Tendency as Principle:
Resurrection of Henry George's
Closed System of Political Economy
PART TWO

Edward J. Dodson

ENGLAND AND IRELAND

THE LONG OPPRESSION
Calm And Storm

Ancient Ireland was invaded between the fourth and third centuries B.C. and its inhabitants conquered by the Gaelic Celts, a tribe emerging from central Europe in a bid for territorial expansion. To Ireland they brought the monarchical form of government, a more advanced knowledge of iron-making, and a socio-political hierarchy that included a privileged class of knowledge-keepers, individuals "who preserved the traditions, epics, laws, pedigrees, and history of the race."[11] Although authority over the Celts was concentrated in a monarch who was both priest and king, actual power was limited by the tribal nature of the Gaelic states and by the absence of roads or large permanent settlements uniting their empire. This absence of what we customarily think of as the centralizing structure of the nation-state has been pointed to by historian, economist and libertarian philosopher Murray Rothbard as support for the libertarian thesis advancing the virtues of minimal government. Rothbard describes Celtic Ireland as "a highly complex society that was, for centuries, the most advanced, most scholarly, and most civilized in all of Western Europe."[12]

Ireland was both locationally and politically at the frontier of Eurasian expansion for most of its known history. At the height of the Roman empire, for example, Ireland remained untouched by Roman presence. When in the late fourth century B.C. the Romans were retreating and yielding control over their far-flung territory, the Irish Celts managed to gain a foothold in western and northern Britain. They were gradually pushed out of southern Britain but established a new civilization in the north that became Scotland.

The Anglo-Norman Invasion

Celtic expansionism was itself curtailed by the arrival in the ninth century of the Norse, against whom was fought a long series of intermittent wars to retain control over Ireland. No sooner had the Celts defeated the Norse, however, than they were besieged anew by Normans who had invaded and conquered parts of Wales and Scotland. Although powerful and numerous, the Normans were slow to consolidate their power over Britain and Ireland because of continued entanglements on the European continent over Normandy lands. An added challenge for the Normans was the difficulty posed by the decentrally-organized Celts, who proved to be resilient and unconventional in their manner of battle. Even when defeated the Celts were troublesome subjects for the Normans. In the end, however, the Norman invasion disrupted the natural development of Celtic civilization in Ireland. As explained by Edmund Curtis:

To the Irish kings a battle was intended to achieve an immediate object; that achieved, their armies retired. To the Norman-French, war was a business proposition and their enterprise a joint-stock company out of which profits were expected. A battle once gained, the next step was to throw up an impregnable castle, the next was to organize the conquered country into a manor or barony and seek if necessary a charter for it from Earl or King.[13]

The ability of the Celts to resist invasion from the far more numerous and technologically advanced Normans was to be short-lived and the final outcome not much in dispute. Improvements in the design of ocean-going vessels brought Ireland within easier striking distance of Norman armies after their conquest of the Anglo-Saxon tribes of Britain. As historian G.M. Trevelyan has observed, the invading Normans generally regarded the Celtic Irish "as savages ... outside the pale of Papal Christendom"[14] and were intent on displacing them from Ireland. Over time, however, a significant number of Normans (many of whom were themselves of mixed Norman and Celtic blood) intermarried with the conquered Celtic Irish. The Normans then brought not only their system of empire but also the centralizing authority of Catholicism and the socio-political institutions of feudalism. Included therein was the concept of granting to individuals private title to nature, and the distribution of other privileges based on aristocratic principles.

The Celtic Irish tribes were slowly forced to abandon their more or less nomadic way of life and live by horticulture near permanent settlements. Use of tribal lands had been largely communal under Celtic traditions. Norman law, however, was far more detailed and established fixed responsibilities between lord and peasant tiller based on a pattern of contributions in produce delivered to the lord in exchange for access to land. In this way, the natural development of the Celtic Irish civilization was interrupted; a hierarchical structure that might not have appeared for several hundred years was imposed on these people overnight.

Applying The Tools of Political Economy

We can examine the impact on the Celtic Irish of Norman rule by applying Henry George's principles of distributive justice to the socio-political arrangements established. The protective and administrative services provided by the Norman lords would tend to improve the security of whatever is produced by the peasant farmers. A claim against this production above that which would be produced without such services represents the legitimate wage associated with the (managerial) labor provided by the lord, or the interest accruing to whatever capital goods the lord provided to the peasant farmers for their use. Examples might be the use of draught animals, tools, the construction of irrigation systems or storage facilities. None of this, of course, addresses the more fundamental issue of how the lord gained control over the feudal estate; the conquest of territory and displacement (or, as occurs more frequently in history, the subjugation or enslavement) of existing inhabitants is inherently unjust. Yet even beyond this level of injustice, when the tillers of the soil are then bound by manmade law to a specific lord -- unable to migrate or labor as they choose -- the lord rather than any market dynamics establishes the actual distribution of wealth produced.

For the political scientist, these socio-political arrangements are externalities that affect a redistribution of wealth different from what would occur naturally. And, in this type of common circumstance, the tendency in history is for redistribution to impoverish producers to the extreme benefit of those who control the land by force.

The Norman presence among the Celtic Irish was not, however, one of full conquest, domination or absorption. A gradual adjustment of sorts emerged, described by Trevelyan as a feudal society "built upon the foundation of an Irish bog."[15] Across the Irish Sea, the Norman conquest of Britain gradually produced a new and unified people distinct from the French-Normans and the earlier Britons. When the Norman monarch arrived in 1154 to rule as Henry II, he brought with him the institutional framework for a uniform system of law that included, as one example of institutional change, a provision for jury hearings. Henry II also ordered that common law be put into codified form. These and other measures tended to diminish the power and independence of the feudal lords to the benefit of the monarchy; and, this centralizing process continued until 1215, when the barons forced King John to sign the Magna Carta. Nevertheless, the thirteenth century initiated the gradual displacement of feudal arrangements by a system of positive law based on contractual responsibilities between individuals.

Near the end of the thirteenth century, the fragile Anglo-Norman state was ruled by Edward I. On the European continent, a territorial struggle was in progress between Norman and other French princes. In an effort to strengthen their own position, the French-Normans seized land on the continent that had remained under Anglo-Norman control. Edward I was not, however, able to respond to this invasion because of serious unrest among the Celtic Welsh (who had revolted against the imposition of heavy taxation) and by Scots, who entered the conflict on the side of the French-Normans. Edward I was forced, in order to obtain needed troops and finances, to agree to new articles limiting further the powers of the monarchy. The feudal barons would no longer be required to answer the monarch's call to warfare, which meant that soldiers would have to be paid by the crown as mercenaries.

Edward I was killed in 1307 during the fighting against the Scots. Seven years later the Anglo-Norman army was routed and destroyed at Bannockburn. With the momentum now in their favor, the Scots landed an army of 6,000 in Ireland, combined their force with the Celtic Irish tribes, and cleared much of the Irish hinterland of Anglo-Norman domination. The Scots were eventually forced to retire, but Anglo-Norman rule in Ireland was significantly weakened. As a consequence, Ireland became a land divided both ethnically and politically, ungovernable and disunited. During the next three centuries, English monarchs continued encroach upon the Celtic Irish territory. Toward the end of the sixteenth century, victories on the battlefields were followed by the arrival of an increasing number of English colonists.

While most of continental Europe inched its way toward government dominated by strong, central monarchies, Britain experienced a gradual shift in power from feudal lords to monarchy, then to a Parliament dominated by landed interests. With the arrival of the industrial revolution and large-scale commercial agriculture, a shift in socio-political power occurred in the direction of a group (class is, perhaps, too strong a word) best described by the term industrial landlords. In the earlier stages of this transition, landed property supplied the investment resources -- and the State the mercantilistic monopolies -- for the creation of joint stock companies that received charters entitling the owners to almost sovereign control over the land and trade in the New World and Asia. The profits proved to be of such magnitude that investors were able to build the world's largest merchant fleet (surpassing that of the Dutch) and a privately-controlled territorial empire of vast proportions.

Britain's transition politically was hastened in the mid-seventeenth century by civil war and the ascendancy of Oliver Cromwell as head of the modern era's first constitutional republic. The constitution brought to a sudden end both the remaining vestiges of feudalism and temporarily eliminated the institution of the monarchy. By the time the Dutch prince William of Orange was invited in 1688 to assume the English throne, the members of Parliament had secured by Declaration of Right substantial protections for their entrenched privileges and licenses. From this point on, the landed and merchant interests worked rather in harmony to complete the privatization of British landholdings and enclosure of the commons.

The initial impetus for the enclosures came from a rising demand for wool, milk and beef, which required far more acreage than subsistence farming. Building a large merchant fleet, as well as men of war, quickly reduced Britain's forests and also diminished the supply of wood as a source of fuel in homes. Coal gradually replaced wood as the primary fuel in factories, the demand for which expanding without limit after the refinement of the steam engine. An equally important result, however, was the appearance of an active speculative market in lands thought to hold coal deposits.

Industrial landlordism did not create but certainly intensified the struggle between the propertied and the propertyless, the latter having virtually no ability to resist whatever oppressions were levied upon them. The most positive option for these desperate people became emigration to the New World, where the opportunity to acquire land and produce wealth for one's own consumption provided a safety valve for an expanding, impoverished population. Property had long found comfort and protection by government, including the privilege of not having to share very materially in the expense of that government. In an 1845 speech before the House of Commons, one of England's leading free trade proponents, Richard Cobden, described just how successful the coalition of industrial landlords, financiers, merchants and landed gentry had been:

For a period of 150 years after the Conquest, the whole of the revenue of the country was derived from the land. During the next 150 years it yielded nineteen=twentieths of the revenue -- for the next century down to the reign of Richard III it was nine-tenths. During the next seventy years to the time of Mary it feel to about three-fourths. From this time to the end of the Commonwealth, land appeared to have yielded one-half of the revenue. Down to the reign of Anne it was one-fourth. In the reign of George III it was one-sixth. For the first thirty years of his reign the land yielded one-seventh of the revenue. From 1793 to 1816 (during the period of the Land Tax), land contributed one-ninth. From which time to the present one-twenty-fifth only of the revenues had been derived directly from land. Thus the land which anciently paid the whole of taxation, paid now only a fraction or one-twenty-fifth, notwithstanding the immense increase that had taken place in the value of the rentals.[16]

Adam Smith, as well as others among the small group of late eighteenth century political economists, had predicted just such a political and distributive outcome. In The Wealth Of Nations, Smith wrote that "[c]ivil government, so far as it is instituted for the security of property, is in reality instituted for the defense of the rich against the poor, or of those who have some property against those who have none at all."[17] As a product of his class and era, Smith was not prepared to challenge this arrangement on the basis of justice. Although he instinctively recognized in labor the legitimate basis for property, he declined to condemn the socio-political arrangements and positive law that interfered with a just distribution of wealth. He did, however, describe the evolutionary process by which a propertyless class arose:

[The] original state of things, in which the labourer enjoyed the whole produce of his own labour, could not last beyond the first introduction of the appropriation of land and the accumulation of stock. It was at an end, therefore, long before the most considerable improvements were made in the productive powers of labour, and it would be to no purpose to trace further what might have been its effects upon the recompence or wages of labour.

As soon as land becomes private property, the landlord demands a share of almost all the produce which the labourer can either raise, or collect from it. His rent makes the first deduction from the produce of the labour which is employed upon land.[18]

By means of the enclosures and the replacement of feudal arrangements with contractual obligations, deeds and mortgages, the landlords (in the transitional stage) and later the industrial landlords had gained the upper hand. By virtue of monopoly control over trade and commerce, a relatively few individuals had prospered at the expense of the many. In the short run, and to a far greater extent in England than in Ireland or elsewhere in Britain, the overall effects on the peasant farmers has been shown to have been more positive than negative. That this might be the case under some limited conditions did not escape Henry George in his analysis of history. He explained that the laws of distribution, although based on natural principles of human behavior, were laws of tendency subject to the influences (i.e., externalities) of whatever socio-political arrangements were in place. A society characterized by widespread land ownership and participatory government (as was the case in the United States) might overcome an unjust distribution of wealth. These were certainly not circumstances existing almost universally throughout Eurasia or that portion of the Americas under European domination.

Opportunity to begin anew, to escape an oppressive socio-political regime, mitigated conditions not only in Britain and Ireland but in other European countries as well. Nevertheless, rapid population growth stimulated the demand for land to serve the needs of manufacturing and housing in urban areas and brought ever more marginal land under cultivation. One consequence was that the process of wealth concentration fed upon itself as industrial landlords enlarged their holdings. Profits gained from production found their way into land speculation, yielding additional profits, and so on. The immediate victims were the large numbers of propertyless workers in the factories and on the land whose wages were pushed to subsistence level. John Osborne describes living conditions among factory workers that were more life-threatening than whatever poverty the rural peasant had previously experienced:

Factories, dyeing vats and slaughter houses discharged their waste matter into streams used for drinking water. Dwellings were built as close together as possible. Streets were unswept and privies unemptied.[20]

One wonders whether -- had the propertyless peasants any choice -- they would have willingly left the land to face such conditions as those associated with life in the factory and factory towns? I think not. Marx and Engels were not the first to show that the propertyless from Ireland had for generations been used by English factory owners to keep the labor pool large, thereby imposing a downward pressure on wages. Moreover, so long as English workers concentrated their antagonism on the Irish immigrants and not on the privileges enjoyed by industrial landlords, the real beneficiaries of this system remained protected and the causes of injustice were safely hidden. Toward the end of the nineteenth century, these issues became the focus of Henry George's activism in the British Isles, fist as correspondent for the Irish World and later as a lecturer in his own right.

Henry George and Reform
His Influence on British Politics

Despite the notoriety George gained during several extended visits to the British Isles, he failed to convince the Irish nationalists and other reformers in Britain that their longer run interests depended on changing the structure of property law and taxation to distinguish between landed property and that produced by labor or capital. For George, Ireland presented a highly visible and obvious example of the problems caused by "the same land system which prevail[ed] in all civilized countries." [21] The solution he advocated was remarkable in its simplicity, revolutionary in its potential impact. "It is merely necessary," declared George, "to divert the rent which now flows into the pockets of the landlords into the common treasury of the whole people."[22]

In an atmosphere of republican government, there seemed to George to be good reason for optimism that constructive reform could be achieved without dramatic upheaval. The century long flirtation with laissez-faire and, more recently, with Social-Darwinism, that allowed industrial landlordism to blossom was under serious attack from individuals sincerely concerned with the harsh conditions under which the majority of individuals lived. Reform-minded civic leaders and social scientists were about to usher in the Progressive era in the United States and Fabian Socialism in Britain. George was initially categorized both by supporters and opponents as a Socialist and, because of his strong advocacy of Irish home rule, a revolutionary. George's gradualist and democratic principles eventually convinced even opponents that he was among the vanguard of what would become a more moderate reform movement. However, as George Bernard Shaw intimated, George had shown British socialists that radical ideas could be introduced into the political debate and placed on the agenda of public opinion.

One result of George's activism in the British Isles was that both the Liberal and Labour Parties incorporated into their platforms his call for a tax on land values. Very few leaders of Britain's political parties accepted, however, George's charge that the system of land tenure was the primary cause of poverty and of recurring recessions. By this time they had lived too long under the grip of industrial landlordism to separate the ownership of capital from that of land, or legitimate returns to capital from returns accruing to monopoly privileges.

Among those in Britain most influenced by George's reform message was Joseph Chamberlain, who subsequently authored and pushed for much of the Radical Programme that made its way into the mainstream of British politics. Yet, even Chamberlain could not accept George's overall analysis of the fundamental causes of the problems experienced by people in an industrial society. "That the masses have not benefited, as it might be hoped they would," wrote Chamberlain, "by the extraordinary prosperity of the last half century is true enough; but that the whole of the increase of wealth during this period has gone into the pockets of the land owners is conspicuously false."[23] What Chamberlain and others failed to distinguish was George's emphasis on tendency and the combination of power and wealth inherent to the system of industrial landlordism. The very fact that land prices had risen to extraordinary heights supported George's scientific analysis of the laws of production and distribution. Technological advances had resulted in productivity gains that dwarfed any expectations of what earlier generations thought possible, so that the total amount of wealth produced and in existence outpaced the advance of rent. Rent, nonetheless, represented a vast privately-appropriated portion of this wealth. This was one reason why Chamberlain and other sincere reformers had difficulty with George's argument that the owners of capital were legitimate producers and should be freed from taxation.

In what seemed to be another anomaly of industrial landlordism, individuals with certain crucial skills fared much better than the average worker. George had, of course, written at length on the market dynamics that favored those with superior skills, abilities or knowledge. Nor did the growing power of trades unions to limit wage competition, thereby improving the bargaining power of their members, obviate the tendency of wages to fall as rent rises.

One prominent Englishman whose early writings on political economy come virtually unchanged from the analysis of Henry George, was Winston Churchill. In a political tract entitled The People's Rights, Churchill boldly stated the proposition:

Land differs from all other forms of property. It is quite true that the land monopoly is not the only monopoly which exists, but it is by far the greatest of monopolies -- it is a perpetual monopoly, and it is the mother of all other forms of monopoly. It is quite true that unearned increments in land are not the only form of unearned or undeserved profit which individuals are able to secure; but it is the principal form of unearned increment which is derived from processes which are not merely not beneficial, but which are positively detrimental to the general public. Land, which is a necessity of human existence, which is the original source of all wealth, which is strictly limited in extent, which is fixed in geographical position -- land, I say, differs from all other forms of property in these primary and fundamental conditions.[24]

What Churchill would learn, of course, was that to wage war against privilege and long-established traditions was an uphill climb that demanded much. Opposition was everywhere vehement and well-organized. In the end, even Churchill's energy faded in the face of repeated crises and external threats to the British empire. Justice took a back to seat to expediency on the agenda of political priorities in Britain, and elsewhere. He abandoned the movement for real reform and accepted the program of Liberalism as inevitable.

Home Rule (and Liberty?) for Ireland

The agitation among Irish nationalists for control over their own political destiny and to rid Ireland of absentee English landowners met stiff resistance from conservatives in the British Parliament, many of whom had long benefited by existing arrangements. The question the Irish nationalists had to resolve was how hard to press and in what directions. The strategy they chose is described by Thomas W. Heyck:

If the British would not let the Irish govern Ireland, then the Irish M.P.'s would not let the British govern Britain. The obstructives would impede the progress of all bills without regard to their content.[25]

By 1886 the pressure on Gladstone, the Prime Minister, and the government finally resulted in the introduction of two bills before the House of Commons. One provided for Irish home rule and the other for the purchase of land from English landowners, to be resold to Irish citizens. These two bills failed to pass this time and again in 1893. A decade later, however, Parliament approved funds for the purchase of landholdings in Ireland that were then sold back to tenants on the former estates. The next step toward home rule occurred in 1911 with the elimination of the Lords' veto power over acts passed by the Commons. Finally, in 1913, a home rule bill for Ireland (excepting Ulster) was passed by the Commons.

The implementation of home rule was delayed by the First World War. Then, in 1920 the partition of Ireland was completed; and, in 1922 the Republic of Ireland became an equal member of the British Commonwealth. In the north, the nationalist (and Catholic) minority refused to accept a permanent separation of Ireland into two republics that left an English (and Protestant) majority dominant. For the majority of Irish, however, creation of the Republic seemed to be what they hoped for -- the restoration of liberty. What the Irish nationalists failed to grasp was that neither independence, nor representative government, by themselves constituted a just system of socio-political arrangements and institutions. Their society also needed to secure equality of opportunity; and that, according to Henry George, required a restructuring of the tax system to ensure that landowners began to pull their weight.

Viewed more sympathetically, the struggle for Irish independence was long and violent. Gradually, pressures exerted by public opinion and by individuals who recognized the injustices perpetrated by the British government in the name of empire ripened into a political movement that could no longer be ignored. The possibility of making Ireland a more equitable society existed only after the citizenry gained full control over their political institutions. Also, the Irish struggle must be viewed in the context of the larger twentieth century struggle against colonialism. The First World War signalled an approaching end to the era of empires and to the re-establishment of small, sovereign nation-states. The extent of land monopoly that continues to plague Ireland is revealed by Raymond Crotty, whose research indicates that approximately fifty percent of all land in the Republic is owned by one percent of the population, while over ninety percent own no land at all (residential land included).[26] Neither political independence, the revolution in technology and communications, nor massive social spending by government has materially altered the distribution of wealth among Irish citizens. The unfortunate reality is that most of the laws and regulations enacted in this century have thwarted the production of wealth by protecting a privileged class of rent-seekers in much the same way as colonialism protected absentee landlords. "Ireland is distinguished from the other countries of the Third World," writes Crotty, "apart from its European location, in the intensity and singlemindedness of the pursuit of profit from the property in land that was created by the colonial power. That was made possible initially by the uninhibited application of colonial force, and subsequently for the past 140 years by the removal of opposition through the emigration of almost every second person born in Ireland and surviving childhood."[27]

The statistics also reveal that the British population suffers from a similar concentration of wealth, income and purchasing power. The introduction of social welfare legislation, increasingly heavy taxation of individual and personal income, and the nationalization of industries were the policies pushed for by Liberals and Socialists alike during most of the this century. To the extent that Labor has held power, their policies have advanced these policies and tried to overcome dwindling production by financing social welfare with debt. For the last decade or so, the Conservative party has lessened the tax burden on the wealthy and on landed property as well, making a case that these policies would bring economic prosperity to all. For the most part, the fact that landed interests have escaped having to compensate society for the exchange value of titleholdings has brought only runaway land speculation and directed a tremendous windfall profit to those who sold land during this period. In late 1988, however, the land boom faltered, bringing down many financial institutions that had loaned money to real estate developers. A prolonged decline in business activity ensued that has left millions of workers unemployed, many of whom have lost their homes.

CONCLUSIONS

Ireland presents the interesting anomaly of a nation governed under principles of participatory democracy while showing a concentration of wealth ownership and income more characteristic of Third World societies. The Irish share a history similar in many respects to that of other Third World peoples who have gained political independence from colonial rule. Their economic advance should have been greater with the expulsion of absentee landowners; however, as Crotty's research has shown, the Irish merely assigned to a few of their own the benefits of privilege previously enjoyed by a small number of English overlords. One result has been the continued migration of the Irish to other countries in search of opportunity; a second result has been the continued impoverishment of many who remain.

There continues to be great confusion among economists and policymakers who profess to understand how market-oriented systems operate. In the late 1970s the global economy came dangerously close to a prolonged crash, brought on by a combination of fiscal and monetary irresponsibility, confiscatory taxation on productive activity and a continued failure by government to capture the rental value of nature (allowing this value to be capitalized into higher and higher land prices). A response, of sorts, appeared in the form of a shift in policies toward the supply-side, emphasizing deregulation of industry, reductions in the tax on so-called capital gains and in the marginal rates of taxation imposed on high individual and business income. Another element in this policy shift has been the gradual lifting of barriers to trade and foreign ownership of assets in many countries. To the extent a general observation is possible, the net result of these actions has been to drive the wedge deeper between the haves and the have nots throughout the world and even within the most prosperous of the social-democracies.

An important objective of this paper has been to present the experience of the Irish people in a way that reveals the fundamental reasons why independence and participatory government have failed to significantly lift their standard of well-being. The principles at work were clearly presented by Henry George at the end of the last century. Unfortunately, the reforms he espoused were not incorporated into the Irish nationalist program. Long before even George, however, the conservative British statesman Edmund Burke recognized the source of Ireland's problem, writing that "[t]he cheapness of labor in Ireland gave her no advantage, for experience every day showed that where labor was dearest the manufacturer was able to sell at the lowest price." [28] Burke may not have realized the importance of his observation; few others did or even make the connection today. What makes this difficult for some to see is that in the developed world there is a false sense that a landed class no longer exists, or that control over nature is no longer an important element in the global economy. The case of Ireland should give us all reason to pause and subject these conventional wisdoms to critical analysis.

FOOTNOTES

1. Author's Note: I use the term "American" becaase of the common acceptance of its usage; namely, the civilization dominated by individuals of European heritage in that portion of North America now comprising the United States. The extent to which this civilization is even now truly pluralistic is subject to considerable debate. For most of the last three centuries, not only where the indigenous people (i.e., the pre-Columbians) but Africans, Asians and many Eurasians systematically denied the exersie of their human rights.
2. Henry George, Jr. The Life Of Henry George (New York: Robert Schalkenbach Foundation, 1960 edition. Originally published 1900), pp.178-179.
3. Henry George. The Science Of Political Economy (New York: Robert Schalkenbach Foundation edition, 1968. Originally published 1897), pp.86-88.
4. Henry George. Progress and Poverty (New York: Robert Schalkenbach Foundation edition, 1975. Originally published 1879), p.166.
5. Author's Note: Reference is made by Steven Cord to Jackson's familiarity with the works of Henry George. See: Steven Cord. Henry George, Dreamer Or Realist? (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1965), pp.74-76.
6. Author's Note: The arrangements between workers and factory owners took a number of forms. At one extreme, all the material needs of the workers were provided and a small amount of discretionary income awarded. In other instances, employees would be paid in coinage for in paper currency redeemable with local merchants.
7. Henry George. Progress and Poverty, p.328.
8. Ibid., p.405.
9. Author's Note: See the Complete Works of Leo Tolstoi (New York: Carlton House, 1928), pp.346-352, for a discussion of his interest in George's ideas.
10. George Bernard Shaw. Everybody's Political What's What? (New York: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1945), pp.15-16.
11. Edmund Curtis. A History of Ireland (London: Methuen & Co., Ltd., sixth edition, 1950. Originally published 1936), p.2.
12. Murrary N. Rothbard. For A New Liberty (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1973), p.239.
13. Edmund Curtis. A History of Ireland, pp.49-50.
14. G.M. Trevelyan. History of England, Vol.I (Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Company, third edition, 1952), p.269.
15. G.M. Trevelyan. History of England, Vol.I, p.272.
16. Quoted in: Francis Neilson. Modern Man And The Liberal Arts (New York: Robert Schalkenbach Foundation, 1947), p.112.
17. Adam Smith. The Wealth of Nations (New York: Random House edition, 1937. Originally published 1776), p.674.
18. Ibid., p.65.
19. See: John W. Osborne. The Silent Revolution (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1970), pp.33-34.
20. Ibid., p.204.
21. Henry George. The Land Question (New York: Robert Schalkenbach Foundation edition, 1935. Originally published 1881), p.8.
22. Ibid., p.53.
23. Elwood P. Lawrence. Henry George In The British Isles (East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University Press, 1957), p.92.
24. Winston S. Churchill. The People's Rights (London: Jonathan Cape edition, 1970. Originally published 1909), p.117.
25. Thomas W. Heyck. The Dimensions Of British Radicalism, The Case Of Ireland 1874-95 (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1974), p.33.
26. See: Raymond Crotty: "The Irish Land Question and Sectarian Violence," Centenary Essays, No.4 (Essex, England: Economic and Social Science Research Association, 1981), p.6.
27. Raymond Crotty. "Bourgeois Distress: Modernization of Ireland Continued." Land and Liberty, Vol. XCIII (London, July-August 1987), p.63.
28. Quoted in: Maurice R. O'Connell. Irish Politics And Social Conflict In The Age Of The American Revolution (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1965), p.57.