

That boast would be bad politics. But it is the fact. Mr. Brandeis has shown a verbal peephole through the Roosevelt platform, and it isn't quite appropriate to Ananias him for it. What he says is true. The Roosevelt platform "does not promise industrial democracy." What it represents is *plutocratic benevolence*.



Roosevelt versus Deneen.

The essence of the violent quarrel between Governor Deneen and Mr. Roosevelt is this: Governor Deneen supported Mr. Roosevelt in his efforts to secure the regular Republican nomination for President. Mr. Roosevelt then welcomed his support. When Mr. Roosevelt's proprietary rights in that nomination were stolen, and he "bolted" the regular Republican convention to form his new party, Governor Deneen "stood pat," hoping to get for re-election as Governor the support of both factions. In this he had the co-operation of Mr. Roosevelt's Illinois organ, the Chicago Tribune, but not of Mr. Roosevelt. Having to choose between the factions, Governor Deneen took a month or so to think about it, meanwhile campaigning the State in his own behalf and maintaining a masterly neutrality on the Presidential problem. His neutrality was steadied by the Tribune, which continued to support Roosevelt for President and Deneen for Governor. In the course of his campaigning, Governor Deneen learned, or thought he did, that Roosevelt's strength in Illinois is declining. He saw, or thought he saw, that Roosevelt votes are rippling over to Wilson or slipping back to Taft. So he decided to come out for Taft. Some strong language has, in consequence, been interchanged. On the point of veritability, Deneen appears to have the best of it; at any rate he offers facts in evidence, whereas Roosevelt confines himself as usual to shirt-sleeve eloquence and epithets. But there is really nothing very substantial in the controversy. Deneen would have "looked good" to Roosevelt if he had come over to Roosevelt; in Deneen's eyes, Roosevelt would have "looked good" if the Illinois vote had had a stronger Roosevelt coloring. The one important thing about it all is that *Governor Deneen has come to the conclusion that Roosevelt will be third in the race in Illinois*. It should be added that whatever else Deneen may or may not be, he is an acute political observer.



Mayor Dunne as a "Big Joke."

As Mayor of Chicago, "Dunne was a big joke." So states an autogenetic "committee of 100" in

Chicago. And he was—to the idle and indifferent swallows of grafters' gossip. But Mayor Dunne was no joke, little or big, to the crooks of Chicago, respectable or disreputable. He made war on their graft; and he could not be bought off, coaxed off nor scared off. Until Mayor Dunne spoiled it, one of the juiciest centers for respectable graft was the school board. This graft has run up into millions annually, and lots of it keeps on going to the very newspapers that have conspired to make the groundlings think that Dunne was a "big joke" as Mayor. It was their only way. Failing to make him a grafter like themselves, they labeled him a "joke." Let whoever doubts, read the official reports of the Supreme Court of Illinois since the election of Dunne in 1905. That the Court had to decide for technical reasons in favor of the grafters sometimes, will not mislead any intelligent person; their graft was uncovered just the same. Were all the truth known, it is not improbable that some of this graft might be traced to the inner councils of that autogenetic "committee of 100" which denounces Mayor Dunne's school board record. By no means was Dunne's administration a "big joke" to big grafters (or little ones, either); the joke was too big on them to be big to them.



FREE SHIPS AND FREE SEAMEN.

A consideration of the problem of the American merchant marine discloses four palpable facts: (a) The American flag has all but disappeared from the high seas; (b) the disappearance of our shipping is a distinct loss to the country, both in peace and in war; (c) the American sailor has been driven from the sea by antiquated laws, which have as their central feature a high protective tariff; and (d) our place can be regained only by repealing the restrictive laws, and adopting such a liberal code as will give liberty to the shipmaster, and freedom and self-respect to the men.



It is not the purpose of an editorial to provide a Congressional program, but it may discuss the general principles upon which such a program must rest.

There has been a vast deal of discussion as to how our flag is to be restored to the high seas.

During the fifty years that the protective tariff has been slowly but surely strangling this one-time great industry, Congressional committees

have sat, reports have been made, and laws have been passed.

But still the American sailor continued to desert his calling, and the American shipmaster to withdraw from the contest.

Why?

Why should this industry, once so great—the very apple of the Republic's eye—why should it decline in spite of all this solicitude?

To answer that question is to lay bare the fallacy of a protective tariff.



Trade is the greatest labor-saving device known to man. No other agent so multiplies his power over Nature.

To restrict trade, therefore, is to curtail production. No nation can survive the curtailment of production due to a high tariff, except it be unusually blessed with natural wealth and have a large proportion of its population so situated that they can bear the burden and so obtuse that they do not feel it.

No government has anything to give to one of its citizens save what it takes from another citizen; hence, to protect any industry means to lay a corresponding burden upon other industries.



Thus it has come to pass in this country that the tariff laws have shifted the burdens from one set of shoulders to another set of shoulders, until they come at last to the farmers. And the farmers have been so blessed with soil and climate that they have been able to struggle on in spite of the handicap.

When the owner of the mine received tariff protection, because, presumably, mother nature charged man more for the ore she deposited in America than in England or Germany, the rolling-mill man demanded like protection. And so it continued through all the stages of manufacture, until the iron, in the shape of a plow, loaded with all the increases exacted by the various men through whose hands it had passed, was sold to the farmer.

This would have been an insuperable burden but for the fact that his soil was so rich and his industry so great that he could produce wheat and cotton cheaper than any other farmer on earth.



But industries not so situated were crushed out of existence.

Among these was the American merchant marine. It was one thing to lay tariff taxes on ore

and iron used in a plow, because the farmer could bear it; but it was quite a different thing when the iron was used in a ship, and the price raised to cover it.

The shipmaster was carrying freight in direct competition with men who paid no tariff taxes on their ships. And as Congress would not remove this burden he did the only thing possible: he pulled down the American flag, and retired from the sea.



When Congress was finally frightened, or shamed, into doing something for American shipping, it was secondary always to the interests of the shipbuilders and the various tariff beneficiaries.

In no instance was its action timely, effective or even honest. The first action was to put on the free list materials for wooden ships. But the world had turned to iron ships. The decline continuing, materials for iron ships were put on the free list. But it was a dishonest proposition in both instances; for ships built of such materials must not engage in the coasting trade for more than two months in a year, which, together with the trouble and expense of importing materials for a single ship, is so much of a handicap as to render it useless.



Now that the American merchant marine is dead, heroic treatment is necessary for its revival.

Our shipmaster must be put on an equal footing with his competitor. He must be given as cheap a ship, and he must have as cheap a crew. To this end Congress must grant two things: (a) Free ships, and (b) free seamen.

Liberal mail contracts for fast ships may follow; but a general system of subsidies is entirely unnecessary.



That free ships will equalize the initial investment is plain; that free seamen will overcome the difference in the present cost of operation will be apparent upon examination.

In the earlier stages of the world, when the workingman rose from Slavery to Serfdom, he was granted freedom of person, but was chained to the soil. As generation followed generation Serfdom itself passed away, with one exception, that of the sailor.

Workmen ashore were given liberty to quit their places, but not so the seaman. Railroad men, factorymen, or any other class of landmen may

leave their jobs individually or collectively when they choose; but the sailor must sign a contract, and cannot quit. Should he attempt to leave the ship after she is safely in harbor and unloaded, he is seized by the marshal, thrown into jail, and put aboard in irons when she is ready to sail.

Such conditions have had two evil effects.

They have enabled foreign shipmasters to keep down wages; and they have driven self-respecting sailors from the sea.

The International Seamen's Union has a bill before Congress giving our seamen the right to leave the ship when she is safe in port; and giving, by treaty agreement, the right of foreign seamen to leave their ships when safe in American ports.

A small enough thing, is it not, the extension of the landsman's right to the sailor?

Yet it is far-reaching, as every step toward freedom is far-reaching. Foreign vessels now ship their men abroad, where wages are low; and the men are bound by all the power of law to return with the ship to the port of enlistment. Thus the foreign master can sail his ship from a low-wage country to a high-wage country, and yet keep his crew on low wages. But give that crew the right to quit when the vessel is safe in harbor. Then a foreign ship coming into an American port with a low-priced crew would lie there until she shipped a crew at the prevailing wages of this country.

This would equalize the cost of operating vessels on the high seas in the best possible way: *not by lowering American wages to the foreign level, but by raising foreign wages to the American level.*

And in bringing about this end Congress would not only put the American shipmaster on an equality with the foreign shipmaster, but would give the seaman the freedom enjoyed by the landsman, and beget a self-respect and a love of his calling that would make him wish his son to follow him.



And shall we not do this for the seamen, both-masters and men?

Who are more deserving?

What single calling brought more honor to the nation during the first seventy-five years of its life? The sailors were a source of profit in time of peace, and a means of safety in time of war. It was the men drawn directly from our merchant marine that made possible a successful issue of the War of 1812, and of the Civil War.

Without similar men in the future our navy will be useless.

The restoration of the American flag to the high seas is not a question of subsidies, nor of preferential tariffs; it is simply a question of freedom and justice.

STOUGHTON COOLEY.



"TAXING THE FARMERS' BUSINESS."

That is what the land sharks say the Singletax would be—"taxing the farmers' business."

Because the Singletax wouldn't tax anything but the "raw-land" value, the "community-made" value of land.

But what kind of reasoning is this which concludes that taxes on "raw-land" value, taxes on "community-made" value would be taxing the farmer's business?

His business is to *use* land and the Singletax would abolish all taxes on the *use* of land.



Every one who knows anything about land knows what "the raw-land value" or "the community-made value" of land means—if he will think a minute. It is the value of land in the "raw," or uncleared, or "unimproved" state. That value is not due to what the owner has done to the land. It is due to population and the demand for "raw" land.

Doesn't every farmer know that land "near town" is worth more than just as good land several miles farther from town? Raw land, or unimproved land, near town is often worth more than better and improved land miles away from town. And doesn't every farmer know that an acre of unimproved land in a business district is worth a great many acres of the best improved farm land anywhere?

For example, H. L. Pittock's Block 215, in the business district of Portland, Oregon, is not quite one acre, and the land alone is now assessed at \$502,000, without counting the value of two old houses on it. That is the "unimproved value," or "community-made value" of this land. Compare that with the improved farm land, for example, in Josephine County, Oregon. Last year, 1911, the farmers in that county had 20,921 acres of improved land, assessed \$48.47 an acre, on the average for the whole county. That \$48.47 an acre includes the value of clearings. But the raw-land value, or unimproved value was only \$19.39 an acre, on an average.

So the unimproved value of the less than one acre of the Pittock block of land in Portland was equal to the unimproved value of 25,889 acres of improved farm land in Josephine County—and that is 4,968 acres more than all the improved land in the county.