Review of the Book:
The Long Emergency
by James Howard Kunstler
H. William Batt
[(New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2005, (and
Spring, 2006 paperback edition)]
Belatedly, a year after its initial publication, I am reviewing James
Howard Kunstler's fourth non-fiction book, The Long Emergency:
Surviving the Converging Catastrophes of the Twenty-First Century.
I am doing so first, because I promised him I would, and second,
because this book is important. It is a keeper, because it has staying
power much like the books of Jared Diamond's Guns, Germs and
Steel, and his later book, Collapse. Readers will find
themselves referring to it a decade from now for its prescience.
Unlike other books that address the prospect of "peak oil,"
the looming acme of oil extraction after which we will see a decline
in supply, Kunstler explores the likely impact of this unfolding
specter. But in taking a view of history covering not just the "age
of oil" but the before and after, he offers his interpretation of
what our civilization likely faces beginning in the near future -- a
future which may already have begun.
The book proceeds in logical order, first by reminding us how much
our whole mode of living is premised on the existence of cheap and
convenient fossil fuel energy sources, mostly petroleum and natural
gas. It then traces how we got to this point, the evidence that
changes are in store, and what other energy options, if any, are
possible. The author adds a short chapter on what other crises will
likely be coterminous with peak oil's arrival: climate change,
epidemic disease, water scarcity, habitat destruction, and how much
the industrial age can explain these threats. (One is reminded here
also that he is far from alone in anticipation of these; for a
comparable list, check Colin Mason's book, The 2030 Spike,
accessible online in part at www.2030spike.com, and worth looking at.)
It is in the next to last chapter, however, where the book really
outclasses others of the genre. Here the author steps into the deep
waters of economics to address globalization, ecological impact, and
future welfare, and he manages to explain the issues in clear English
without stumbling. Few others have been so bold or as successful. He
actually refers to the school of ecological economics. Doing so
requires a discussion of entropy, the second law of thermodynamics,
which posits that matter and energy stocks flow toward an
ever-increasing state of randomness. It is worth quoting him here at
length, as few conventional economists appreciate the importance of
energy sources as anything but one more commodity in their equations:
. . . A hot cup of coffee cools off sooner or later.
Its heat is diffused until the temperature of the coffee stabilizes
to equilibrium with the air around it. It never gets spontaneously
hotter. A tire goes flat, it never spontaneously reinflates. Windup
clocks wind down, they don't wind up. Time goes in one direction.
Entropy explains why logs burn, why iron rusts, why tornadoes happen
and why animals die.
The reason that everything in the real world does not fall apart at
once is that the flow of entropy faces obstructions or constraints.
A given system will automatically select the paths or drains that
get the system to a final state - exhaust its potential - the
fastest possible rate given the constraints. Simple, ordered flows
drain entropy at a faster rate than complex disordered flows. Hence,
the creation of ever more efficient ordered flows in American
society, the removal of constraints, has accelerated the winding
down of American potential, which is exactly why a Wal-Mart economy
will bring us to grief more rapidly than a national agglomeration of
diverse independent small-town economies. Efficiency is the
straightest path to hell. (p.191)
So if we are to maintain social order, it is necessary to build in
stops, fixed points that offer us the opportunity to build structures
of every sort to assure a greater comfort and security for our lives.
Economic globalization may offer one kind of rationality, perhaps, but
it compromises others, and Kunstler shows how it is that we have
destroyed our towns, our family and social relationships, our very
modes of living, all for the sake of a cheaper hair dryer or coffee
maker. All the imported goods coming from beyond our national borders
depend on our momentary reliance on cheap oil, while we at the same
time trash our own manufacturing and distribution infrastructure,
allow our labor force to wither away, and eviscerate the community
bonds that hold together the body politic.
A particularly interesting digression involves the shift we have
experienced in the nature of capitalism. This is apparent not only in
the transformation from farming to agribusiness, but also going from
manufacturing to finance capitalism. Until the past generation, money
was mostly earned through labor. Increasingly we have witnessed an
ever larger proportion of income derived from manipulation of paper
and property, all unearned. The ten pages devoted to the "abstracted
economy" as he calls it -- the chapter is titled "Running on
Fumes" -- trace the growth of the joint stock company, its
evolution and recognition in law as a "person," and the
implications of according corporations limited liability, all of which
is leading to ever more power and dominance of business rationality
over our daily lives. Immediate and short-term payoffs become the
signposts of every part of our existence. But all of this
transformation is possible only because, and insofar as, the true
costs of energy are not recognized -- because petroleum is priced as a
free good, no more than what it takes to pump it from the ground and
bring it to our neighborhoods.
Later on Kunstler opines that,
. . . the America of the 1980s and 1990s was [a]
commoditization and conversion of public goods into private
luxuries, the impoverishment of the civic realm, and, to put it
bluntly, the rape of the landscape - a vast entropic enterprise that
was the culminating phase of suburbia. The dirty secret of the
American economy in the 1990s was that it was no longer about
anything except the creation of suburban sprawl and the furnishing,
accessorizing, and financing of it. It resembled the efficiency of
cancer. Nothing else really mattered except building suburban
houses, trading away the mortgages, selling the multiple cars needed
by the inhabitants, upgrading the roads into commercial strip
highways with all the necessary shopping infrastructure, and moving
base supplies of merchandise made in China for next to nothing to
fill up those houses. (p.222)
The book argues that the artificial pricing of motor fuels for the
distribution of our goods and services has led more than anything
else, to the growth of suburbia -- what he terms "the greatest
misallocation of resources in the history of the world -- a design
which has no future." It is here where a better understanding of
Georgist economics and the concept of ground rent might have served
him well. In an earlier book -- Home from Nowhere -- he has devoted a
chapter to describing land value taxation as a means by which to
foster urban infill and revitalization, remove the penalties on
improvements, and to reverse the centrifugal forces of sprawl. But
here, in this book, he makes no mention of Georgist thought, focusing
almost exclusively on energy rather than land resources. That they are
in a sense reciprocal is a point perhaps he will emphasize in his next
book.
The concluding chapter offers the authors thoughts on what he thinks
this country -- indeed the world to a lesser degree -- will face when
the petroleum crisis is really upon us. Having shown earlier that no
alternative and no combination of alternatives are likely available to
supplant our century-plus indulgence -- what he at times calls the "oil
fiesta" -- he explores with inexorable logic what kind of society
we are likely to become. He points out how much even food we eat
relies on petroleum input -- long before it is brought to our table:
that "under the current industrial farming system it takes
sixteen calories of input to produce one calorie of grain, and seventy
calories of input to produce one calorie of meat." This is all
due to the energy-intensive agriculture system that relies on enormous
quantities of water and fertilizer, farm machines, and other
mechanization. Reversion at some point to a system where human labor
is once again primary leads to the conclusion that many more people
will be involved in growing food, and that our diets are likely to
change drastically.
From here he goes on to explore the implications for land use, for
property rights, for urban land use configurations, for
transportation, and for just about every other dimension of our lives.
"The Long Emergency will present conditions Americans have never
experienced, and the non-rich masses may resort to the kind of
desperate action that other historically put-upon people have taken."
His allusions to the political possibilities are veiled but
nonetheless conveyed. The possible changes in our institutions --
businesses, schools, and even national borders are touched upon, but
necessarily remain broad-brush speculation. He concludes by saying
that "we spent all our wealth acquired in the twentieth century
building an infrastructure of daily life that will not work very long
into the twenty-first century." He didn't add that future
generations may well resent our shortsightedness and
self-centeredness.
In the final analysis, however, he is quite clearly a puritanical
Yankee in his outlook, as it is evident throughout that he believes
that people should earn their keep and not live off the largess of
others or of nature. This becomes particularly clear in his account of
how attitudes toward gambling have changed in his own lifetime.
. . . in the 1950s and 1960s of my youth, gambling
was considered a vice, with criminal sanctions applied to it,
occupying the distant margins of society. Now, forty years later,
gambling is a mainstream recreation in an entertainment-saturated
culture. Following that a little further, though, one can't fail to
see how the new attitude toward gambling reflects a deeper
fundamental shift in normative thinking - that so much current
behavior is predicated on the belief that it is possible to get
something for nothing. (p 302)
But it's not just gambling; it's looking for lawsuit windfalls, or
flipping real estate parcels. As our own society divides increasingly
between those who work for a living and those who rely upon economic
rents -- what David Korten, Michael Hudson, and others are calling "finance
capitalism" -- the moral dimensions of our economic designs, as
well as their study, are becoming ever clearer. "Landlords grow
richer in their sleep without working," wrote John Stuart Mill.
It's an apt and useful quote to remember.
The record of the book's sales, likely well over six figures, is
warranted, as Kunstler is an extremely skillful writer, as well as
witty, hard-hitting and on target. Amazon.com's posting space contains
over 300 comments on the book, most of them laudatory even if often
disturbing. The book suffers for not having an index or even a short
bibliography. But that's only a reflection on the nature of publishing
today. Now that the paperback edition is available, for only $14, it
should be part of many university courses as well as a choice of
reading clubs. His hope in writing it was to jolt our society out of
its "sleepwalking" ignorance and lack of preparedness for
what is likely an alarming future; he says at the beginning he's
neither as gloomy as the die-off crowd, or as polyannish as the
technocrats. Students coming of age today should have this book
assigned in their classes. They need the perspective, which Jim
Kunstler offers, as it should be a factor in how they plan their own
lives. As a former university professor myself, I can envision the
book used in all social science and policy courses, in philosophy,
history and American studies, and even for courses of a technically
oriented nature. It is the technocrats, after all, that need to be
disabused of their hubris that solutions to our energy future are just
around the corner.
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