What Henry George "Left Out"
Lindy Davies
[Afterword to the 2004 abridged edition of The
Science of Political Economy by Henry George, published by the
Robert Schalkenbach Foundation]
In the prefatory note to the original edition of The Science of
Political Economy, Henry George, Jr., who edited his father's
unfinished work, said that the author's original intention had been to
create a "Primer of Political Economy" that would "set
forth in direct, didactic form the main principles of what he
conceived to be an exact and indisputable science, leaving controversy
for a later and larger work." However, George's plan changed,
because of the great mass of confusion regarding the basic terms and
concepts of the discipline, which had intensified since the
publication of Progress and Poverty. George exhaustively explored and
debunked the standard definitions of terms such as wealth, capital and
distribution, and the standard explanations of such economic
principles as "the law of diminishing returns in agriculture".
In fashioning a version of George's text for use by modern students,
a great deal of material, dealing with notions current in George's
day, could profitably be removed. His list of the various
contradictory definitions of wealth by long-forgotten economists
offers little to today's general reader. Likewise, his long discourse
on the meaning of space and time, while interesting as an overview of
philosophical currents of the 1890s, does little to elucidate economic
principles today. Henry George believed that all this disputation was
essential to comprehensively making his case. But when his topical
wrangling is stripped away, what's left is an astonishingly simple
elaboration of the basic principles of economics - something very much
like the sort of "primer" that George originally wanted to
write!
Originally, I intended to create an afterword that offered an "update"
of a work that could not have been expected to deal with all the
problems of the ensuing century. I wanted to suggest, in other words,
an outline of how George might have altered his textbook, had he
visited the Earth again in the 21st century. However, as I proceeded
with the abridgment I realized that I was making the same sort of
mistake that the academic establishment has always tended to make
regarding George's work. We find none of today's economic buzzwords in
The Science of Political Economy; however, George also had little to
say about the buzzwords of his own time, except as examples of
underlying confusion. As a "primer of political economy",
George's work still stands. If one uses it as the author intended, as
a "template on which emerging details can be coherently arranged"[1],
it can offer the modern student a great deal of insight into
contemporary questions.
To demonstrate this, I want to briefly discuss some pressing
questions for modern-day economics which, though they aren't mentioned
in The Science of Political Economy, are elucidated by the
analytical system it sets forth. The ones I'm thinking of (though
others could easily be brought forward) are externalities,
environmental policy, business cycle theory (and its relationship to
the economic role of government), and globalization.
EXTERNALITIES
"Externalities exist", writes Paul Samuelson, "when
private costs or benefits do not equal social costs or benefits."
Thus, externalities can affect aggregate outcomes without changing
individual incentives. The fact that externalities have become a big
area of concern in contemporary economics might reflect a response to
the neoclassical emphasis on individual behavior - on aggregate
phenomena being understandable as the sum of individual choices. That
methodology makes externalities a thorny problem. We cannot say the
whole is the sum of its parts if the parts affect the whole in ways
that cannot be seen by examining the parts themselves. Therefore,
external costs (or benefits) are seen as being outside the
marketplace.
Henry George's characterization of the "greater leviathan"
of the "body economic" alerts us to the fallacy in the above
statement. If external costs are costs, then how can they be outside
the marketplace? They are paid by somebody, regardless of whether they
appear in any formal accounting of transactions. George's analysis is
helpful here because he understands the economy to be the aggregate of
all production and distribution, whether denominated or imputed, over
the table or under it. Hence, externalities are part of the
marketplace, regardless of any official action to "internalize"
them. If the government were to step in and impose penalties, that
would merely bring those costs back within the comfort zone of
quantifiability.
George, however, has the classical preoccupation with the entire
economy, or the "wealth of nations" - and it's easy to see
that externalities, far from being a new postmodern wrinkle, are a
natural and essential part of that analysis. The way that people take
advantage of the benefits of civilization is, essentially, by
producing wealth and exchanging it. In the laws of production and
distribution that George describes, the producer bears the cost of the
factors of production, and enjoys the benefits - wages and interest -
while the community gets the value it created: economic rent. In
George's view, these natural laws of distribution cannot be broken; if
human arrangements unwisely go against them, the consequences will
inevitably be seen in subsequent production patterns.
In other words, those unwise human arrangements are externalities.
External costs are imposed on labor and capital in the form of high
rents (which include the speculative increase in the cost of land,
plus interest on the money that must be borrowed to acquire land at
that price) and confiscation, via taxation, of some of the produce of
labor. External benefits are bestowed upon the landowner in payments
for benefits that are due to the activity of the entire community.
Although economists tend to describe externalities as though they
arise mysteriously from some well of market complexity, these, anyway,
are directly attributable to arrangements of human law. (And there are
many other, lesser examples of legislated externalities, such as the
results of zoning regulations, farm subsidies, protective tariffs,
etc.)
For Henry George, the question of externalities, and what to do about
them, is profoundly simpler than it is for the modern mainstream
economist. This is because, for George, the moral basis of property
cannot be separated from economic analysis; land is inherently
different from wealth. Many pooh-pooh this as merely a moral judgment.
But the difference between natural opportunities and the products of
labor is so obvious that it can only be denied by an explicit effort
to define it away. Natural opportunities are the stuff from which our
satisfactions must come, and human labor the means by which our
desires can be satisfied. The mixture of the passive element of land
and the active element of labor creates wealth - something essentially
distinct from both. Since land is not produced by labor, any income
that comes from owning land must be an externality.
If there were no natural principle of ownership, and ownership merely
stemmed from an ever-changing social contract, then we could not
expect predictable consequences to arise from mucking about with those
natural principles. Yet they do. The imposition of absolute private
ownership of land distorts the processes of production and
distribution in ways that have long been understood.
For the mainstream economist, the problem of externalities is far
more complex. Denying the possibility of any sort of "natural law
of property" - and steadfastly refusing to consider the character
of land as a separate factor of production - the mainstream economist
is compelled to evaluate each externality afresh, without any guidance
except for empirical studies of market behavior. This could lead on
the one hand to an excess of regulatory interference, or on the other
to a "social Darwinian" impulse to leave things alone to
equilibrate. (It also requires major mental gymnastics in the effort
to imply - if not actually prove - that land value is not an
externality but somehow arises from the landowner's business acumen.)
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
Environmental policy is largely seen in terms of externalities. Firms
benefit from spewing greenhouse gases into the atmosphere; foreign
debt burdens create perverse incentives to destroy virgin forests and
the species they contain; irrigation steals river water from
downstream users. But the case-by-case wrangling that characterizes
modern environmental policy makes for little progress. Lacking any
clear, scientific guide, decisions hinge on a corrupt and/or
ill-informed political process. Here, I think, Henry George's
political economy has a profound contribution to make.
Henry George affirms the Biblical injunction that "the land
shall not be sold forever". That "forever" is
important, because it indicates that Georgist political economy, like
the Old Testament land law, recognizes the security of land tenure. In
fact, George points out that secure tenure is the only way to secure
private property in the products of labor. (This lesson has been
learned in recent decades by the government of China, which found that
privately-owned farms are vastly more productive, per capita and per
acre, than collective farms.)
Now this concept - of conditional private property in land - far from
being some archaic notion, is clear to anyone familiar with modern
laws concerning real estate. In legal terms, "selling a piece of
land" is a non sequitur. What is transacted is a "bundle of
rights" that attaches to a particular site. These rights could
include surface rights, subsurface mineral rights, aquifer use rights,
air-space rights, etc. When Henry George thundered "We must make
land common property!" his fervor and bluntness unnerved some
people - but he meant it. George insisted that we allocate the bundle
of rights according to the moral basis of ownership. Society must
grant secure land tenure, refuse to confiscate the products of labor,
and "not sell the land for ever" - by collecting, for
society, the socially-created rental value of land.
This simple distinction could go a long way toward solving difficult
problems of environmental policy. If the gifts of nature belong to
all, then a starting point for environmental policy would be to
identify instances in which natural opportunities are being taken for
private profit. And if we think of land not just as a square of ground
but as a "bundle of rights", we can think of many
applications. Northern-hemisphere industrial nations, for example, use
the still-uncut forests of the south to soak up their C02 emissions.
The opportunity to keep their cars and factories spewing with impunity
is worth a great deal to them. The cause of that externality is no
mystery: the enclosure, for the benefit of a few, of a natural
opportunity - in this case, the use of the atmosphere as a dump for a
particular quantity of pollution.
It would be rash to say that merely "going Georgist" would
make a no-brainer out of environmental policy. A great deal of sorting
out would have to be done. For an example of how complex this can get,
consider the case of car owners who use the atmospheric commons as a
dumping ground for their cars' emissions. They enjoy the benefit of
high-performance transportation, yet are only as bothered by pollution
as everyone else. Clearly that amounts to the monopolization of a
natural opportunity. Wouldn't it be fair, then, to charge car-owners
an emissions tax? Perhaps it would be - but there is a whole stew of
other incentives to consider. People live and work in a system that
virtually requires them to drive a car in order to make a living -
because of urban sprawl and the lack of sensible public-transportation
alternatives. Furthermore, the sale of automobiles has been actively
subsidized by the public provision of highways, cheap fuel, etc.
Should individual drivers be penalized for the full amount of
pollution that they spew, or should there be some more systemic
attempt at reigning in the built-in misincentives? And, if motorists
are compelled, because of rush-hour congestion, to wait in traffic,
thus increasing their spewage, should they be further charged for this
by means of a tax on highway congestion? Could such a tax be
administered equitably, or would it just amount to marketing the
privilege of using the public highway at the most convenient times? Do
not all these real-world complications blow away our happy fantasy of
clear-cut Georgist policy decisions?
The fortunate fact is that they do not - or at least, not nearly so
much as some would have us think. Trying to evaluate economic
phenomena in their moment-to-moment context is like trying to identify
scraps of paper in a hurricane. It makes for challenging doctoral
thesis topics, requiring ever-subtler mathematical modeling. But in
the broad public-policy areas that we are dealing with here - the
ones, after all, that are the most important - it isn't necessary. To
see why, we have to remember two important facts:
1) Natural opportunities are functionally different from
wealth, and can be clearly identified as such. The factors of
production are plainly different from each other. Let's imagine
factor payments as three colors that get mixed together in the gross
receipts of a firm: land is green, labor is red and capital is blue.
Mixed together, they become brownish-gray. It's awfully hard to get
any of the original colors out. But before they get mixed, Georgist
policy calls for the land portion to be taken - while it is still
green - and then the entrepreneur's profit can be appropriately
purple.
2) Although public policy decisions work through the "body
economic" over time in complex ways, Georgist theory reassures
us that if those decisions are properly based on "association
in equality"[2] from the start, the resulting interactions will
also have that character. Let's consider a (negative) example. At
the turn of the 20th century, New York City, responding to its
tremendous need to move people efficiently about the city, created a
public transportation system (fortunately) before the automobile
came into widespread use. The system worked so well that it still
carries some seven million riders a day, helping New York City,
despite all its other urban problems, to achieve a level of economic
dynamism that other cities cannot match. However, the primary
beneficiaries of this system - the city's landowners - have not been
called upon to pay for it; instead, it is charged to the riders and
the general taxpayers. Because rent was not charged to landowners,
land speculation was encouraged, which retarded the city's economy.
Revenue was always a problem, and in time the subway system fell
into disrepair. Meanwhile, the (heavily subsidized) national mania
for cars and highways threw huge, neighborhood-destroying,
revenue-sapping freeways across the city. This is not (necessarily)
to say that a sensibly funded and planned city would have no
highways at all. But, had the public transportation system been
supported as it should have been, by the land rents it helped to
create, it could have been provided as a free service, would never
have had to suffer from neglect and decay, and would have provided a
more viable alternative to highways. Surely that would have made for
a more tractable set of urban-planning problems.
A shift to the "Georgist paradigm in public revenue will not
magically answer all our questions. There are vital debates about, for
instance, whether straight land value charges, or severance taxes, or
a mixture of both, would be best to secure equal rights to mineral
resources, and their efficient use. There are debates over how rights
to global resources, such as geosynchronous orbits, or the atmosphere
itself, should be assessed and charged. Nevertheless, the fundamental
principle that the value of natural opportunities must be collected
for common benefit is a powerful de-obfuscatory tool, as useful in the
academy as it is at the grassroots.
THE BUSINESS CYCLE
Nowhere is the potential for liberating simplification shown more
clearly than in the Georgist theory of the business cycle. This is an
area of today's public policy that seems complicated beyond any hope
of clarity. There is this bewildering interaction of international
balance-of-payments, domestic savings levels, fluctuating currency
prices, swinging equity markets, see-sawing rates of unemployment,
consumer confidence, geopolitical threat levels and (probably) sunspot
activity. For Keynes the business cycle was an inherent feature of the
modern economy, a negative by-product of an otherwise highly
successful financial system. For Marxists it augurs the eventual fall
of capitalism under the weight of its quest for ever-diminishing
profits.
Yet George, in setting forth what he deemed necessary for a basic
understanding of political economy, never mentioned the business cycle
at all! Now, to be sure, he dealt with the question extensively in
Progress and Poverty; understanding the "paroxysms of industrial
depression" was a major focus in that book. He identified the
phenomenon of land speculation as the root cause (underlying the
myriad proximate causes) of the business cycle, showing how the
tendency to boom and bust was merely a special case of the overall
problem of poverty amid progress.
The job of political economy, according to George, is to understand
the natural laws that govern the production and distribution of
wealth. But the business cycle is caused by a refusal to conform
society's property relationships to those laws. For Georgists the
business cycle is not part of the economic organism, but rather a
disease - a chronic disease, to be sure - yet one that can be fully
cured. To the extent that the annual value of natural opportunities
can be collected, and taxes on labor and capital abolished, the
problem of the business cycle can be solved. That's why The Science of
Political Economy "fails to mention" the business cycle,
except as an example of the consequences arising from interference
with the distribution of wealth.
What, then, does this say about the role of government in a system
informed and corrected by Georgist principles? Here again, there is
little need for the "basic primer" to go into specific cases
when the guiding principle is so clearly stated. Rewards attributable
to labor and the products of labor go to those who provide the
service; rewards attributable to natural opportunities or to the
entire community's activities go to the community. (The rent fund
always directly affects the community's vitality and health: either
positively, as when it is collected and used for common benefit, or
negatively, as when it is left in private hands and a syndrome of
social pathologies results.)
There is a certain class of activities, often called "natural
monopolies", whose value is created by the action of the State.
George recommends that such enterprises, which by their nature do not
permit competition, should be operated by the government. In his other
works he discusses various examples of these things, but in The
Science of Political Economy he focuses on one only: money. This is
because other monopolies come and go with changes in time and
technology, but money is an essential part of political economy.
For George, "bad money" (i.e., money with less intrinsic
value) drives out "good money" because the fundamental
usefulness of money is to save labor in the process of exchange, and
it takes less labor to provide credit money than commodity money. He
notes many historical examples in which the debasement of currency has
led to ruinous inflation. But, he reasons, currency can easily be
debased - in fact its commodity value can be utterly removed - without
any harmful effects, if only its supply is kept carefully regulated.
This leads us to realize that the most efficient way for currency to
be issued is by government fiat. If any profit is to be gained from
issuing money, it should go to the general treasury, and not to
private banking interests. In other words, the essential nature of
money indicates that, at a sufficiently advanced stage of
civilization, it must be issued by government.
There is considerable disagreement, even (or perhaps especially)
among advocates of Georgist policy about the precise role of money in
society and how to secure a just, stable supply of the stuff.
Nevertheless, it is clear that the beacon of the natural law of
property as a fundamental guiding principle can bring us far closer to
the goal of comprehensibility in questions of public policy. It allows
us to evaluate the role of government in terms of basic principles,
rather than merely as month-to-month crisis management.
GLOBALIZATION
Today's "anti-globalization movement" responds with
something very much like panic to the economic realities of our time.
And well it might: the "internationalization of production"
seems to come along with a host of frightening problems: the erosion
of wages and regulatory standards, the disappearance of habitats and
species, the possibility of irreversible climate change, corporate
predation of workers in nations struggling under the burden of foreign
debt, the decline of labor unions, the decline of manufacturing in the
United States. Understandably worried as folks are, though, most are
not clear on the causes of these problems. The increasing fact of a "global
economy" frightens people - but why, exactly? International trade
has been going on for centuries, despite persistent attempts to choke
it off (to benefit some special interest) via tariffs or blockades.
Lately, improvements in transportation and communication have made it
easier for producers to move parts of their operations overseas - but
can technological progress be blamed for today's economic woes? After
all, both international trade and technological progress have the
potential to increase production with the same amount of exertion, or
to achieve the same level of satisfaction with less damage to the
environment. Yet those things are not being done: why? "Because
the corporations are in control" is the next common answer. "Corporations
use their henchmen in the WTO to erode national sovereignty and become
more powerful than nations. They skim off all the benefits for their
richest one per cent, leaving everyone else worse off."
This is true; income and wealth are becoming more polarized all the
time, ^et one wonders how the corporations manage to seize regulatory
control from the grasp of sovereign nations. The standard answer is
that in today's "global economy" a nation must - in order to
be able to sell its goods abroad - play by international-trade rules
that are set by the corporations. A nation that tries to stick with
minimum-wage, worker safety or environmental regulations will not be
able to compete in the "race to the bottom" with other
countries that are even more desperate.
It ought to be pointed out, though, that not one of these "desperate"
national governments has taken advantage of its power to resolve the
underlying, fundamental problem of poverty - which it shares with
every other nation in the world today. That is the secret of the "merry-go-round"
that no country can seem to get off of. Every player in the "global
economy" today allows individuals and corporations to own land in
fee simple, and every nation imposes taxes on labor and capital. In
addition, many of the world's nations struggle under a burden of
foreign debt, contracted by earlier regimes, almost never with the
people's say-so. The borrowed money was mostly squandered, and the
debts, which ballooned as the United States fought to contain
inflation in the early 1980s, are essentially unpayable. Yet in return
for "debt relief', nations must impose "austerity" -
further cutting back on needed investment in infrastructure, education
and public health.
It is this pattern of fundamental injustice, and the inefficiency it
brings about, that is really at the heart of what people see as the "death
force" of globalization. Once again, Georgist political economy
furnishes a guiding principle that allows us to make sense of a wide
range of seemingly disparate effects - and provides clear policy
alternatives. Indeed, if a few nations were to succeed in implementing
Georgist public revenue policy, they could begin a "domino effect"
far greater than the "red menace" nightmares of the old cold
warriors. This outcome would be good for workers and producers, but
disastrous for the special interests that currently run the show -
which provides even more support for Prof. Mason Gaffney's contention,
in The Corruption of Economics, that even now, a large part of the
intellectual power of mainstream economics is spent on making sure
that these guiding principles, in all their powerful simplicity, do
not become widely understood.
NOTES
[1] Mark Solms, in
Scientific American, May 2004, referring to the role of
Darwin's theory in modern molecular genetics - and, though it had long
been thought otherwise, the role of Freud's ideas in modern
neuro-science. It is widely contended that Henry George's theoretic
contributions, despite having long been held in disrepute, must
eventually assume their proper place as just such a template for
economic science.
[2] These are the attributes that George identifies in Progress and
Poverty (Book X, Chapter HI) as fundamental to human progress.
Lindy Davies is the Program Director of the Henry George
Institute. He has been teaching political economy since 1988, and has
written, edited, designed and implemented numerous curricular
materials in that effort. He is the webmaster for www.henrygeorge.org
and www.landreform.org.
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