

Ammon, the god of Cyrene, I will defend and maintain it in all places.

Socrates—Then you will say that a man who does not defeat an evil deed is more guilty than the man who plans and carries it through by all the means in his power?

Gorgias—What do you mean, Socrates? What I said is clear and certain. If Mr. Bryan had not persuaded the democratic Ephors, the treaty would have been rejected or amended. Therefore the guilt is on his head.

Socrates—Well, let us follow the argument, Gorgias. Who is the real housebreaker, the man who plots a violent entry for robbery, or the man who fails to eject him?

Gorgias—It would be the former, Socrates.

Socrates—And you would say the same of political robbers?

Gorgias—I do not know what you mean, Socrates.

Socrates—Well, I will ask you what you would say if a Spartan general should agree with a Persian satrap to corrupt the Lacedaemonian state by introducing Persian customs—whom would you blame, that general or a private citizen who weakly acquiesced in his plot?

Gorgias—The general would be the man, Socrates.

Socrates—That is, you distinguish between the principal and the accessory?

Gorgias—All men do, Socrates.

Socrates—Then, by the dog of Egypt, tell me who was the principal in the matter of the Paris treaty. Was it Mr. Bryan?

Gorgias—No, but he "frustrated" the attempt to defeat it.

Socrates—But President McKinley might have frustrated the treaty itself, might he not? He negotiated it, did he not? When you were opposing its ratification, he was urging it, night and day, was he not?

Gorgias—I cannot deny it.

Socrates—Then, in the name of Zeus and Athene at once, how can you, who denounce the accessory, praise the principal? How can you say that the man who is chiefly responsible for what you describe as an attempt to "change our republic into an empire," is the "best beloved president who ever sat in the chair of Washington?"

Gorgias—But I expressly said that I had never questioned the honesty of purpose of President McKinley.

Socrates—Yet you question Mr. Bryan's honesty, Gorgias.

Gorgias—How so, Socrates?

Socrates—You said you thought he wanted the treaty ratified so as to

"keep the question for an issue in the campaign."

Gorgias—Yes, I said that, Socrates. Socrates—But how could the deed of an honest and beloved president be an issue in the campaign?

Gorgias—It might seem, nevertheless, bad for the state.

Socrates—Then an honest and beloved man might ruin the republic?

Gorgias—That is so, Socrates.

Socrates—A dishonest and hated man might save it.

Gorgias—It would seem so.

Socrates—Then it is better to be right than to be beloved?

Gorgias—Better in a public man, I admit. Mr. Bryan, however, was both wrong and disliked. He was for ratifying the treaty, and that meant a continuation of the war.

Socrates—Yet he said he wanted to end the war, did he not?

Gorgias—He did.

Socrates—And he urged his friends to vote for the joint resolution putting the Philippines on the same footing as Cuba?

Gorgias—Even so, Socrates.

Socrates—And they did so?

Gorgias—They did.

Socrates—You voted for it yourself?

Gorgias—Assuredly, Socrates.

Socrates—And it would have ended the war, if adopted, and prevented the republic from becoming an empire?

Gorgias—I have no doubt of it.

Socrates—Yet McKinley was against it? All his friends among the Ephors voted against it? It was defeated only by the casting-vote of the vice president? Are not all these things so?

Gorgias—They are.

Socrates—Then must you not admit that Bryan and his friends wanted to end the war and save the republic, and that McKinley and his friends were really the ones who prolonged the war and threaten now to convert our state into an empire?

Gorgias—No, Socrates, I do not admit it. By Here, I never will admit that!

Socrates—But why not, if truth and argument compel you?

Gorgias—Because I am a republican, Socrates.

Socrates—Exactly. I merely wanted to know if it was the truth you were in search of, or an excuse for supporting your party. Well, good by, Gorgias. Send me word if the entrails indicate that you will be chosen Ephor again.—N. Y. Nation of July 12.

It is as much a theft to steal with a long head as with a long arm.—John Ruskin.

RATIFY THE TREATY—DECLARE THE NATION'S POLICY.

An article written by William Jennings Bryan and published in the New York Journal at the time when the ratification of the treaty of peace with Spain was pending in the United States senate. It is to this article that Mr. Bryan's adversaries (including Senator Hoar) allude when they charge him with being responsible for the ratification of that treaty, without amendment, and the consequent purchase of the Philippines.

I gladly avail myself of the columns of the Journal to suggest a few reasons why the opponents of a colonial policy should make their fight in support of a resolution declaring the nation's purpose rather than against the ratification of the treaty.

The conflict between the doctrine of self-government and the doctrine of alien government supported by external force has been thrust upon the American people as a result of the war. It is so important a conflict that it cannot be avoided, and, since it deals with a question now before congress, it must be considered immediately. It is useless to ask what effect this new issue will have upon other issues. Issues must be met as they arise; they cannot be moved about at will as pawns upon a chessboard.

The opponents of imperialism have an opportunity to choose the ground upon which the battle is to be fought. Why not oppose the ratification of the treaty?

First, because a victory won against the treaty would prove only temporary if the people really favor a colonial policy.

That a victory won against the treaty would depend for its value entirely upon the sentiment of the people is evident. A minority can obstruct action for a time, but a minority, so long as it remains a minority, can only delay action and enforce reflection; it cannot commit the nation to a policy.

When there seemed to be some probability of the rejection of the treaty the friends of the administration began to suggest the propriety of withholding the treaty until the new senate could be convened in extra session. As soon as the new senate will have a considerable republican majority it would be quite certain to ratify the treaty. Thus an effort to prevent the ratification of the treaty would be likely to fail in the very beginning. But let us suppose it possible to defeat ratification in both the present and next senate—what would be the result?

Would the imperialists abandon the hope of annexing the Philippines so long as they could claim the support of

the president and a majority of both houses? Could a minority of the senate prevent the annexation of Hawaii? As we are now in possession of the Philippine islands, the advocates of a colonial policy might secure an appropriation sufficient to pay the \$20,000,000 agreed upon and leave the rest of the treaty for consideration. In other words, if the opponents of imperialism have a majority in both houses they can declare the nation's policy; if the imperialists have a majority in both houses, they cannot be permanently thwarted by a minority in the senate.

A resolution declaring the nation's policy recognizes that the destiny of the United States is in the hands of all the people and seeks to ascertain at once the sentiment of the people as reflected by their representatives.

If that decision is in harmony with the policy which has prevailed in the past the question will be settled and the people will return to the consideration of domestic problems. If, however, the advocates of imperialism either postpone consideration or control the action of congress an appeal will be taken to the voters at the next election. So great a change in our national policy cannot be made unless the authority therefor come directly and unequivocally from that source of all power in a republic—the people.

In answer to those who fear the question of imperialism, if discussed, will draw attention away from other questions, it is sufficient to say that the people cannot be prevented from considering a question which reaches down to the foundation principles of the republic. Instead of avoiding the issue it is the part of wisdom to deal with it at once and dispose of it permanently.

Second, The rejection of the treaty would be unwise because the opponents of the treaty would be compelled to assume responsibility for the continuance of war conditions and for the risks which always attend negotiations with a hostile nation.

The rejection of the treaty would give the administration an excuse for military expenditures which could not be justified after the conclusion of peace, and the opponents of the treaty would be charged with making such appropriations necessary. It must be remembered that in case the treaty is rejected, negotiations must be renewed with an enemy whose ill will is not concealed. Who is able to guarantee the nation against new dangers and new complications? In order to form an estimate of the risks which would thus be incurred, one has only to recall the unexpected things which have hap-

pened since war was declared. Is it wise to so make the attack as to assume all the risks when the same end can be gained by a plan which throws the risks upon our opponents? If the imperialists vote down a resolution declaring the nation's policy or postpone its consideration, they become responsible for any loss of life or expenditure of money which may follow as a result of such action.

I suggest below a few reasons in support of a resolution declaring it to be the nation's purpose to establish a stable government in Cuba and the Philippines and then to give the inhabitants independence under an American protectorate which will guard them against molestation from without.

First, such a course is consistent with national honor.

Our nation owes it to the nations with which we have dealings, as well as to the inhabitants of Puerto Rico, Cuba and the Philippines, to announce immediately what it intends to do respecting the territory surrendered by Spain.

The president has said that the only purpose the nation has in taking possession of Cuba is to assist the inhabitants to establish a stable and independent government. It can do no harm for congress to reaffirm this purpose, and it may do much good. The Cubans, having fought for independence for many years against great odds, are naturally jealous of the liberty which they have won, and no doubt should be left as to the sincerity and good faith of our government in its dealings with them. Such a declaration would not only be harmless, but it is almost made necessary by the flippant, if not contemptuous, tone in which some United States officials speak of the intelligence and patriotism of the Cubans and of their right to independence.

The duty of declaring our national policy in regard to the Philippines is even more imperative. The Filipinos were fighting for independence when the United States declared war against Spain. In the formal protest filed with the peace commissioners in Paris the representatives of Aguinaldo asserted that they received friendly assurances from United States officials, and acted upon those assurances in cooperating against the Spaniards. Whether or not such assurances were given, frankness and honesty should characterize our dealings with them.

If we announce to the world that we hold the Philippine islands, not for pecuniary profit, but in trust for the

inhabitants; if we declare that our only purpose is to assist the Filipinos to establish a stable and independent government, friendly relations will be maintained and there will be little need of troops. If, on the other hand, the Filipinos are not to have independence, but merely a change of masters, we should break the news to them at once and send over a large army to instruct them in the principles of a government which, in one hemisphere derives its just powers from the consent of the governed, and in the other derives its authority from superior force.

While our nation is not prepared to draft a complete code of laws suited to the peculiar methods of the Filipinos, we ought to be able to decide at once whether we intend to deal with them according to the principles of our own government or according to the customs prevailing among European monarchies. Even a republican congress ought to be able to choose without hesitation between a policy which establishes a republic in the orient and a policy which sows the seeds of militarism in the United States.

The trade relations possible under a protectorate would be of more value to the United States than any which could come as a result of forcible annexation.

The people of Puerto Rico have not manifested any desire for political independence and would, in all probability, favor annexation; yet it is only right that they should have an opportunity to choose. The resolution authorizing intervention recognized the right of the Cubans to independence. To be consistent we must also respect the wishes of the inhabitants of Puerto Rico. The resolution could without impropriety offer annexation to Puerto Rico.

In a recent interview I suggested that the United States should retain a harbor and coaling station in the Philippines and in Puerto Rico in return for services rendered, and added that Cuba should be asked to make a similar concession on the same ground.

Second. A resolution declaring the nation's purpose presents a plain and clear-cut issue between the theory of self-government and the colonial policy. It presents a positive affirmative method of dealing with the question. In opposing the treaty we would be on the defensive; in outlining a policy we shall be aggressive. The strongest arguments which could be used in support of the treaty will lose their force entirely when Spain is eliminated and the American people are able to dispose

of the question according to their own ideas and interests.

Third. It secures, by easier means, every end that can be secured by a rejection of the treaty.

If an officer of the law arrests a person in possession of stolen goods, he can either compel the return of the goods to the owner or he can first rescue them and then return them himself. We find Spain in the possession of a title to a part of the Philippines. She has not yet conquered all the native tribes, but the title which she has was acquired by force and has been held by force. We can either compel her to surrender her title to the Filipinos, as we compelled her to surrender Cuba to the Cubans, or we can accept possession and then of our own accord turn over the islands to the inhabitants.

The peace commissioners might have demanded independence for the Filipinos as they did for the Cubans. If they did not properly interpret the wishes of the people of the United States, the blame must fall upon them and not upon the people. Certainly 70,000,000 citizens are under no obligation to abate their devotion to the ideals which they have cherished for a century in order to indorse the work of a peace commission or to approve of the instructions of an executive.

If it is urged that the ratification of the treaty imposes upon us an obligation to pay \$20,000,000 to Spain, I answer, first, that this amount can probably be secured from the Filipinos in return for independence; and second, that if it cannot be secured from them, it is better to lose the amount entirely than to expend a larger sum in securing a modification of the treaty.

It is better to regard the amount paid as a contribution to liberty than to consider it the market price of land, improvements, or people.

To terminate the war upon the same high plane upon which it was inaugurated is worthy of a great republic; to descend from a sublime beginning to the purchase of sovereignty (for our own profit) from a nation whose title we disputed in Cuba would lay us open to the charge of Punic faith.

A Rhode Island Yankee proposes to settle the war against the ice trust by manufacturing portable machines that will enable every housekeeper to evolve ice cakes like biscuits, at a cost of two to three cents a pound. By the evaporation of concentrated ammonia the temperature of the little water tank can be lowered to 15 degrees Fahrenheit.—Chicago Chronicle.

THE INSTINCT PRIMAL.

For The Public.

Boers and Britons' men and brothers,
Plous heathen, savage moderns,
Clowns and flunkeys, peers and peasants,
Masters of Earth's dusky races,
Of the Hindoo, of the Kaffir:
Classic lore nor wider thinking—
New nor old interpretation
Of the law—divine or human,
Yet hath tamed your instincts primal,
Inborn of the Goth and Vandal.

Now behold the southern rivers
Redden, and the rocky passes
Dripping with the Aryan life-stream,
Spilled in lavish Teuton fashion.
See the savage in the shepherd
And the zealot mad with combat.
Grim and sickening the drama
Of the century departing.

Whirl, ye wild winds, o'er the brown
veldt.

Heap the dust and hide the fragments—
Oh, the quiv'ring shell-torn fragments.
Briton, lie beside Tugela,
Burgher, rest beneath the Modder,
Sleep! For know that spirit dies not.
Torn the mortal, yet the tearing
Shrapnel cannot stay the race life;
Nor the ancient hates recurrent
And the making of machine guns
Bar forever works fraternal.
For a power that mates with progress
Yet the darker moods shall conquer
Of the Atavar Teutonic.

F. HARMER.

After the census man had jotted down the answers to the preceding questions, he asked:

"Do you speak the English language?"

"Say," replied the "gent" who was under examination, "what kind of a spiel is this you're uncorkin' on me, anyway? Me speak the English language? Well, my boy, if you think I'm talkin' Choctaw to you now you're up against one of the emptiest propositions that ever come down the pike. Say, if the man that invented the English language could hear me spiel on my larynx he'd holler for help, and that's no josh neither. You don't haft to have no translator to git my meanin' into your headpiece, do you, huh? Me talk English! Old man, if I'm throwin' anything else into you rite now you give me a map of it on a roller, will you?"—Chicago Times-Herald.

God has given the earth in common to all, that they might pass their life in common, not that mad and raging avarice might claim all things for itself; and that that which was produced for all might not be wanting to any.—Lactantius, Divine Institutes (A. D. 300).

"Anna, what must you do before everything else, to have your sins forgiven?" "Commit the sins."—Woman's Journal.

HOUSING THE POOR.

For The Public.

Building nests for birds,
Scratching holes for hares,
Choosing sites for spawning beds,
Digging dens for bears.

Fish and flesh and fowl
Can house themselves the best.
Then let the poor possess the land,
And they will do the rest.

W. D. McCRACKAN.

In Utica, N. Y., a block of new apartment houses has just been furnished with complete installation of electric cooking utensils in each flat. The electric kitchen furniture consists of three round platters or "stoves," an oven and a broiler. It is declared, apparently with reason, that meats broiled on the electric gridiron are much more palatable than those charred and storched in the ordinary way over hot coals. The most remarkable feature of these electric kitchens is that the stoves, etc., are simply placed on an ordinary kitchen table, and when the cooking is completed can be stowed away in a convenient closet, leaving the kitchen free of even a trace of cookery. Space is thus saved.—Chicago Chronicle.

An Irish member of the house of commons, having made a speech in which several peculiar passages occurred, the reporter, to call public attention to these peculiarities, underlined them. The printer of the paper in which the report appeared, being called to the bar of the house to answer for his offense, offered to prove that the report was an exact transcript of the member's words. "That may be," exclaimed the irate Irishman, "but did I spake them in italics?"—Woman's Journal.

BOOK NOTICES.

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