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SCI LIBRARY

Catch 22 in Central America

James L. Busey



[A paper presented at the Joint Georgist Conference,
University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. 1989]


Introduction


Unlike problems in mathematics, those arising from international relations do not necessarily come with ready-made answers. Indeed, for many problems in world affairs, there may be no answers at all.

The primary reason for this is that international relations are conducted in a contest of only semi-organized anarchy, among nation-states that regard themselves as being sovereign, independent, self-propelled and outside of any organized control. Whatever international organizational structure there is, comes in the form of weak and largely ineffective entities such as the United Nations or the Organization of American States, whose members adhere to notions of untrammeled sovereignty and refuse to give up the powers and authority needed for enforcement of an ephemeral "international law."

In this chaotic jungle, each nation-state quite understandably looks after what it regards as its "national interest," defined as it sees fit. To seek easy answers to the clashing objectives that emerge out of such a formless confusion, is to misunderstand entirely the true character of world affairs. Bumper stickers do not solve world tensions.

To illustrate this point of the intractability of international relations, examples may be found everywhere. One that is worth our serious attention is that of conflict in Central America.

Among Latin Americanists, Central America is regarded as including five republics: Guatamala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica. Panama", which was set adrift from the South American republic of Columbia in 1903, is not normally regarded as being part of Central America. It was never a member of the five-nation Federal Republic of Central America (1823-1838), which was formed after independence from Spain (1821) and Mexico (1823). If anything, Panama forms an isthmian bridge between South and North America. Figuratively speaking, the Panama Canal, which cuts through the heart of the republic and accounts for much of its economic viability, illustrates this point.


Causes of Central American conflict


In Central America as elsewhere, the usual disorderly characteristics of international relations combine with regional factors to create elements of conflict. Causal factors endemic to Central America include, (1) terrible sociopolitical conditions in at least four of the five republics, (2) in most of the area, an historical relationship with the United States that many leading Central American political and intellectual figures perceive as including U.S. conduct that was insensitive to local concerns, intrusive, insulting, and in many cases overwhelmingly domineering, (3) predominance of the Marxist-Leninist theoretical message among socially conscious reformers and revolutionaries, (4) an inevitable Soviet involvement in Marxist political movements and regimes, and (5) an equally inevitable negative U.S. reaction to such Soviet involvement in affairs so close to U.S. borders.


Socio-Political Conditions. This is not the place to undertake detailed description of the appalling economic and social travails that have so long been suffered by most of the people in at least four of the five Central American republics - Costa Rica having been, since the very earliest days of its history, a partial exception to this pattern of unremitting misery.[1]

In the other four countries, large majorities of populations have been afflicted by inadequate health care, poor or no housing, massive unemployment or under-employment, and low levels of educational opportunity combined with widespread illiteracy - all in sharp contrast to conspicuous opulence enjoyed by influential minorities; and governments have too often been marked by callous political repression, persistent domination by military elements, corruption and violence.[2]

The U.S. and Central America. Causes of the Central American socio-political malaise go very far back to the period of Spanish conquest, long before the United States existed; and though individual U.S. private interests such as the fruit companies have taken advantage of prevailing patterns of employer-employee relations, wage scales and working conditions as they found them, appalling economic conditions have long prevailed in Central America, with or without involvement of U.S. corporate elements.

Also, it is inaccurate to contend that U.S. relations with all the Central American republics have always been marked by insensitivity bordering on arrogance, heavy-handed "diplomatic" intrusions and even direct armed interventions.

In greater or lesser degrees, however, all the countries have experienced episodes of heavy pressure brought by U.S. diplomatic representatives, which in some cases have resulted in changes of governments. Costa Rica and El Salvador were relatively free of excessive U.S. influence until the last two decades, but now are being especially sensitized to the presence of the North American giant - Costa Rica, because of massive U.S. economic aid, and El Salvador as a consequence of large doses of military assistance and advice.

Honduras must now undergo ubiquitous U.S. military emplacements and personnel in areas near Nicaragua, as well as thousands of uprooted contras, most of whom were until recently fighting against the Sandinistas in the neighboring republic. In Guatemala in 1954, the CIA played a significant role in overthrow of the Marxist-leaning Jacobo Arbenz regime by Guatamalan dissidents under command of Col Carlos Castilla Armas; and in subsequent years the country has often felt the heavy hand of U.S. diplomatic pressure, especially in response to emergence of Marxist guerrilla forces.

Thus, the United States must carry a heavy load of historical baggage. Episodes of undue U.S. intrusion into internal affairs of small and sensitive Central American republics are not soon forgotten or forgiven. Even such events in Mexico, such as the U.S.-Mexican War (1846-1848) or marine landings in Veracruz (1914) or General John Pershing's pursuit of Francisco Villa through northern Mexico (1916-17), become well known and resented in nearby and culturally related Central America. Also, nationalist and anti-American elements are always present to fan the flames of historical memory and resentment.

Of the Central American republics, Nicaragua has had the most direct experience with various forms of United States intervention.

During 1856-1857 a band of independent filibustered under command of Wm. Walker invaded the country, and for a short time Walker even had himself set up as the English-speaking president de la reptiblica. It took the combined armed forces of Central America, led by Costa Rica, to throw out the intruders. The Walker episode, inspired by pro-slavery sentiments and a wild plan to set up some kind of slave territory in Central America, occurred without official connivance of the U.S. government; but, it was understandable that Central Americans think of it as having been an American invasion. Anti-U.S. elements do nothing to dissuade them from this notion.

In order to secure the continuation in office of regimes favorable to U.S. economic interests, the American marines were landed in Nicaragua in 1912; and with one brief interruption remained until 1933, when the commander of the National Guard, Anastasio Somoza, was on his way to power. In February of 1934, an early order of business for the emerging Somoza dictatorship was to assassinate the nationalist revolutionary, Augusto Cesar Sandino.

The seemingly interminable Somoza dictatorship (1933-1979) featured immense abuses of power and enormous corruption. Today, opponents of the Marxist Sandinista regime tend to downplay the role of the United States during the Somoza years, which continued through the life of the original founder of the dynasty (assassinated in 1956) and rule by his two succeeding sons, as well as some figurehead presidents who flitted across the stage.

The facts are, that until the Carter administration decided at the last minute that the time had come to sever connections with the unsavory dictatorship, most U.S. diplomacy in Nicaragua carried on an unusually cozy relationship with the successive Somoza regimes. In this respect, the most notorious U.S. ambassador was Thomas Whelan, who during 1951-1963 made the United States synonymous in most Nicaraguan minds with the Somozas themselves. Whelan's period was exceptional in terms of the degree to which U.S. diplomacy and a hated dictatorship became indistinguishable from each other; but other U.S. ambassadors, before and after Whelan, differed from him only in the degree to which they carried on their friendly dealings with a dynasty whose stability was thought to be good for U.S. investments and national interest.

Of course news about the U.S.-Somoza affair was not confined to Nicaragua, but spread through Central America, into Mexico, and southward to the for reaches of South America.[4]

Predominance of the Marxist theoretical message. For spreading strong support for Marxism, the Central American environment would be hard to beat. First of all, there is the terrible poverty, often coupled with brazen human exploitation by powerful monopolists of both land and capital (both fused in the uninformed mind as "capital"). Secondly, political power, whether civilian or military, is often rightly seen outside Costa Rica as a creature of the same exploitive elements. Thirdly, and most significantly in the case of Central America, the great "capitalist" Yankee power is perceived to have both worked in close collusion with oppressive, anti-popular regimes, and to have offended Central American sensibilities by intruding into their internal affairs, even to the extent of trying to establish unwanted regimes and occupying their republics with yanqui marines.

The scene was made for emergence of powerful Marxist revolutionary forces, and that is exactly what happened. There is no other visible social message, so the advocates of radical social change have taken the only route they know.

In Guatemala, this is true of the Guatemalan Labor Party, the Armed Revolutionary Forces, the Guerrilla Army of the People, and the Organization of the Armed People. It is true in Honduras, where the persistent presence of U.S. armed forces and contras is putting new life into the Morazan Front of National Liberation. It is true in El Salvador, where the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) is named after an assassinated Communist hero, combines five different Marxist armies and parties (including the Communist Party of El Salvador), and the hammer and sickle emblazon its banners.

It would be odd if the Sandinistas of Nicaragua, the republic most abused by U.S. interventionist activities, would be an exception to this rule, and it is not. Organized by young students of the 1950s (Carlos Fonseca Amador, Silvio Mayorga, Thomas Borge, etc.), who knew no other doctrine of social reform except Marxism, the FSLN (Frente Sandinista de Liberaci6n Nacional; Sandinist Front for National Liberation) has been overwhelmingly Marxist-Leninist from the start. Students of Central America who are aware of the travails of its people and the unavailability of competing social doctrines, have no difficulty understanding this.

Two years prior to overthrow of the last Somoza, the FSLN Military-Political Platform of 1977 proclaimed Sandinista goals to be "inseparably linked to the Marxist-Leninist cause." On September 17, 1979, exactly two months after the Sandinistas came to power, a first order of diplomatic business was to hold an immense public rally in adulation of visiting Vietnam Premier Pham Van Dang. On September 5 and October 1 of the same year, the new revolutionary regime sent the first plane loads of teenagers to study in Cuba; and on November 22, the first of many contingents of Cuban teachers arrived in Nicaragua. In March, 1980, leaders of the Sandinista Directorate (guiding committee of the FSLN) visited Moscow to enter into an agreement calling for close collaboration between the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. and the Sandinista Front.[5]

Now, of course, after a decade of Sandinista rule in Nicaragua, the rest is history. The background is understandable and the consequences probably inevitable.

Soviet Involvement. Though but rarely understood, this causal element of Central American conflict actually requires only a minimum of explanation.

There is little need to debate the chicken-egg question as to which came first, negative U.S. reaction to the sandinista revolution or Sandinista determination to gravitate into the Soviet orbit. Chronologically, the Sandinista pro-Soviet moves began almost immediately after the revolution of July, 1979, and continued during their first months in power at the same time that the Carter administration was offering friendly overtures and economic aid to the new regime; but it can be argued that past Nicaraguan experiences with the United States induced the sandinistas to seek out other friends around the world.

Nor is it necessary to determine whether the Nicaraguan revolution was instigated by the Soviets, which apparently it was not.

Regardless of these chronological questions, which are still debated uselessly in some quarters, it should be easy to understand that regimes tend to gravitate toward others that share their own perspectives. Governments founded on Judeo-Christian and Western values tend to associate with each other. Moslem nations find it easy to ally with others of similar orientation. Among the Moslems, Shiites collaborate with Shiites more easily than with Sunnis, and vice versa; and Unitarians tend to mingle more with Unitarians than they do with holy rollers. Even Georgists like to run around with other Georgists, when they can find them. Simply put, birds of a feather hang together. Nations and people with similar cultures, languages, political or religious values tend to hobnob with each other.

Therefore, it should be no mystery that Marxist-Leninist regimes find more in common with other Marxist-Leninist regimes than with "reactionary imperialist" capitalist ones; and the Marxist-Leninist Sandinistas of Nicaragua are no exception. Whatever the friendly or obnoxious behavior of the United States, the Sandinistas would have followed this universal rule, and as quickly as possible climbed into the Cuban-Soviet orbit.

A reverse side of this rule of human and national behavior might be that when a regime displays an otherwise inexplicable urge to associate closely with the Cuban-Soviet orbit (or with any other orbit, for that matter), an ideological analysis might help to untangle the puzzle.

From the standpoint of perceived U.S. national interest, the results are considered in many American circles to be intolerable, and lead to a closing of the circle from which there seems to be no escape.

The negative U.S. reaction. Stripped down to these fundamental considerations, the negative U.S. reaction to the Sandinista regime does not defy explanation. Any part of Central America is closer to New Orleans (1,350 miles from Costa Rica, 1,200 from Nicaragua) than Philadelphia is to Oklahoma City (1,368 miles) or to San Antonio, Texas (1,692 miles). Soviet-Cuban military emplacements, including airfields for long-range bombers and potential missile bases, cannot be viewed by the United States without concern. Anyone who does not understand this should reflect on the Cuban missile crisis of October, 1962.

The Monroe Doctrine of 1823 may or may not be regarded as a daily guide to contemporary American foreign policy; but it conveyed a central theme that in this semi-anarchic world is a part of the conceived national interest of any nation anywhere: "... the American continents are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers." Though in excessively brutal forms, the U.S.S.R. understood this when the Hungarian revolutionaries of 1956 appealed for help from the West, and when the Czechs attempted their "spring revolution" in 1968.

Thus, the trap is sprung for "Catch 22": Awful sociopolitical conditions have combined with irreversible historical clashes between the United States and Central America to set the stage for entrance upon it by Marxism-Leninism, the only visible formula for a people suffering interminably from grotesque socio-economic distortions. Since this development leads inevitably to intervention in Central America by members of the Cuban-Soviet bloc, the United States perceives that its national security, if not its ultimate survival, requires that it halt the march of communism in the region by doing what it can to turn back the governments and movements that espouse it.

Of course there are other factors, including economic interest, that prompt the United States to react negatively to the forward march of Marxism-Leninism in Central America; but in the realm of foreign policy, considerations of national security are and should be controlling. Therefore, there is no point in taking time or space to reflect on economic or other factors behind the anti-Marxist reaction of the United States insofar as Central America is concerned. Even if the United States should be successful in turning back the oncoming Marxist-Leninist tide in Central America, this will contribute nothing to the solution of the problems, including historically induced animosities, that brought it on in the first place. Revolutionary fervor of the same ideological character can be expected to reemerge at any point, determined to resume the struggle for liberation from thralldom. The case of Guatemala, which with U.S. assistance threw out a quasi-Marxist regime in 1954, is instructive. For the past several years in that country, a program of brutal repression has been underway against militant Marxist movements. If allowed to flourish without resistance, they would surely have recaptured Guatemala several years ago.


Is there no way out?


Seen in the light of these apparently immovable and irresistable factors, it would appear there is no solution to the problem of Central American conflict; either unceasing exploitation and bloodshed, or Cuban-Soviet domination and permanent threat to U.S. security interests must prevail.

However, this need not be the only future for Central America.

Among the five factors of conflict discussed above, it is conceivable that two of them may be more amenable to transformation than we have thus far supposed. Another radical message, that of Georgism-physiocracy (which I choose to abbreviate as "geocracy") could be a worthy substitute for Marxism-Leninism as providing a solution to the unspeakable Central American conditions that are the root cause of Central American turbulence.

This brings us back squarely to the central proposition in President Richard Noyes' draft paper that:

It is George's realization with which we must be concerned, and it is his realization which is ripe now in the dialectical movement. The remedy is sound, and we must get to it when the dialogue is ready for it, but no playwright with his head screwed on would insist upon its being said, and nothing else, until it fits the sequence and so makes sense.[6]


Is the Central American "dialogue" ready for the geocratic remedy?

I think it is ready, and has been for a very long time. Physiocracy played a significant role in Spanish and even Latin American thought before Henry George existed.[7] As Noyes also stresses (page 8), "the public dialogue is full of what the land problem has to do with things in Nicaragua, and the Philippines, and Brazil, to name a few." Indeed, the subject of land reform has long been uppermost in the social concerns of Latin America, including specifically Central America. Essentially all movements of social reform in that part of the world have included some reference, often a leading or dominant one, to the need for land reform.[8]

Thus, the context for a new approach to Central American social change is already in place. When we consider the obstacles that geocracy faces in getting its message across in the United States, it may be doubted that anything much can be accomplished in Central America. Our task lies in finding the devices that will effectively convey our concepts to socially concerned Central Americans not already hopelessly converted to Marxism-Leninism.

If we can do that, we can make a significant contribution both to the termination of Central American social distress and to the cessation of their bloody conflicts. Also, if geocracy rather than Marxism-Leninism would become a significant force for solution of Central America's pressing problems, it might put U.S. policy makers more at ease.


NOTES


[1] It would go far beyond the scope of the present brief summary to attempt to describe or explain the unusual political-economic conditions of Costa Rica, which include a very long experience in constitutional democracy, somewhat higher levels of economic opportunity, and wider distribution of property, than are to be found in other Central American republics. See, by this author, Prospects for the Social Transformation of Latin America (London: Economic and Social Science Research Association, 1985), pp. 35-40. Idem., Notes on Costa Rican Democracy (Boulder: University of Colorado Press, 1967) Several other sources will be cited in final paper.

[2] To observers of Central American life and informed readers, these are matters of general knowledge. In the final version of this paper, more details and sources will be cited. For now, a quick reference source that is readily available is the World Almanac and Book of Facts, 1989 (New York: World Almanac, 1988), which informs us that in the four republics other than Costa Rica, per capita income varies from $700 in El Salvador to $1,000 in Guatemala (Costa Rica, $1,352); life expectancy at birth from 55 years in Guatemala to 64 in El Salvador (Costa Rica, 69); infant mortality per 1,000 births from 73 in Honduras to 37 in Nicaragua (Costa Rica, 15); daily newspaper circulation per 1,000 population, 30 in Guatemala to 71 (?) in El Salvador (71 in Costa Rica); and adult literacy, 48% in Guatemala to 66% in Nicaragua (Costa Rica, 90%). All such figures, no matter where found, almost invariably come from official sources, so must be evaluated insofar as their dependability is concerned, in the light of governmental characteristics of individual republics.

[3] A few sources on U.S.-Central American relations: Morris Blachman et al, eds., Confronting Revolution: Security Through Diplomacy in Central America (NY: Random House, 1986); James Chase, Why We Are in Central America (NY: Random House, 1984); Bernard Diederich, Somoza and the Legacy of U.S. Involvement in Central America (NY: Dutton, 1981); . Mark Falcoff et al, eds.. The Continuing Crisis: U.S. Policy in Central America and the Caribbean (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1987); John A. Findling, Close Neighbors, Distant Friends (NY: Greenwood Press, 1987); Lawrence Greene, The Filibusterer: The Career of William Walker (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1937); Richard Alan White, The Morass: United States Intervention in Central America (NY: Harper & Row, 1984).

[4] In final paper, extensive sources on U.S.-Nicaraguan relations will be cited.

[5] The literature on the early attachment of the Sandinistas to the Marxist-Leninst cause is authoritative, thoroughly documented, and - except among committed ideologues - is completely persuasive. E.g., among other sources to be cited in the final paper, there is Shirley Christian, Nicaragua: Revolution in the Family (NY: Random House, 1985); David Noland, FSLN (Coral Gables: Institute of Interamerican Studies, University of Miami, 1984); Douglas W. Payne, The Democratic Mask (NY: Freedom House, 1985).

[6] Noyes draft paper, p. 4.

[7] Founder of the physiocratic school was Francois Quesnay (1694-1774) of France; its most prominent supporter was Robert Turgot (1727-1781), minister of finance under Louis XVI. Names of Spanish-Latin American "Georgists before George" will be cited in final paper.

[8] Unfortunately, in Latin America our term "land reform" is replaced by the phrase "reforma agraria," or agrarian reform, thus erecting an obstacle to advocacy of the geocratic remedy for both agricultural and urban settings.

Some sources on the subject as related to Latin American in general would include Solon Barraclough, ed., Agrarian Structure in Latin America (Lexington: D.C. Heath, 1973); Merilee S. Grindle, State and Countryside: Development Policy and Agrarian Politics in Latin America (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985); T. Lynn Smith, ed., Agrarian Reform in Latin America {NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 1965); William C. Thiesenhusen, ed., Searching for Agrarian Reform in Latin America (NY: Unwin Hyman, 1988).

On Central American land reform and related subjects, there are, among others, Thomas P. Anderson, The War of the Dispossessed: Honduras and El Salvador, 1969 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. 1981); Charles D. Brockett, Land, Power and Poverty: Agrarian Transformation and Political Conflict in Central America (Winchester, Mass.: Alien & Unwin, 1988); Julio Castellanos Cambranes, Coffee and Peasants: The Origins of the Modern Plantation Economy in Guatemala (Recent: Must look up publisher); Forrest D. Colburn, Post-Revolutionary Nicaragua: State, Class and the Dilemmas of Agrarian Policy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986); Thomas L. Karnes, Tropical Enterprise: The Standard Fruit and Steamship Company in Latin America (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1979).

The most devastating study of third-world land reform to date is John Powelson, Richard Stock et al. The Peasant Betrayed: Agriculture and Land Reform in the Third World (Lincoln Institute of Land Study, 1987). The Powelson-Stock book includes parts of Latin America, including Nicaragua.