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 Review of the Book:The Price of Inequality: How TodayDivided Society Endangers our Future
 by Joseph E. Stiglitz
H. William Batt
 [Review dated 9 July, 2012]
 
 The Price of Inequality is another tour de force by Joe
          Stiglitz, the latest in what is coming to be a book about every two
          yearswith at least another coauthored with others. This one
          takes up a theme that has often been argued, once famously by S.M.
          Lipset,[1] that the health of a democracy depends
          very much upon the strength of a middle class. American societys
          middle class has now been in jeopardy for more than three decades. To
          this extent the book is about politics as much as it is economics.
          Professor Stiglitz argues (p 76) that we have created an
          economic and social system, and a politics, in which, going forward,
          current inequalities are not only likely to be perpetuated but to be
          exacerbated; we can anticipate in the future more inequality both in
          human capital and in financial capital."
 
 He says this is due in part to changes in our economy: a decline in
          manufacturing together with the rise in the information and financial
          services industry. But it is explained equally by government policies
          that have been captured by the machinations of powerful and
          opportunistically situated special interests, able to suck from
          society what economists call rents. With the connivance of political
          conspirators who have facilitated changes in our laws, these interests
          have been able to reorient our economy in ways that extract wealth
          from others yet do nothing themselves to earn it. Rent seeking has
          reached proportions in American society that make it a high art. We
          have a political system, he says (pp. 31-32), that gives
          inordinate power to those at the top, and they have used that power
          not only to limit the extent of redistribution but also to shape the
          rules of the game in their favor, and to extract from the public what
          can only be called large 'gifts.'
 
 Of course lawmakers and economists are not alone in having
          accomplished this; it is due as much to what students of cognitive
          psychology call framing, the manipulation of frames, and thus
          perceptions and behavior by which the public makes judgments and
          decisions. In explaining how the economics profession has been
          captured by a particular faction, and how it in turn has influenced
          the economics of the entire public arena, Dr. Stiglitz points to the
          insidious influence of the thought today best identified with the Chicago
          school, and referred to as market fundamentalism.
          This is the idea that markets left to their own devices are optimally
          efficient, and therefore productive, and that government therefore has
          a minimal role in directing economic affairs. Yet he points out that
          these ideas fly in the face of empirical evidence in almost every
          instance. But he is hardly the first to have identified this history.
          He cites (p 44) one study done in 1993 by the Alliance for Justice,[2]
          tracing this influence, but he could as well have cited Mason Gaffneys
          The Corruption of Economics,[3] which follows in
          even greater detail how it was that economic thought was torn from its
          traditional three-century-old moorings. As Gaffney shows, the concept
          of rent was a pivotal element of classical political economy,
          but is now trivialized in the teaching of neo-classical economics.
 
 Professor Stiglitz recognizes (p 39), as rent seeking many of
          the ways by which our current political process helps the rich at the
          expense of the rest of us. Rent seeking takes many forms: hidden and
          open transfers and subsidies from the government, laws that make the
          marketplace less competitive, lax enforcement of existing competition
          laws, and statutes that allow corporations to take advantage of others
          or to pass costs on to the rest of society. The term 'rent' was
          originally used to describe the returns to land, since the owner of
          the land receives these payments by virtue of his ownership and not
          because of anything he does. This stands in contrast to the situation
          of workers, for example, whose wages are compensation for the effort
          they provide. The term 'rent' then was extended to include monopoly
          profits, or monopoly rents, the income that one receives simply from
          the control of a monopoly. Eventually the term was expanded still
          further to include the returns on similar ownership claims.
 
 One sees him employing the concept and the word rent in his writing
          more and more. Of course he presented one of the original papers in
          1977 to introduce what is now known as the Henry George Theorem,[4]
          but his public finance text,[5] even in the most
          recent edition, makes no mention of George or the word rent. So it is
          particularly heartening to see, for example, his 2010 monograph,
          written for The Roosevelt Institute[6] recognize
          that
 
 
 "One of the general principles of taxation is that
            one should tax factors that are inelastic in supply, since there are
            no adverse supply side effects. Land does not disappear when it is
            taxed. Henry George, a great progressive of the late nineteenth
            century, argued, partly on this basis, for a land tax. It is ironic
            that rather than following this dictum, the United States has been
            doing just the opposite through its preferential treatment of
            capital gains."
 "But it is not just land that faces a low elasticity of
            supply. It is the case for other depletable natural resources.
            Subsidies might encourage the early discovery of some resource, but
            it does not increase the supply of the resource; that is largely a
            matter of nature. That is why it also makes sense, from an
            efficiency point of view, to tax natural resource rents at as close
            to 100% as possible. The well-designed auctions described earlier
            enable government to capture most of the rents derived from
            government owned assets."
 More recently still, in an interview with a European reporter,[7]
          he referred to certain elements of our modern economies as parasites:
 
 A lot of American inequality is caused by rent-seeking: monopolies,
          military spending, procurement, extractive industries, drugs. We have
          some economic sectors that are very good, but we also have a lot of
          parasites. The hopeful view is that the economy can grow if we rid
          ourselves of the parasites and focus on the productive sectors. But in
          any disease there is always the risk that the parasites will devour
          the healthy body parts. The jury is still out on that.
 
 Going even further in a just published interview,[8]
          Professor Stiglitz urged that some of the bankers most responsible for
          creating the current financial crisis should be jailed. His book is a
          bit more circumspect; he refers, politely always, to bankers and
          banks, never to banksters as many now do. But it is clear that
          he holds the financial industry primarily accountable for the problems
          we face. Our problem is that people see little moral difference today
          in how one makes ones money, as long as it is not illegal. There
          are those who regard earning an income as more virtuous than
          speculation, but the latter is by no means shameful. The investment
          firm Smith Barney years ago ran a television ad featuring John
          Houseman, an actor perhaps most widely known as Professor Kingsfield
          in the long-running TV series, The Paper Chase. In that advertisement,
          the tag line was "We make money the old-fashioned waywe
          earn it." It appealed to a sentiment that is becoming rare. It is
          not clear that Stiglitz goes so far as to call earned income virtuous
          and rent-seeking theft, but hes getting close.
 
 The problem arises because rent-seeking, or rather capturing rent
          that is socially created wealth is, from an economical standpoint,
          essentially stealing. Henry George believed that private capture of
          that which was God-given was theft, pure and simple: Thou Shalt
          Not Steal! he told the Anti-Poverty Society of New York in 1887.
          It was as immoral to capture freehold ownership of nature as it was to
          own other human beingsslavesas property.[9]
          There are contemporary economists that also seem to view rent-seeking
          in such a light. Arye Hillman, the author of one current public
          finance textbook, says, Rent seeking is the competition
          for privilege. The form of government affects the extent of rent
          seeking that takes place
. In general, whenever personal benefits
          depend on decisions made by other people, life can become a quest for
          personal favors, and people spend time and effort in rent-seeking
          activity.[10] A contemporary economic
          historian has a still more pointed definition: the use of
          resources to get a rent by reducing the welfare of others.[11]
 
 So if it isnt theft, it is at best inefficient and anti-social.
          Legitimized rent- seeking, or capturing resource rents as capital
          gains (that are arguably most if not all rent) explains much economic
          inequality and injustice. "The bottom 90 percent of the
          population gets less than 10 percent of all capital gains. Under 7
          percent of households earning less than $100,000 receive any capital
          gains income, and for these households capital gains and dividend
          income combined make up an average of 1.4 percent of their total
          income. Salaries and wages accounted for only 8.8 percent of the
          income of the top 400, capital gains for 57 percent, and interest and
          dividends for 16 percentso 73 percent of their income was
          subject to low rates. Indeed, the top 400 taxpayers garner close to 5
          percent of the country's entire dividends." (p 72) He concluded
          (p 266) that "We have created an economy and a society in which
          great wealth is amassed through rent seeking, sometimes through direct
          transfers from the public to the wealthy, more often through rules
          that allow the wealthy to collect 'rents' from the rest of society
          through monopoly power and other forms of exploitation."
 
 There are places where a true Georgist might quibble. For example, he
          writes repeatedly of a housing bubble and a real
          estate bubble, when surely he knows that it is land values that
          are the cause of the rise. And his book gives essentially no attention
          to land rent itself, arguably the greatest single source of
          rent-seeking. It was Winston Churchill, after all, that reminded
          people,[12]
 
 
 "It is quite true that land monopoly is not the only
            monopoly which exists, but it is by far the greatest of monopolies
            -it is a perpetual monopoly, and it is the mother of all other forms
            of monopoly. It is quite true that unearned increments in land are
            not the only form of unearned or undeserved profit which individuals
            are able to secure; but it is the principal form of unearned
            increment which is derived from processes which are not merely not
            beneficial, but which are positively detrimental to the general
            public." Why then so little attention to land itself and all the rent it
          holds? Is it because this is where the middle class gets its dribble
          of rent when their homes are sold for a small gain? One might also ask
          whether some of what Professor Stiglitz calls rent-seeking arising
          from inordinate compensation of corporate CEOs is really rent or
          captured interest and dividends. There is more discussion of the high
          compensation for corporate executives than there is the palpable rent
          from natural resources. Thats not something that I can sort out.
          But he does identify in passing the numerous widely recognized
          instances of rent-seekingin mineral and fossil fuel resources,
          in the electromagnetic spectrum, in the pharmaceutical industry, and
          in the insurance and finance industries among others. He is willing at
          least to regard the field of economics as a moral discourse, unlike so
          many of his colleagues who regard it as value free. But that judgment
          extends for the most part to his view of it as inefficient, and
          distributively unfair. It is not clear that he would go so far as to 
          call others of its practices and judgments immoral. That is what
          separates him from those of us who are Georgists: most of us would
          prefer to think of economics as a continuation of moral philosophy.
 
 
 
 NOTES AND REFERENCES
 
            SeymourMartinLipset,PoliticalMan:TheSocialBasesofPoliticsNewYork:Doubleday,
              1960.Justice for Sale:
              Shortchanging the Public Interest for Private Gain, a monograph
              published by the Alliance for Justice, 1993; accessible (July 10,
              2012) at
              http://www.afj.org/assets/resources/resources2/Justice-for-Sale.pdfMason Gaffney and Fred
              Harrison, The Corruption of Economics. London: Shepheard-Walwyn
              Publishers, 1994, accessible online at
              http://homepage.ntlworld.com/janusg/coe/!index.htmTheory of Local Public
              Goods, in The Economics of Public Services, M.S. Feldstein
              and R.P. Inman (eds.), MacMillan Publishing Company, 1977, pp.
              274-333. (Paper presented to IEA Conference, Turin, 1974.)Economics of the Public
              Sector, Third Edition. New York: Norton. 2000Principles and
              Guidelines for Deficit Reduction, The Roosevelt Institute,
              December 2, 2010, Working Paper No. 6.Austerity and a New Recession,
              an interview with Martin Eiermann, Politics Is at the Root
              of the Problem. April 23, 2012.The Independent, the newest of
              British national morning papers, interview with Ben Chu, July 7,
              2012; online at
              http://blogs.independent.co.uk/2012/07/02/stiglitz-the-full-transcript/Henry George, Thou Shalt
              Not Steal, an Address delivered on 8 May 1887 to the
              Anti-Poverty Society, New York City. Henry George argued that
              seizing private titles to land, and by extension any elements of
              nature, was essentially theft, and was the moral equivalent to
              owning slaves. See
              http://www.wealthandwant.com/HG/George_TSNS.htmlArye Hillman, Public Finance
              and Public Policies. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003
              p. 448. Karl Gunnar Persson, An
              Economic History of Europe: Knowledge, Institutions and Growth,
              600 to the Present (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010):
              248.Winston Churchill, The
              Peoples Land. One of nine speeches given in 1909 and
              then published in a booklet titled The Peoples Rights. See
              http://www.wealthandwant.com/docs/Churchill_TPL.html 
 
 
 
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