

can rely upon the Transvaal word? If the Boers could be trusted then they can be trusted now. Nothing has happened since to discredit their good faith. The Transvaal case does not challenge the abstract proposition. Whether some case in the future might challenge it, it can hardly be profitable to discuss. There is no case in modern history yet which has fairly done so.

Recurring then to the abstract proposition, the danger regarding the abrogation of a nation's independence by force from without is that it places weaker nations at the mercy of stronger ones with which they may quarrel, and makes the question of independence not a matter of peace and order but of conquest and rapine. Once admit the right, and international comity breaks down. The world would soon become a vast centralized and despotic empire.

Some weeks ago the New York Journal of Commerce called Mr. Bryan to account, with a supercilious sneer, for pointing to the increase of farm tenancy in the west as evidence of economic decadence. It admitted the fact, but disputed the inference. Since then it has been bombarded, apparently, with remonstrances upon the subject, to which it replies in the same arrogant spirit in which it criticized Mr. Bryan, and with evident marks of high bred irritation. Its view of the question may be gathered from this extract: "The increase of tenant farming is not due to the impoverishment of farmers, but to the increasing value of farm land." Reducing these two assertions to one by eliminating the least important, we have this result: "The increase of tenant farming is due to the increasing value of farm land." That assertion, whether true or not as an inclusive statement, is true as far as it goes. The increasing value of farm lands does cause increase of tenant farming. But what causes the increasing value of farm

lands? According to the editor of the Journal of Commerce it is greater productivity. He argues, therefore, that higher values are evidence of the prosperity of the tenant as well as of the landlord. That is to say, the landlord could not get higher rent if it was not worth while for the tenant to pay it. Right here the Journal of Commerce does what it arrogantly and with the light touch of a consciously superior pen charges upon its critics. It neglects to distinguish and reflect. To assert that the tenant would refuse to pay higher rent if it were not worth his while is to leave the assertion incomplete. The full statement is that he would not pay it if it were not worth his while under the circumstances. And the circumstances are that the land of the country is so completely monopolized as to create fictitious land values. Tenants must pay rent for land out of proportion to its productiveness because land is made abnormally scarce by monopolization. It is not, therefore, land that makes higher values, but its greater scarcity. Greater productivity there may be; but the greater productivity does not equal the higher rents. Scarcity is the principal factor. It is the only one. Without scarcity of such land, greater productivity would not increase rents at all. But scarcity has the effect of taking the benefit of greater productivity from the user and giving it to the landlord. And when scarcity is complete, as it almost is in the west—that is, when there is no free, or virtually free, land within reasonably convenient access to markets,—rack-renting sets in. That process has well begun in the west. Owing to the great market-scarcity of land, rent absorbs so much of the product that tenants have little chance to accumulate capital. Increasing tenancy in the west means increasing dependency of the tenant class upon the landowning class; and the Journal of Commerce is entitled to all the credit of discovering that this condition is significant of prosperity.

RECIPROCIITY A TENDER TO PROTECTION.

Statistics of our trade with Brazil have been recently quoted in support of an assertion that it has suffered a great decrease. The falling off thus indicated is attributed to the repeal, during Cleveland's administration of the reciprocity treaty with that country. But the figures quoted forcibly illustrate a danger ever lurking in statistics, and the necessity, if we desire to arrive at true conclusions, of considering every factor of the problem.

In comparing the imports from Brazil, the writer referred to—William E. Curtis, in the Chicago Record—fails to consider the fact that coffee, which constituted nearly 80 per cent. of our imports from that country in 1895, the year following the passage of the Wilson bill, has declined in price over 60 per cent. Consequently, though our imports of this article, measured in dollars, declined over 41 per cent., the number of pounds imported increased over 44 per cent.

Our imports of coffee, as reported by the bureau of statistics were as follows:

	1895.	1899.
Pounds	435,871,706	628,417,812
Dollars	\$60,316,677	\$35,253,010

The figures are for the fiscal year ending June 30.

Thus we have a great increase in the quantity of coffee received, at a greatly reduced cost, requiring a much smaller export of our own products to pay for it. This, to a person of ordinary intelligence, would seem an advantage to our country, though to persons of the extraordinary intelligence required to comprehend the beneficence of protection and the emasculated species of free trade for which Mr. Blaine designed to safeguard that policy, it is doubtless different. To be thus flooded with the cheap goods of other countries is, according to their profound philosophy, a calamity to be guarded against.

Coffee, together with India rubber, sugar and cocoa, constituted over 97 per cent. in value of our imports from Brazil in 1895, and over 96 per cent. in 1899. Excepting sugar, all of these articles were on the free list

prior to the enactment of the McKinley law providing for reciprocity treaties, and have remained on the free list to the present time. The McKinley law placed raw sugar such as is imported from Brazil upon the free list, but both the Wilson and the Dingley laws placed a duty on such imports.

Of India rubber, the second in importance of our Brazilian imports, there has been an increase in both quantity and value, the increase in value being most decided. These imports were 26,489,207 pounds, valued at \$13,195,255, in 1895, and 27,464,756 pounds, valued at \$16,999,345, in 1899.

Of cocoa there was an increase from 4,264,701 pounds in 1895 to 4,631,201 pounds in 1899.

The only import in which we find a decrease in quantity is sugar, which decreased from 180,262,039 pounds, valued at \$2,701,287, in 1895, to 41,222,162 pounds, valued at \$810,276, in 1899. As we find the imports of this article for the preceding year to have been 139,426,195 pounds, valued at \$2,317,987, it appears that the principal decrease in imports of sugar from Brazil occurred after the enactment of the Dingley tariff. There being other causes than changes in tariffs for increased or decreased imports, we may not perhaps properly infer that this great decrease in importation of sugar was caused by the Dingley tariff, but such conclusion is certainly more reasonable than that it was the result of the action of President Cleveland and a democratic congress.

Thus we find, instead of a great decrease, a very considerable increase in our imports from Brazil of every article of any importance except the comparatively insignificant import, sugar; and that the principal decrease in imports of this article occurred under a republican tariff.

Looking to our exports to Brazil we find them greatest in the year succeeding the passage of the Wilson tariff.

This law went into effect June 30, 1894, and in the fiscal year ending June 30, 1895, our domestic exports to Brazil amounted to \$15,135,025, as against exports of \$13,827,914 in the preceding year under the

McKinley tariff and the reciprocity agreement.

It is true that there was an increase in our exports for the year ending June 30, 1891, to \$14,049,273, from exports of the preceding year amounting to \$11,902,496. But as the McKinley law did not go into effect until October 6, 1890, and the reciprocity dickers were not arranged till some months after, they could have had little or no effect to increase our exports for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1891.

That the increase must be attributed to some other cause is evident from the fact that our exports to Brazil for the year ending June 30, 1893, fell to \$12,339,584, and did not again reach the figures of 1891 and 1892 until after the enactment of the Wilson tariff, when, in 1895, they reached their highest point.

These figures of our trade with Brazil indicate how trivial and inefficient were the measures for extending our foreign trade proposed by Mr. Blaine and advocated yet by his blind followers who failed to comprehend that the real purpose of reciprocity was, as declared by Mr. Blaine, to "safeguard protection." This was accomplished through deluding the public with the idea that something substantial was being done toward freeing commerce, while in fact the fetters were being more closely riveted and trusts and combinations in restraint of trade more strongly entrenched in privilege.

Chicago.

H. L. BLISS.

NEWS

The safety of the foreign ministers in China, as late as the 24th, is now positively assured. This with the exception, of course, of the German minister, whose murder by a mob the Chinese government promptly announced.

At the time of our last report upon this subject (page 248), the only evidence of the safety of the ministers was a cipher message from Mr. Conger, the American minister, received through Chinese channels. This indicated that the ministers were alive but hard pressed on the 18th. It was accepted as genuine by the American government, but the European pow-

ers with one accord denounced it as a clumsy Chinese forgery. They were unanimously of the opinion that all the ministers had been massacred very early in the month.

But on the 26th a message reached Chefoo from Sir Claude Macdonald, the British minister at Peking. Though this message was dated as early as the 4th it indicated that the legations could hold out for a short time, which had the effect of weakening the theory that the ministers had been massacred early in the month. That theory was further weakened by a second dispatch from Macdonald. Its date was the 6th and its tenor as follows:

We are receiving no assistance from the authorities. Three legations are still standing, including the British. The Chinese are shelling us from the city with three-inch guns and some smaller ones which they use for sniping. We may be annihilated any day. Our ammunition and food are short and we would have perished by this time only the Chinese cowards have no organized plan of attack. If not pressed we may be able to hold out for a fortnight longer. Otherwise not more than four days at the utmost. I anticipate only a slight resistance to the relief force, which I advise approaching by the eastern gate or by the river. Our losses until to-day have been 40 killed and 80 wounded.

On the 27th a servant of the murdered German minister reached Tientsin and reported that the legations were safe as late as the 8th. This was confirmed and the period of assured safety extended to the 19th by a cipher dispatch brought by a Japanese runner to the Japanese consul at Tientsin. The consul had sent the runner to Peking on the 15th. On the 19th he left Peking to return with the dispatch, which was as follows:

We are defending ourselves against the Chinese very well, but now the attack has stopped. We will keep up to the last of the month, although it will be no easy task.

A third message from Sir Claude Macdonald brought the date of safety down to the 21st. He said:

British legation, Peking, June 20 to July 16 repeatedly attacked by Chinese troops on all sides. Both rifle and artillery fire. Since July 16 an armistice, but a cordon is strictly drawn on both sides of the position. Chinese barricades close to ours.

This note was rapidly followed by messages from different directions