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# Hegemony in Post-Independence Jamaica

D.A. DUNKLEY

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## Introduction

**JAMAICANS TODAY ARE EITHER** nostalgic about the seventies (1972–80) or view this period with regret. These eight years are seen by one group as a period of political and social development, cut short by the fact that a proportion of the society objected to the decision taken by the government under Prime Minister Michael Manley to pursue a programme of democratic socialism.<sup>1</sup> They also view the interference of the United States, due to the politics of the Cold War, as another, albeit external, factor contributing to the failures of the Manley-led government of the seventies. However, there are some Jamaicans who see the period as marred by political turmoil, social dissolution and economic collapse. These they blame squarely on Manley for having forced the country into democratic socialism which bankrupted the economy and forced mainly middle-class business people and professionals into flight, as well as alienating Jamaica's most important political and economic ally in the West: the United States.<sup>2</sup>

The purpose of this article is to take another look at the extent to which Manley's decision to pursue democratic socialism can be blamed for the political turmoil and economic problems which the country faced during the seventies. In this regard, the essay will examine critically Manley's decision to embark on democratic socialism using the concept of 'hegemony'. The question from which the essay arose is, to what extent was Manley a hegemonic leader and can this help in understanding the seventies? Hegemony is of course

quite a difficult concept to apply in a country with a democratic tradition and especially during a time when democracy was at the centre of the political ideology chosen by the leader alleged to be hegemonic. Therefore, the concept has not been used to shape analysis of the seventies, a significant period in the post-independence history of Jamaica.<sup>3</sup> On the other hand, hegemony by definition relies on garnering wide approval from the population, and so reliance on the rhetoric of democracy is necessary in a context where hegemony is being applied. The essay will also employ an analysis of cultural policy in the seventies to illustrate some of the ways in which hegemony manifested during the period.<sup>4</sup>

## The anatomy of hegemony

According to Carl Boggs, the concept of hegemony is essentially an “organising principle” which is used by certain leaders to gain the consent of the population for programmes which might have some appeal or importance to the public, but which is not enough to satisfy the objectives being pursued by the leadership of the society.<sup>5</sup> Philip Cerny has also explained that hegemony is never simply about domination; rather, it is something which is far more complex, as seen in the case of Ancient Greece, where hegemony first appears in Western civilisation. Cerny points to the fact that hegemony in Greece operated as “a relatively consensual form of leadership”, one “within an alliance of quasi-independent political units”. In simpler terms, the concept fostered a special relationship or bond between leaders and their people, which allowed the leaders to rule effectively. In this way, hegemony therefore “stabilises, manages, shapes and/or controls” without seeming dictatorial, authoritarian, tyrannical or corrupt.<sup>6</sup> Aristotle mentions this aspect of hegemony when he explains that the fact that hegemony is seen as “legitimate” accounts for its survival. In other words, it is perceived as a method of ruling which “serves [the] common interests”.<sup>7</sup>

Gramsci is the person with whom hegemony as a concept is most often associated. His important contribution was the explanations he gave showing the influence that hegemony had on different groups in society. One which came up for his assessment was the intellectual. Gramsci basically castigated the “intellectuals” as potentially “deputies” or “functionaries” of the hegemon.

It is possible for the intellectuals to be tricked into an alliance with the hegemonic ruler by their showing support for policies which enjoy a fairly good amount of regard among the wider community, and in which the intellectuals themselves also share an abiding interest, due to what Gramsci called their “organic” and/or “traditional” associations with the classes in the society.<sup>8</sup> These policies are used by the hegemon to put into effect a political ideology which maintains and stabilises the leadership of that hegemon, and allows for the production of other controls.

In his addition to the discussion on hegemony, Saul Newman has observed that in the post-Marxist era, these theorists (post-Marxists) have examined how hegemony has worked through multiple “sites of power”. In other words, hegemony can extend even to controlling “cultural values” or the ways that these are interpreted and function in society.<sup>9</sup>

Weber’s now classical discussion of the different types of leadership also made a contribution to the understanding of hegemony. Weber asserts that there are essentially three types of leadership: “charismatic”, “traditional” and “rational” or “legal”. Each in some way has the capacity to exercise some form of hegemony. The “charismatic” leader best describes Jamaica’s Michael Manley, whose background, rise to leadership and style of leading during the seventies all resounded with evidence of charisma and the use of this charisma to enhance his reputation among the people. Weber said that this kind of leader achieves the “devotion” of the people through his or her personal attributes or “specific and exceptional sanctity, heroism or exemplary character”.<sup>10</sup> Weber’s “ideal types”, including the one he dubbed as “charismatic authority”, provide a template, as Nivedita Menon has stated, which can be used to assess the hegemony of particular leaders.<sup>11</sup>

The idea that hegemony can take place in a democratic society is nothing new. Jürgen Habermas addresses this phenomenon in the term *Das-Nein-sagen-Können*, which basically means that through “critical objection”, laws gain “natural right” and “decisive significance” in democratic societies, but these same laws might be introduced by the hegemonic ruler. Once there is a discourse, an open or public discussion or debate about a law, that law will enjoy legitimacy or validation if and when it comes into effect. All the hegemonic leader has to do, in other words, is to facilitate a discussion about the merits of a piece of legislation and that discussion ultimately gives it its authentication. It is fairly easy, then, for hegemony to take place in a democracy or

for laws emanating from hegemonic leadership to gain what has been called “social recognition” and become the basis of various forms of control.<sup>12</sup>

Gramsci realised, too, that hegemony required “social engineering”, a term that was adopted by Manley.<sup>13</sup> In Gramsci’s argument, social engineering is tantamount to the “manufacturing” of “consent”, to use D.F. Ruccio’s terminologies.<sup>14</sup> This is done through the systematisation of values which seem fairly harmless and even in many cases appear to be for the good of the society. Manley, for instance, made ‘social justice’ and ‘egalitarianism’ the focus of his administration, which provided the basis for the introduction of democratic socialism. Jamaicans were bombarded with the virtues of these goals and the message was reinforced in Manley’s speeches that democratic socialism was the route through which these objectives could be achieved. Manley’s opponents, however, warned that democratic socialism achieved social justice and egalitarianism through the redistribution of wealth, which would in effect alienate the people who were already prospering. However, the idea of the redistribution of wealth was made to “appear natural and innocent of power” by constant reference to its objectives of social justice and egalitarianism.<sup>15</sup>

Much of the literature has focused a great deal on analysing Manley’s accomplishments. Attention has thus been shifted away from critical assessments geared towards highlighting his possible use of hegemonic approaches. Anna K. Perkins, in a recent book, chooses to analyse Manley’s achievements in the areas of equality and social justice, areas about which we are well aware.<sup>16</sup> And while addressing Manley, Patrick Bryan has opted, in his recently published biography of Manley’s political nemesis Edward Seaga, to consider the question of Manley’s nationalism. Bryan argues that “[n]ationalism continued to be the guiding principle of government, but with greater emphasis by Manley on the assertion of sovereignty and diversification of Jamaica’s markets and friends abroad”.<sup>17</sup> Under Manley, however, nationalism was integrated into the rhetoric aimed at creating a consensus around his ideology of democratic socialism.

## Manley and Jamaica’s history since the 1930s

The traditions of the “charismatic authoritarian leader”, bequeathed to Jamaican politicians of the post-independence era, benefited Manley in his

effort to win the hearts of the Jamaican people and also to promote the virtues of democratic socialism.<sup>18</sup> Manley was also the son of one of the country's premier political leaders, Norman Manley, who founded the PNP in 1938 and the National Workers' Union (NWU) in 1952, which had close ties to the PNP. It was from his father that Michael would inherit his leadership of the PNP in 1969 after his father's retirement in 1968. Michael's mother Edna Manley was an artist whose efforts in raising awareness and appreciation for Jamaican art were instrumental too in elevating the family's name among the Jamaican population. Edna's work as a sculptress catapulted her to fame locally and overseas. She was involved in what became known as the National Art Movement and participated in the establishment of the Jamaica School of Art and Crafts in 1950. Michael grew up with an appreciation and awareness of the important role of the arts in society – in the creation of a national cultural identity and the fashioning of a national consensus. He would even toy with the idea of becoming “an art critic” after completing university studies in London in the late 1940s.<sup>19</sup>

Jamaica had serious colour and class divisions which were the historical legacies of slavery and colonialism, and which survived during the post-independence period. In terms of both colour and class, Michael Manley belonged to the light-skinned upper middle class, the group that was most likely to benefit from elite education firstly in Jamaica and subsequently in tertiary institutions overseas. The middle class as a whole also provided many of the leaders of pre- and early post-independence Jamaica – leaders in politics, the professions and business. Among the names of early leaders with a middle-class background that we could mention are George William Gordon, Norman Manley and Edward Seaga. Mervyn Alleyne writes that Michael Manley was “phenotypically white/light brown” because Norman was “at least three-quarter white” and his wife Edna was “white British”.<sup>20</sup> Colour distinctions were used during slavery to maintain the supremacy of whites in Jamaica. The enslaved people were mainly of black African descent, while most slaveholders were white. Between this white/black division were a group which was known as coloureds, some of whom were free and the owners of slaves as well. The manumission process through which a number of slaves gained freedom before emancipation benefited coloureds more frequently than it did dark-skinned enslaved people. Barry Higman records that the frequency of manumission increased the closer the slaves were to white.<sup>21</sup> Among the

political leaders of the nationalist period from the 1930s to benefit from the colour distinctions were Norman Manley and Alexander Bustamante, both light-skinned and the founders of the island's two major political parties. Both were succeeded as party leaders by light-skinned heirs.

Manley was born in 1924, six years before the decade in which working-class protests would erupt in Jamaica and the wider British Caribbean. That decade of protests would lead to the production of a nationalist movement that, in 1944, achieved universal adult suffrage in Jamaica. Jamaican leaders now needed to speak directly to issues affecting the lives of the poor and working-class majority to achieve victory at the polls. Manley had grown up within the context of this burgeoning democracy. When he returned to Jamaica in 1949, he was armed with a degree from the prestigious London School of Economics and media exposure from a brief stint with the British Broadcasting Corporation.<sup>22</sup> He joined the staff at *Public Opinion* and continued working in journalism. This newspaper had ties to the PNP and was known for its left-wing views. Manley would become its editor. Thereafter, he joined the NWU, which was "the second largest trade union" in Jamaica and had been vying for first place since its inception.<sup>23</sup> Manley's political capital expanded because of the union work he did. He was appointed to the senate and then was elected to the House of Representatives in 1967.

Within the JLP administration of the sixties, there was an awareness of the need to channel the black consciousness of a growing segment of the population. As prime minister, Hugh Shearer had acknowledged that Jamaica had performed poorly in its response to groups such as the Rastafarians which had been clamouring for closer ties with African nations. This, they argued, would remove the stranglehold of imperialism which was seen as a cause of the persistent race and class problems of the country. The JLP policy was the opposite. The developmental model of 'industrialisation by invitation', promoted by renowned economists Arthur Lewis and William Demas, and learnt from the Puerto Rican experience, fostered closer ties with the imperial west. The JLP was thus seen as having failed on the race issue. Class problems continued also because its economic policy produced few jobs for the masses. Unemployment was 22.8 percent in 1972 despite the growth of the economy by 5.81 percent in what was known as the "golden" period: the late 1960s.<sup>24</sup> The Industrial Development Corporation generated £5.6 million investment capital, but less than 1 percent of this money had been used for job creation.<sup>25</sup>

According to Colin Palmer, in the sixties “[f]ew could maintain with confidence that black Jamaicans who constituted a majority of the population wielded economic power”.<sup>26</sup> The Jamaican film *The Harder They Come*, released in 1970, depicted some of the poverty and desperation of the black majority.<sup>27</sup> In 1972, political scientist Carl Stone gave this description highlighting that the socioeconomic condition of the poor had deteriorated even further: “The lumpen culture espouses unbridled sexuality and violence, mastery of the gun, hostility to all symbols and figures of authority, class and racial militancy . . . unrestrained individualism, egocentric behaviour, and a disdain for work, particularly manual work.”<sup>28</sup>

Manley focused on the economic and racial problems facing the country. In 1969 when he became PNP leader, he stated that these were “crucial areas” that “should have high priority in our thinking and planning”. Elaborating, he called for closer attention to be paid to “the economy” and “the development of the people and how they are utilised and their engagement in the society”, adding that emphasis must be placed on “our foreign policy, the political system”, in addition to “the acute problem in this area of national identity”.<sup>29</sup> Highlighting these issues brought Manley closer to the path of democratic socialism. In time, he announced that his goals were “equality, social justice, self-reliance and discipline”, the aims of socialist democracy.<sup>30</sup> The idea of non-alignment, which was also crucial to Manley’s idealism in the seventies, capitalised on the anti-imperialism of groups within the society. From as early as 1969, he had pursued warm relations with the influential Rastafari community.<sup>31</sup> In the 1970s, he initiated “dialogue with the communist Workers Party of Jamaica, established by Trevor Munroe”, and Manley’s pursuit of non-alignment, evident in his promotion of the idea internationally, led to the development of relationships with Cuba, Venezuela, Mexico and nations in Africa.<sup>32</sup>

Manley’s massive victory at the polls in 1972 was a manifestation of his ability to bring together the issues highlighted by all the groups contending for representation of their views on the national stage. He was still supported by the middle-class allies of the PNP despite his rhetoric expressing the concerns of the poor and activists for change focusing on the race problem. The election results of 1972 revealed that under Manley’s leadership, the PNP won 56 percent of the votes and 37 parliamentary seats, while the JLP obtained 43 percent and maintained 16 seats in parliament.<sup>33</sup>




## Charisma and ideology

Manley's charisma was widely known and was seen as one of the reasons he was able to "cut across various well-defined layers of Jamaican society". It was reported that he had "been blessed with a special kind of charisma", one "which women especially find difficult to resist". The fact that he was "[t]all (6-foot-2½), lean, distinguished grey and articulate" increased his ability to attract women. Even his attire in the seventies became a "fashion rage" in Jamaica. He wore a "shirt-like, open-neck 'bushjacket' and matching slacks" that were seen as "acceptable wear for informal as well as formal events".<sup>34</sup> Manley's fourth wife, Beverley Anderson, whom he married in 1972 after winning the elections of that year, recalls that "the only leader who came close to him in terms of charisma and ability to 'play' an audience was Fidel Castro".<sup>35</sup> Rachel Manley has also described her father as someone with the capacity to influence people, a "creator of visions".<sup>36</sup>


Manley was perceived as black by the African-Jamaican majority. However, "this never sufficed", according to Beverley Anderson. Manley had told her of his longing for blackness. He said that "he wanted to be a black man more than anything else in the world".<sup>37</sup> Marriage to Anderson gave him some of that access. Anderson's African identity was indisputable. She was black-skinned and frequently wore African attire at public events during the seventies. She maintained an Afro hairstyle like the Black Power activists of the sixties and seventies. Her background as lower-middle-class also gave the impression that she understood the predicaments of the lower rungs of the society. She helped Manley to develop the image of a leader who cared about the range of issues affecting the poor, but also women and children. Drawing on her experiences in drama and the media, Anderson also adds that she taught Manley how to improve his public speaking to reach a wider audience and to have a greater impact on listeners. She "taught him how to 'colour' his words so that they would jump off the page".<sup>38</sup>

Manley's first book, *The Politics of Change*, addressed the race and class problems in Jamaica directly, and presented democratic socialism as the solution to these problems. Manley acknowledged that in writing the book he had struggled "back to the rediscovery of my own idealism"; and according to Darrell E. Levi, the book contained "most of the elements necessary to democratic socialist development".<sup>39</sup> The year following its publication, Manley



Cover of the first edition of Michael Manley's *The Politics of Change*. This was Manley first book in which he outlined most of his ideas about democratic socialism and the changes that Jamaica needed to undertake to become a democratic socialist nation. Picture courtesy of the National Library of Jamaica, Kingston. This first edition was published in London by Andre Deutsch in 1973.

## Hon. Michael Manley Prime Minister



*Michael Manley was first appointed Prime Minister of Jamaica on March 2, 1972, following the success of the People's National Party (PNP) in the General Election held on February 29 that year. The PNP won 36 seats and the Jamaica Labour Party (JLP) 17 in the 53-seat House of Representatives.*

*He was reappointed on December 20, 1976, after his party was returned to power with 47 of the Parliament's 60 seats.*

This picture and caption are from a pamphlet published by the Agency for Public Information, Kingston, in 1977. Notice the subtlety of the celebratory fashion in which the caption is written. Both major political parties in Jamaica have embarked on similar self-promotion. In Manley's case, the promotion of both himself and the PNP was used to establish and maintain Manley's hegemonic leadership.



Manley with Cuban leader Fidel Castro in Montego Bay, Jamaica, 1977. Pictures such as these helped to fuel rumours that Manley was a communist and wanted to use democratic socialism to introduce communism in Jamaica in due course. On the other hand, Manley's friendship with the Cuban leader increased his popularity among Jamaica's poor, who saw Castro as a man who had fought hard for the poor of his own country. Picture courtesy of the National Library of Jamaica.

then “rededicated the PNP” to its democratic socialist roots. Aside from the fact that the PNP had been established as “nominally socialist” by Norman Manley, himself an “intellectual Fabian socialist”, democratic socialism proposed an improvement of the democratic political tradition of the country.<sup>40</sup> Manley had the advantage of this tradition to help propel his ideology in the imaginations of Jamaicans. The proposal to widen participation in the political process, to foster the development of “a mood of national confidence”, was viewed by Manley as likely to succeed based on not only the democratic tradition, but also the anti-imperialism of the sections of the society concerned with these issues as prerequisite for eradicating the race and class problems. Manley presented the “mood of national confidence” as the solution to any “doubts that linger” in Jamaicans about their own potential – doubts which had been “planted by history with no real root in present circumstances”, he argued.<sup>41</sup>

The “national mood of confidence” centralised the concept of nationalism as a crucial part of democratic socialism. However, nationalism is a highly flexible phenomenon which can be manipulated to stabilise political ideologies. In this regard, nations have been described as products of the imagination, which require the manufacturing of a “spiritual principle” that also establishes the “soul” or identity of those nations.<sup>42</sup> Other observations describe the production of a “sense of belonging” as the foundation on which nations are built.<sup>43</sup> In postcolonial societies such as Jamaica, “new and powerful identities” can be created and also recreated fairly easily if these can convincingly offer to “challenge” existing and past linkages to “colonialism not only at a political or intellectual level, but also on an emotional basis”.<sup>44</sup> The ability to shift around the idea of the nation is due to what Homi K. Bhabha calls its “cultural temporality”. This leaves nation-states and their nationalisms exposed to real management, or to the “attempts by nationalist discourses persistently to produce the idea of the nation”.<sup>45</sup> Manley proposed the realignment of Jamaican nationalism towards a new ideology. The change was sold with frequent references to the “hopes, needs, longings and interest” of the people. Eric Hobsbawm delivers this list of factors, among others, which he shows can help in the shaping of nations and nationalism. Therefore, leaders who decide not to address these issues will soon become aware of their inability to lead with any success.<sup>46</sup>

From before 1972, Manley had been speaking about addressing more

directly the people's "hopes, needs, longings and interest". Speaking in parliament in that year, he talked about creating "a land in which there is power for the voter, power for the farmer, power for the small businessman, power for the worker, power for the simple man and woman who can make this country great". In this speech, Manley made use of the powerful message that the people had an inalienable right to a stake in their society. This was one of their hopes, one of their needs, one of their longings. This kind of message privileging the people's interest set the stage for Manley's implementation of the democratic socialist ideology.<sup>47</sup>

### Manley's cultural policy

Manley used the term "social engineering" more than once in *The Politics of Change*. This term illustrated the methodology that his cultural policy would employ. He explicitly outlines that this approach "must begin with an act of psychological disengagement". The preponderance of the African heritage of Jamaica had signalled to Manley where the focus of cultural policy should be – the necessity for "vigorous promotion" of this objective. The school system was therefore to be infused with a "strong stream of African studies". Schools must not fail to include training in the arts with a heavy focus on African-Jamaican accomplishments. The full range of art forms was to receive this promotion: dance, drama, music and the visual arts.<sup>48</sup>

Training in the arts, in Manley's view, performed the twin functions of giving the society artists to represent its important ideas and to provide the kind of artistic output that was deemed useful. Manley was very clear on the matter of the inspirational value of the arts, realised when art reflects the ideological mood of the nation. As Manley stated, art "must reflect the total social experience and be appreciated by the society as a whole".<sup>49</sup> Some of these views concerning the arts were shared by Rex Nettleford who was Manley's cultural advisor from the beginning of his tenure in the seventies. Nettleford lent his intellectual gifts to the promotion of both Afrocentric expression and government patronage of the arts. He criticised the "Eurocentric fallacy" of some who were suspicious of government, adding that

none of the Jamaicans 'exploring' the state of the arts in 1972 were unrealistic enough to believe that the State support for the arts cannot do what court patronage and

private patronage used to do in Europe and in the case of Jamaica what private patronage, to a large extent, still does! In any case the intervention of government into several areas of cultural activity during the first ten years of Independence without strangling artistic endeavour challenges views that would see danger from a democratic socialist government charting the course for a cultural policy.<sup>50</sup>

The Manley government was never merely “charting the course for a cultural policy”. That was not the role envisioned for culture. Culture was seen as supporting the democratic socialist enterprise. Manley noted that education, which helps to produce and perpetuate culture, should manufacture the “opportunities” and “attitudes” for “the successful pursuit of objectives”.<sup>51</sup> Those objectives became democratic socialist development after 1974. In addition, government’s role before Manley was different. The centrepiece of cultural policy in the sixties was the Jamaica Festival. One of the key founders, Edward Seaga, has recently written that its “establishment” was “on a completely non-political basis”, which “was the key to its overwhelming national acceptance and success”.<sup>52</sup> Festival showcased the artistic expression; it did not try to control or engineer it. Talented people across the country were free to create art “out of the reservoir of [their] talents”.<sup>53</sup> Nettleford, along with Eddie Thomas, founded the National Dance Theatre Company in 1962, which flourished with the encouragement of individual creativity during that period. Other creative persons worked in both African and non-African themes, while the emphasis placed on folk culture was part of the nationalism that had begun in the thirties and was not associated with the promotion of any political ideology. Festival developed into the Jamaica Festival Commission in 1968 but the work continued to be the same: “island-wide participation in numerous events affecting large numbers of the population”.<sup>54</sup>

However, Manley argued that “exposure to art must be planned”. Measures were necessary to formalise and control exposure. This was unavoidable if national development along egalitarian lines was the objective of society. Creative people must be brought into “the stream of musical education”, which had the added benefit of being “of considerable advantage to their techniques”. Even reggae musicians should be trained, despite Manley’s knowledge that reggae gained its power from the untainted, untrained talents of musicians working from their backgrounds in poverty and desperation.<sup>55</sup> By 1975, Manley informed parliament that the implementation of the planned exposure to

art had begun; “further mobilisation” was ahead, he added.<sup>56</sup> The cost of the venture, he said, was not an issue. However it was in reality. The flight of capital from the country had started. By the following year, US\$300 million had vanished from Jamaica.<sup>57</sup> Manley remained committed and confident that the cultural policy of the government was vital. Democratic socialism needed it and planned exposure would grow.

Commencing the policy in 1973 was the restructuring of the famed Institute of Jamaica (IOJ). Under the exercise, individuals with socialist leanings were placed on the IOJ board: John Maxwell, John Hearne, Sylvia Wynter and Rex Nettleford. The executive director, Neville Dawes, did not hide his advocacy of the government’s plans. Speaking in 1975, Dawes used phrases such as “indigenous” and “cultural control” to market the revamped mission of the IOJ.<sup>58</sup> The concept of nationalism was brought in to provide additional support for the revamping exercise. It was reported that the policy “embarked on” was “attempting to make [the IOJ’s] implicit values and programme activities more relevant to the needs of Jamaica in the 1970s”.<sup>59</sup>

The emphasis that was placed on “cultural transmission” meant simply “bringing Jamaican manifestations of culture to the consciousness of the ordinary people”. In reality, however, it was interpreted to mean exploring and manifesting cultural heritage within the framework of a political ideology. An influential role was assigned to the African-Caribbean Institute of Jamaica (ACIJ), established in 1972. This division of the IOJ was a flagship institution in the involvement of government in culture. For one, Manley realised his goal to centralise African heritage. The ACIJ was “the government’s principal agency for the promulgation of information about Africa and the African cultural heritage as transmuted in Jamaica and the Caribbean”. Additionally, it was unmistakably “guided by the government’s general directive of 1972”, under which “programmes” were “devised so as to achieve a ‘multiplier’ effect upon the mass of the population”. Through the “focus on evidence of a continuing and virile African heritage”, the government promoted itself and its agenda. Although it was stated that the research was to be “non-racial”, Africa was the undeniable focus. The initiatives undertaken included developing relationships with Ghana to send and receive cultural researchers and practitioners. There was a yearly film festival featuring films about Tanzania, Ghana, Zambia, Swaziland, Liberia, Kenya, Angola, Mozambique and other African countries. Research was initiated on the presence of African languages

in Jamaican English. Of note was the search for “Kikongo, Nago, Twi, [and] Ibo” retentions.<sup>60</sup>

Centralisation was the main consideration made in the establishment of the National Gallery of Jamaica in 1974. The gallery had limited autonomy; it was placed under the broadened administrative reaches of the IOJ. The board of governors of the IOJ appointed the board of directors of the gallery, also its curatorial staff. Decisions taken about which of the works of art produced by Jamaicans were part of its “fine art” tradition were taken by gallery staff. Exhibitions organised to showcase these works in the gallery elevated their ascribed importance. Funding through “scholarships” and “fellowships” was available, but to persons who met the criteria of the gallery. Research done of “the history of Jamaican art” coincided with the expectations of the gallery.<sup>61</sup>

Under the new IOJ law, slated for implementation from 1977, the institution was to receive a reconstituted “Board of Governors under the name of ‘the Council’”. It had “additional functions” to ensure it materialised the policies of government, but more significantly, it gave government greater control over the IOJ.<sup>62</sup> The council was based on suggestions to establish an “Arts Council” made by the Exploratory Committee on the Arts that Manley convened in 1972 with Nettleford appointed as chair.<sup>63</sup> This committee was conscious of the risk of suppressing free artistic expression by proposing measures for greater government involvement in the arts. In its report, the committee strongly argued the point that

[t]he responsibility is placed on the community rather than on Government exclusively since the Committee saw the arts not as an instrument of propaganda but as an instrument of cultural growth and personality development. As such, Government, through practical help and constructive guidance, can act as a catalyst to help an activity which flourishes best if left to ferment on its own.<sup>64</sup>

Things turned out differently. As of 1977, the council proposed for the IOJ would “consist of twenty-five members” who were all “appointed by the [government] ministry” responsible for culture. Only five of the members were to be “Fellows of the Institute”. Nevertheless, the accolade of IOJ Fellow, awarded for “distinguished personal achievement in cultural activity”, was conferred on persons who met criteria approved by the government. The approval process was stringent and caution was taken when nominations were



considered. In terms of its operations, the proposed council was under “the minister”, who reserved the right to “appoint boards of management” to run the various “divisions of the institute” – its reference library, museums, projects, centres and publications.<sup>65</sup>

The Cultural Projection Programme and Junior Cultural Centres were also among the divisions of the IOJ. Part of the role these played involved giving “media” coverage to government’s accomplishments in areas of “cultural activities”. Persons sanctioned as sufficiently knowledgeable and capable were contacted as resource individuals to provide the materials used in the projection programme. They brought “demonstrations” to “primary schools, high schools and colleges” to spread the cultural information to the younger generation. “Jamaicans at home and overseas” were encouraged to interpret their culture based on the materials provided by the projection programme. The IOJ had three junior centres in Kingston, which made sure that “children” were included. The aim was to project “Jamaica’s cultural heritage in the widest sense”. Despite using the term “in the widest sense”, both the “content and techniques” were designed to “focus on Jamaican reality” which in the seventies was democratic socialism.<sup>66</sup>

A blatantly political decision was the association of the junior centres with the west Kingston community of Tivoli Gardens. This community was a stronghold of the JLP and was represented by the JLP leader since 1974, Edward Seaga. The West Kingston Trust operated the Tivoli Gardens Community Centre and was linked to the junior centres of government and “the central administrative point for a number of other centres in the community”. The participation of the trust was regarded as a seminal achievement. It promoted a number of cultural activities in that “working-class section of Kingston”.<sup>67</sup>


Not apparent was any initiative to reduce the ties of central government to cultural activity. Expenditure on culture remained the remit of the administration and continued to grow. The relationship maintained the government’s position as provider and chief operator. The IOJ and its divisions, for example, were not made self-sufficient and the thinking that this should happen was not visible. Government was its funding agent, giving J\$940,824 in 1975, which climbed to J\$1,471,711 in 1977.<sup>68</sup> The completion of the Cultural Training Centre in 1976 cost J\$2.6 million. The importance of this project for the officials was underscored, as Nettleford states, by its genesis in spite of the

economic crisis in 1973 due to worldwide oil shortages.<sup>69</sup> Marketing government undertakings was never better served than when massive spending was involved. The message was sent that it was a critical improvement. As an educational institution, the centre also sold itself.

Government gained access to all the major areas of cultural activity through the centre: “Art, Dance, Drama and Music”. The schools produced “teachers and cultural agents” and dispatched them to “the educational system at all levels, and for work with the community”. Training of personnel was slated as the “main priority” and emphasis was placed on its role in reducing class divisions. Selling this benefit of the centre was part of creating a consensus for the idea by linking it to the hopes and longings of the poor for betterment. It would improve “the quality of education offered in . . . public elementary schools” to level the field and achieve what “the education offered at expensive private schools available only to the rich” had presumably been doing.<sup>70</sup> The centre was vital to stabilising democratic socialist development. The same role was envisioned for the Jamaica Festival Commission which previously held the yearly Independence Festival as “a showcase for individual artistic expression”. This role was changed to emphasise community “awareness” and “a feeling of unity”, to “develop a sense of direction and generate a national spirit”. The commission therefore placed a lot of importance on “work in primary schools” to guarantee a future for the approved ideals. Popular music seminars gave valuable advice to young singers, but also gave lessons in what were considered as appropriate choices, covering even their “choice of materials”.<sup>71</sup>

## Conclusion

Free expression is the first causality of hegemony. It is hard to see the assaults against this freedom when the rhetoric of governing highlights the needs and wants of the people. Hegemonic rule ensures the mobilisation of a consensus that appears to reflect popular aspirations. The greatest achievement of the hegemon is to make the people believe that they are leading rather than being led. This masks the damage done to freedom and stabilises political ideologies. The ideology which is attached to popular aspirations becomes like a moveable feast. Regardless of the forum, whether it is areas of cultural activity or

something else, the ideology is maintained because of its identification with people's deepest desires and interests. But ideologies create specific pathways to the future and suppress alternatives and competing possibilities. In this essay, I have tried to show how Manley developed as a hegemonic leader in a context which provided him with the essentials for his projection of democratic socialism after 1974. Manley was by no means an exception with regards to his accomplishments in the area of hegemony in post-independence Jamaica. What is, however, unique about Manley is how well he captivated the Jamaican imagination, and the endurance, at many levels, of the conviction that his leadership signalled progress more than anything else. 

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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
## NOTES

1. Darrell E. Levi, *Michael Manley: The Making of a Leader* (Kingston: Heinemann Caribbean, 1989), 151.
2. For the criticisms of Manley, see Christopher Arawak, *Jamaica's Michael Manley: Messiah . . . Muddler . . . or Marionette* (Miami: Sir Henry Morgan Press, 1980). For views of how economic and social "conditions" were "worsening" in the seventies, see also Carl Stone, "UNESCO-Jamaica Government Survey Part 1: Ideology, Public Opinion and the Media in Jamaica" in *Perspectives on Jamaica in the Seventies*, ed. Carl Stone and Aggrey Brown (Kingston: Jamaica Publishing House, 1981), 314, 315. The *Daily Gleaner* and *Star* newspapers were critical of Manley as well. The *Gleaner* faced accusations "muckraking" and the creation of "excitement and near hysteria" because of its criticisms. See Aggrey Brown, "JBC News Commentary", 1 September 1978, in *Perspectives on Jamaica in the Seventies*, 367.
3. I am referring to the following literature: Anna Kasafi Perkins, *Justice as Equality: Michael Manley's Caribbean Vision of Justice* (New York: Peter Lang, 2010); Edward Seaga, *My Life and Leadership, Vol. 2: Hard Road to Travel, 1980–2008* (Oxford: Macmillan Education, 2010); Patrick E. Bryan, *Edward Seaga and the Challenges of Modern Jamaica* (Kingston: University of the West Indies Press, 2009); Delano Franklyn, comp. and ed., *Michael Manley: The Politics of Equality* (Kingston: Wilson


- Franklyn Barnes, 2009); *Edward Seaga, My Life and Leadership, Vol. 1: Clash of Ideologies, 1930–1980* (Oxford: Macmillan Education, 2009); Beverley Manley, *The Manley Memoirs* (Kingston: Ian Randle Publishers, 2008); Rachel Manley, *In My Father's Shade* (London: BlackAmber Books, 2004); Holger Henke, *Between Self-Determination and Dependency: Jamaica's Foreign Relations, 1972–1989* (Kingston: University of the West Indies Press, 2000); Brian Meeks, *Narratives of Resistance: Jamaica, Trinidad, the Caribbean* (Kingston: University of the West Indies Press, 2000); David Panton, *Jamaica's Michael Manley: The Great Transformation (1972–92)* (Kingston: Kingston Publishers, 1993); and Levi, *Michael Manley*.
4. For the assessment of cultural policy, I will be using Rex M. Nettleford, *Caribbean Cultural Identity: The Case of Jamaica, An Essay in Cultural Dynamics* (Kingston: Institute of Jamaica, 1978); and *Cultural Policy in Jamaica: A Study Prepared by the Institute of Jamaica* (Paris: UNESCO, 1977).
  5. Carl Boggs, *Gramsci's Marxism* (London: Pluto Press, 1976), 39.
  6. Philip G. Cerny, "Dilemmas of Operationalizing Hegemony", in *Hegemony and Power: Consensus and Coercion in Contemporary Politics*, ed. Mark Haugaard and Howard H. Lentner (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2006), 68.
  7. Mark Haugaard, "Conceptual Confrontations", in Haugaard and Lentner, *Hegemony and Power*, 4.
  8. *Ibid.*, 5. Also see Antonio Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, ed. and trans. Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1971), 9.
  9. Saul Newman, "Does Power Have a Place? Hegemony, Antagonism and Radical Politics", in Haugaard and Lentner, *Hegemony and Power*, 169, 170.
  10. Max Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization* (New York: The Free Press, 1964), 328.
  11. Nivedita Menon, "Power", in *Political Theory: An Introduction*, ed., Rajeev Bhargava and Ashok Acharya (Delhi: Darling Kindersley, 2008), 152.
  12. Øjvind Larsen, *The Right to Dissent: The Critical Principle in Discourse Ethics and Deliberative Democracy* (Copenhagen: Museum Tusulanum Press, 2009), 171, 172.
  13. Michael Manley, *The Politics of Change: A Jamaican Testament* (London: Andre Deutsch, 1974 [1973]), 92.
  14. David F. Ruccio, "Globalization and Imperialism", *Rethinking Marxism* 15, no.1 (January 2003): 76.
  15. Menon, "Power", 154.
  16. Perkins, *Justice as Equality*, 5.
  17. Bryan, *Edward Seaga*, 164–65.
  18. O. Nigel Bolland, *The Politics of Labour in the British Caribbean: The Social Origins of Authoritarianism and Democracy in the Labour Movement* (Kingston, Oxford and Princeton: Ian Randle, James Currey and Marcus Wiener, 2001), 517.

19. Manley, *The Manley Memoirs*, 113.
20. Mervyn C. Alleyne, *The Construction and Representation of Race and Ethnicity in the Caribbean and the World* (Kingston: University of the West Indies Press, 2005), 234.
21. B.W. Higman, *Slave Population and Economy in Jamaica, 1807–1834* (Kingston: The Press, University of the West Indies, 1995), 176.
22. Hans J. Massaquoi, “Jamaica: Its New Beginning Under New Leadership”, *Ebony*, October 1973, 38.
23. Robert J. Alexander, *A History of Organised Labour in the English-Speaking West Indies* (Westport and London: Praeder, 2004), 45.
24. Meeks, *Narratives of Resistance*, 124; Seaga, *My Life and Leadership, Vol. 1*, 205, 206.
25. Randolph B. Persaud, *Counter-Hegemony and Foreign Policy: The Dialectics of Marginalised and Global Forces in Jamaica* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2001), 126.
26. Colin Palmer, “Identity, Race, and Black Power in Independent Jamaica”, in *The Modern Caribbean*, ed. F.W. Knight and Colin Palmer (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1989), 111.
27. David Howard, *Kingston: A Cultural and Literary History* (Kingston: Ian Randle Publishers; Oxford: Signal Books, 2005), 213.
28. Carl Stone, quoted in Levi, *Michael Manley*, 128–29.
29. Franklyn, *Michael Manley*, 11.
30. Panton, *Jamaica’s Michael Manley*, 34.
31. For Manley’s alliances with the Rastafari, see Anthony Bogue, *Black Heretics, Black Prophets: Radical Political Intellectuals* (New York and London: Routledge, 2003), 154, 165. Under Manley, the PNP also developed close associations with reggae musicians, whose music was highly influenced by Rastafari, and which proved especially useful during the 1972 general elections. See Anita M. Waters, *Rastafari and Reggae in Jamaican Politics: Race, Class and Political Symbols* (New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 1999), 135, 134.
32. Bryan, *Edward Seaga*, 165, 173–75, 177–82.
33. Panton, *Jamaica’s Michael Manley*, 33.
34. Massaquoi, “Jamaica: Its New Beginning”, 38, 39.
35. Manley, *The Manley Memoirs*, 99.
36. Manley, *In My Father’s Shade*, 5.
37. Manley, *The Manley Memoirs*, 93.
38. *Ibid.*, 79.
39. Levi, *Michael Manley*, 150, 151.
40. *Ibid.*, 151.
41. Manley, *The Politics of Change*, 92.
42. See Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London and New York: Verso, 2006); and Ernest Renan, “What is

- a Nation?" in *Nation and Narration*, ed. Homi K. Bhabha (London and New York: Routledge, 1990), 18, 19.
43. Barbara Ward, *Nationalism and Ideology* (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1966), 17.
  44. Ania Loomba, *Colonialism and Postcolonialism* (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), 155.
  45. Homi K. Bhabha, "Introduction: Narrating the Nation", in *Nation and Narration*, I, 2.
  46. Eric J. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 10–11. Hobsbawm's complete list is "the assumptions, hopes, needs, longings and interest of ordinary people".
  47. Franklyn, *Michael Manley*, 91.
  48. Manley, *The Politics of Change*, 92, 155.
  49. *Ibid.*, 156.
  50. Nettleford, *Caribbean Cultural Identity*, 89, 90.
  51. Manley, *The Politics of Change*, 94.
  52. Seaga, *My Life and Leadership*, Vol. I, 117.
  53. This was from a speech by Edward Seaga in the seventies, quoted in Nettleford, *Caribbean Cultural Identity*, 82.
  54. *Cultural Policy in Jamaica*, 23.
  55. Manley, *The Politics of Change*, 156, 157.
  56. Franklyn, *Michael Manley*, 268.
  57. Meeks, *Narratives of Resistance*, 124.
  58. Nettleford, *Caribbean Cultural Identity*, III.
  59. *Cultural Policy in Jamaica*, 36.
  60. *Ibid.*, 36, 39, 37.
  61. *Ibid.*, 40.
  62. *Ibid.*
  63. For Nettleford's comments on the Exploratory Committee, see Nettleford, *Caribbean Cultural Identity*, 87–91.
  64. *Cultural Policy in Jamaica*, 27.
  65. *Ibid.*, 41.
  66. *Ibid.*, 42.
  67. *Ibid.*, 43.
  68. *Ibid.*, 46.
  69. Nettleford, *Caribbean Cultural Identity*, 110.
  70. *Cultural Policy in Jamaica*, 44.
  71. *Ibid.*, 48, 50.



Manley at a book signing, flanked by female admirers. Manley's intellectual persona suggested that he had the capacity to lead the country through the change towards democratic socialism. Picture courtesy of Herbert Hewett, published in an article by Jennifer Ffrench, "Manley's New Book Launched," *Daily News*, 3 February 1977.



Manley with his fourth wife, Beverley Manley, née Anderson, the woman who helped him to connect with the majority black population and to be seen as a leader who was deeply concerned about gender issues. This picture was taken after their wedding ceremony in 1972. Picture by Ashley Chin, courtesy of the National Library of Jamaica.