

## RELATED THINGS

### CONTRIBUTIONS AND REPRINT

#### BRYAN.

(To Susan Look Avery.)

For The Public.

You marked him at the dawning of his fame,  
And gave him your allegiance, as a man  
Fearless and wise and just, whose thought outran  
His time's slow pace; one with great hopes aflame,  
To whom Democracy was no mere name  
For set or faction, but a noble plan  
Of life for all through all, in Freedom's van  
Still moving upward toward a common aim.

Today the man that long ago you knew  
Is known to all; a nation's grateful hosts  
Grant him at last the homage long his due;  
Now is his triumph,—and your triumph too.  
No longer shall men doubt a cause that boasts  
Leader and follower such as he and you.

W. R. BROWNE.



#### BRYAN ON PROTECTIONISM.

Extracts from the Speech of William J. Bryan at  
Dallas, Texas, September 14, 1909. From  
the Commoner of September 24, 1909.

I began the study of public questions with the tariff question, and years ago reached the conclusion that the protective principle is indefensible from every standpoint.

It is wrong in principle, wrong in policy, and its influence must always and everywhere be harmful.

As unrestricted trade is the natural condition, the advocate of protection must be prepared to establish three propositions before he can maintain his position.

1. He must prove that the principle of protection is right;
  2. That the policy is wise; and
  3. That the protection asked for is necessary.
- What protectionist has ever attempted to establish any one of these propositions?



We contend that the principle is wrong.

A protective tariff is an indirect bounty. In the case of a bounty the government collects the money and turns it over to the favored individual or corporation. In the case of a protective tariff the government imposes a duty upon the imported article, and the theory is that this duty, being added to the price of the imported article, so increases the cost of the imported article that the manufacturer can collect from the consumer an amount equal to the tariff in excess of the amount

that he could collect if there were no tariff. The protective tariff and the bounty do not differ in principle, but merely in form. We contend that the government has no right to collect money from all the people for the benefit of a few of the people.

In what is known as the Topeka (Kan.) case, the United States Supreme Court held that the city of Topeka could not tax the people of that city to aid a manufacturing plant, located in or near that city, and the court in rendering the opinion, said: (I quote from memory.) "To lay with one hand the power of the government upon the property of the citizen and with the other to give it to private individuals to aid private enterprises and build up private fortunes, is none the less robbery because done under forms of law, and called taxation."

If the city of Topeka, acting for a majority of its citizens, could not tax the people to aid an industry located in the city, upon what principle can the people of one part of a State be taxed to aid an industry located in another part of the State? Upon what principle can the people of one State be taxed to aid an industry located in another State? Upon what principle can the people of one section of the country be taxed to aid the people who live in another section?

If the doctrine laid down in the Topeka case is sound, then the sheep owners of western Texas have no right to tax the cotton growers of the rest of the State.

If the doctrine laid down in the Topeka case is sound, upon what principle can the owners of timber lands and sawmills collect a tax upon the builders of homes throughout the land?

If we concede the right of the government to tax all of the people, for the benefit of those who may secure the favor of the government, there is no ground upon which we can plant ourselves in our fight for a tariff for revenue only; and I may add, if the protective principle is wrong, then how can we logically demand that it shall be invoked in behalf of certain sections or certain classes, merely because it has been wrongfully invoked in behalf of other sections or other classes?



But even if we could defend the right of the government to tax the many for the benefit of the few, we would find difficulty in defending the policy, because of the evils to which it leads in practice. The moment we concede the right of a man to use the government as an asset in his business, we must expect him to become active in the control of the government.

The protective system has been productive of more corruption in government than any other agency. The manufacturers have supplied the sinews of war for those candidates who are willing

to agree in advance to reimburse the manufacturers out of the pockets of the people.

An alarming fact is that advocacy of protection as a principle and toleration toward its applied doctrine, tends not only to a corruption of politics and acts injuriously to the people who permit it, but is also a menace to public morals, in that it teaches that a man's vote should be determined by the amount of money he is likely to receive from legislation rather than by his desire to contribute to the common good.

Years ago a prominent Republican coined a phrase that has since been in common use, viz: "Frying the fat out of the manufacturers."

If the manufacturers have fat which may be fried for campaign purposes, and large lumbermen and sheep owners are to be dealt with upon the same basis, where is the system to end? How can we denounce the bribe-taker, who sells his vote for 50 cents or \$5, if we condone the conduct of the rich, whose personal profits run into the hundreds, the thousands or even into the millions?

Men have been sent to Congress and kept in Congress by the campaign funds furnished by the protected interests.

In the last Presidential campaign our national committee collected about \$600,000, and more people contributed to it than ever contributed to a campaign fund before, and yet probably not more than 5 per cent. of the Democratic voters sent in contributions to the national fund. A single corporation like the steel trust could afford to contribute more than \$600,000 to any party that would promise to protect its products. Its net earnings have amounted to over \$150,000,000 in a single year. It could give ten times as much to a campaign fund as we collected from the entire Democratic party last year, and yet make the money back over and over in a single year out of the favoritism which protection bestows; and it will not help matters any to add the producers of raw material to the manufacturers as a corrupting influence.

The benefits of the tariff on lumber do not go to any large percentage of the people, but mainly to the owners of timber lands and sawmills. The Weyerhaeuser company, for instance, owns immense tracts of timber lands and many sawmills.

While I cannot speak in detail of the lumber interests in Texas, I am sure I am within the truth when I say that there are twenty-five voters in Texas who are injured by the tax on lumber for every voter who derives a pecuniary benefit from the lumber tariff. The profits which the large lumber owners and lumber companies derive from the tariff on lumber is so great that they could easily finance a national campaign, if by so doing they could retain a tariff on lumber.

In my tariff speech at Des Moines last year I quoted from a speech made by Senator Pettigrew and reported in the Congressional Record,

in which he commented on a statement made in the Northwest Lumberman, giving the profit that would be derived on lumber by a group of men who assembled in one of the committee rooms of Congress to protest against free lumber. One of the group declared that a tariff of \$1 per thousand feet on lumber would amount to six million dollars to the men in the room.

As long as men and corporations find it profitable to go into partnership with the government, in the use of the taxing power we shall have corruption in politics.



The third objection to a protective tariff is that its advocates do not attempt to show that it is necessary, even from their own standpoint. The Republican platform asked for a protective tariff equal to the difference in the cost of production plus a reasonable profit to the manufacturers, and if a protective tariff is to be defended at all, that is the logical basis upon which to defend it.

What Democrat can defend a protective tariff, even on raw material, on any other ground, or to any greater extent?

And yet what protectionist has attempted to show that we need a tariff?

The testimony taken before the committees at Washington last winter did not cover this point, although this was the very question presented by the Republican platform. The Republicans who asked protection for the manufacturing interests did not attempt to show that those interests needed the protection asked for, and those who demanded the tariff on raw material did not attempt to show that the producers of raw material needed a tariff.

When a man starts out to defend a protective tariff he abandons logic and argument, and contents himself with demands and threats; he assumes that the principle of protection is right; he presumes that the policy is wise, and he takes it for granted that the rate which he asks for is necessary.

The man who contends for incidental protection soon becomes as unreasonable as the man who asks for direct protection. Incidental protection is protection that was not intended—a protection that came without planning; the moment you begin to plan for protection it ceases to be incidental and becomes direct and intended protection, and to defend it one must resort to the same arguments that are used to defend the protective system in general.

While it is true that the immediate effect of an existing tariff is the same, whether it was intended for protection or intended for revenue, yet in the construction of a tariff law it makes a great deal of difference whether those who make the law are looking for revenue or looking for protection. In making a revenue tariff you so adjust the tariff

as to collect a revenue, and you stop when you get enough; in constructing a protective tariff you may so adjust the rates as to impose a heavy burden upon the people and yet collect but little revenue, and you never know when to stop.

Take the tariff on iron ore as an illustration; the steel trust wanted a tariff on iron ore. We have this upon the authority of Senator Smith of Maryland, who said on the floor of the Senate that he had it from a Representative of the steel trust. Some of our Democrats voted for a tariff on iron ore, on the theory that it was a revenue tariff, and they estimated that a duty of 25 cents per ton would bring in a revenue of \$250,000, but if the steel trust adds the tariff to the price of the ore which it sells or to the price of the finished product which it makes from the ore which it converts into steel it will collect a tax of some \$10,000,000 from the people, because of the duty on iron ore. If this be true will any one defend the tariff on iron ore as a revenue tariff? And the same might be said of a tariff on oil. The amount of oil imported would be very small, but a tariff on oil would permit an enormous tax to be levied upon the American people.

Other illustrations might be used, but these will show how important it is that a tariff law should be made by those who oppose the principle of protection, rather than by those who favor the principle of protection.



## WOODROW WILSON.

From Funk & Wagnalls' Standard Encyclopedia, Volume xxv, Page 341.

WILSON, Woodrow (1856), was born in Staunton, Va., the son of a Presbyterian clergyman, and was graduated from Princeton 1879. He then studied law at the University of Virginia, practiced at Atlanta, Ga. (1882-83), and went to Johns Hopkins University, where he specialized in history, jurisprudence and political science.

Soon after he began his career as an educator as professor of history and political economy at Bryn Mawr College. From 1888 to 1890 he was professor of the same subjects at Wesleyan University, and from 1890 to 1902 he was professor of jurisprudence and politics at Princeton. In 1902 he was elected first lay president of the last named university. During his term as president, which ended 1910, his powers of organization were clearly seen, and he extended the influence of his university as a great intellectual institution.

In 1910 his high personal qualities and his undisputed position as a master of the methods of government, secured him election as Democratic governor of New Jersey. This scholar in politics has turned out to be a great man of action, and a politician who is prepared to fight for the ideals of the Democratic party. His term of office has

already been distinguished by several fearless and even drastic departures in public policy. He opposed the working of the political machine in the selection of candidates, has forced through a Democratic Assembly and a Republican Senate a direct primary and election law, a Workingman's Compensation Act, a Corrupt Practices Act, a Public Utilities Bill, and a Direct Election Law.

In regard to wider affairs, he believes in the Oregon initiative and referendum, objects to the recall of judges, supports the Sherman act and the larger policy it implies and sees the need of a tariff revision.

He is Democratic leader of the advanced radicalism of the nation, and at present (March, 1912) appears the man of his party most likely to be chosen at the coming convention as candidate for the presidency. Already he has attracted all eyes towards him, even some belonging to the Insurgent and Progressive Republicans, and his power is great in the Middle West.

His works, as an historian and writer of political sciences, are authoritative. They include *A Study in American Politics* (1885), *The State: Elements of Historical and Practical Politics* (1889), *Division and Reunion, 1829-1909* (1909), *George Washington* (1896), *History of the American People* (5 Vols., 1902), *Constitutional Government in the United States* (1908), and *Civic Problems* (1909).



## THE SOLDIER OF FREEDOM.

Gilbert K. Chesterton in the *London Daily News* and *Leader* of September 28, 1912.

A certain sort of Liberal, who largely dominated the last great Liberal century, seems to have disappeared entirely from our politics. . . . But whether or no the man be worthy of regret, he is certainly worthy of record. For he did most of the dirty work of cleansing Europe of a quite diseased and festering feudalism; and he can be judged with as much composure and magnanimity as a Jacobite. For he seems to have vanished utterly.

I mean the soldier of freedom, the Radical Militant; the more romantic kind of Republican who wished his country or himself to be a knight-errant of the new equality. The whole prose and poetry of nineteenth century England was filled with his spirit; ever since Byron left hanging on the altar of Hellas a sword as splendid and more stainless than his lyre. The whole politics and public oratory of nineteenth-century England had echoes of him up to the time when Ruskin rolled his richest thunders against the desertion of insulted Denmark. Swinburne is full of him. Mrs. Browning is full of him. Rossetti is full of him; and so was George Meredith in "Vittoria" and "Sandra Beltoni." Nor was it a mere atmosphere or spirit; this doctrine of military intervention in the cause