The Single Tax
Thomas Nixon Carver
[Chapter XI from Essays in Social Justice,
published by Harvard University Press, 1915]
As to wealth which accrues from a rise in the site value of land,
there can scarcely be any two opinions. From Adam Smith down,
economists have recognized the fact that the fortunate owner of a
piece of land whose mere site value, irrespective of all improvements,
has increased on his hands, is simply a recipient of good fortune, and
that this part of his wealth does not represent his own earnings in
any way, shape, or manner. There may be a good deal of difference of
opinion as to the proper inference to draw from this fact. The single
taxers certainly go too far, first in assuming that the wealth which
goes to one individual in this way is necessarily taken from somebody
else, or that it in some way deprives somebody else of what he has
earned, and in the belief that by taxing away land values we should
eliminate poverty and many other social ills. If my neighbor's land
has increased in value on his hands, it would doubtless be a fine
thing for me if I could share in that good fortune; but I could not
with a straight face claim that his increment of wealth had in any way
impoverished me or deprived me of what I had earned. My earnings are
entirely independent of the value of his land. His income as a
landowner (not as an improver of land) may not be due in any proper
sense to his own contribution to the product of the community. It is,
however, a measure of the contribution which that piece of land makes
to the productivity of the community, and is not due in any sense to
the contribution which I make.
The assertion that the owner of land who profits through a rise in
the value of his land has necessarily subtracted something from the
earnings of others is based on the assumption that all wealth has been
"earned" by some one. If the owner has not earned it he must
necessarily have robbed some one else, either in a legal or an illegal
manner. But this assumption is incorrect. Some wealth is found. If I
stumble upon a gold nugget, or a rich vein of valuable mineral, I
cannot truly say that I have earned it, nor can any one else. Until
some one could be found who could prove that he had produced or
otherwise earned it, I could not be accused of depriving any one else
of his earnings.
In the opinion of the present writer, the site value of land belongs
in the class of findings, rather than in that of earnings or
stealings. Even in the case of the gold nugget, a pretty good argument
could be made in favor of my dividing it with my fellows, but that
argument could scarcely be based on the ground that they had earned
it. Unless some one wished to resort to cheap political claptrap he
would have to base his argument on two propositions. I. The others
need it. 2. I can't show a very good or positive reason why I should
be allowed to keep all of it.
There is a disposition on the part of certain reformers to deny that
land is productive. This follows as a corollary of the proposition
that all wealth is produced by labor. If that were true, it would
follow, as a matter of course, that none of it is produced by land.
Whatever may be one's opinion on that subject, no one is likely to
deny that land is useful. When asked, for what is it useful ? he would
be compelled to say, at least so far as it concerns land which is used
in production, that it is useful in production. To say that a piece of
land is useful in production can only mean that when it is used the
community gets more product than when it is not. If that cannot be
said of a given piece of land, that piece of land is not useful, and
will not as a matter of fact be used in production. If we can agree
upon this, we need not stop to quarrel over the meanings of the word "
productive," that is, whether that is the proper word to describe
the land which is useful in production.
One of the arguments by which the single taxer supports his
contention that land is unproductive is to the effect that if it were
not for the community around it, together with the roads, police
protection, churches, schools, - in short if it were not for
civilization in general, the piece of land in question would not be
worth anything. Since its productive value is due to the presence of
the community, it follows, they say, that the community and not the
land is the producer. In the first place, this proves too much. All
that is said respecting land could be said of any other factor of
production. If it were not for the community round about, neither the
buildings on the land nor the labor of the lawyer, the doctor, the
merchant and the manufacturer would be of any great value. In the
second place, if we begin at another link in the chain and follow the
same method of reasoning, we could prove that land produces
everything. If it were not for the land there would be no
productivity, or any community either; therefore, since all
productivity is due to land - would be impossible without land - land
produces everything.
But this method of reasoning is so palpably fallacious that it is
useless to pursue it further. The fault with it is that it fails to
distinguish between the community in general and the individuals of
whom it is composed, or between land in general and the particular
parcels of land which are being rented, bought and sold.
Since it is not labor in the abstract but individual laborers who are
hired, the test of the productivity of labor is to find out how much
more the community could produce with than without the individual in
question. The difference is the measure of his value or worth as a
productive agent. The same method is applicable to a given piece of
land. Find out how much more the community can produce when that piece
of land is in use than it could if it were not in use. The difference
gives you the measure of its value or worth as a productive agent.
From this point of view, land is as clearly an agent of production as
is labor, and the productive value of each is to be tested by
precisely the same method. Assume a given piece of land to be
withdrawn from use. The labor and capital now employed in cultivating
that land would have to be employed elsewhere. Being employed
elsewhere would mean that it would have to be added to the labor and
capital employed on other land. This would require somewhat more
intensive cultivation of the other land, which would increase somewhat
its total product, but would not increase it sufficiently to balance
the amount formerly produced on the piece of land in question. Or to
put it another way, suppose that the piece of land is now being held
out of use for speculative purposes. Its potential rent is the amount
which its use would add to the total productivity. If it were brought
into use, labor and capital would have to be expended upon it. This
labor and capital does not come out of air. It would have to be
withdrawn from other land. Being withdrawn from other land, the
product from that other land is diminished. But if the piece of land
is of any value, this diminution of the amount produced on other land
would not be equal to the amount which could be produced on this
particular piece of land. The difference between the diminution in the
amount produced on the other land and the increase of the amount
produced on this land is the measure of the productive value of this
land.
There are two distinct dangers, however, lurking in this argument.
While land is undoubtedly a productive agent, as productivity is thus
defined, it does not follow by any means that the landowner is a
productive agent. In one important respect he differs from the owner
of a productive agent which has been made by human labor and
ingenuity. The owner of the latter either made it himself or bought it
from some one who did. If he made it himself he may be said to be the
real producer of the apparent product of the material agent. If he
bought it he may be assumed to have paid the producer what it was
worth. The producer having transferred his rights to the buyer, the
latter may be assumed to be standing in the place of the producer. In
the case of land, however, since no one made it, no one can be called
the real producer of the apparent product of the land. The land is, in
other words, an original or primary factor of production, and no
person can claim to be the producer of land as he can in the case of a
machine. The landowner's rent, therefore, while payment for the
productive value of land, cannot be said to be payment for the
productive value of the landlord himself - it being understood that we
are now speaking of the land itself and not the improvements which the
owner may have placed upon the land.
On the other hand, it is not to be assumed that the landowner is a
parasite, or a useless member of society. While he is not in any sense
the producer of the land, he is, in a very important sense, the
conserver of its productive powers and other valuable qualities.
Property in land there must be, either private or public. Throwing
land open to use is so unthinkable that not even a single taxer in his
sane moments would advocate it. Its effective use requires definite
control, fencing the public off, and devoting it to specific purposes
which require the exclusion of trespassers. Either under public
ownership or under private ownership subject to the single tax, this
would be precisely as necessary as under the present form of private
ownership. If the land is worked by private individuals who either do
not own it, or nominally own it under the obligation to pay its full
rental value to the public in the form of a single tax, it is worked
by men who are actually or virtually tenants. Under the single tax the
nominal owner is virtually a tenant of the public because he pays
economic rent to the public, and does not gain or lose by a future
increase or decrease in the value of the land - (as distinct from
improvements) . His rent will go up or down accordingly. Every one
knows what a tenant does to land if he is not controlled by the owner.
Having no interest in the future increase or decrease in its value,
his interest is concentrated in the present. If he is not prevented by
the control of the landowner, he will speedily exhaust the soil and
leave it when he is through with it. In its own interest as the
virtual owner of the land, the state would be compelled to safeguard
its future value by very close and detailed regulation and inspection.
This would require an army of officials who would have to be paid
salaries. It would not be pretended that these officials were not
earning their salaries if they were doing their work reasonably well.
That precise work is now done by landowners, the only difference being
that they receive rent instead of salaries. It may be that they are
not doing it as well as they ought, and it may be that they receive
more in the way of rent than that body of officials would receive in
the form of salaries; but in any event, it could not be denied that
they are earning something, whether they are earning all they are
getting or not. Possibly a refined form of the single tax could be
devised which would tax only site value and not soil or anything else
which could possibly be exhausted or destroyed. In that case the
public would be the virtual owner of the site alone, and the private
owner would be the real as well as the nominal owner of everything
else, including the soil. He would then have the same motive as now
for conserving the value of everything which might be exhausted and
which therefore needs conserving, leaving to the state the virtual
ownership of the site, the only thing which cannot be exhausted and
therefore needs no conservation.
There is another and far broader aspect of the question of
landownership than any we have yet considered, an aspect, by the way,
which is almost universally ignored in modern discussions of this
important subject. It is obvious that this becomes a social problem
only where there is a considerable landless class, on the one hand,
and where, on the other hand, land has become very scarce and
valuable. These two conditions necessarily go together. Land becomes
very valuable only when there is a dense population. A dense
population means a large landless class. In other words, without a
large landless class, no land would be very valuable, and no landowner
would be able to get a large rent. We may well ask the question in all
seriousness why there should be a dense population and a large
landless class at any particular spot. We too frequently assume that
the density of Boston Neck or Manhattan Island is a part of the
providential ordering of the universe, that it must be taken for
granted as divinely ordained, and, being so, it is very wrong that so
many should own no land while the little land that there is in such
places should be owned by so few. To a person who looks at the matter
in this way, it is useless to point out that there is plenty of land
elsewhere where all those people might become landowners. To him it is
so unnatural that men should spread out and live on the land, and so
natural that they should flock together in these vast rookeries called
cities, that he simply cannot take you seriously. The writer's hope is
that there may be a few readers who have enough of the scientific
imagination to see that there is no necessity why men should herd
together in this way, that it is quite conceivable that they might
continue to spread out, as every colonizing race has spread, and that
they may have enough historical knowledge to realize that every great
race has been a colonizing race. To such a reader it may be worth
while to present the following argument.
The fact that men congregate in cities instead of going on the land
is because they prefer the pleasures and hardships of the cities to
the hardships and pleasures of landownership where land may be had.
The reason that men prefer to work in the employ of landowners is
because they prefer the wages and the lack of responsibility, to the
hard work, the danger, and the other hardships of pioneering. This
condition is made easy for them because an older and sturdier race of
pioneers has preceded them, has subdued the land and brought it under
control. If you compare the hired man, as thus understood, with the
pioneer, it would be so difficult to determine where to bestow the
term "parasite," that we should do well to omit it
altogether from our economic vocabulary. When we come to compare not
the hired man with the pioneer for whom he works, but the later hired
man with the descendants of the pioneer, the question becomes mixed up
with the question of inherited wealth and is not a question of
landownership pure and simple.
The cry for a share in the value of the land which a certain
aggressive type of single taxer is so busily engaged in stirring up,
is quite different from the desire to own and use land. They who
desire land know where they can get it; what the aggressive single
taxer wants is not land, but a share in the value of the land which
somebody else has. He can get land in Canada, but he prefers it in New
York, Boston, or some other large city where it is very scarce and
valuable. The single tax movement, therefore, differs fundamentally
from the agrarian laws for which the Gracchi sacrificed their lives.
They proposed to give the people land - to make them owners of land -
where it was to be found; the modern movement is to give them, through
taxation and public expenditure, a share in the value of the land
already occupied by other people. Moreover, it must be said, this
modern movement is promoted, not by appealing to the pioneering,
colonizing, spirit of a sturdy, conquering race, but too often by
appealing to jealousy, covetousness, and other of the less commendable
motives which actuate mankind. However, no pity need be wasted upon
the landowners in our large cities. They find it profitable to
encourage the coming of masses of mankind who prefer to sweat and stew
in cities rather than to pioneer the way for civilization. If this
mass of people should vote to confiscate the value of the land on
which they are now living, the landowners need not complain of being
badly treated. They have gambled with economic and political forces,
and must stand to lose.
However, while no sympathy need be wasted either upon landless men
who refuse to go where there is land to be had, or upon the landowner
if the landless masses should decide to take his land, or its value,
away from him, still, this is not a matter of sympathy. It is a matter
of constructive statesmanship. From this point of view we must
consider fairly and patiently whether priority of occupation is or is
not a sufficient ground upon which to base a legal right to land, and
if so, what are the reasonable limitations of that right. It is so
universally agreed, in civilized societies, that the man who first
occupies a piece of land has a somewhat better right to it than they
who come later, that it would seem that the burden of proof should lie
upon those who deny it. In actual practice, however, there are several
recognized qualifications to this agreement. In the first place, it is
customary to give a preference to the members of our own civilization,
over others. These considerations are sometimes allowed to take
precedence over mere priority of occupation, as illustrated by our
treatment of the American Indian. Nevertheless, as between citizens of
our own state, we allow some precedence to the first occupier. In the
second place, for the proper recording of titles, and the proper
safeguarding of the public interest, the occupier is generally
required to go through certain legal formalities. If he neglects
these, his mere priority of occupation may not avail to secure his
superior right to the land. With these and a few minor qualifications,
there is no doubt that civilized nations do, as a matter of practice,
allow priority of occupation to count as a factor in giving a legal
right to landownership. Couple with this factor the right of transfer,
under which the original occupier may transfer the rights which he
has acquired to others, either to his heirs by bequest, or to others
by bargain and sale, and you have every essential feature of the
modern right of property in land.
But it is not necessary to rest the case in favor of priority of
occupation as a basis of property rights on the mere fact of the
universality of the practice, or upon the fact that the burden of
proof is thrown, by this universality, upon those who attack it. It is
even less necessary to base the argument upon any absurd or
metaphysical doctrine of human rights in general. An excellent example
of this class of argument is as follows:
I. Every man must be assumed to have a right to him- self. 2. When a
man has worked upon a thing he has put a part of himself into it.
Therefore he has a right to that upon which he has worked. If the
premises were true, the conclusion would follow as a matter of course.
Unfortunately neither premise is necessary. The first may or may not
be true, it does not matter. The second is absurd and meaningless, and
that is sufficient to spoil the argument. What does it mean to say
that one puts a part of oneself into anything ? When one has worked
upon a thing, has he diminished himself - i.e., the part of himself
which is left outside the thing - or has he not? If, after he has
parted with the thing he has as much of himself left as he had before,
can he be said to have put a part of himself into it?
But such arguments are as unnecessary as they are futile. All sound
and genuine rights are based upon social utility. Is it useful in the
long run, i.e., does it work well, to allow the first occupant of a
piece of land some rights in it which we deny to those who come later
and want a part of it or of its value? Of two communities otherwise
equally favored, one of which recognizes this right while the other
does not, which is likely to become the more comfortable, prosperous,
and powerful? These are the considerations which must guide the
law-maker or the nation-builder in his quest for social justice,
rather than the mere sentimental notions of equality and fair play.
These notions are important factors, to be sure, and when they are not
too short-sighted, are fairly safe guides. But when short-sighted they
are the most destructive factors in any civilization. Justice is mercy
writ large. It is benevolence with a long look ahead, a look which
takes in the most distant generations of the future and places them on
an exact equality with the present generations; which has as much
regard for an as yet voiceless individual to be born a thousand years
hence as for any individual now alive and clamoring for his rights.
As an illustration of the way in which a sentiment of fair play and
justice may prove to be short-sighted, let us take the law of
primogeniture under which only the eldest son can inherit land, as
compared with the modern system under which all the children share
equally in the inheritance. Primogeniture seems obviously unfair to
the younger children, and therefore unjust, while the other system
seems obviously fair to all, and therefore just. But if it should
happen that, under primogeniture, the younger sons, realizing that
there is nothing to be gained by staying on the ancestral estate,
should go out into the world to conquer little kingdoms for
themselves, by pioneering and bringing new lands under cultivation, by
starting new business enterprises and expanding the nation's
productivity, or by exploring in the fields of science, that would
produce a growing, expanding and prospering civilization. If, on the
other hand, under the other system, the sons should decide to hang
around home waiting for the old folks to die in order that each might
get his little share of the estate, that would tend to produce a
narrow, contracting, decaying civilization. Of two nations, the one
reacting in the former and the other in the latter manner, there is
not much doubt as to which would grow more prosperous and powerful,
and play the larger role in the civilization of the future. This is a
large consideration which should make us pause before we decide to
follow a sentiment of fair play and justice which does not look beyond
the present generation and its immediate successor.
This should lead us to give careful consideration to several
questions. First, to what extent is pioneering stimulated by the
desire to get the future "unearned increment" of land value?
Second, to what extent would a sharing in the enormously inflated
value of land in overcrowded urban centers induce the landless classes
to stay in these centers rather than to spread out where land is more
abundant and cheaper?
If the later comers to a growing community are made to feel like the
younger sons of the English nobility, that the land is all taken and
they are to have no share in its rent, they are then thrown upon their
own resources and are forced to make good in some other way, that is,
to find some other source of income, or to go somewhere else where
there is land to be had. If, added to this, they are given to
understand that if they do face the hardships of pioneer life and take
up vacant land they shall be allowed to profit by it, not only in the
present, but in the distant future when that land increases in value,
you will have a double stimulus to pioneering and a double
discouragement to hanging around old and overcrowded centers in the
hope of sharing in the prosperity of the earlier comers. You may not
think it desirable to encourage pioneering, you may think that it is
better not to pioneer, but to encourage men to stay in the older
centers and get a share of the land values accruing there, but here
again is a situation in which it is difficult to know where to bestow
the word parasite.
This difference in the point of view of the old timer and the new
comer is one of the oldest and most persistent causes of class
antagonism. Fundamentally there are only two kinds of aristocracy in
the world. One is a military aristocracy, under which a race of
military conquerors set them- selves over a more or less subject
population. The other is the aristocracy of old timers, or old
families who have attached themselves to the soil, built up the
community, and attracted new comers. At first the new comers are the
plebeians and accept a distinctly lower social position than that of
the patricians. But as their numbers increase, and their sense of
power and solidarity grows, they resent the exclusiveness of the upper
classes, that is, of the old timers, and gain greater and greater
control over the affairs of the city and state. Naturally the old
timers resent this, and much bitterness ensues. This kind of social
distinction and its attendant bitterness of feeling will probably
persist as long as populations shift, and as long as, through this
shifting, they can be divided into the two classes, the ins and the
outs, the attached and the unattached, those in established positions
of economic independence, and those new arrivals who are as yet
unestablished. In the case of a military conquest, of course, it is
the new comers who form the aristocratic class. In other cases, they
form the plebeian class.
If we are at all to consider pioneering, and the conditions of
industry which prevail in a pioneering community, there will not
appear to be so very much difference between property in land and
property in other things. But if we ignore the possibility of
pioneering several distinctions occur. One is that land is a free gift
of nature. Another is that other products are made by human labor.
To the first distinction it may be objected that other goods are, in
their original form, free gifts of nature as truly as land. The only
basis of a man's claim to them is that he appropriated them and
changed their form to suit his own or some one else's purpose, - that
is, he put them into a form which was valuable. The same is true of
land, and it is this aspect of the case which would naturally appeal,
and did as a matter of fact appeal, to the first settlers in a new
community. If one settler saw a tree which seemed to contain
possibilities, and chopped it down and made it into a table, it would
be in accordance with social utility that the table should be his. If
another settler saw a piece of land which seemed to contain
possibilities, and cleared it and ploughed it and reduced it to
cultivation, on the same reasoning the land would be his. Each settler
would have found a free gift of nature, each would have worked upon
it, each would have changed its form from the raw state in which he
found it to a form which would serve his purpose. The mere fact that
the result of one's labor happened to be a farm, and that of the
other's labor a table, would not have appeared at the time to be a
real difference. This aspect of the case is recommended to the
consideration of those who believe that the private ownership of land
is forbidden by a moral law ordained from the foundation of the world.
If, however, the community should grow in population, a real
difference between the table and the land would begin to appear. In
the first place, it would be found that the owners of the land held
control of the original raw material for the manufacture of tables and
all other produced goods. When the maker of the first table wished to
make a new one to replace the old one when it was worn out, he would
have to pay the landowner for the privilege of cutting a tree from
which to make it. In the second place, the value of the land would
increase in proportion to the number of persons wishing to make use of
its products either for purposes of consumption or for the purpose of
producing other goods. The fortunate owners of the limited supply of
land would find themselves in possession of a growing income far in
excess of anything which the land might have cost them, whereas the
owners of the tables and other such goods would find themselves always
compelled to expend approximately as much in the making of them as
they were worth. As time goes on this difference increases, especially
in a growing city, until small areas of land come to have fabulous
prices, while the value of tables continues to bear a fairly close
relation to their cost of production.
To the second distinction it may be objected that land is sometimes "made"
in the sense of being reclaimed from the sea or the desert, whereas
there are other goods, such as antique furniture and rare works of
art, which cannot now be reproduced. But the fact remains that by far
the greater part of the present land supply is not "made."
In fact, there is not enough "made" to have any appreciable
effect on the value of land in general, and it certainly does not
prevent certain choice situations from rising to stupendous prices. On
the other hand, with few exceptions, other goods are capable of
reproduction, and are actually reproduced so long as they have a value
high enough to repay the cost of production. Whereas non-reproducible
land is the rule and reproducible land the exception, reproducible
goods of other kinds than land are the rule and non-reproducible ones
the exception. This may be called a difference of degree only, but the
difference of degree is so great as to constitute, for scientific and
practical purposes, a difference of kind. As a matter of fact, nearly
all scientific differences are differences of degree. It is not
denied, however, that there are many resemblances between land and
other goods. There are also certain resemblances between a man and a
clothes-pin, but the differences are sufficiently important to warrant
our placing them in different classes. [Note: T. N. Carver,
Distribution of Wealth, pp. 108-111]
In view of all these considerations it will be difficult for any
reasonable man to lash himself into a state of moral indignation
against the private ownership of land. If a pioneer settler were
brought face to face with a certain type of radical single taxer who
makes a moral issue of the ownership of land values, and makes free
use of certain formulae, such as the equal right of all to access to
God's earth, the moral indignation would not all be on the side of the
single taxer. To the demand for access to God's earth, the pioneer
would reply, " You do not seem to want access to the earth, you
want access at this particular spot, which is mine. You may have all
the access you want elsewhere, but I have access here and shall defend
my position." He would naturally feel that his priority of
possession gave him a right superior to that of the later comer.
However, the single taxer disclaims any desire to dislodge the prior
possessor from his possession. All he proposes is to require the
possessor to pay for the privilege. After the first possessor has
settled himself, others come and say to him, "We outnumber you,
we can therefore outvote you. We shall, therefore, vote that you pay
for the privilege of holding this land. It is we who create the value
of your land anyway." The matter might, of course, be presented
to him in a more reasonable way. They might say to him, "We will
come to your community and live on your land provided you will make an
inducement. Our coming will add to the value of your land and,
therefore, you can well afford to pay considerable sums for public
improvements in order to attract more people. It will really be money
in your pocket to do so." This might or might not appeal to him,
but it would scarcely stir up moral indignation. However, the single
taxer who makes a moral issue of his doctrine would disdain to
temporize in this way.
Pioneer conditions, however, have long passed away in those centers
where the single tax propaganda is active. The first generation of
settlers and their immediate descendants having passed away, this
argument, it may be said, no longer applies. But we grant the right of
transfer, either by sale, gift, devise, or inheritance, then we grant
that each later owner has acquired the rights of the original settler.
If we grant the right of the original settler, we cannot deny the
rights of any of these later owners without attacking the right of
transfer. As a matter of fact, the problem of landownership has, in
all old communities, become so mixed up with the problem of
inheritance that it is difficult to discuss them separately. It will
be found, upon analysis, that every real objection to the laws of
property in land is as much an objection to inheritance of land as to
property in land as such. In no case can the question, by any process
of mental contortion, be made a moral question. It is wholly a
question of expediency. The question is, how does landownership work?
Are there any modifications of the right of inheritance, which may
reasonably be expected to improve economic or social conditions, to
stimulate the productive energies of the community, or secure such a
distribution of wealth as to develop the productive virtues of the
people?
There are, as a matter of fact, three specific advantages which would
result to modern society through an increase in the taxation of land
values. The first is that under such a system it would become less
common than it now is to hold valuable land out of use for speculative
purposes. When the owner sees that the taxes on the site value of his
land are eating up all possible profits through the annual increase in
that site value, and that his only way of making anything out of his
land is by using it rather than by holding it to sell at a higher
price, he will either begin to use it himself or hastily sell it to
some one else who will use it. Thus there would result a certain
increase in the amount of land in actual use, or a diminution in the
amount held out of use, which amounts to the same thing.
Under the laws of value already outlined, this increase in the
available supply of the factor called land would result in an
increased demand for the other factors which have to be combined with
land in production. In order to use this land which is now held out of
use, there must be labor and capital. Where, as in thickly populated
parts of the country, land has become a scarce factor, it occupies
very much the same position in actual production that saltpetre did in
the illustration used above. Bring more land into use, and it will
have very much the same effect upon the demand for labor and capital
as an increase in the supply of saltpetre had upon the demand for
charcoal in the illustration.
A second beneficial effect which may be expected from an increase in
the taxation of the site value of land would be the reduction in the
taxation on active industry. Assuming that a certain revenue has to be
secured for public purposes, it must be secured either by taxation on
land or on industry, or on both combined. In proportion as the burden
is placed upon the site value of land, it is taken off active
industry. The result of reducing taxes on active business, that is on
the products of industry, must invariably be to encourage business and
industrial activity. If the farmer knows that his land must bear all
the taxes, and his buildings, crops, improvements, and live-stock
none, that is to say, if his taxes will be as high when his land is
unimproved or half improved as when it is highly improved, he will
have every encouragement to improvement. But if he knows that every
time he adds to the value of his estate by putting improvements on his
land his taxes must go up, that must operate, to a certain degree at
least, to discourage improvement. And if the owner of a vacant city
lot knows that his tax will be as high as it would be if a valuable
building stood upon the lot, in other words, that he will not be taxed
at all upon the building, that would be, to some degree at least, an
encouragement to building. All these improvements upon farm land and
buildings upon city lots not only require labor in the first place,
but they continue adding to the total productivity of the community
thereafter, making goods more abundant for all members of the
community, including the laborers.
A third beneficial result of this process, more important perhaps
than all the others, is that it would tend to eliminate a certain kind
of waste labor. The most serious waste of labor power is not found at
the bottom of the social scale in the form of an unemployed class; it
is found at or near the top of the social scale, in the form of a
voluntarily idle or leisure class. Generally speaking, the leisure
class is made up of the most capable members of the community, though
this is not necessarily true in every individual case. As a rule, the
most successful farmer will lay up a fortune more rapidly and be able
to retire from active farming earlier in life than the less capable
farmer, whose rate of accumulation is less rapid. So with the capable
business man. The more capable business man will acquire a competence
earlier in life than the less capable man, and if he is inclined to
retire at all the more capable he is the more likely he will be to
retire, and the earlier in life he will retire.
Now economic capacity is largely a matter of need and scarcity. A
kind of labor power, mental or physical, for which the need is far in
excess of the supply, counts as high ability. But no matter how great
the need for it, if there is as much of it as is needed, it does not
count as high ability. The scarce forms of ability, relatively to the
need for them, are the kinds which command the highest salaries, or
secure the largest profits in any healthy and well-governed community.
But if, as a result of the scarcity of their talent, a certain class
of men grow prosperous, and as a result of their prosperity, they
retire from business early in life, the active talent is thereby made
still scarcer, and a bad situation is made worse. If, in addition, he
not only retires from active business himself, but brings up his sons
in idleness, they, in turn, expecting to be able to live on their
inherited wealth, the scarcity of active business talent is made still
scarcer. This, however, will be considered under the discussion of
inherited wealth.
Probably the scarcest form of productive power is genuine investing
ability; the ability to see just where new industrial enterprises are
needed, coupled with the courage to act, and the skill to get the new
enterprise started in the right way. A few more men possessing this
kind of ability in any community would remake that community by
causing an expansion of industries, creating new employment for labor,
and increasing the products for the satisfaction of wants. But there
are productive and unproductive investments. If I invest in a real
productive enterprise, I help to start a new enterprise, and the
community is benefited by my action. But if I invest in land,
intending merely to hold it for a rise in value, I have done nothing
for the benefit of the community. No new land is created by my
investment, and the community is in the same condition as though I had
never invested. The most that could be said of my investment would be
that I had released the capital of the seller and that he might, if he
chose to do so, invest the capital thus released in productive work.
But this could not be said of land investors as a class. There would,
therefore, be this important difference. The more men there are buying
tools, machinery, buildings, etc. - for that is virtually what
investment means - the greater will be the demand for such things, and
the more their production will be stimulated. The normal result of
this kind of investment is to increase the world's stock of tools,
machinery, buildings, etc. But the more men there are buying land, but
not themselves improving it, the higher the price of land goes, and
that is the end of the process. No more land is produced, because land
cannot be produced, and the world is no better supplied with land than
it would be if men did not invest in it. Much of the investing talent
of the country is perverted to this unproductive purpose. If this
opportunity for unproductive investment were closed, some of this
talent would be forced into other and productive channels. Instead of
buying land, men would buy other sources of income, that is, other
means of production. The increased purchases of these things would
stimulate their production and thus the world would be better
equipped. By taxing away the selling value of land and thus making it
an unprofitable field for the investors, the scarcest and most
precious form of industrial talent would be made somewhat less scarce
than it now is. If we could prevent its being diverted into the
useless channels of land investment, and turn it into useful channels,
it will count for something. Because this kind of talent is so scarce
and so precious, it is of vastly greater concern to us to save it and
utilize it than it is to save and utilize a kind of labor power which
is abundant relatively to needs.
If that is virtually what investment means, the more men there are
investing in tools, machinery, buildings, etc., the more of such
things there will be produced. The result, therefore, of increasing
the number of this class of investors, especially the number of wise
investors, will be an increase not only in the number of tools,
machines, and buildings, but in the quality and value of these
instruments of production. But, as pointed out above, if the higher
forms of investing ability are absorbed in useless speculation in
land, speculation which neither increases nor decreases the supply of
anything, there is that much less left for the kind of speculation
which really draws the productive forces of the community into the
manufacture of other productive agents.
Because a considerable extension of the land tax would tend to force
into productive use a certain amount of land which is now held out of
use for speculative purposes; because it would tend to relieve active
production from the repressive burdens of taxation, and because it
would tend to cut off the incomes which now support capable men in
idleness thus forcing a certain amount of talent into action, we must
conclude that an extension of the land tax would work well for the
nation. However, one cannot be called a single taxer who believes also
in the inheritance tax.
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