

10 DIASPORA

... *e terra quoniam sunt cuncta creata*

Lucretius, *De Rerum Natura*, v, 796

... Out of land, indeed, all things are created.

At the outbreak of war, the leading statesmen on both sides of the House tried to set the land question, and most other matters not directly related to the war itself, into political cold storage. Some backbench land-taxers argued that their long-sought reform would provide a great source of revenue for wartime purposes; but they were unable to persuade either Government or Parliament that it was expedient to tackle the question immediately. Some opponents of land-taxing, like Sir Frederick Banbury, Conservative MP for the City of London, argued that land valuation should be stopped in order that the valuation staff might be used elsewhere. They also failed to carry their point; although in practice the people employed on that work were largely dispersed. At the beginning of the war, 4,760 men had been valuing land for taxation purposes; by November 1915 (when conscription had not yet been introduced), 2,600 had been dismissed, and 1,000 had enlisted.¹ Some important wartime measures related to the land question. An Act of 1915 commenced the state control of rents and mortgages of dwelling houses. This provided a precedent on which was founded a large bulk of postwar legislation, which has been adapted and continued right to our own time. Early in 1917, another precedent was established, with the introduction of minimum agricultural prices to stimulate food production.

Yet the war proved profoundly damaging to the land-taxers' cause. In August 1914, C. P. Trevelyan was the only more or less "orthodox" land-taxer in the Government. He resigned in protest against Britain's participation in the war. Among the backbench land-taxers, J. C. Wedgwood was for a moment inclined to take the same view; but then he had second thoughts — won a naval DSO and later served on Smuts's staff in the army. His colleague in the neighbouring constituency of Hanley was the no less enthusiastic land-taxer, R. L. Outhwaite, who took a pacifist

attitude throughout the conflict. The most senior men of the pre-war Government, Asquith and Lloyd George, had both earned the sincere gratitude of the land reformers; but before the war came to an end they found themselves leading opposite sides of the House — for reasons which had nothing to do with the ordinary issues of domestic politics, and less to do with the conduct of the war itself than people once imagined.

Thus, almost by accident, the men who in different ways had been advancing the cause of land reform found themselves not merely dispersed, but also associated with other politicians whose aspirations were quite different from their own. By the closing stages of the war, Lloyd George was Prime Minister, and was heading a government in which Conservatives preponderated over all other groups combined. Those Liberals who sat with Lloyd George included some noted land-taxers, but also other people who in the old days had done what lay in their power to damp their party's enthusiasm for land reform. Exactly the same could be said of the Liberals who sat with Asquith. Meanwhile, men like Outhwaite and Trevelyan found themselves co-operating closely with pacifist socialists who belonged to the ILP.

As the war moved towards its end, the official organs of the Liberal and Labour Parties seem very largely to have assumed that politics would revert essentially to what they had been before the war. The Labour Party had acquired new policies; but on the familiar "land problem" both of the two Parties continued to talk the old language. The Labour Conference of January 1918 and the National Liberal Federation's Conference of September, both declared in favour of land value taxation — in terms, no doubt, which offended some purists,² but not in terms which differed noticeably from those which had been used before the war. What neither Party seems to have contemplated was that the circumstances in which the next election would be fought would bear no relation to those which had prevailed in the past.

The enforced national unity of wartime produced some real sympathy between social classes which had not existed before; and it would be quite wrong to regard this phenomenon too cynically. A great landowner, the Earl of Dartmouth, wrote to Wedgwood in 1916, expressing a view which was widespread among his class. National reconstruction, in Dartmouth's view, must follow the war. It would mean ". . . sacrifices of some kind from us all, but as it is inconceivable that after all that has

passed we should go back to the old extremes of wealth and poverty, the old suspicion and prejudice, the continual warfare between class and class, employer and employed — it means, especially, that those who have most will have to make the largest sacrifices . . .”³ Rather in this spirit, the Cabinet had given early consideration to the special problems of returning ex-servicemen, some of whom would certainly desire to acquire land. Lloyd George’s Minister of Agriculture was a Unionist, R. E. Prothero (later Lord Ernle). Prothero’s first view was that a private approach to great landowners would produce most of the land required; but he later modified this opinion, and concluded that some compulsion would be necessary.⁴ The Cabinet decided, in May 1918, to set up a politically mixed committee, under the Chairmanship of the Home Secretary — another Unionist, Lord Cave. With some prodding, the Cave Committee began to prepare recommendations which — in the view of one of its Liberal members — were “fairly thoroughgoing — indeed revolutionary — when you consider who has approved them”.⁵

The war ended with unexpected abruptness while the Cave Committee was still sitting. Within a day or so of the Armistice, the Government announced that a General Election would take place in the following month, December 1918, and that the Coalition would remain together to contest that election as a united body. The Labour Party declared that it would withdraw from the Government and make an independent appeal to the nation. A week or so later, the Government published the names of the candidates who would be receiving its official support. The great majority of the Unionist candidates was included, but rather less than half of the Liberals. Those Liberals who were to receive the Coalition’s blessing did not include Asquith — still the official leader of the Party — nor his closest political associates.

On land questions, neither the Government parties nor those Liberals who stood outside could make any very definite pronouncements. The Coalition was inhibited by the fact that the Cave Committee was still sitting. The Committee’s initial report was considered by the Cabinet ten days after the Armistice — by which time the General Election was already in full swing. The recommendations did not go far enough to satisfy the Cabinet,⁶ and the Government was not able to finalise its proposals before polling day. The broad lines of thought, however, were fairly clear, and the Government’s election manifesto promised State provi-

sion for smallholdings, allotments and cottage plots for ex-servicemen, with equipment and credit on easy terms to assist them in stocking the land. The Liberal leaders could neither endorse the Coalition's programme — for many Liberals were being opposed by Government nominees — nor set forward their own policies in opposition to those of the Coalition — for many other Liberals were receiving Government support. In land policies, as on other matters, the pronouncements of the official organs of the Liberal Party were designed rather to minimise friction among the Liberals than to present a clear policy to the nation.

The Coalition won an enormous majority. The Unionists were not only by far the largest element within that Coalition, but they also formed an absolute majority of the House of Commons. The results were an unqualified disaster to the land-taxers not only because most of the Government supporters were hostile to their cause, but also because no alternative administration could be discerned on the Opposition side of the House where land-taxers had any real influence. Asquith, and every one of his principal associates, had been wiped out. The total contingent of Liberals elected without Government support was around thirty. The Labour group mustered fifty-seven; but nobody could fairly describe those men as the most luminous members of their Party.

The fate of individual land-taxers at that election is but illustrative of the general confusion. *Land Values*, organ of the enthusiasts, listed fourteen men who had sat in the old House, whom it regarded as "prominently associated with the taxation of land values". Four received Government support, and of these three were elected. Eight stood as official Liberals without Government support, and of them five were elected. One was defeated standing as an Independent Liberal; one standing as an Independent. *Land Values* also evinced special interest in the fate of eleven other candidates who had not sat in the old House. Three were elected: one each as a Coalition Liberal, a Liberal without Coalition support and a Labour man. Four who stood as non-Coalition Liberals were defeated; four who stood in the Labour interest were also defeated.

Some of the land-taxing candidates had illuminating experiences. Wedgwood, in Newcastle-under-Lyme, made it quite clear that he had no confidence in the Government, and refused to commit himself to any Party — describing himself as an

“Independent Radical”. His status as a “war hero” probably played a large part in persuading both Unionist and Labour Parties not to oppose his candidature. The Coalition gave him its official support — support which not only was unsolicited, but was formally repudiated. His neighbour Outhwaite discovered that official Government support was given to an opponent from the mushroom National Democratic Party, and that the other candidates ranged against him including both a Liberal and a Labour man. The experience of Trevelyan in Elland was rather similar, although in his case the recipient of official Government support was a Unionist. P. W. Raffan, MP for Leigh, was also a strong land-taxer. He was too old to be a war hero, but he was not a pacifist either; while his statements about the Coalition were a good deal more pointed and hostile than those of Asquith himself. Yet Raffan received official Government support, and was elected. J. Dundas White, a land-taxing enthusiast of similar views but perhaps greater eminence, found that the Coalition was backing his Unionist opponent in Glasgow, and was defeated. Arthur Ponsonby, son of Queen Victoria’s famous Private Secretary, was a land-taxer who had taken a pacifist line during the war. Coalition opposition was inevitable in his seat of Dunfermline; but in this case the opponent who received Government support was not only a Liberal but a noted land-taxer as well. As the Coalition Liberal was elected, the land-taxing cause in that constituency may have suffered no harm.

It soon became apparent that the situation was even worse than had originally appeared, for the relationships between the political groups in which the various land-taxers found themselves grew steadily worse. Coalition and non-Coalition Liberals very soon came to regard each other as deadly enemies. The differences between Labour and Liberal in the old Parliament had sometimes been little more than nominal; from 1918 onwards the gap between Labour and the Liberals in either group became wider and wider.

In none of the three bodies were the land-taxers dominant. From a purely numerical point of view, they might be expected to have most effect upon the non-Coalition Liberals, for six of that small band were noted land-taxers. Yet what was their influence worth, when none of the leading figures of the Party had managed to get into the House? The centre of gravity of the so-called “Asquithians” lay outside the walls of Parliament and

not within; and relations between the MPs and the leadership outside the House were often far from affable.

The effectiveness of the land-taxers before the war had turned on a remarkable relationship. There was an informed electorate, whose attention had been focused again and again on questions relating to land, and who understood the main arguments. There was a substantial group of really ardent, hot-gossiping land-taxers in the House of Commons, the great majority of them within the Liberal Party. The bulk of the Government MPs, and most of the members of the Government itself, were by no means dogmatic Single Taxers; but they were not hostile in principle to any proposals for immediate action which the extremists were likely to raise. As political realists, the Government leaders and most of the Liberal MPs had been very conscious that land reform was a popular cause among the voters.

Now, at the close of 1918, all of this had gone. Most of the voters had never been involved in the old controversies; those who had been involved had had their minds deflected to other things for four terrible years.

That faith which the informed land-taxers had once had in the Liberal leadership was largely shattered. Lloyd George was a prisoner of the Unionists — although, to a degree, they were his prisoners as well. Asquith was already in his late sixties, and showing many signs of age. His energy returned in fits and starts; but it took some considerable time before he was again able to give much of a lead to Liberals, and there was certainly no evident successor among those who followed him.

Perhaps in despair, perhaps in hope, the land-taxers began to drift towards the Labour Party. Not only had Labour twice as many MPs as the Asquithian Liberals, but they had a substantial and growing electoral support, backed by massive funds. True, they had recently committed themselves to a policy in which Fabian socialism loomed much larger than land-taxing; yet it was still far from certain which of their various policies would receive principal emphasis in future. To many land-taxers, it must have seemed that the Labour Party could hardly fail to be influenced if a band of educated and informed enthusiasts, who mustered between them a very impressive record of Parliamentary experience, should decide to join it. The natural route into the Labour Party for men of middle-class origin was through the ILP, and this route was particularly attractive to those who had

been pacifists during the war, for they had already formed close ILP contacts.

Outhwaite was the first to go. Almost immediately after the election, he and most of his election workers constituted themselves the Hanley ILP. Very soon Trevelyan followed in the same direction. Wedgwood, in spite of the anomalous circumstances of his election, was at first disposed to work with the Asquithians. Yet when he heard Asquith speak a few weeks later, and discovered that "taxation and rating of land values and a levy on capital occupy no place in the Liberal leader's programme", Wedgwood decided that there was no place for him in the Liberal Party, and proceeded to join the ILP. A few months later, Wedgwood was followed by Dundas White, and soon by yet another former MP who had rendered conspicuous service in the past, E. G. Hemmerde. Thus, by the later part of 1919, quite a substantial group of former Liberal MPs with land-taxing proclivities had accumulated in the Labour Party.

Most of them were very far from uncritical of their new associates. Trevelyan, who found the ILP "quite enormously the most congenial organisation I have ever worked with" was the most ecstatic; but even he was driven to observe that when Labour contrived to "get hold of the government", they would "probably . . . make a horrid mess of it".⁷

Nor was the Labour Party disposed to welcome these converts with open arms. Wedgwood could hardly be deterred from joining the ILP, but admission to the Parliamentary Labour Party was a very different matter. The Labour Party's Joint Parliamentary Sub-Committee recommended that his application should be refused. Later, the Executive Committee reversed this decision, and he was allowed to join; but the reversal was far from unanimous.⁸ Others had comparable experiences. Ponsonby wrote of the Labour Party that: "So long as Adamson & Co. lead them I do not see much hope. I am afraid that our gang is not at all popular with the officials. They have just turned me down for consideration in Dunfermline (my old constituency) and chosen the miners' nominee."⁹

Some of these land-taxers who had once sat as Liberals did find their way back to Parliament eventually under the Labour aegis; but a considerable number never did so. Whether Labour doubted the sincerity of their conversion, or was jealous of their ability, is difficult to discover.

A few land-taxers — of whom Outhwaite is the most famous — found the discipline or compromises of political life within the Labour Party intolerable, and departed to form a new organisation, which eventually became known as the Commonwealth Land Party, which was designed to preach land reform in its purest form. Organisations without substantial financial backing seldom have much success in British politics, and the Commonwealth Land Party was no exception. Two candidates were fielded in Stoke-on-Trent in 1931; both fared disastrously.

In the period immediately after the war, some agonising confrontations between land-taxers in different Parties were inevitable. At the Rusholme (Manchester) by-election of October 1919, a Unionist seat was attacked by both Liberals and Labour, and both of those candidates were land-taxers. Outhwaite and Wedgwood gave public support to Dr Dunstan, the Labour man; P. W. Raffan gave no less public support to W. M. R. Pringle, the Liberal.¹⁰ The situation looked even worse when the Unionist was returned on a minority vote.

A very different position arose in the confused, but important, Spen Valley by-election at the close of 1919. Sir John Simon, the Liberal candidate, contrived to omit all reference to land taxing from his election address; while the Labour man who defeated him gave the matter some prominence.

A few months later, Asquith himself was the Liberal candidate at the even more important contest in Paisley; and the situation was different again. Asquith was by no means unfriendly to the land-taxers — while the Labour man's statements, at least at the beginning of the campaign, were positively hostile. Yet this did not deter such staunch land-taxers as Wedgwood, Outhwaite and Trevelyan from sending messages of support to the Labour candidate.

The difficulties which faced the Government itself were no less profound than those of the Opposition. At first, all seemed to be comparatively plain sailing. Prothero, Minister of Agriculture, wrote to Lloyd George that: "Land settlement for ex-Service men is a national duty, and the State must be prepared to bear a considerable part of the initial cost."¹¹

No political group would dare dispute that proposition. In Prothero's view, the main demand for land would come from demobilised ex-farm labourers. He recommended a Land Settlement Bill in order to meet it. This would not make radical changes

in the substantive law, but would introduce considerable administrative streamlining. Prothero's Bill was approved by the Cabinet in March 1919, and passed into law without much difficulty later in the year. The responsibility for building houses on smallholdings was passed to the County Councils. Preference would be given to ex-Service men, but the scheme would not be limited to them. This measure was accompanied by a parallel Act for Scotland. Unfortunately the schemes soon encountered trouble through the rising cost of cottage building, and in the middle of 1920 County Councils were officially urged to cease buying un-equipped land for settlement where houses could only be provided "after long delay and at unreasonable cost".¹²

While the Land Settlement Bill was being considered by the Cabinet and Parliament, attention was also given to the more general question of compensation for land which had been acquired under compulsory powers. Early in March 1919, a committee was set up by the Cabinet under the Lord Chancellor, Lord Birkenhead, to examine the question.¹³ The first report appeared within a fortnight; but Lloyd George's reaction was positively sulphurous: "I have received the report of your Committee on the Land Acquisition Bill with profound disappointment. The Bill was supposed to be one to facilitate acquisition of land for most urgent public purposes, speedily and at a fair price. It has been transformed into a Bill which will be represented as making sure the landlord gets a good price, that the lawyers get their pickings, and that there should be no undue hurry in completion of the transaction . . ."¹⁴

The public, who knew Birkenhead for his arrogance and rather cruel wit, would have been fascinated to read his grovelling reply: "I have called the Committee together again tonight . . . I have no doubt that they will arrive at conclusions satisfactory to you. I can only add that if I had been at the original Cabinet, and had the slightest means of understanding what your views were, and the grounds upon which they rested, the difficulty, such as it is, would never have arisen . . ."¹⁵

This particular exchange by no means ended the political machinations over the Government's land compensation proposals. A Parliamentary Bill appeared in April 1919. This proposed the establishment of a tribunal to assess compensation when land was compulsorily acquired, and laid down rules to govern its operation and procedure.

There was much playing to the political gallery. In his correspondence with Birkenhead, Lloyd George had urged the Government's sensational defeat at the West Leyton by-election (March 1919) as evidence for the need for drastic proposals. When the Bill appeared, the Coalition Liberals decided to occupy the front Opposition bench, in order to give the Government support from that unwonted quarter, and to undermine the authority of Sir Donald Maclean, who was leading the Opposition Liberals during Asquith's absence from the House. The non-Government Liberals' main criticism of the Bill was that it proposed an *ad hoc* system of valuation, instead of using the existing land valuation records as the basis of compensation.

Inevitably, the Bill was carried in the form which the Government desired; but an interesting and important point had been raised. If the land valuation which had been accumulated over so many weary years was of no use in fixing compensation — and, instead, a new and expensive device was required for that process — then could the valuation be of much use as a basis for taxation — or, indeed, for anything else? It was by no means surprising that a problem of this kind should arise. Land values had been rising rapidly in relation to other commodity values; and it was even less realistic to use the pre-war land valuation as a basis for compensation or taxation than to use pre-war assessments of (say) personal property, or income.

Five days after Maclean's criticisms were first aired in the House of Commons, the Cabinet decided that a Select Committee should be appointed to examine the land value duties, and the whole system of valuation.¹⁶ Unfortunately, the terms of reference of the Select Committee were ambiguous. The Liberal land-taxer P. W. Raffan, and the Labour MPs who sat on the Committee, wished to submit new proposals for land-taxing. The Chairman ruled them out of order, and was upheld by the officials of the House of Commons. Raffan and the Labour men threatened to withdraw unless they were allowed to raise these proposals; while the Unionist E. G. Pretyman, and some other members of the Committee, retorted by threatening to resign themselves if the proposals were made. The question was brought before the Cabinet, who tried but failed to achieve a compromise. The Select Committee thereupon broke up, having failed to agree on its terms of reference, much less its recommendations.¹⁷

It is not difficult to guess the nub of the dispute. The members

of the Committee probably agreed that the existing duties were more or less useless; the operative question was whether they should be replaced by a thoroughgoing system of land value taxation, serviced by frequent revisions of the land valuation — or whether they should be abandoned altogether.

Soon after the Select Committee collapsed, but before the Government had taken any further action on the matter, a somewhat extraordinary resolution was carried by the National Unionist Association, chief organ of “grass-roots” Conservatism, who declared that they “regard(ed) with alarm the persistent propaganda carried on by the Labour Party and others in favour of the Nationalisation of land and industries, and desire(d) a clear declaration by the Prime Minister and Mr Bonar Law of their determined opposition to this policy”.¹⁸

It was, of course, in no way surprising that the Unionists should oppose nationalisation, whether of land or anything else; but why did the National Unionist Association seek to raise the question in such a form at that time? At least one very important Conservative saw the resolution as “a subtle move to create an atmosphere of hostility and discontent in the rank and file of the Party”.¹⁹

The resolution may also have been prompted by a desire to force the Government to give tangible proof of its “trustworthiness” — from the Conservative point of view — on the land question. If that was the object, the proof soon appeared.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer in the Coalition Government was Austen Chamberlain, the second man to Bonar Law in the Unionist hierarchy. In his Budget of April 1920, Chamberlain proposed to abolish both the existing land value duties and the whole valuation system. What caught the public interest most about the situation was that Lloyd George, who had introduced the land taxes and valuation in 1909, was now presiding over the Government which recommended their abolition. To the Unionist opponents of land-taxing, this confirmed their view that the whole notion had been useless from the start; while the land-taxers tended to interpret it as further evidence that Lloyd George had sold the pass to every enemy of radical thought and practice.

The Government’s argument was simple, and superficially impressive. The duties were complicated and costly to administer, and their yield was slight. The valuation system existed to service the duties. Both, therefore, should be abolished.

All the old issues of 1909-10 were recalled. The land-taxers made it abundantly plain that they had supported the Lloyd George proposals before the war, not because they were enamoured of the particular duties which he proposed, but because they saw the Budget as the thin end of the wedge — as a means for securing a system of land valuation, which could later be used as the basis of a more rational, more simple and infinitely more effective system of land value taxation. In the course of the debate in Parliament, Asquith was able to throw important light both on the current arguments of the land-taxers and on the motives of the pre-1914 Liberal Government: “. . . I still believe, as my Chancellor of the Exchequer said in February 1914, in the necessity, first of all, of the valuation, and next, as a consequence of that valuation, and as a proper purpose to which it should be applied, the taxing for public purposes, both imperial and local, of the site value of land. Further it has always been to me one of the great recommendations of the valuation and taxation of land that land may be acquired by the community at the same rate and upon the same terms upon which it was taxed. The converse is even more true, that it should be taxed and rated at the same price at which the owner is willing to sell it to the community, when the community wants to purchase it. I have not changed my views upon that by a hair's breadth.”

Col. Wedgwood : I only regret that you did not do it while you were in power.

Mr Asquith : We were doing it; we were on the point of doing it, in the spring of 1914 — as I have shown in the passage I have quoted — by legislation. Then came the war in August of that year which made such legislation impossible . . .”

In the same debate, Chamberlain taunted Asquith with not having been “an early or an enthusiastic convert to the principle of these taxes”. To this Asquith was able to give a devastating reply by inviting the Chancellor “to apply to the Prime Minister and ask his views on that”.²⁰

Although yet again the Government could hardly fail to win in the division lobbies, it was remarkable how little support they received from the Coalition Liberals. The total contingent of the “Coalies” was about 130. The numbers voting in the various divisions was not always constant; but a representative sample was the division of 14 July 1920, on the motion to retain land value duties. Only eighteen Coalition Liberals supported the

Government; while thirteen of their number went into the Opposition lobbies with the "Asquithians" and Labour. Perhaps one may read some significance into the fact that all four of the Scottish Coalition Liberals who voted in the division opposed the Government, and so also did three of the five who sat for Lloyd George's own "pocket borough" of Wales. It was not wise for a putatively Liberal MP for a Celtic constituency to be seen as an enemy of land reform.

Thus in the course of 1920 it became abundantly clear that the Government could be regarded as a certain enemy of the land-taxers' cause, and that any hope for the taxation of land values must lie with the Opposition parties. The "Asquithian" Liberals were not hostile, and many of them were strong supporters; but, as time went on, the prospects of any substantial revival gradually receded. It was predictable that they would win some seats at the next General Election; but there was good reason for thinking that most of these would be in rural areas, far from the great population centres. What, then, of the Labour Party? As we have seen, a large proportion of the most prominent land-taxers had decamped to the Labour Party in the year or so which followed the Armistice. Yet there was little to suggest that the Labour Party would be likely to press the land question with the vigour which the enthusiasts desired. An assortment of Labour Party organisations at the national and local levels continued from time to time to issue statements which were designed to placate the land-taxers or the land nationalists or both. These statements are strongly reminiscent of a church congregation reciting the Apostles' Creed; many of the faithful probably did not understand what they were saying, and might not have agreed with it if they had. In any event, the political centre of gravity of the Labour Party was rapidly moving in a different direction. Right at the end of 1920, there was an enormous upswing in the unemployment figures. During the years which followed, the incidence of unemployment was far higher than it had been in even the worst years before the war. Land-taxers could — and did — argue that land-taxing was the long-term cure for unemployment;²¹ but the unemployed demanded some policy which seemed to offer quick returns. Thus the Labour Party gave more and more attention to such proposals as the Capital Levy and industrial nationalisation.

Throughout 1921 and most of 1922, the political tensions

within the Coalition grew greater and greater. At last, in October 1922, the Unionists followed Bonar Law's reluctant lead, broke the Government, and made their independent appeal to the electors. They won a comfortable overall majority. The Labour Party became, without argument, the second party of the State; while the Liberals were divided into two roughly equal groups, one giving nominal support to Asquith and the other to Lloyd George. Both among the "Asquithian" Liberals and among the Labour Party there were substantial bodies of noted land-taxers. It was claimed that no fewer than 126 MPs were "pledged to the taxation of land values".²² Of course this did not imply that they were all enthusiasts, or would give the matter any high degree of priority. In any case, the Government was an avowed enemy. Perhaps the most attractive feature of Bonar Law's administration, from the radicals' point of view, was its incurable lethargy. Such a government would do little positive damage, although it would certainly do no good.

Notes-10

- 1 *Land Values*, December 1915, p. 265.
- 2 See, for example, J. C. Wedgwood's letter, *Daily News*, 11 September 1918.
- 3 Earl of Dartmouth to Wedgwood, 11 October 1916. Wedgwood papers.
- 4 War Cabinet 412, 15 May 1918. CAB 23/6.
- 5 C. Addison to Lloyd George, 27 September 1918. LG(B) F/1/4/26.
- 6 War Cabinet 505, 21 November 1918; 508, 29 November 1918. CAB 23/8.
- 7 C. P. Trevelyan to Eleanor Acland, 24 May 1919. Acland papers.
- 8 LPEC: Joint Meeting of EC and PP, 4 June 1919; EC, 4 June 1919.
- 9 Ponsonby to Wedgwood, 28 October 1919. Wedgwood papers.
- 10 For land-taxers' reactions, see Minutes of Manchester Land Values League, 24 September 1919.
- 11 R. E. Prothero to Lloyd George, 21 January 1919. LG(B) F/15/8/50.
- 12 Cabinet Minutes C37(20)7, 24 June 1920. CAB 23/21.
- 13 War Cabinet 539, 3 March 1919. CAB 23/9.
- 14 Lloyd George to Birkenhead, 15 March 1919 (copy). LG(B) F/4/7/9.
- 15 Birkenhead to Lloyd George, 17 March 1919. LG(B) F/4/7/10.

- 16 War Cabinet 557, 16 April 1919. CAB 23/10.
- 17 Cabinet Minutes C11(19)2, 8 December 1919. CAB 23/18. House of Commons White Paper 243 of 1919; *Land and Liberty*, 1920, p. 330.
- 18 Resolution carried 10 February 1920.
- 19 Sir A. Salvidge to Bonar Law, 16 February 1920. BL 96/3.
- 20 131 House of Commons Debates 5S, cols. 2474, 2477, 14 July 1920.
- 21 This view had been argued long before the war — see, for example, Wedgwood's speech at Manchester Moss Side, *Manchester Guardian*, 14 January 1909. It continued to be argued long afterwards — see, for example, the summary in *Land and Liberty*, 1921, pp. 28-9, 65.
- 22 *Land and Liberty*, 1923, p. 2.