic today are in like manner essentially religious questions. They ask the nation, not What is profitable? but What is duty? The

Mormon question, the Divorce question, the Temperance question, the Indian question, the Negro question, the Labor question, the Prison Reform question, the Public School question, the Woman Suffrage question, the Tariff question, are all essentially religious questions. In a large measure their religious character is recognized by the press and the platform. The more effective writers and speakers are those who recognize the profounder aspect of these problems and address themselves, not to the self-interest but to the conscience of the nation. And they cannot be solved, it must be noted, by individuals acting religiously; they can be solved only by the religious action of the nation in its national capacity. We cannot solve either the Mormon or the Divorce question by individuals resolving to be content with one wife apiece; the question still remains, What will the nation do with polygamy, with the plurality of wives, contemporaneous or successive? What ought we to do? Does liberty demand that we leave polygamy alone? Does purity demand that we prohibit it? Personally taking the pledge does not solve the problem presented by the saloon. What is the duty of the nation towards the liquor traffic; not of the individual to patronize or not patronize, but of the state to protect, to restrict, or to prohibit? Ought the nation to regard alcoholic liquors as legitimate merchandise, like wool or cotton, the manufacture and the sale of which is to be protected if not promoted, or as an extra-hazardous article like nitroglycerin or arsenic, the sale of which is to be carefully regulated and narrowly restricted, or as a positively pernicious article like diseased meats or infected garments, the sale of which we absolutely prohibit? This is a question for the nation to decide as a nation; its decision will be expressed by and incorporated in national legislation;¹ and this action, whatever it is, will be a religious action, that is, an action of the moral nature, in the moral realm, governed by moral considerations. The Indian and the Negro questions are both phases of one and the same question: what duties, if any, do a superior race owe to an inferior and subject race, living in the same territory, under the same government, parts of the same nation? The question cannot be answered by individual philanthropy or by missionary societies; the question is asked of the nation, and the nation only can answer it. If the law "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself" is a religious law, if the question "Who is my neighbor?" is a religious question, then the Indian and the Negro problems are religious problems. For their solution demands the application of this law, and requires an answer to these questions. So of every problem which confronts our State or national organizations today. Labor reform: What duty, if any, of protection does the law owe to the individual wage-earner against the possible aggression of organized capital? The prison question: What is the object of punishment? — since all punishment which is not directed to the true end of punishment is essentially unjust and iniquitous. The public school question: What are the co-relative rights and duties of nation, church, and parent in the education of the children who are to become the citizens and governors of the commonwealth? Woman suffrage: What duty does woman owe the state? Is she exempt from bearing its political burdens as from its

jury, its police, and its militia? The tariff question: What duty does the nation owe of self-protection and self-help? What duty of consideration and brotherhood to the other nations of the earth? Not only in deciding these questions must the individual voter be controlled by religious principles, but their decision incorporates in the nation a religious principle. It becomes by its legislation monogamous or polygamous; an oppressor or an emancipator of its subject races; an accessory before the fact to robbery perpetrated by one class on another, or an impartial defender of each class from the aggressions of any other; an avenger or a curer of crime.

I Or in State legislation. For the preface of this article the distinction between the State and the nation may be ignored.

II. While thus each separate problem presented to the nation today is with us a religious question, — and it would be easy to show that this is equally true of the problems of English, French, and German national life, — they are all parts of one comprehensive problem which it is even more apparent is essentially religious in its character. While every new decision of the nation on the questions thus separately presented to it incorporates in the nation a certain definite religious element (or, if the reader prefer the term, a definite moral element), the decision of the aggregate of these questions gives to the nation's life a moral tendency and to its personality a moral quality. England and Spain were in the sixteenth century rivals and peers. They have since, by successive acts of legislation and resultant constitutional changes, moved along two divergent paths of national development. One has unconsciously to itself been working out in its character the principle, One is your Master which is in heaven and all ye are brethren: it has moved along the pathway of a democratic development. The other has, perhaps equally unconsciously, developed in its people only one virtue, that of obedience, and in its rulers only one obligation, that of maintaining their authority; it has moved along the pathway of an aristocratic development, in church and state. And these two national movements have resulted after three centuries of national growth in the England and the Spain of today. The product is a moral product; the process was a moral process. A state is made religious, not by incorporating a creed in its written constitution, but by such a habit of national life as develops a type of national character.

In our country today all the problems of our national life are parts of one generic problem, How shall we develop a brotherhood of man? This is the problem given to us to work out. Our vast territory; our great variations of climate, soil, and wealth, encouraging every form of industry, agriculture, mining, manufacture, commerce, domestic and international; our heterogeneous population, made up of every race, color, tribe, tongue, nationality, and religious opinion; our great social differences, nowhere greater — millionaires on the one side, masses of pauperism on the other;

our perpetual intermixture of classes, facilitated by the modern ease of locomotion, by the universal circulation of the newspaper press, by a common school system of education, by the absence of hereditary barriers and the easy passing of men from one class into the other; the rapid increase of our great cities and the consequent massing of populations in centers; the perpetual attrition of men of various classes, characters, avocations, temperaments, and faiths against each other; our political institutions throwing all together into one great debating society at every political campaign, and making the subject of yesterday the ruler of tomorrow, and the ruler of yesterday the subject of tomorrow; the problems of our national life — the slavery question, the secession question, the temperance question, the race question, the immigration question, the various forms of the industrial question — all these are elements entering into and constituting one great problem, the problem of human brotherhood. The question which it is our destiny to study, the problem which it is our duty to solve, is, How can such a conglomerate population live in peace and promote one another's well-being? What are their correlative duties to one another? What are the limits of the liberty of the individual? What are the duties which the all owe to the one? What are the limits of the power of the nation? What are the rights of the one which the all must not infringe? What bonds can be trusted to bind together in one harmonious and self-governed state those who are not bound together by force, like the staves of a barrel by its hoops, and who are separated from one another by the most divergent characters, opinions, prejudices, and education? Now this is essentially a religious problem. No nation can solve it without a religion. Its solution will be in the profoundest sense a religious act; the result of that solution will be in the profoundest sense a religious nation. For the brotherhood of man is as truly a religious conception as the Fatherhood of God. Indeed the one is not thinkable without the other. If we are all brethren it is because we have one Father. An atheistic democracy is a contradiction in terms.

III. In dealing with these problems of its national life the nation acts — must act from religious motives and must feel religiously. The nation is not a mere aggregate of individuals. Fifty millions of people on three millions of square miles of territory do not constitute the United States of America. A million or so of people occupying twenty-one thousand square miles did not constitute Greece. It was the Greeks who constituted Greece; it is Americans who constitute America. So many people thrown together on one territory no more make a nation than so many blocks of stone thrown together in a pile make a temple, or so many types in pi a book, or so many threads in a tangle a fabric. Every nation has its own distinguishing features, its own type of character, its own consciousness, its own life. To constitute a nation there must be not only people and land and laws, but laws that are self-evolved, literature that is the expression of national life, language fitted to express that life, and therefore a life to be expressed. And if the nation is ever to count for anything among the nations, that

life must be not merely animal, or social, or industrial; it must and will be also religious. The nation has a brain, it thinks; a heart, it feels; a will, it resolves. This brain must perceive the higher moral truths, or the nation cannot comprehend its problems, much less its destiny. This heart must feel the higher moral emotions, or it cannot solve its problems, much less achieve its destiny. A nation that cannot feel, cannot do; a nation that cannot feel nobly, cannot do nobly. But to see moral truths, to feel moral emotions, and to do moral deeds is religious; to recognize in moral truths the highest of all truths, to yield to moral emotions as the highest of all motive powers, and to be guided in practical conduct by moral truths and ruled by the moral motive powers, is to live religiously. The nation is subject like the individual to passions. Gold is discovered in California; the passion of gold sweeps a multitude across the continent and round by the Isthmus to dig for it. A cannon blazes forth against the flag on Fort Sumter; a passion of patriotism sweeps over the nation and the seventy-five thousand answer to President Lincoln's call almost before the call is issued. Shall the nation then feel only the passion of avarice and not the passion of patriotism? Shall it be moved by covetousness, by party zeal, by pride of blood, and not by reverence, by fidelity, by honor, by sense of duty to God, to posterity? But reverence, fidelity, honor, the sense of duty towards God and posterity, are all religious emotions, profoundly religious emotions. A people without churches, monuments, museums, centennials, national songs, would be a people without power to meet any great crisis or achieve any great deed. Fletcher of Saltoun's saying, "If a man were permitted to make all the ballads, he need not care who should make the laws, of a nation," expresses a profound truth, because the songs which create as well as express the emotions make the nation, while the laws are simply restraints upon it or acts done by it. Only a people who could sing "America" could have fought to a successful issue the American Revolution; only a people who could sing the "Battle Hymn of the Republic" could have fought to a successful issue the Civil War. On the other hand, one might have forecast the issue of the French Revolution from hearing the "Marseillaise."

The nation has recently brought to a close its celebration of the Centennial of the establishment of its Constitution and the inauguration of George Washington as first President of the United States. Incalculable time, strength, and money were expended on a mere sentiment — the sentiment of reverence and affection and honor for a noble ancestry, noble deeds, and a country which they have ennobled. Such a sentiment saves the country from the opprobrious character which has been given to England in the phrase, "A nation of shopkeepers." It was not true of England; it is not true of America. But this sentiment, which sacrifices time, money, strength to give joyous expression to reverence, affection, honor, is essentially a religious sentiment and found its fitting expression in the religious services at St Paul's, Trinity, and other churches in New York City and elsewhere, and in the joining of Dr. R. S. Storrs and

Archbishop Corrigan in the simple religious services which accompanied the public address on the spot where Washington took the oath of office. To deprive a nation of these religious emotions would be to deprive it of its life — of the very bond which binds it together and makes it a nation.

IV. But the possession of a religious life is not only essential to enable the nation to solve aright its great problems which are essentially religious, to fulfil its destiny, which can never be fulfilled without a religious conception in the nation, and to live nobly and heroically, for which religious emotions are a very necessary equipment; without religion it cannot even fulfil its first and simplest function. Some irony has been heaped by the modern school of political economists on what they call the night-watchman theory of government; but the first duty, though by no means the sole duty, of government is to be a night-watchman. Its primary function, that which underlies all the rest, is to administer justice between man and man; to protect the individual from the aggressions of other individuals; to maintain liberty by defending it; to punish crime and to prevent it — and this is essentially a religious function. Justice is as truly a religious act as worship; and justice is the first duty of the nation. To do justly and to love mercy were the first two elements in the old Hebrew prophet's definition of religion, and no nation can fulfil its true functions which does not both do justice and love mercy. The first is scarcely at all, the second is by no means exclusively, the action of the individual; and neither concerns the individual alone: therefore religion does not concern the individual alone. Justice must be the basis of the nation's laws; justice the characteristic of the nation's courts; justice the end of the nation's systems of jurisprudence, both criminal and civil. Most of the readers of this article will probably agree that the Bible is essentially a religious book; let them take down a copy of the Bible and see how large a proportion of it is given either to an exposition of the principles of justice, the application of those principles to specific cases, or the history of the administration of such justice, either between man and man in government, or between God and man in history.

But more than this. Modern penologists are rapidly coming to the conclusion that mercy and justice are not at variance, but that the truest mercy is also the only justice. Reformatory methods are taking the place of punitive methods in all our systems of criminal administration. We are discovering that the only way to protect society from crime is to cure the criminal of his criminal disposition. We are establishing reformatories and penitentiaries in the place of jails and prisons; we are establishing schools in our State prisons; we are beginning to organize our system of prison labor not to make penal servitude hard, but to make industry in the convict a habit; we are trying the experiment of an indeterminate sentence, treating the criminal as diseased, the prison as a hospital, and sending the convict to prison as the lunatic to an asylum, until he is cured. But as it is the lowest and first function of religion to restrain men,

so it is the last and highest function of religion to redeem them, to put into them such springs of action, to form in them such habits of action, that they will require no restraint not self-imposed. Thus it would appear that the function of religion and the function of the nation are in so far identical. They both aim to restrain men from evil courses; they both aim to redeem men from evil influences and habits. In short the highest function of religion is also the fundamental function of the nation, namely, moral cure. There is indeed a difference. The nation only aims to cure men of those vices which make them dangerous to society; while religion goes beyond this and aims to cure men of sin as well as of crime. But the nation cannot even enter upon its task of administering justice, which in these later days we have learned is also an administration of mercy, without exercising a fundamental function of religion — the twofold function of justice and mercy. How can a nation, organized primarily for this very purpose, fulfil its first and fundamental duty, that for which it exists, and without which there would be no excuse for its existence, if it have not a true religious life?

V. This religious life is indispensable not only to justify the existence of the nation, but even to make the existence of the nation possible; and this is preeminently true of a democratic nation, that is, of a nation that avowedly derives its powers from the consent of the governed. Says Lord Macaulay:

The day will come when in the State of New York a multitude of people, not one of whom has had more than half a breakfast, or expects to have more than half a dinner, will choose a legislature. Is it possible to doubt what kind of a legislature will be chosen? On one side is a statesman preaching patience, respect for vested rights, strict observance of public faith; on the other is a demagogue, ranting about the tyranny of capitalists and usurers, and asking why anybody should be permitted to drink champagne and to ride in a carriage, while thousands of honest folks are in want of necessaries. Which of the two candidates is likely to be preferred by the workingman who hears his children crying for more bread? I seriously apprehend that you will, in some such season of adversity as I have described, do things which will prevent prosperity from returning. Either some Caesar or Napoleon will seize the reins of government with a strong hand, or your Republic will be as fearfully plundered and laid waste by barbarians in the twentieth century as the Roman Empire was in the fifth; with this difference—that the Huns and Vandals who ravaged the Roman Empire came from without, and that your Huns and Vandals will have been engendered within your own country and by your own institutions.

Who will say in the light of recent events, and in the presence of living personages, that the American soil can beget no such demagogue, produce no such legislature, breed no such Huns and Vandals? If the danger thus predicted by Lord Macaulay — foreseen also by others, more than he believes in popular government and more

nearly sympathizing with American institutions — is to be guarded against, and the possible tragic consummation prevented, it must be by the power of religion in the nation, on the one hand inspiring the rich and prosperous with a regard for the well-being of their less fortunate fellow-citizens, which Lord Macaulay assumes they will not possess, and on the other hand the poor and less fortunate with a regard for the rights of the individual, which Lord Macaulay also does not impute to them. For a people urged on by such passions as he hints at must be restrained either by force from without or by force from within. Force without is despotism; force within is religion. A people who are governed by their conscience are governed by religion; a people reverential to law which has no other sanction than the invisible sanctions of God and an immortal future are reverential to religion. A people who acknowledge no reverence to such divine law and yield allegiance to no such inward monitor will be the prey to their own animal appetites and passions, unless they are restrained therefrom by the lowest of all the animal passions, that of physical fear.¹

1 “Despotism may govern without faith,” says De Tocqueville, “but liberty cannot. Religion is much more necessary in the republic which they [the atheistic republicans] set forth in glowing colors than in the monarchy which they attack; it is more needed in democratic republics than in any others. How is it possible that societies should escape destruction if the moral tie be not strengthened in proportion as the political tie is relaxed? And what can be done with a people who are their own masters, if they be not submissive to the Deity?”

"Suppose," says Professor Bryce, looking in imagination at the throngs of eager figures streaming through the streets of an American city — “suppose that all these men ceased to believe that there was any power above them, any future before them, anything in heaven or earth but what their senses told them of; suppose that their consciousness of individual force and responsibility, already dwarfed by the overwhelming power of the multitude, and the fatalistic submission it engenders "are farther weakened by the feeling that their swiftly fleeting life was rounded by a perpetual sleep — would the moral code stand unshaken, and with it the reverence for law, the sense of duty towards the community, and even towards the generations yet to come? Would men say, ‘let us eat and drink, for tomorrow we die’? Or would custom, and sympathy, and a perception of the advantages which liable government offers to the citizens as a whole, and which orderly self-restraint offers to each one, replace supernatural sanctions, and hold in check the violence of masses and the self-indulgent impulses of the individual?”

The wise man will not scoff at this foreseen peril to a democratic state whose people know neither the restraints nor the inspirations of religion. He will remember that history abundantly verifies the teaching of philosophy that no despotism is greater or

more to be dreaded than the despotism of an unrestrained democracy. "For myself," says De Tocqueville, "when I feel the hand of power lie heavy on my brow, I care but little to know who oppresses me, and I am not the more disposed to pass beneath the yoke because it is held out to me by the arms of a million of men."

The French Revolution has shown what sort of despotism it is which a multitude of men unrestrained by religion are liable to establish. One needs only to refer to the Jacobin program as M. Taine has set it forth in his graphic picture of that epoch in the history of human governments. "Opulence," writes Saint-Just, "is infamous." "The richest Frenchman," says Robespierre, "ought not to have more than three thousand livres rental." "It is not enough," says Harare, "to bleed the rich; to pull down colossal fortunes; the slavery of poverty must be made to disappear from the soil of the Republic." Says Taine, embodying in his own language the legislation of the atheistic Republic:

We make monopoly a "capital crime"; we call him a monopolist who takes food and wares of prime necessity out of circulation, and keeps them stored without daily and publicly offering them for sale. Penalty of death against whoever, within eight days, does not make a declaration, or if he make a false one; penalty of death against any person who keeps more bread on hand than he needs for his subsistence; penalty of death against the cultivator who does not bring his grain weekly to market; penalty of death against the dealer who does not post up the contents of his warehouse, or who does not keep open shop; penalty of death against the manufacturer who does not verify the daily use of his workable material. As to prices, we intervene authoritatively between buyer and seller; we fix the extreme price for all objects which, near or remotely, serve to feed, warm, or clothe man; we will imprison whoever offers or demands anything more. Whether the dealer or manufacturer pays expenses at this rate matters not; if, after the maximum is fixed, he closes his factory, or gives up business, we declare him a "suspect"; we chain him down to his pursuit, we oblige him to lose by it. That is the way to clip the claws of beasts of prey, little and big!

What shall prevent democracy from repeating this despotism except the life of religion wrought into the life of the nation? And to what end can such a democracy come other than the one to which such unreligious democracies have ever come — the welcoming of the despotic authority of one many as infinitely preferable to the despotic authority of the million?

It can hardly be necessary to quote from authorities either ancient or modern to show that the notion that a nation is or can be unreligious has no support from philosophers or statesmen. It would indeed be difficult to mention the name of a single man eminent in statecraft who has not been, avowedly at least, a believer in the Deity, and who has not based his statesmanship on the reality and invincibility of divine laws. It would be difficult to mention a political philosopher who has not more or less distinctly recognized religion as at once the foundation of the state and the inspiration of its life. "Of all the dispositions and habits," says George Washington, "which lead to political prosperity, religion and morality are indispensable. In vain would that man claim the tribute of patriotism who should labor to subvert these great pillars of human happiness, these fundamental props of the duties of men and citizens." He who advocates the notion that a nation can be unreligious, and that religion be merely a matter of individual conscience, is, consciously or unconsciously, laboring to subvert these pillars of human happiness. He who honestly entertains such a notion must, it seems to me, do so because he confounds religion with either worship, theology, or the church. It is not necessary for the nation to establish a form of worship, or to proclaim its adherence to a system of theology, or to give its support to a church or churches, in order to be profoundly and deeply religious. It is necessary that it should be something more than a mere aggregate of individuals engaged in promoting their own self-interest, and combined in a kind of insurance society to protect one another from the aggression of criminals. It is necessary that it should think, and feel, and act religiously, that it may solve the problems which are constantly presented to it; that it may fulfil its national destiny; that it may possess a true national life; that it may perform aright its first and fundamental function, the administration of justice; that it may even obey the law of self-preservation. If so, while it need not and ought not to give support to ecclesiastical institutions, it ought to recognize the necessity of institutional religion. If it undertakes to teach the children of the commonwealth at all, it ought to teach them those religious principles and imbue them with that religious spirit which is essential to national life; if it undertakes to reform criminals, it ought to select those principles and methods which experience indicates to be most efficacious to that end; it ought not to impose ecclesiastical observances on any of its citizens, or require as a condition of its protection, its offices, or its honors, the acceptance of any ecclesiastical tests; but it ought to protect all religious institutions; as equally entitled to its protection, because they all seek to promote that religious life on which the life of the nation depends; it ought to recognize by law days set apart to the offices of religion by the great body of the avowedly religious teachers and organizations, as it recognizes days set apart by a common desire to the offices of patriotism; it ought to continue to recognize the offices of religion by public and official act on special days

and special occasions, as it recognizes the inauguration of its President or the celebration of its birthdays. In short, recognizing at once the necessity of religious life to the maintenance of its own life, and the impossibility of securing from its citizens any common agreement as to the methods by which that life shall be maintained and promoted, the nation should in a reverent spirit recognize all methods employed to that end, and, giving to neither a favorite's support, should give to all a common recognition and encouragement.