

CHAPTER II.

DEFINITIONS.

SECT. I.—DEFINITION OF MAN, AND JURAL EQUALITY OF THE INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS OF THE HUMAN RACE.

“ God, that made the world and all things therein,
hath made of one blood all nations of men.”—*Acts of the Apostles,*
17th chap.

WHILE the *science* of politics, as a formal development of true and necessary *thought*, is confined to the statement of one or two axioms, with the application of those axioms to the subjects of a few definitions, and to the logical deduction of certain consequences which follow independently of all will on the part of man, it must not be forgotten that the reality of politics is not a matter of logical deduction, but a vast reality of *action*. The problem to be solved is not *merely* whether a certain proposition be logically valid. This is the question for the student, who bends his intellect on the bare form of the truth expressed in language. As a student his only question is, “ Is this proposition true, or is it false ? ” The trueness or the falsity is the only end he has in view,—the ultimatum of his

labour, the final termination of his thought. On the other hand, when we turn to the *reality*, we are astounded with its vastness. The question then comes, clothed with realization—teeming with hot life—warm in the breath and blood of *men*. It is no longer the strict examination of a syllogism, but the investigation of a problem in which millions upon millions of sentient and rational beings are involved. It is no longer the mere study of a barren and fruitless truth, but of a truth that may spring into gigantic life and give birth to action which no calculation can compute. It is the question, “*What is the rule of life, with relation to each other, for these millions of rational beings associated upon earth?*”

Around us we behold the glorious universe of God, which to the ear of reason hymns its majestic praise, and overwhelms the soul with the beauty it unfolds. We gaze on stars that hold their perpetual habitation beyond the furthest reach of reason’s measurement, while within the measureable expanse we behold orbs that wing their way in a stable harmony of order. We look on earth, our moving home, that floats and circulates and returns according to her season. We look on matter, formless and dead as it may be from the abrasion of its parts, or shooting into forms that give us the first evidence of regularity. From the crystal we turn to the moss, and see matter creeping into life and beginning a system of function where part is necessary to part, and where the whole forms a *one*,—an individual that grows, and lives, and dies. From matter that merely lives and grows, and trans-

mits its species, we turn to matter that moves, and acts, and exhibits phenomena of conscious sensation. We run through the scale of animal organization, and last of all we find one that has no peer, that stands alone—incomparable—the crowning piece-work of earth's creation.

Such is the great field of nature. The space illimitable—the perpetual duration—the firmament with its orbs—the all-pervading air—the verdant earth—the unfettered ocean—the rock, the river, tree, shrub, and herb—the fish of the sea—the bird of the air—the beast of the field—and all the visible creation around us—the light and the darkness—the sunbeam and the shadow—the sound and the silence—the motion and the stillness—the eye that beholds, the ear that listens—the nerve that conveys to our spirit the reality of the world without:—these are nature; but are these all? If all that is mere matter were annihilated, would there remain—*nothing*? If it were so there could be no science of morals, nothing that could teach men their duty towards each other. With a godless Universe and a soulless Man, it is idle to speak of Duty. There might, indeed, be a summation of nervous emotions—a computation of pleasures and pains, but never could there possibly be any rule established why, if I chose, and have the power, I should not inflict pain, and do as I *will*, let the consequences to others be what they may. Nor need it be replied that those consequences will reflect upon myself in the shape of pain. This, in the first place, is not an invariable *fact*, and in the second, if it were

invariable, it is too minute to be comparable with the pain I inflict on others. I may say, as the man maddened with ambition and tempted with the possession of power virtually says, "I *accept* the pain, I take the consequences, be what they may, to myself." And so soon as I have triumphed over the shrinking frailties of my physical nature, and resolved to act my own will, though I should in the course of action be blown into ten thousand atoms, will it then be true that I have emancipated myself from every law of morals? And if it is *not* true, then is there something more than matter?

Is it indeed true that *will* is non-existent, and that we have lived to this age of the world only to learn that man is an aggregate of material atoms, ruled by the adamantine laws of fate; for such is the conclusion at which all systems must arrive which reason exclusively on the knowledge obtained through the senses? When Regulus returned to Carthage, or Cæsar crossed the Rubicon, was it a mere function of white and grey matter acted on by atmospheric and other material influences? And when the martyr Christians sung their songs of immortal aspiration, and departed, joyful that they were counted worthy to bear the reproach of their Lord, when they hymned their way to heaven amid the flames and agonies which their fellow-men had awarded as the due meed of their unworldly virtue, was it indeed a mere function of their carbonization, a mere effect produced on matter by the physical circumstances in which that matter was placed? To this conclusion a physical theory of

the universe *necessarily* brings us. Strange that it should be possible for man so to mistake his nature and his destiny !

So far from the *material* universe being the most important object with which man is acquainted, we maintain that, in this nether world, man himself is incomparably the highest object that comes within the limit of our knowledge. *Mind* is the true reality. Divest the world of human mind, and you have left it irrational, impelled by the laws of mechanics, electricity, chemistry, vegetable life, and animal instinct. You have robbed it of its fairest inheritance and blotted out its jewel. You have robbed it of its soul, and left a mere aggregation of atoms to function according to the laws of irrational determination. Within the sphere of thought and of natural appreciation there is nothing comparable to mind. Mind peoples the earth with spirit, and links it with that world after which the hopes of man are ever going forth. Mind is the substance of reason and volition ; matter is only the substance of resistance, form, and colour. Mind knows, wills, and originates its actions ; matter knows nothing, wills nothing, and obeys in blind unconsciousness. If we could only break through the crust of our physical sensations, and emancipate ourselves from the influence of sense ; if we could weigh the world, and have present to our appreciation, at one and the same instant, every atom of which it is composed, every phenomenon it is capable of manifesting, and every reality it contains, we should see that mind, human mind, was incomparably

the most glorious (all fallen as it is), incomparably the most important, and incomparably the most valuable of all the created substantives that come within the limits of our knowledge.

Politics, then, in its dogma is the definite statement of the relations of men in equity; and in its reality is the expression of the rule of life for all the millions of men who inhabit the globe, so far as their actions affect their social relations. In so far as the pure dogma is laid before the spiritual *mind*, the science is abstract; in its actual reduction to real action, it is concrete. Were the mind a *disembodied* spirit, the *duty* would still remain—the law of the volitions, affections, and desires. But as the spirit is embodied, and men are not only capable of desiring, but of executing acts of justice and injustice, and of inflicting pain upon their fellows, the duty becomes a *rule of life*, founded on a dogma deduced from the primary and underived axioms of the reason. The mere body is not the man, neither is the mere mind the man. The man is the mind embodied. But so far as the dogma is concerned, the intelligent mind is that which it addresses, while the mind that wills and determines its actions is that which receives its *rational law*.

Politics, then, is the development of the rational law which should determine human volition and human action, so far as mutual interference is concerned.* It gives the moral law primarily to human

* Politics in its definition is the science of equity; in its description, the knowledge of the rational law which ought to

volition, and consequently to human action. But volition requires an impulsion as well as a law of regulation, and the dogma is not the *cause* of action, but the *reason for acting in one mode rather than another*.

We have not, therefore, the elements of a definition of man so far as is requisite to a science of politics. Man is a conscious being capable of acting voluntarily, endowed with various emotional sentiments (among which is that of equity or justice), and endowed with a reason or intellect which enables him to comprehend not only relations of number, quantity, extent, direction, &c., but relations of *equity*. The will *acts*, the emotional desire furnishes the *cause* of action; but inasmuch as the intellect furnishes the moral law of the action, and the conscious being may choose between two different courses, the man is morally guilty or morally innocent according to whether he acts in accordance with the law of the reason, or acts merely according as he is impelled by passion.* The law of the reason is imposed on man, not in any such mode as

regulate the active will of men so far as mutual interference is concerned. It may otherwise be expressed the science of those mutual *duties* which are universally obligatory *and which may at all times be justly enforced*.

* The "freedom" of the will, or its "non-freedom," may depend very much on the point of view from which we survey the mental operations. Both are true in one sense, both false in another sense. But the sense in which one is true, is the sense in which the other is false, and *vice versa*. Let us take an illustration. A ship is on the open sea and a north wind is blowing. The ship is necessarily constrained to move. Do what the mariners will the ship will move. If we view the ship from the *point of view of the wind*, we affirm that it is subject to the law of necessity. Let us now turn to the mariners and the helm.

shall necessarily determine him to act in any particular direction, for in that case it would be a law of instinct and not a law of *reason*; but in such a mode as shall necessarily convince him that he *ought* to act in a particular direction, whether he does so act or not. All men exhibit the *sentiment* of equity; but the diversities of the law by which the sentiment should be regulated are as numerous as can well be conceived. Neither should we argue from this that there is not a stable and universal law which ought to regulate human action in the figure of society, but rather compare the various opinions which prevail to the various opinions which prevailed in the physical sciences not many centuries since, where, when truth was discovered, men abandoned diversity and adopted unity of credence.

So soon as the mere *will of the ruler* is no longer held to be the rule of political rectitude, it is evident that the *opinion* of the ruler requires an intellectual law, without which it is no more entitled to attention than his will. There is, and there must neces-

By trimming the sails and regulating the helm the mariners may make the ship sail in any direction between E.N.E. southward to W.N.W., and by tacking may bring the ship to a given point due N. from its former position. The mariners, therefore, may navigate their ship to almost any point they choose. If, then, we view the ship from the *point of view of the helm*, we affirm that it is *not* subject to the law of necessity, inasmuch as it is not necessarily constrained by the wind to move in *any one particular direction*. If we call the wind the *motives*, the man at the helm the *will*, and the chart and compass the *reason*, we have a tolerable analogy. But a theologian steps in and deduces the non-freedom of the will from its invariability to act with perfect morality. Thus we might say, the ship, although free, cannot sail up into the air.

sarily be, a *truth* and a *falsehood* in politics as much as in geometry or astronomy ; and, notwithstanding the almost endless diversity of political creeds and political enactments, we have no hesitation whatever in believing, that ere the great curtain of eternity shall have fallen on the drama of man's terrestrial existence, legislation will come to be as exclusively *the application of ascertained truth to the conditions of men upon the globe*, as is mechanics the application of ascertained truth to the conditions of matter.

As in the physical sciences a century or two since, men wished to make propositions true which were false, and propositions false which were true ; so has legislation, even down to the present day, endeavoured to make crimes of actions which were not criminal, and to punish those actions as if they had been infringements of the moral law of equity. Laws have endeavoured to regulate thought, and to make some religions true, others false ; to regulate speech and action, and to make these innocent or criminal, upon a principle of arbitrary determination, which did not, and would not, investigate the reality or non-reality of the crime. Men are beginning to emerge from political superstition, and to cast about for that objective law which, when the intellect discovers it, shall acknowledge to be the true basis of political association. There is a vast troubling of the waters which indicates the crying desire for political *truth*, and whatever interests may be implicated in the struggle, there can be little doubt that truth shall yet be evolved, and that the world shall

yet see it carried into practical and universal operation.

The only question, then, that remains, before proceeding to the investigation of the dogma of politics, is this, "Are all men *equal* in natural rights?"

This question is sometimes encumbered with such a mass of absurdity that it seems almost hopeless to disentangle it, or even to state it in such a manner that even the mere statement shall be unobjectionable. The objectors to the equality of men say, "men differ in intellect," "men differ in strength," "men differ in perseverance," "men differ in good fortune," &c. &c. All these are entirely beside the mark, and never affect the question in any possible way.

There are three regions to which we may address ourselves for an answer.

1st, Scripture; 2d, Reason; 3d, Observation. Scripture informs us that God made of one blood all nations of men. This makes all men of the same species, and whatever differences there may be between individuals, whatever variety of races, whatever peculiarity of form or colour, the whole tenor of Scripture teaches us that God, who is no respecter of individuals, has given the same moral law as obligatory on all, and consequently that the same duties are incumbent upon all.

2d, Reason. Reason teaches us that rights arise out of the universality of the moral law. As regards a lion or a tiger, I have no *rights*, he slays me if he can, and I destroy him if I can, in circumstances where he

appears likely to be *dangerous*. We never attribute to him the power of conceiving of a moral law, and, therefore, we never attach to his actions those judgments which we invariably pass upon the acts of men. With men it is otherwise; reason tells us that men *ought* not to murder, to steal, or to defraud. But if one man is bound by a moral law to refrain from murdering or defrauding, every other man thereby acquires a moral *right* to be unmurdered and undefrauded. Rights, therefore, arise from the universality of the moral law, and the only question is, Is the same moral law universally binding upon men? for if it is, all men are necessarily *equal* in natural rights.

If there be no moral law, then it is true men have no rights. This doctrine, as fatal to every high aspiration of the human mind as it is to the safety and welfare of society, has been advocated by some whose attention was exclusively directed to the investigation of the laws of utility. We have no doubt whatever that great good will ultimately arise out of the doctrine of utility; but many who are capable of understanding the doctrine itself appear incapable of understanding its *position*, and endeavour to advance it to the exclusion of every other law, divine or moral. So far as the doctrine of utility is positive, that is, assertory, it is true, and cannot be controverted. Things are, or are not, *beneficial* in a certain order or sequence. But so far as the doctrine is *exclusive*, that is, negative, it fails, like every other doctrine that assumes to be

the *only* rule. It has a province, and in its province it is supreme and cannot be disputed. But there is a province which it cannot reach, a region that lies beyond it, a sphere where the quantities are incommensurable with mere profit and loss, a vast region of thought (and of language) where the coins or counters of utility neither pass current, nor are capable of implementing transactions. If it be the only rule, there is nothing *right* and nothing *wrong*, only something *beneficial* and something *prejudicial* (that is, something pleasant and something painful); just as if induction be the only mode of investigation, there is nothing *necessary*, but only something *general*. To advance any doctrine whatever that contradicts the universal form of human thought, and the universal form of human language, we conceive to be a vain attempt. The most consistent materialists never could obliterate either the concept or the word *force*; the most consistent sensualists never could obliterate *thought* and *mind*, neither can the utilitarians (those of them who deny all moral law) obliterate both the concept and the word *duty*. When men of science have abandoned the word *force* (and all its equivalents) it will be time enough for moralists to take into consideration the abandonment of the word *duty*. We grant that there are innumerable opinions as to what *is* a duty, just as in theology there are (taking the earth at large) multitudes of opinions as to *who* is God; but that there is a duty and that there is a God it is vain to controvert. Scepticism on both points may endure

for a short period; but the two concepts are the necessary requirements of stable thought, and in spite of all reasonings and of all subtleties men invariably return to them, because they are the only thoughts that in a certain province can find a lasting home in their minds, and fill a requirement of their nature which ever and ever calls for satisfaction.

While reason teaches us that rights arise out of the universality of the moral law, her office does not stop here,—she also teaches us that the moral law is universally binding on *man*. In the first place, it follows, as a necessary consequence, that if one man is morally bound to refrain from a certain action, every other man is morally entitled to escape from the effects of that action—in short, that if one man is bound to refrain from *doing*, every other man is entitled to escape from *suffering*. This right to escape from suffering constitutes the basis of all political rights, but the word *suffering* must be understood, not in the sense of *pain*, but in the grammatical sense of being *acted upon*. If another man has no right to *act*, I have a right to be *unacted upon*. If another man is morally bound to refrain from slaying, robbing, defrauding, &c., I, as a necessary consequence, have a correlative *right* to be unslain, unrobbed, and undefrauded. This is the whole theory of political *rights*, namely, that where the moral law imposes a *restriction* upon one man, another man is thereby necessarily endowed with a correlative *exemption*. The final termination of political *progress* will be found at the point where the law of

the land ensures to every man this *right* that arises from the restriction which the moral law makes absolutely binding upon every *other* man. Never till then, can the EQUILIBRIUM OF EQUITY be restored; and never till then, can we be certain that the elements of change are finally obliterated. Until that period, at whatever great a distance it may be, we must necessarily anticipate a constant series of changes. But reason teaches us that the moral law is absolutely universal,—because every axiom that exists in the human mind is universal, and the moral law is based on the axioms of the reason. Every axiom that relates to numbers is universal with regard to numbers; every axiom that relates to spaces is universal with regard to spaces; and every axiom that relates to *men* is universal with regard to men. Axiomatic reason not only *does not* draw a distinction between the individuals of whom the human race is at any one period of time composed, but axiomatic reason does not even know the means of drawing such a distinction. Every axiom is abstract, and the moment we have abstracted, we have left behind all distinction of individuals, and assembled into one general category all the substantives to which the axiom refers.

From revelation, then, we learn the fact of primary creation—that God made all men of one blood. From reason, we learn the universal restriction which the moral law makes obligatory on all moral beings, so far as they can act upon each other.

But neither revelation nor reason, alone, can teach us another fact which is absolutely necessary to com-

plete the series of propositions, and to transform the abstract law of morals into a concrete rule of life. Reason lays upon us a restriction *so far as other moral beings are concerned*; but reason, alone, does not tell us who (what individuals) are moral beings. For this, *observation* is necessary. In a physical sense man is an animal; and we require to distinguish him from the other animals that inhabit the globe, before we pronounce that any given individual is a moral being, and entitled to the rights which flow from the moral law. But although observation furnishes us with the outward and visible appearance, observation *alone* can never make man other than an animal of a higher species. Observation appreciates form and colour, &c.; and although observation may class man at the very top of the scale of organization, it can never detect his moral and rational character, inasmuch as moral and rational characteristics are inappreciable by sense, and can only be apprehended by the reason. When, therefore, any given individual is presented to us, observation *classes* him; and if he be ranked in the class *man*, reason at once endows him with all the inward and invisible attributes of humanity. This process would still be the same even were there no other animals whatever. It is not because we distinguish man from *them* that we endow him with reason and volition, but because we have *classed him in the same category with ourselves, and viewed him only as another individual of the same species or kind.** The very moment we have done this,

* We are conscious that *we* are moral beings, and bound by a

we have endowed him of necessity with all the rights to which we ourselves lay claim, and deprived ourselves of all the rights which we are not willing to accord to him. *Reason* can know no difference between individuals in the same category, whatever the accidents that attach or do not attach to them. Below all the accidents and all the variable phenomena, reason lays holds of the permanent and stable characters that know no change, and are subject to no transformation. If they are there at all, they are there the same, identical in their definition, immutable as the reason that substantiates them. If I have rights, it is not because I am *I*, but because I am *a man*; and the moment we place another in the same category as ourselves, reason at once endows him with all the abstract qualities, and all the abstract relations to which we can have any possible claim. ←

To decide upon who are men and who are not men, forms no part of our inquiry. The question is, "Are all men *equal* in natural rights?"—not, Is

law of equity. We have the inward witness of our moral nature, which, it is true, we may neglect, but from which we can never entirely escape; and when we class another individual in the same category with ourselves, we judge instantaneously that *he* is a moral being and has a moral nature, and is also, as much as ourselves, bound by a law of equity. When *he* neglects the law of equity, we complain and feel justly entitled to remonstrate or to *resort to force*. When we reason of justice and righteousness, we do so with the full and perfect conviction that however *depraved* an individual may be, he is still endowed with a rational power of comprehension, and with a moral principle that bears witness in his heart that he *ought* to act in a particular direction, and to refrain from acting in another direction. Were moral teaching not felt to be *imperative*, it would be unintelligible.

this or that individual a man? The latter is settled *currently* by each one as the various individuals happen to be presented to him, and *generally* by the man of science, who classifies individuals according to their permanent physical characters, and assigns the name *man* to a certain class, all the individuals of which, although presenting extensive varieties and peculiarities of race, he reckons to belong to the same species. Some (perhaps in jest) have pretended to advance that negroes were not men.* Even though they were not, and it could be proven that they were not, this would not affect, in the slightest degree, the equal rights of those who were men. All the difference would be in the fact of throwing out certain individuals who had been improperly classed. The moral relations of all who remained,—that is, of the *men*,—would remain exactly as they were before, and those relations, we have endeavoured to prove, are relations of equality.

At the same time it should not be overlooked that those who have no rights have no *duties*. The two are correlative; and if we deny an individual his rights, we, by the same process, emancipate him from his duties towards *us*. Were the blacks of the

* The highest moral peculiarity of man is his capacity for the intelligent *adoration* of the Divine Being. The second is his capacity of experiencing the emotion, and intelligently performing the action, of *benevolence*. The third is his capacity of experiencing the emotion, and intelligently performing the action, of *justice*. What character can be given to slavery, when it denied religion to the slave, deprived him of all that was his own, and taught him that he had no rights of *justice*!

southern states of America to accept the theory that they had no rights, they would soon see the equivalent proposition that they had no duties. If they are men, they have rights; and if they are not men, we can have no means of laying a moral duty on them. This doctrine the slaveowners ought to propagate with caution—it might be dangerous.

We arrive, then, at the conclusion—

1st, That rights arise out of the restrictions of the moral law. If A is morally bound not to perform a certain action towards B, it follows necessarily that B has a moral right to be free from the effects of that action.

2d, That Scripture makes the same divine law obligatory on all mankind.

3d, That the moral law of reason is universal, and applies to all men.

4th, That the moral law of reason is one and the same at all times and in all circumstances, and that it knows no distinction whatever except abstract distinctions, nor can acknowledge any distinction except abstract distinctions between the different individuals of the same species.*

5th, That consequently the same duties are in-

* It may be necessary to explain what is meant by an *abstract* distinction. For instance, the man who by his labour produces a new value in raw material is the *creator* of that value, while another who does not produce such value is not the creator. Reason both establishes and acknowledges a distinction between these two individuals, *not as individuals*, but as *creator and non-creator*, that is, in their *abstract relations*. If the axiom relate to individuals, it is universal with regard to individuals,—*e. g.*, a whole is equal to the sum of all its parts; if it relate to *creators*, it is universal with regard to creators, and so forth.

cumbent on all men, and consequently, as a right is only the correlative of a duty, the same rights are morally possessed by all men.

6th, That therefore all men are equal in those natural rights that derive from the reason, and in all those rights that derive from the Divine Creator through the particular revelation of Scripture.

7th, That observation enables us to understand who are men, and thereby the abstract laws of reason are brought into a region of real operation. The theoretic dogma is translated into a practical rule of life.

The question as to the equality of human rights is susceptible of endless disputation when confounded and interchanged (as it so frequently is) with the question, "Have all men an equal right to the same material object?" The tendency in the human mind to abandon the abstraction and to fix it in some sensible object, is one of those phenomena against the results of which reason has ever to maintain a perpetual struggle. While in religion man abandons the spiritual idea and manufactures an idol, or a symbol, to which alone he ultimately comes to bend the knee, so in ethics do men endeavour to reduce the abstraction to some material and concrete reality, and to reason with that reality, as if they were reasoning with the immutable abstraction. Hence the origin of the peculiar sense of the word "*property*," as applied to a certain extent of land—"duty," as applied to the mere action, whether that action were really a duty or a crime—

“*goods*,” as applied even to bales of blasphemous books, &c.*

Of course, wherever this ambiguity of language prevails, men are speaking of things perfectly distinct, and nothing but diversity of assertion can be anticipated, although in reality there may be no diversity of opinion. Both are correct in their own sense, because one is speaking of the abstraction, the other of the concrete reality. While mere opinions, and not scientific truth, are allowed to prevail in politics, any assertion, however absurd, may be made the basis of action; but should the day ever come when there shall be a system of truth capable of being taught, and of being maintained against every *rational* objection (as distinguished from the objection of mere assertion, backed by power), diversities of opinion and diversities of assertion will fall to the ground, as they have already done in so many other branches of science. Men now speak in politics and pronounce definite opinions, although they have scarcely ever devoted an hour’s real thought to the investigation of the subject; and yet can there be a doubt that so absurd a system will eventually die away, and that they will first *learn* (either from the fountain, or from those who have been at the fountain), before they give utterance to

* For instance:—“This man has a fine *property* in Yorkshire, although, if each had his own, it would belong to his cousin.” “The men were ordered to sack and burn the town, and they performed the *duty* with great alacrity.” “A foreign house consigned some *goods* to me, but they were of so infamous a description that I returned them.”

propositions which after all are only, "I think so because I do?" The whole progress of society is teaching us, that propositions which will not bear the most strict and thorough investigation of the reason must be abandoned and overthrown. The tide of TRUTH has set in, and wherever that truth may lead us, *there* we can have little doubt will man be found to follow. Through many breakers, and through many disasters, it may be, but still it is the tide of truth, and no fortuitous event—no hand of man—no complication of circumstances—not all the adverse powers of all the universe, can prevent the destinies of our race from landing at last in that bright haven of peace and safety, of true knowledge and Christian virtue, which on the sure word of prophecy we confidently anticipate.

Although politics as a science is perfectly distinct from religion, the history of man, past, present, and future, is essentially connected and bound up with religion. No separation between the two is possible without at once landing us in the most inexplicable mysteries, which do not admit even of intelligible statement.

It is the duty of every Christian surely and certainly to expect a millennium. Whether there shall or shall not be a personal reign of the Son of God on the earth we know not, and can offer no opinion that is worthy of attention. At the same time, we have the sure word of promise that there shall be a reign of righteousness (justice) on the earth, and that God himself, the true and legitimate ruler of

the human race, shall take to himself his great power and *reign*. If God reign, we must necessarily have the total abolition of all systematic injustice ; and as the human race is evolving from the multitudes of diverse credences, so may it ultimately evolve from the multitudes of human rulers and be assembled under its one legitimate Lord. It is true, the world may say that "these all do contrary to Cæsar, saying that there is another king, *one Jesus*," but "let all the house of Israel know assuredly, that God hath made that same Jesus, Lord and Christ."

That Jesus is the only personal ruler who has a right to reign over mankind. Until he assume his power, it is the duty of human rulers merely to fill the office of administrators of the rules of justice. They are the magistrates of equity, not the rulers of men. To all honour and to all proper obedience they are entitled, when they act justly and impartially ; but the only PERSON who can rule from his own right as a person, is the incarnate Son of God. The Christian can give allegiance to no other, except as that other is the administrator, and not the supreme sovereign ; if he act wrongfully, he may be deposed, tried, or even condemned to death, if he have been guilty of a crime that would entail that penalty on a subject ; he may be set up to-day, and put down to-morrow, and set up again the next day, without any more crime attaching to such actions than attaches to the hiring and discharge of a servant. For man, there is but one true ruler ; one

who hath purchased his kingdom, who hath redeemed his people, who is not only the true and good pastor, but the legitimate and rightful Lord; one who is not only man but God, blessed for ever. Whether in visible form, or in spiritual essence, that divine Lord must ultimately reign. The world may scoff as it will, but it can neither arrest the promise nor the arm of the Almighty. "Thy kingdom come," is all that the earth requires to make it happy.

SECT. II.—DEFINITIONS.

POLITICS is the science of EQUITY, and treats of the relations of men *in* equity, or of the equitable relations of men.

[As arithmetic is the science of number, and treats of the relation of things in number, or of the numerical relations of things.]

Equity or Justice is a simple concept, totally incapable of definition, but common to all mankind. It stands on the same footing as the concepts *identity, equality, number, quantity, space, force, value, utility, &c.*, neither of which is capable of definition, yet all of which are common to all mankind. Equity or justice, although incapable of definition, is capable of *division*, that is, we may specify its *forms*. These are distributive justice, corrective justice, and retributive justice.

Distributive justice has for its end the equitable allocation of all the elements of society, in rights, property, office, relation, succession, &c. It professes to distribute all things that enter into the region of politics, *justly*.

Corrective justice has for its end the restoration of the elements of society to their equitable condition, when that condition has been disturbed either by intention or accident. Hence all *suits* in civil law.

Retributive justice has for its end the prevention of intentional crime, by the infliction of such pains and penalties as are supposed to be capable of *detering* any from intentionally disturbing the equitable condition of society.

These three are equally included in a science of politics, although the first only is commonly treated of under this name.

A complete system of political science ought to discuss the principles of the three divisions.

The noun adjective of equity is *equitable* or *just*.

The adverb of equity is *justly* or *equitably*.

The verb of equity is the moral *ought*.

[The verb *ought* points out the relation of *correctness*. This it does *generally*. *E. g.* :—A circle *ought* to be drawn in such and such a manner ; the intellect *ought* to be convinced by sufficient evidence ; a man *ought* to act towards others as he would that others should act towards him. The meaning in each case is, “that it is *correct*,” &c. This correctness depends on the region of thought in which we are discours-

ing. *E.g.*:—If we wish the *nearest* distance between two towns, the length of a straight line drawn from one to the other is the *correct* distance required. If we consider this as a mere *fact*, it belongs to the region of *external nature*. A different kind of correctness is found in the region of *thought*. If $x + a = a$, we *conclude* that $x = 0$. The *conclusion* is correct.

In *rational action* again we have a different kind of correctness. *E.g.*:—“The weather was so dry that the grass failed, but the farmer brought a run of water to the head of the field and irrigated it. In a few days the grass revived.” His *action* was correct, that is, it *produced the desired end*.

In *moral action* again we have still a different kind of correctness. *E.g.*:—“While exposed to many temptations his *conduct* was correct.” That is, *the end produced was correct*.

It is evident that a straight line, a logical conclusion, a rational action, and a moral action, are very different things; yet the same language applies to them and gives rise to many ambiguities. The verb *ought* follows wherever *correct* is employed, and we may say, “A road to be the shortest ought to be straight.” “If $x + a = a$, x ought to be $= 0$.”

“If the farmer wants his grass to grow, he ought to irrigate his field.”

“He did what he ought although exposed to temptation.”

UGHT, therefore, has no specific meaning until the region in which we discourse is determined, and it then signifies the relation of correctness *in that*

region. When the relation of correctness is ascertained (or supposed) in either of the four regions of BEING, KNOWING, ACTING RATIONALLY, or ACTING MORALLY, the verb *ought* may be employed, as a verb is required to facilitate discourse. The current ambiguities of the verb *ought* may usually be traced to the difference between *rational action*, which has for its object *the production of an end merely*, and *moral action*, in which we pronounce on *the character of the end produced.*]

In political economy the verb *ought* is employed in a non-moral sense. *E.g.*:—"What means ought to be employed to produce a given end?" This is the exclusive inquiry of political economy. In politics the sense is perfectly distinct from the sense in political economy. "*What end ought to be produced?*" is the exclusive inquiry of politics. Both signify *correctness*; but the one is *rational correctness*, the other *moral correctness*.

In politics the verb *ought* signifies correctness in *equity*.

The most important words involving equity are the nouns substantive, DUTY, CRIME, RIGHT, WRONG, PROPERTY.

Duty and crime apply to *actions*; right and wrong apply to *actions, conditions, and possessions*; property applies to *possessions*. The terms *duty, crime, right, wrong, and property*, are *abstract*, that is, they signify mental concepts which have no correlatives in external nature; but which are superadded to actions, conditions, and possessions, by the human reason, which, from its constitution, is necessarily impelled

to regard actions, conditions, and possessions, not merely in their physical characteristics, which can be ascertained by sensational observation, but also in their moral characteristics, which are inappreciable to sense, and can only be apprehended by the reason.

[Neither of the above terms can ever be introduced *legitimately* into political economy.]

The terms *duty*, *crime*, *right*, *wrong*, and *property*, taken as substantive concepts of the intellect, are simple, incapable of analysis, and consequently incapable of definition. But they may be viewed in another light.

The general form or abstract concept is incapable of real definition; but the concrete form or particular case is capable of *determination*; otherwise a practical rule of action could not be evolved. We must consider, therefore, not what concepts *compose* duty and crime in the abstract (they being not compound, and consequently indecomposable), but what characteristics of an action *constitute* it a duty or a crime. We have, therefore, to unite the abstract concepts and principles, which belong exclusively to the reason, with the concrete characteristics of an action, which are derived exclusively from observation, and the question presents itself in this light—given, the concept equity, with its axioms, and the *physical* characteristics of an action, to determine whether the action be a duty or a crime, or neither.

Viewed in this light, therefore, a duty becomes an action that corresponds with the axioms of

equity ; and a crime, an action that controverts the axioms of equity. The concise definition of a crime, therefore, is "*a breach of equity.*" Whatever is a breach of equity is a political crime, and whatever is not a breach of equity is *not* a political crime (and can never be *justly* treated as such).

Finally, *duty* and *crime* are opposites to each other.

The above observations apply to the substantives *right*, *wrong*, and *property*.

Let us first consider the use of the word *right* as it appears in ordinary discourse. "The *rights* of man." "A man has a *right* to do what he wills with his own." "The slave has a *right* to his liberty." The substantive *right* here evidently signifies "just claim"—the just (or equitable) claims of man. The slave has an equitable claim to his liberty.

But as there is ever in man a tendency to forsake the abstract concept, and to adhere to the object to which the concept is attached, or in which it is supposed to reside as a quality, the *object* of the just claim is sometimes called the *right*,—*e.g.*, liberty is a natural right. Here the form of expression is abbreviated ; it is not meant that liberty is a just claim, but one of the things *to* which man has a just claim. This principle of abbreviation is applied so generally in common discourse that an attempt to avoid it there is mere pedantry. At the same time, it is necessary to distinguish between the object and the character of the object ; and as one of the terms of politics (*property*) is so often used in an improper sense from the confusion of the object with its

character, we define RIGHT (the noun substantive) as "an equitable or just claim,"—*e.g.*, a man has a right to liberty, that is, a man has an equitable claim to liberty.

A WRONG, an unjust interference with the powers, property, or reputation of another.

PROPERTY, the object to which a man has a just claim. Property is usually restricted to *material* objects, but a man's life or reputation may be said to be his property. *Matter* does not enter into an abstract science, and the word *object* is used in its grammatical signification to signify either things material or immaterial. A copyright, for instance, may be property, and yet it can scarcely be called a material object.

Property is one of the important substantives of politics, and, like liberty, is used in two senses, one of which implies equity. It is sometimes used to signify the object of property, *e.g.*, the estate, land, houses, money, &c., *possessed*; sometimes to include the relation of the object to the person who has a just claim to it. The former sense is expressed by the terms, "*object possessed*," or "*possession*." (Possession has two meanings also, namely, the object possessed, and its relation to the possessor.) This abbreviation of language is quite legitimate, and every one is entitled to use it, provided it belong to the language in which he writes.* It is, of course

* In Archbishop Whately's Logic, some remarks are made on the use of terms in senses not consistent with the definitions.—(See definitions of terms used in Political Economy. Logic, p. 402, &c.)

desirable, that uniformity should be preserved, but it must not be forgotten that the language of ordinary discourse is ambiguous. The definition sense is only obligatory in matters of proof. In the ordinary current of the work, the English, and not the definition sense is quite legitimately employed. We should scarcely consider a mathematician inconsistent for calling Russell Square a *square*, because it did not happen to coincide exactly with his definition of that figure. The cases pointed out by Archbishop Whately may, however, be those in which the ambiguity is involved in the *argument*, and not in the *narration*, and in that case the criticism is valuable as calculated to improve so important a branch of knowledge. *Possession*, we shall use indifferently as the object, or the relation. It is so used in ordinary discourse, and the *peculiar* terms of politics are all that we profess to define,—*e.g.*, a slave is the possession of his master, or *in* his possession; a slave is not the *property* of his master.

The ambiguity of the word property, as signifying either “the thing actually possessed,” or “the thing justly possessed,” is at the bottom of all the arguments in favour of the rights of slaveholders or the rights of landowners. It is impossible that a slave should be the *property* of his master. One of the objects of this work is (ultimately) to exhibit the *impossibility* both as applied to *slaves* and to *land*.*

* In Mr Alison's History of Europe, the words *rights* and *property* present a long series of ambiguities, and these ambiguities really form the basis of his reasonings. The slave says, “I have a *right* to my liberty.” The slaveowner says, “I have a *right*

PROPERTY is a correlative term, and always requires the existence of a *proprietor* or *owner*. Where there is no *owner*, there can be no *property*, and where there is no *property*, there can be no *owner*. An object may exist and may be *valuable*, but if it have not a proprietor, it is merely *an object*, and not *property*. The definition states, "*object to which a being has a just claim*,"—we do not mean *material* object. Every noun substantive is supposed to represent an *object*, whether material or immaterial. This distinction is necessary, because a man may have a just claim to the *value* (or part of the value) of an object, and yet not to the material object itself. Or the material object in which a value resided may be destroyed, and yet a man may have a just claim to the *value*. This principle is every day exhibited in legal matters. We have defined *property*, "*the object to which a being has a just claim*," but "*just claim*" constitutes "*a right*," consequently the concise definition of property is, "*object to which a being has a right*."

VALUE is a simple concept and cannot be defined. It is one of the numerous *causes* that are supposed to excite or produce emotions. "*We desire objects—to my slave*." It is impossible that these two propositions can be *true*, where the word *right* is used in the same sense; but they *are* true in fact, because the slave means *moral* right, the planter, *legal* right. The ambiguity of the word is really at the bottom of all that can be advanced by the slaveowner. No man can possibly have a moral right to a slave, that is, to another man subjected to servitude, without his consent. "*The assembly had long hesitated as to the course they should adopt, and were inclined to support the rights of the planters*."—*Alison, Hist. Eur.*, chap. vii.

let the quality (resident in the object) which causes that desire be called *value*." This is all that can be said about the abstract form of value, but value may be divided into its various concrete forms, and they can be definitely limited and determined. *Commercial* value is only one form of value, namely, that form which men are willing to receive in exchange. Value never exists *alone*, but resides in some object, whether material or immaterial.

LIBERTY is not necessarily defined by political science, inasmuch as it does not involve *equity*, when used in its most general signification. But as it forms an important term of politics, and as it frequently *does* involve equity from the abbreviation of language, we define it as the condition in which a man's powers and property are disposed of by his own consent—*e.g.*, This man is in a state of liberty, that is, this man is in a condition in which his powers and property are disposed of by his own consent.

In politics, however, the relation of man to man is the only subject of investigation, and liberty may be defined, "The condition in which a man's powers and property are disposed of without the interference of another man, unless such interference be by consent." The former definition states, "by his own consent." Now, the elements may destroy his property, or the snow may make him a prisoner in his house. In these cases he loses his liberty, but not his *political* liberty,—that is, he loses nothing by the agency of his fellow-men. The latter definition is, therefore, the one that applies to politics; the former,

the one that applies generally to the most extensive case of liberty.

POWERS OF PERFORMANCE consist of the powers of thinking, feeling, speaking, writing and publishing, and acting. *Power* is sometimes confounded with *right*, but power is a general term, and is non-moral in its general form.

PLEASURE and PAIN are two primaries, non-moral in their *general* signification.

INTERFERENCE is one of the most important terms in politics. Its general form is non-moral, but we shall find it in a postulate.

LAW has various significations.

1st, A generalised *fact*—*e.g.*, Matter gravitates towards matter in a certain ratio. This fact is ascertained by observation. This form is termed “a law of the physical universe.”

2d, A necessary form of thought—*e.g.*, Things equal to the same are equal to each other. This is a universal and underived conviction of the reason, altogether independent of sensational observation. This form is termed “a law of the reason.”

3d, A divine command—*e.g.*, Thou shalt not kill. This form is termed “a divine law, a revealed law, or a law of God.”

4th, A human enactment—*e.g.*, The man who shoots a grouse without a game certificate shall be fined or imprisoned. This form is termed “a human law, or law of the legislature.”

In the various sciences the principles of truth peculiar to each (or especially used in each) are

sometimes and perhaps not improperly termed laws, whether those principles are primary or consequential, general or particular.

In politics and in political economy, we have the laws of equity and the laws of utility; the former being general principles of the reason, the latter, generalised facts learnt through observation. But to these must be added human enactments, which are variable, without any principle of permanence, and certainly not *morally* obligatory except so far as they coincide with the principles of equity.

A law of the legislature, therefore, is "an expression of the will of one or more beings, which expression requires obedience."

SECT. III.—AXIOMS.

Action.

1. No man has a right to *originate* an interference with another man.

2. A just interference (of one man with another) must be based on a reason sufficient in equity (or in negation). An interference that has not a reason sufficient in equity, is not a just interference.


3. All just interference of one man with another man must be based on the fact, that this other man has originated an interference with ourselves or others.

Property.

1. An object is the property of its creator. [An object may be either material or non-material.]
2. Right should lead to possession.
3. A proprietor may give his right.
4. A proprietor may lend his right.
5. He who receives a gift from the proprietor, becomes the proprietor of the gift.
6. He who loans an object from the proprietor, becomes just lessee of the object.
7. A proprietor may justly defend his property.
8. A proprietor may justly recover his property. [As a *right* may be considered as *property*, even when it applies to *action*, these axioms refer also to rights of action.]

General.

1. *Politically*, a man may do what he pleases with his own powers or property, provided he does not interfere with another man. [That is, what a man does without *interfering* with another (by force, fraud, or defamation), does not come within the limits of *politics*. His personal actions belong to personal, and not to political morals.]
2. A whole is equal to the sum of all its parts. If it be equal, it cannot be greater; consequently, a whole can contain nothing but the aggregate of those things that are contained in its constituent parts.

3. All men are bound by the laws of justice.
 4. Two rights cannot be contradictory. [Various other axioms might be added, but these are sufficient to develop the elements of a system.]
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Postulates.

1. It is possible for men to act towards each other equitably or unequitably.
2. It is possible for men to possess portions of the earth equitably or unequitably.
3. Labour may create new value in raw material.