

Red Wing, Minnesota, in 1858. He spent his boyhood on a Goodhue County farm, where he received the frontiersman's education in hard work.

At sixteen he joined an older brother in Minneapolis as a carpenter's apprentice. Passing successively from apprentice to journeyman, foreman, and superintendent, he helped erect many of the large buildings of Minneapolis in the later eighties and early nineties.

He was elected a County Commissioner of Hennepin County in 1886 and served four years. During that time the legislature created a Court House and City Hall Commission for Minneapolis and Hennepin County of which Mr. Erickson was made a member. He served on this Commission twelve years, and in a history of the Commission published in 1909, received a fine tribute for efficient and faithful service. The last seven years of his residence in Minneapolis he was superintendent of buildings and machinery for Wm. Donaldson & Co.

But the cold winters of Minnesota made inroads upon his health, and in the spring of 1900 he resigned his Donaldson position and his official place on the Court House Commission and moved to Seattle, where he organized the Erickson-Wyman Company for the manufacture of electrical machinery. Through the eleven years of this company's life, Mr. Erickson has been its president.

Mr. Erickson's connection with the single tax movement dates back to 1885, when his brother, E. G. Erickson, who was then living in Chicago, sent him a copy of "Progress and Poverty." It was a case of true love at first reading, and no political affinities have since arisen to disturb its course. He regards his education, so far as he admits having any, as having begun with the reading of that book. The tone of the man's character may be caught in this extract from an address delivered in a campaign for Mayor of Seattle a year ago: "It has not been my good fortune to receive the benefits that come from a university education. I have had to rely on the daily papers as my teachers, the magazines as my professors, and the university of hard knocks as my alma mater. If I have any fitness for the high office friends have asked me to seek, the credit is due to those educators, to an affectionate brother, and to twenty years' association with a cultured and thoughtful wife."

It was Henry George and his books that made Mr. Erickson a politician; but a politician for a cause. Never out of season but tirelessly within season, he has worked for his cause with the same forethought and energy he has given to his business; and political activity has afforded him one of his greatest opportunities. Whether a candidate himself or not has made no difference to him; he has worked just the same. But such a man—masterful though modest, clear-headed and courageous—would inevitably be thrust into the lead in any enterprise he might enter upon. So it was

that he became the Democratic candidate for Congress from Minneapolis in 1894, that fateful year of popular reaction against Grover Cleveland's administration, when a Democratic Congress of 94 majority in the lower House was turned into a Republican majority of 142. In a nominally Republican district, this democratic Democrat and pronounced free trader, stood no chance whatever of election, and he was defeated; but his campaign was among the first of those progressive fights which Tom L. Johnson began in 1888, and which are now becoming national in their magnitude.

It is interesting to note that Thomas G. Shearman made a special trip from New York to Minneapolis to speak for Mr. Erickson's election in that campaign, and that Henry George was his personal friend and political mentor. It was Mr. Erickson who in the middle '80's brought Henry George from Chicago to Minneapolis to lecture in the latter place after his first lecture in the former.

Since going to Seattle, Mr. Erickson has changed in nothing but the growth that comes with experience to all who are of open mind and faithful purpose.

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RESPONSIBILITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN POPULAR GOVERNMENT.

Portions of a Speech Advocating the Popular Election of Senators, Delivered in the Senate of the United States, Feb. 14, by the Hon. Jonathan Bourne, Jr.

Recent discussions by some of the opponents of the pending resolution providing for direct election of United States Senators have enriched literature, furnished well-rounded periods and beautiful diction, resurrected the Athenians and Romans and carried us back thousands of years, but have absolutely failed to prove that selfish interest rather than general welfare is the better motive power of government or that the individual legislator is wiser, more unselfish, better developed, or more competent to legislate or select public servants than is the composite citizen.

A Brief History of the Evolution of Popular Government.

The art of printing was discovered in 1456 and gave to the day of general intellectual development its dawn. Cromwell (1599-1658) taught kings true sovereignty—the sovereignty of the people. John Locke (1632-1704), the son of a captain in Cromwell's army and a graduate of Oxford, among other things printed for the world his theory of popular sovereignty, which theory no doubt was cradled in the uprising of the English people under Cromwell. Hume (1711-1776) in England and Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778) in Paris and Geneva, contemporaneously

revamped, echoed, and re-echoed Locke's theory of popular sovereignty, and Kant (1724-1804) in Germany gave it voice. Thomas Paine (1737-1809) in England and America, and Thomas Jefferson (1743-1826) in America became the chancellors of liberty and popular sovereignty on this continent. The chronology of popular sovereignty in modern times is thus traced through successive and contemporaneous writers from Locke to Jefferson, the teachings of each of whom for democracy it is impossible not to believe exerted an influence upon the final formation of our Government, while it is equally evident that the compatriots of Paine and Jefferson brought to bear their knowledge of the failure of ancient republics, and particularly that of Greece, as furnishing arguments against the universal franchise, the direct responsibility of and to an electorate, and in favor of some form of beneficent despotism.

It is generally conceded, however, by present-day political writers, that of these named in the chronology, Jean Jacques Rousseau, in his "Social Contract," exercised the most profound influence of any of them upon the world's history. The one central idea in his political philosophy was popular sovereignty. Around that gyrated the logical deduction that where there is no equality there can be no liberty, and where there is no liberty there can be no general prosperity. His attempt to construct upon these postulates a working plan for a democratic government on a large scale does not signify the unsoundness of the fundamental truths that lie at the bottom of his thesis. In his day, and, indeed, until recent times, any attempt to establish a democratic form of government on a large scale was not feasible because of the lack of extensive and rapid intercommunication among the individual units of a numerous commonwealth occupying a large area and actuated by different and oftentimes conflicting interests.

Born a free citizen of Geneva, Rousseau picked up under adverse circumstances a knowledge of the ancient political writers, Plato, Aristotle, Socrates and others, and was also no doubt familiar with the writings of Locke, whose theories of popular government, as modified by his own conceptions, he purveyed to his generation in France and Switzerland.

Social Conditions in America in 1776.

The conditions in the American Colonies, by the unfoldment of human progress, in 1776 were barely propitious enough to warrant the fates in launching the first great Republic that gives promise of realizing the aspirations of true democracy. The field was fallow for revolution, having been plowed by the Puritans, the Quakers and the Huguenots, but barely fertile enough for the planting of a republic, much less for that of democracy, which could be only a Utopian dream until made feasible by the development of a high

order of general intelligence and the creation of time and space annihilators for the individual units of society to effect rapid interchange of thought and action. These last-named conditions are now abundantly in evidence in this country, and need but the awakening of general intelligence as the final auxiliary factor in the transmogrification of an irresponsible representative system into a system directly responsible to a completely enfranchised, intelligent, sovereign electorate.

The adverse and favorable conditions for the establishment of any sort of a popular government in the Colonies were about equally balanced at the close of the American Revolution. The lack of sufficiently rapid intercommunication and close and frequent contact of the individual units of each colony with those of other colonies was perhaps the most serious of the adverse conditions. Diversity of religious sectarianism was another, national prejudices a third, conflict of trade and commercial interests still another, and many others. The favorable conditions were a common language, a common source of fundamental principles of law, a certain sense of brotherhood, born of a companionship in arms, and, after a three years' trial of a loose confederacy, a final sense that in an effective union alone there was national safety and that, metaphorically, they must still band together or hang separately in a world of piratical nations.

So, under these conditions, the Constitutional Convention of 1787 met for the purpose of "forming a more perfect union" of States, to be given authority in a central federal government with powers defined and limited by a written constitution.

Opposing Views in Constitutional Convention.

To this convention went adherents of two great Americans of approximately equal learning but whose temperaments were the antitheses of each other, whose observations were from exactly opposite viewpoints, whose estimates of human nature were at entire variance, whose views with regard to the construction of society and the relations of people to the Government were antagonistic. These men were Thomas Jefferson, of Virginia, and Alexander Hamilton, of New York, and the latter was himself a member of the convention. Jefferson was a disciple of Locke and Rousseau, and his adherents in the convention stood for the incorporation of the broadest possible democratic principles in the new Constitution, while Hamilton, essentially an aristocrat and monarchist, without faith, or any kind of confidence in the average intelligence, patriotism, or stability of mankind, stood for every possible device that went to exclude and remove from the people any direct contact with, or immediate or remote responsibility for the Government. It was confederation-

ist arrayed against nationalist. It was the Jeffersonian idea to retain all the power possible in the sovereignty of the States and to leave the people in the respective States to their own devices in administering public affairs.

It was the Hamiltonian idea to leave with the States as little power as possible, and with the people none at all. These two strenuous schools had each its following, the Jeffersonians chiefly among the masses who had fought the war and read Thomas Paine's pamphlets, and the Hamiltonians largely among the conservative property-owning and commercial classes who had been Tories or who had straddled the fence during the progress of the Revolution. The less strenuous members of the convention gave us the compromise Constitution, in the final adoption of which the Hamiltonian idea predominated, and is best expressed in the declaration that the Constitution is an instrument of "admirable checks and balances," which placed it in the hands of the judicial branch of the Government to exercise an absolute veto upon every act of the other two co-ordinate branches; and, while in the theory only a power of negation, is, in fact and may be in practice, one of far-reaching legislative initiation and crystallization.

Constitutional Method of Electing Presidents Changed by Usage.

It was provided in the Constitution—since amended by usage—that the Chief Executive should be elected by State electors appointed by the States in such manner as the legislatures thereof might determine, a provision calculated to remove Presidents as far from the people as possible, again filtering power through as many intermediates as could be devised between the people and the Government, the source of and the expression of power.

After dividing the legislative branch between two houses of Congress and the Executive, giving to the latter a qualified negation over the exercise of legislative power by the Congress, it was the purpose to further restrict the powers of the people and get the Government still further removed from direct responsibility to them, by first limiting the tenure of the popularly elected or lower branch of Congress to two years, and to check any undue or radical action on its part by subjecting such action to the approval, amendment or rejection of an upper House, a body of Senators whose respective tenures of office were fixed for six years and who were to be elected by State legislatures, so as to take their acts and this branch of Congress out of the range of direct responsibility to the electorate. By the Constitution the Senators are declared United States officers, representing, in theory, the whole Republic, though elected to office by particular, individual States, two to each State. As a political creation,

therefore, the United States Senate is unique in the whole history of government. The great powers that the Constitution confers upon the Senate, the method of its creation, the six-year tenure of the individual officer and the never-dying character of the institution as a body, are all strictly Hamiltonian in their natures, and were conferred with the premeditated design of reducing and minimizing to the last degree the influence, immediate or remote, of the electorate over the law-making power of the Government, and in so far as possible to nullify and render as naught every vestige of popular sovereignty.

In providing for the creation of this branch of the National Legislature and fixing its status was found by the convention to be one of the chief difficulties in agreeing upon the charter of our Union, because it involved the autonomy and relative share of the States as such in the conduct of the Federal Government.

This was of little concern to Hamilton, however, so long as the powers conferred on the Senate were in inverse ratio to the Senate's responsibility to the people. Roger Sherman, a delegate from Connecticut, who proposed the plan finally adopted, and who seems to have been chief spokesman for the Hamilton contingent, on May 31, 1787, advocated the election of the lower House of Congress by the State legislatures, and is reported by Madison as opposing the election by the people, insisting that it ought to be by the State legislatures. "The people," he said, "immediately, should have as little to do as may be about the Government." And this was the actuating motive of the Nationalists when in the following July the convention finally, after long and serious debates, adopted the present Hamiltonian method of electing United States Senators.

Constitution as Framed Was Against Popular Sovereignty.

When the Constitution was finished by the convention and signed, every grant of power it contained, every bar it put up between the people and the Government, every check and balance it imposed on the electorate and on the States was Hamiltonian, and, as far as possible, was constructive of an irresponsible machine. It was aggressive against State sovereignty, against popular sovereignty, and against the spirit of democracy among the electorate of the States. Jefferson and his school were, in truth, on the defensive, and the battle resulted in a victory for what exactly at that time was needed—and all that the conditions then warranted—a union of States under a centralized government. Conditions were not then ripe for Rousseauism, in the application of popular sovereignty, on a national scale. But witness the 15 amendments to the Constitution and observe this curious fact: Every single one of them, in its last analysis, is a recognition of

the sovereign rights and powers of the people as against both the sovereignty of the State, as such, and that of the Federal Government. They are the people's bill of rights.

Conditions Have Changed.

In the last 120 years conditions have greatly changed. Electricity and steam, the telegraph, telephone, railroad and steamboat have established media of instantaneous intercommunication of ideas and rapid co-operation of action of the individual units of society.

Centralization of government, business and the individual units of society is the inevitable result incident to the evolution of civilization. With this centralization comes increased power, and to insure the proper use of same it must be correlated with increased responsibility and accountability, which should go together.

Responsibility and Accountability Must Go Together.

To insure good service, responsibility and accountability must go together. Whatever an individual is responsible for he should to the same degree be accountable for. Under delegated government he is accountable to the political boss, who in most cases is but the agent of the largest campaign contributor, at best a shifting accountability, because of the relative fluctuations of contributions and contributors. Under popular government like the Oregon system the accountability is always to the composite citizen—individual unknown—always permanent, never changing, the necessitated result being that the public servant must serve the composite citizen who represents general welfare or be recalled, where the recall exists, or fail of re-election where an efficient direct primary exists.

The greater the centralization of power the wider should be the distribution of accountability. Where the accountability is to the individual, the payment will be personal, meaning necessarily special privilege or serving a selfish interest. Where the accountability in government is to the composite citizen—that is to say, the electorate, or, in corporate business, to all the stockholders—the inevitable result is necessitated service for the general welfare of all, or the earliest possible elimination of the servant, whether public or corporate.

Accountability Secured Through Direct Primary.

I repeat that the securing of proper accountability of government and corporate officials is one of our greatest national problems. The solution is simple. In government, direct accountability of all public servants to party and general electorates. This can only be secured by the people selecting all their public servants through direct primaries and minimizing the misuse of money through comprehensive corrupt practices acts, with the ultimate absolute elimination of all

political machines, conventions and caucuses. In business, rigid responsibility of the commercial force to the police force of society. In corporation management, primary responsibility to government, equal obedience to laws and equal accountability to stockholders, giving the Government and the stockholders the fullest publicity of its operations, including absolute honesty and simplicity of its accounts, thus protecting the rights of the people and insuring to all the stockholders proportional enjoyment in the fruits of successful management, resulting in far greater stability for values and an infinitely greater market for its securities.

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TOM L. JOHNSON.

J. W. Bengough in Toronto Globe of April 17.

Another Captain of the Host
Has fallen, broken sword in hand,
'The Champion of the Right and Just,
A warrior grand;
Full victor-crowned in hearts of all who prize the
brave in every land.

Not what he did, but what he dreamt,
And what attempted, made him great;
His smiling, genial contempt
Of rich estate;
His wit, his wholesome mirth, his pluck, his fine
devotion to the state.

No pallid martyr-face he wore,
This homespun hero, blithe and gay,
Though pains and penalties he bore
For many a day,
And dead at last, a martyr true to freedom's holy
cause he lay.

The age he served was not unstirred
By his great life; that poet cry,*
"A man is passing!" was a word
That found reply;
A man, indeed, who loved his kind and blessed
the world in passing by.

*Vide Edmund Vance Cooke's poem so entitled. See The Public, April 7, page 325.

BOOKS

PEACE SOCIETIES AND THE TARIFF.

The Folly of Building Temples of Peace with Untempered Mortar. By John Bigelow. Published by B. W. Huebsch, New York. 1910.

The Peace Societies, writes Mr. Bigelow, are building with "intempered mortar." Let them read Ezekiel, chapter xiii, and learn their own vanity. For vain is "the concoction of peace organizations with the left hand while deliberately and persistently waging a flagrant tariff war against every commercial nation, not excepting