Catch 22 in Central America
James L. Busey
[A paper presented at the Joint Georgist Conference,
University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. 1989]
Introduction
Unlike problems in mathematics, those arising from international
relations do not necessarily come with ready-made answers. Indeed, for
many problems in world affairs, there may be no answers at all.
The primary reason for this is that international relations are
conducted in a contest of only semi-organized anarchy, among
nation-states that regard themselves as being sovereign, independent,
self-propelled and outside of any organized control. Whatever
international organizational structure there is, comes in the form of
weak and largely ineffective entities such as the United Nations or
the Organization of American States, whose members adhere to notions
of untrammeled sovereignty and refuse to give up the powers and
authority needed for enforcement of an ephemeral "international
law."
In this chaotic jungle, each nation-state quite understandably looks
after what it regards as its "national interest," defined as
it sees fit. To seek easy answers to the clashing objectives that
emerge out of such a formless confusion, is to misunderstand entirely
the true character of world affairs. Bumper stickers do not solve
world tensions.
To illustrate this point of the intractability of international
relations, examples may be found everywhere. One that is worth our
serious attention is that of conflict in Central America.
Among Latin Americanists, Central America is regarded as including
five republics: Guatamala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa
Rica. Panama", which was set adrift from the South American
republic of Columbia in 1903, is not normally regarded as being part
of Central America. It was never a member of the five-nation Federal
Republic of Central America (1823-1838), which was formed after
independence from Spain (1821) and Mexico (1823). If anything, Panama
forms an isthmian bridge between South and North America. Figuratively
speaking, the Panama Canal, which cuts through the heart of the
republic and accounts for much of its economic viability, illustrates
this point.
Causes of Central American conflict
In Central America as elsewhere, the usual disorderly characteristics
of international relations combine with regional factors to create
elements of conflict. Causal factors endemic to Central America
include, (1) terrible sociopolitical conditions in at least four of
the five republics, (2) in most of the area, an historical
relationship with the United States that many leading Central American
political and intellectual figures perceive as including U.S. conduct
that was insensitive to local concerns, intrusive, insulting, and in
many cases overwhelmingly domineering, (3) predominance of the
Marxist-Leninist theoretical message among socially conscious
reformers and revolutionaries, (4) an inevitable Soviet involvement in
Marxist political movements and regimes, and (5) an equally inevitable
negative U.S. reaction to such Soviet involvement in affairs so close
to U.S. borders.
Socio-Political Conditions. This is not the place to undertake
detailed description of the appalling economic and social travails
that have so long been suffered by most of the people in at least four
of the five Central American republics - Costa Rica having been, since
the very earliest days of its history, a partial exception to this
pattern of unremitting misery.[1]
In the other four countries, large majorities of populations have
been afflicted by inadequate health care, poor or no housing, massive
unemployment or under-employment, and low levels of educational
opportunity combined with widespread illiteracy - all in sharp
contrast to conspicuous opulence enjoyed by influential minorities;
and governments have too often been marked by callous political
repression, persistent domination by military elements, corruption and
violence.[2]
The U.S. and Central America. Causes of the Central American
socio-political malaise go very far back to the period of Spanish
conquest, long before the United States existed; and though individual
U.S. private interests such as the fruit companies have taken
advantage of prevailing patterns of employer-employee relations, wage
scales and working conditions as they found them, appalling economic
conditions have long prevailed in Central America, with or without
involvement of U.S. corporate elements.
Also, it is inaccurate to contend that U.S. relations with all the
Central American republics have always been marked by insensitivity
bordering on arrogance, heavy-handed "diplomatic" intrusions
and even direct armed interventions.
In greater or lesser degrees, however, all the countries have
experienced episodes of heavy pressure brought by U.S. diplomatic
representatives, which in some cases have resulted in changes of
governments. Costa Rica and El Salvador were relatively free of
excessive U.S. influence until the last two decades, but now are being
especially sensitized to the presence of the North American giant -
Costa Rica, because of massive U.S. economic aid, and El Salvador as a
consequence of large doses of military assistance and advice.
Honduras must now undergo ubiquitous U.S. military emplacements and
personnel in areas near Nicaragua, as well as thousands of uprooted
contras, most of whom were until recently fighting against the
Sandinistas in the neighboring republic. In Guatemala in 1954,
the CIA played a significant role in overthrow of the Marxist-leaning
Jacobo Arbenz regime by Guatamalan dissidents under command of Col
Carlos Castilla Armas; and in subsequent years the country has often
felt the heavy hand of U.S. diplomatic pressure, especially in
response to emergence of Marxist guerrilla forces.
Thus, the United States must carry a heavy load of historical
baggage. Episodes of undue U.S. intrusion into internal affairs of
small and sensitive Central American republics are not soon forgotten
or forgiven. Even such events in Mexico, such as the U.S.-Mexican War
(1846-1848) or marine landings in Veracruz (1914) or General John
Pershing's pursuit of Francisco Villa through northern Mexico
(1916-17), become well known and resented in nearby and culturally
related Central America. Also, nationalist and anti-American elements
are always present to fan the flames of historical memory and
resentment.
Of the Central American republics, Nicaragua has had the most direct
experience with various forms of United States intervention.
During 1856-1857 a band of independent filibustered under command of
Wm. Walker invaded the country, and for a short time Walker even had
himself set up as the English-speaking president de la reptiblica.
It took the combined armed forces of Central America, led by Costa
Rica, to throw out the intruders. The Walker episode, inspired by
pro-slavery sentiments and a wild plan to set up some kind of slave
territory in Central America, occurred without official connivance of
the U.S. government; but, it was understandable that Central Americans
think of it as having been an American invasion. Anti-U.S. elements do
nothing to dissuade them from this notion.
In order to secure the continuation in office of regimes favorable to
U.S. economic interests, the American marines were landed in Nicaragua
in 1912; and with one brief interruption remained until 1933, when the
commander of the National Guard, Anastasio Somoza, was on his way to
power. In February of 1934, an early order of business for the
emerging Somoza dictatorship was to assassinate the nationalist
revolutionary, Augusto Cesar Sandino.
The seemingly interminable Somoza dictatorship (1933-1979) featured
immense abuses of power and enormous corruption. Today, opponents of
the Marxist Sandinista regime tend to downplay the role of the
United States during the Somoza years, which continued through the
life of the original founder of the dynasty (assassinated in 1956) and
rule by his two succeeding sons, as well as some figurehead presidents
who flitted across the stage.
The facts are, that until the Carter administration decided at the
last minute that the time had come to sever connections with the
unsavory dictatorship, most U.S. diplomacy in Nicaragua carried on an
unusually cozy relationship with the successive Somoza regimes. In
this respect, the most notorious U.S. ambassador was Thomas Whelan,
who during 1951-1963 made the United States synonymous in most
Nicaraguan minds with the Somozas themselves. Whelan's period was
exceptional in terms of the degree to which U.S. diplomacy and a hated
dictatorship became indistinguishable from each other; but other U.S.
ambassadors, before and after Whelan, differed from him only in the
degree to which they carried on their friendly dealings with a dynasty
whose stability was thought to be good for U.S. investments and
national interest.
Of course news about the U.S.-Somoza affair was not confined to
Nicaragua, but spread through Central America, into Mexico, and
southward to the for reaches of South America.[4]
Predominance of the Marxist theoretical message. For spreading
strong support for Marxism, the Central American environment would be
hard to beat. First of all, there is the terrible poverty, often
coupled with brazen human exploitation by powerful monopolists of both
land and capital (both fused in the uninformed mind as "capital").
Secondly, political power, whether civilian or military, is often
rightly seen outside Costa Rica as a creature of the same exploitive
elements. Thirdly, and most significantly in the case of Central
America, the great "capitalist" Yankee power is perceived to
have both worked in close collusion with oppressive, anti-popular
regimes, and to have offended Central American sensibilities by
intruding into their internal affairs, even to the extent of trying to
establish unwanted regimes and occupying their republics with yanqui
marines.
The scene was made for emergence of powerful Marxist revolutionary
forces, and that is exactly what happened. There is no other visible
social message, so the advocates of radical social change have taken
the only route they know.
In Guatemala, this is true of the Guatemalan Labor Party, the Armed
Revolutionary Forces, the Guerrilla Army of the People, and the
Organization of the Armed People. It is true in Honduras, where the
persistent presence of U.S. armed forces and contras is
putting new life into the Morazan Front of National Liberation. It is
true in El Salvador, where the Farabundo Marti National Liberation
Front (FMLN) is named after an assassinated Communist hero, combines
five different Marxist armies and parties (including the Communist
Party of El Salvador), and the hammer and sickle emblazon its banners.
It would be odd if the Sandinistas of Nicaragua, the republic
most abused by U.S. interventionist activities, would be an exception
to this rule, and it is not. Organized by young students of the 1950s
(Carlos Fonseca Amador, Silvio Mayorga, Thomas Borge, etc.), who knew
no other doctrine of social reform except Marxism, the FSLN (Frente
Sandinista de Liberaci6n Nacional; Sandinist Front for National
Liberation) has been overwhelmingly Marxist-Leninist from the start.
Students of Central America who are aware of the travails of its
people and the unavailability of competing social doctrines, have no
difficulty understanding this.
Two years prior to overthrow of the last Somoza, the FSLN
Military-Political Platform of 1977 proclaimed Sandinista
goals to be "inseparably linked to the Marxist-Leninist cause."
On September 17, 1979, exactly two months after the Sandinistas
came to power, a first order of diplomatic business was to hold an
immense public rally in adulation of visiting Vietnam Premier Pham Van
Dang. On September 5 and October 1 of the same year, the new
revolutionary regime sent the first plane loads of teenagers to study
in Cuba; and on November 22, the first of many contingents of Cuban
teachers arrived in Nicaragua. In March, 1980, leaders of the Sandinista
Directorate (guiding committee of the FSLN) visited Moscow to enter
into an agreement calling for close collaboration between the
Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. and the Sandinista Front.[5]
Now, of course, after a decade of Sandinista rule in
Nicaragua, the rest is history. The background is understandable and
the consequences probably inevitable.
Soviet Involvement. Though but rarely understood, this causal
element of Central American conflict actually requires only a minimum
of explanation.
There is little need to debate the chicken-egg question as to which
came first, negative U.S. reaction to the sandinista
revolution or Sandinista determination to gravitate into the
Soviet orbit. Chronologically, the Sandinista pro-Soviet moves
began almost immediately after the revolution of July, 1979, and
continued during their first months in power at the same time that the
Carter administration was offering friendly overtures and economic aid
to the new regime; but it can be argued that past Nicaraguan
experiences with the United States induced the sandinistas to
seek out other friends around the world.
Nor is it necessary to determine whether the Nicaraguan revolution
was instigated by the Soviets, which apparently it was not.
Regardless of these chronological questions, which are still debated
uselessly in some quarters, it should be easy to understand that
regimes tend to gravitate toward others that share their own
perspectives. Governments founded on Judeo-Christian and Western
values tend to associate with each other. Moslem nations find it easy
to ally with others of similar orientation. Among the Moslems, Shiites
collaborate with Shiites more easily than with Sunnis, and vice versa;
and Unitarians tend to mingle more with Unitarians than they do with
holy rollers. Even Georgists like to run around with other Georgists,
when they can find them. Simply put, birds of a feather hang together.
Nations and people with similar cultures, languages, political or
religious values tend to hobnob with each other.
Therefore, it should be no mystery that Marxist-Leninist regimes find
more in common with other Marxist-Leninist regimes than with "reactionary
imperialist" capitalist ones; and the Marxist-Leninist Sandinistas
of Nicaragua are no exception. Whatever the friendly or obnoxious
behavior of the United States, the Sandinistas would have
followed this universal rule, and as quickly as possible climbed into
the Cuban-Soviet orbit.
A reverse side of this rule of human and national behavior might be
that when a regime displays an otherwise inexplicable urge to
associate closely with the Cuban-Soviet orbit (or with any other
orbit, for that matter), an ideological analysis might help to
untangle the puzzle.
From the standpoint of perceived U.S. national interest, the results
are considered in many American circles to be intolerable, and lead to
a closing of the circle from which there seems to be no escape.
The negative U.S. reaction. Stripped down to these fundamental
considerations, the negative U.S. reaction to the Sandinista
regime does not defy explanation. Any part of Central America is
closer to New Orleans (1,350 miles from Costa Rica, 1,200 from
Nicaragua) than Philadelphia is to Oklahoma City (1,368 miles) or to
San Antonio, Texas (1,692 miles). Soviet-Cuban military emplacements,
including airfields for long-range bombers and potential missile
bases, cannot be viewed by the United States without concern. Anyone
who does not understand this should reflect on the Cuban missile
crisis of October, 1962.
The Monroe Doctrine of 1823 may or may not be regarded as a daily
guide to contemporary American foreign policy; but it conveyed a
central theme that in this semi-anarchic world is a part of the
conceived national interest of any nation anywhere: "... the
American continents are henceforth not to be considered as subjects
for future colonization by any European powers." Though in
excessively brutal forms, the U.S.S.R. understood this when the
Hungarian revolutionaries of 1956 appealed for help from the West, and
when the Czechs attempted their "spring revolution" in 1968.
Thus, the trap is sprung for "Catch 22": Awful
sociopolitical conditions have combined with irreversible historical
clashes between the United States and Central America to set the stage
for entrance upon it by Marxism-Leninism, the only visible formula for
a people suffering interminably from grotesque socio-economic
distortions. Since this development leads inevitably to intervention
in Central America by members of the Cuban-Soviet bloc, the United
States perceives that its national security, if not its ultimate
survival, requires that it halt the march of communism in the region
by doing what it can to turn back the governments and movements that
espouse it.
Of course there are other factors, including economic interest, that
prompt the United States to react negatively to the forward march of
Marxism-Leninism in Central America; but in the realm of foreign
policy, considerations of national security are and should be
controlling. Therefore, there is no point in taking time or space to
reflect on economic or other factors behind the anti-Marxist reaction
of the United States insofar as Central America is concerned. Even if
the United States should be successful in turning back the oncoming
Marxist-Leninist tide in Central America, this will contribute nothing
to the solution of the problems, including historically induced
animosities, that brought it on in the first place. Revolutionary
fervor of the same ideological character can be expected to reemerge
at any point, determined to resume the struggle for liberation from
thralldom. The case of Guatemala, which with U.S. assistance threw out
a quasi-Marxist regime in 1954, is instructive. For the past several
years in that country, a program of brutal repression has been
underway against militant Marxist movements. If allowed to flourish
without resistance, they would surely have recaptured Guatemala
several years ago.
Is there no way out?
Seen in the light of these apparently immovable and irresistable
factors, it would appear there is no solution to the problem of
Central American conflict; either unceasing exploitation and
bloodshed, or Cuban-Soviet domination and permanent threat to U.S.
security interests must prevail.
However, this need not be the only future for Central America.
Among the five factors of conflict discussed above, it is conceivable
that two of them may be more amenable to transformation than we have
thus far supposed. Another radical message, that of
Georgism-physiocracy (which I choose to abbreviate as "geocracy")
could be a worthy substitute for Marxism-Leninism as providing a
solution to the unspeakable Central American conditions that are the
root cause of Central American turbulence.
This brings us back squarely to the central proposition in President
Richard Noyes' draft paper that:
It is George's realization with which we must be
concerned, and it is his realization which is ripe now in
the dialectical movement. The remedy is sound, and we must
get to it when the dialogue is ready for it, but no playwright with
his head screwed on would insist upon its being said, and nothing
else, until it fits the sequence and so makes sense.[6]
Is the Central American "dialogue" ready for the geocratic
remedy?
I think it is ready, and has been for a very long time. Physiocracy
played a significant role in Spanish and even Latin American thought
before Henry George existed.[7] As Noyes also stresses (page 8), "the
public dialogue is full of what the land problem has to do with things
in Nicaragua, and the Philippines, and Brazil, to name a few."
Indeed, the subject of land reform has long been uppermost in the
social concerns of Latin America, including specifically Central
America. Essentially all movements of social reform in that part of
the world have included some reference, often a leading or dominant
one, to the need for land reform.[8]
Thus, the context for a new approach to Central American social
change is already in place. When we consider the obstacles that
geocracy faces in getting its message across in the United States, it
may be doubted that anything much can be accomplished in Central
America. Our task lies in finding the devices that will effectively
convey our concepts to socially concerned Central Americans not
already hopelessly converted to Marxism-Leninism.
If we can do that, we can make a significant contribution both to the
termination of Central American social distress and to the cessation
of their bloody conflicts. Also, if geocracy rather than
Marxism-Leninism would become a significant force for solution of
Central America's pressing problems, it might put U.S. policy makers
more at ease.
NOTES
[1] It would go far beyond the scope
of the present brief summary to attempt to describe or explain the
unusual political-economic conditions of Costa Rica, which include a
very long experience in constitutional democracy, somewhat higher
levels of economic opportunity, and wider distribution of property,
than are to be found in other Central American republics. See, by this
author, Prospects for the Social Transformation of Latin America
(London: Economic and Social Science Research Association, 1985), pp.
35-40. Idem., Notes on Costa Rican Democracy (Boulder:
University of Colorado Press, 1967) Several other sources will be
cited in final paper.
[2] To observers of Central American life and informed readers, these
are matters of general knowledge. In the final version of this paper,
more details and sources will be cited. For now, a quick reference
source that is readily available is the World Almanac and Book of
Facts, 1989 (New York: World Almanac, 1988), which informs us that
in the four republics other than Costa Rica, per capita income varies
from $700 in El Salvador to $1,000 in Guatemala (Costa Rica, $1,352);
life expectancy at birth from 55 years in Guatemala to 64 in El
Salvador (Costa Rica, 69); infant mortality per 1,000 births from 73
in Honduras to 37 in Nicaragua (Costa Rica, 15); daily newspaper
circulation per 1,000 population, 30 in Guatemala to 71 (?) in El
Salvador (71 in Costa Rica); and adult literacy, 48% in Guatemala to
66% in Nicaragua (Costa Rica, 90%). All such figures, no matter where
found, almost invariably come from official sources, so must be
evaluated insofar as their dependability is concerned, in the light of
governmental characteristics of individual republics.
[3] A few sources on U.S.-Central American relations: Morris Blachman
et al, eds., Confronting Revolution: Security Through Diplomacy in
Central America (NY: Random House, 1986); James Chase, Why We
Are in Central America (NY: Random House, 1984); Bernard
Diederich, Somoza and the Legacy of U.S. Involvement in Central
America (NY: Dutton, 1981); . Mark Falcoff et al, eds.. The
Continuing Crisis: U.S. Policy in Central America and the Caribbean
(Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1987); John A.
Findling, Close Neighbors, Distant Friends (NY: Greenwood
Press, 1987); Lawrence Greene, The Filibusterer: The Career of
William Walker (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1937); Richard Alan
White, The Morass: United States Intervention in Central America
(NY: Harper & Row, 1984).
[4] In final paper, extensive sources on U.S.-Nicaraguan relations
will be cited.
[5] The literature on the early attachment of the Sandinistas
to the Marxist-Leninst cause is authoritative, thoroughly documented,
and - except among committed ideologues - is completely persuasive.
E.g., among other sources to be cited in the final paper, there is
Shirley Christian, Nicaragua: Revolution in the Family (NY:
Random House, 1985); David Noland, FSLN (Coral Gables: Institute of
Interamerican Studies, University of Miami, 1984); Douglas W. Payne,
The Democratic Mask (NY: Freedom House, 1985).
[6] Noyes draft paper, p. 4.
[7] Founder of the physiocratic school was Francois Quesnay
(1694-1774) of France; its most prominent supporter was Robert Turgot
(1727-1781), minister of finance under Louis XVI. Names of
Spanish-Latin American "Georgists before George" will be
cited in final paper.
[8] Unfortunately, in Latin America our term "land reform"
is replaced by the phrase "reforma agraria," or agrarian
reform, thus erecting an obstacle to advocacy of the geocratic remedy
for both agricultural and urban settings.
Some sources on the subject as related to Latin American in general
would include Solon Barraclough, ed., Agrarian Structure in Latin
America (Lexington: D.C. Heath, 1973); Merilee S. Grindle, State
and Countryside: Development Policy and Agrarian Politics in Latin
America (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985); T. Lynn
Smith, ed., Agrarian Reform in Latin America {NY: Alfred A.
Knopf, 1965); William C. Thiesenhusen, ed., Searching for Agrarian
Reform in Latin America (NY: Unwin Hyman, 1988).
On Central American land reform and related subjects, there are,
among others, Thomas P. Anderson, The War of the Dispossessed:
Honduras and El Salvador, 1969 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska
Press. 1981); Charles D. Brockett, Land, Power and Poverty:
Agrarian Transformation and Political Conflict in Central America
(Winchester, Mass.: Alien & Unwin, 1988); Julio Castellanos
Cambranes, Coffee and Peasants: The Origins of the Modern
Plantation Economy in Guatemala (Recent: Must look up publisher);
Forrest D. Colburn, Post-Revolutionary Nicaragua: State, Class and
the Dilemmas of Agrarian Policy (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1986); Thomas L. Karnes, Tropical Enterprise:
The Standard Fruit and Steamship Company in Latin America (Baton
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1979).
The most devastating study of third-world land reform to date is John
Powelson, Richard Stock et al. The Peasant Betrayed: Agriculture
and Land Reform in the Third World (Lincoln Institute of Land
Study, 1987). The Powelson-Stock book includes parts of Latin America,
including Nicaragua.
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