

of imperialism? I have heard of three defenses: First, that there is money in it; second, that God is in it; third, that we are in it and can't get out. Have you ever heard any others? I will give you the substance of every republican speech you hear in defense of imperialism. The speaker will start out by telling that the republican party didn't do this at all; that it was God's work; that God opened the door, pointed to a career of conquest, and commanded us to proselyte by the sword and spread the blessings of civilization through bursting lyddite bombs, and after the speaker has laid it all on Jehovah, he lowers his voice and says: "And it will pay, too." It is philanthropy and five per cent. That is what Secretary Gage called it a year ago last December. He said he thought philanthropy and five per cent. would go hand in hand. They have traveled together in all wars of conquest. Philanthropy chloroforms the conscience of the conqueror, and five per cent. picks the pocket of the conquered; and whenever philanthropy gets weary and rests by the wayside, five per cent. goes right on and never feels lonesome.

You say we must stay in the Philippine islands because American blood has been shed upon Philippine soil.

I reply that American blood was shed at San Juan hill and El Caney, and yet the president told the Cubans we would get out of Cuba. You say that the flag has been raised over Manila, and that when the flag is once raised it can never be hauled down. I reply that the flag was raised over Havana a year ago last January, and yet the president told the Cubans that he would haul it down when the flag of the Cuban republic was ready to rise in its place. You tell me that the American flag cannot be hauled down. I would rather a thousand times that the American flag should be hauled down and a Philippine republic's flag hoisted in its place, than that our flag should be made the emblem of a despotism that has cursed the world. Better two flags of a republic than one flag of an empire based on force.

You cannot point to a reason for staying in the Philippine islands that would not compel you to stay in Cuba. The only difference between Cuba and the Philippine islands is that we promised the Cubans that we would get out and we didn't promise the Filipinos. But if you will read the resolution you will find that it reads that the

people of Cuba are and of right ought to be free. And if we told the truth in those resolutions, the rights of the Cubans existed before we recognized those rights and would exist whether we recognized them or not; and I dare you to draw a line between the rights of the Cuban and the rights of the Filipino. Say, if you dare, that God gave the Cuban a right to his liberty and gave to the Filipinos only the right to be an American subject without the protection of the American constitution. You cannot do it, my friends.

Do you say that the people of the Philippine islands are not capable of self-government? I tell you that that is the doctrine that kings have used in all ages of the world. Let me read you what Lincoln says about this: "Those arguments that are made that the inferior race is to be treated with as much allowance as it is capable of enjoying, that as much has to be done for it as its condition will allow—what are these arguments? They are the arguments that kings have made for enslaving the people in all ages of the world. You will find that all the arguments in favor of kingcraft were of this class. They always bestrode the necks of the people; not that they wanted to do it, but because the people were better off for being ridden."

That is what Lincoln says, that your argument is simply the argument that kings have used in all ages of the world for enslaving the people. Read what Henry Clay said 50 years ago. He said in defending the right of the people of South America to their liberty and independence—he said that any man who denied that any people were capable of self-government was guilty of impeaching the wisdom of the Creator. I repeat what Clay said, that God never made a race incapable of self-government.

When the ratification of the treaty came up there was a difference among our people. Some believed that it was best to reject the treaty. I believed that it was best to ratify it and correct its defects by legislation. I believed that if we would ratify the treaty and close the war and bring the volunteers home, stop the expense, we could give liberty and independence to the Filipinos quicker by legislation than we could do it through diplomacy with Spain.

I believe that we can stop the war to-day. I believe that the moment this nation announces to the world that it is fighting not for land, but for lib-

erty, that when a stable government is established that government is to belong to the Filipinos and not to us—I believe when this declaration is made, the war will stop, and it will not take 5,000 soldiers to establish a stable government. And then I want this nation to announce to the world that when this nation helps a republic to stand upon its feet, the ground whereon it stands is holy ground, and that no king shall ever set foot upon that soil.

THE KAFFIR AS POLITICIAN.

A leading Englishman remarked to me recently that he supposed the Kaffir did not concern himself much with politics or take much practical interest in the public life of the Cape Colony.

I replied, somewhat to his amusement, by telling him what an educated Kaffir said to me. "There are only two sections of the population of the colony," said this Kaffir, "which have the true political instinct—the Dutch and the Kaffirs." The English, he added, were always splitting over trifles, but the Dutch and the Kaffirs subordinated smaller issues to larger.

The Kaffir I allude to was Mr. J. Tengo-Jabavu, a Fingo.

A good many years ago Mr. Jabavu, who was educated at Lovedale, matriculated in the Cape university, afterward serving for a time in, I think, the Cape civil service. When the Kaffir newspaper *Imvo* was started in Kingwilliamstown he was appointed editor. From that time to the present he has edited *Imvo*, and he now owns it. He has recently taken into partnership the Rev. John Knox Bokwe, a Xoso. *Imvo* is the only native newspaper of any weight in South Africa. It has a couple of columns in English for English readers, but otherwise the whole paper, including advertisements, leading articles, notes, telegrams, etc., is in Kaffir. It circulates among educated natives and some white people, from Cape Town to Rhodesia, and has among its subscribers such men as Mr. J. H. Hofmeyr and the Bechuana chief, Khama. Mr. Jabavu is an orator (as is Mr. Bokwe) both in English and in Kaffir, and a man of great ability and singular balance of judgment. Hardly a journalist in South Africa has, since 1896, pursued so just, fearless and level-headed a course as Mr. Jabavu, or kept so firm a hold on the essentials that underlie our present troubles.

What Mr. Hofmeyr has been to the Dutch, that Mr. Jabavu has been to the natives. He has educated them in

public affairs, and led them in that course which, while advancing their own interests, has been best for the empire. He is by far the most powerful, as well as the ablest, Kaffir in the public life of the Cape Colony. It is therefore well that England should understand his attitude and be largely guided by it.

How is it that Mr. Jabavu, with all his personal influence and that of his paper, is opposed to the war; and how is it that he and the Kaffirs are largely in the same political camp as the Afrikander Bond? For it is an incontrovertible fact that, for the first time in the history of South Africa, responsible native opinion is on the same side as the Dutch, and in opposition to the so-called English.

The answer is short and emphatic. In the first place, the natives look at the war very much as the Dutch do. They consider it a capitalist intrigue, instigated and engineered by Mr. Rhodes for the purpose of seizing the Transvaal, in the same manner that war was forced on the Matabele, that their country might be seized. They look upon the war as a crime and a disgrace to England, and say that people who can treat Dutchmen so badly will treat natives much worse when they once have them in their power.

In the next place, though they have been no lovers of the Dutch, and have up till recently allied themselves with the English, yet they now say (and it is a truth capable of demonstration) that, since Mr. Rhodes came into power, the English have treated the natives worse than the Dutch have.

Like the Dutch, they have a firm belief in the English people, but the same thing is alienating both them and the Dutch—namely, the policy of those who now in South Africa arrogate to themselves the claim to be representatives of English opinion.

Now, what is it that finally alienated the political support of the natives from the English?

It is easily explained.

There are no Kaffirs or colored persons in the Cape parliament. This being the case, they seek for white champions to represent and defend their interests in the legislature of the country. In choosing any man, they ask themselves no other question than this: What is his attitude towards the native? On that alone they decide.

The two men they think most of are probably Mr. R. P. Solomon and Mr. J. W. Sauer. The other principal native champions are Mr. J. Rose Innes, Mr. John X. Merriman, Mr. J. C. Moltano,

Mr. J. T. Moltano and Mr. William Hay. All of these have been long recognized as pro-native men, and have had the support of the Kaffirs and the colored people generally.

Now, it happens—indeed, it is inevitable—that, without exception, these men are opposed to Mr. Rhodes. (It is remarkable that Mr. Sauer, Mr. Innes and Mr. Merriman were members of Mr. Rhodes' cabinet, and that Mr. Solomon, who was counsel for De Beers, was once returned to parliament by that company.) They are opposed to Mr. Rhodes—which means also to the South African league, of which he is president, and to the so-called "progressives," whose de facto leader he is—for several reasons, among them being his duplicity, his degrading influence upon public life, his oppression of the natives, his cruel treatment of the Dutch, and the harm he has done England in South Africa. When the last general election took place Mr. Rhodes and his supporters tried in every case to prevent the return to parliament of the pro-native men. But the Dutch, recognizing in these same men lovers of justice and upholders of the best English traditions—the Dutch, aided by the native vote, put the native champions into parliament. (Mr. Innes, who was, I think, elected unopposed, did not need the Dutch vote, though he would have got it. Mr. Rhodes was anxious to keep him out, but found him too strong.)

With his keen "political instinct," the native judges those to be his friends who befriend him, and it matters not to him whether those friends be English or Dutch; and here he sees the "English" (as represented by Mr. Rhodes, the South African league, and the "progressives") straining every nerve and spending thousands of pounds to keep his friends out of parliament and thus leave him unprotected and unrepresented, while the Dutch have taken them up and put them not only into parliament, but into the ministry. Of the four men who practically compose the ministry, three (Messrs. Sauer, Solomon and Merriman) are avowed and recognized native champions. Add to this that the pro-native men that were kept out of parliament at the last general election (such as Mr. William Hay and the late Mr. C. T. Jones) were in every case defeated by Mr. Rhodes' influence.

Now, the native looks these facts straight in the face; he takes the false professions of friendship of those who would keep his friends out of parliament at their true value; and, without necessarily allying himself with the

"Dutch," he draws off from the "English" and joins a party which includes the Dutch, some of the best English South Africans, and his own champions, against a selfish capitalism, masquerading under the guise of imperialism which will be as bad for him as for all the right sort of men in South Africa, whether white or black, and which is led and controlled by men who have shown themselves to be his deadly and unrelenting enemies. As between Rhodes and the Bond, the native chooses the Bond—there is the hard fact with which no vilification of the Dutch can do away. He recognizes that Dutch sentiment towards the native is changing in his favor, while, on the other hand, he sees that the same persons and forces that are killing the Dutchmen for their own selfish ends will enslave and crush and, if need be, kill him as soon as they have the power to do so. The natives on the spot, led by such cultured, disinterested and far-seeing statesmen as Mr. Jabavu and Mr. Bokwe, who are at the same time passionate lovers of that England we used to know, supported and championed by all the recognized pro-native white statesmen, are far more valuable and trustworthy witnesses than any other can possibly be.—S. C. Cronwright Schreiner, in the London Speaker of April 7.

"George," queried the dream-visitor, "what would you do if you had the battle of Manila to fight again?"

"What would I do?" responded the self-made presidential candidate. "I would postpone the event until the day before the holding of the democratic convention."

And the dream-visitor said no more, for he is sufficiently versed in worldly wisdom to comprehend the subtle allusion to the fickleness of the American people.

G. T. E.

Nutrite—Do you think the Boers will let the English army reach Pretoria?

Proboerine—They would be foolish if they did. Why, they haven't prison facilities for half so many soldiers.

G. T. E.

BOOK NOTICES.

"Japanese Notions of European Political Economy, being a summary of a voluminous report upon that subject forwarded to the Japanese government, by Tentaro Makato, commissioner to Japan to make the investigation," has just appeared in a third and revised edition. This is the little book that we described (34-6) upon its first appearance as "a unique pamphlet which may or may not be a contribution to the literature of wit, but