

drawing it they cause disaster, panic and ruin. If they wish to sell they loosen their hold upon the money market and the price of securities soars towards the sky. If they would buy, they tighten their grip, withdraw the money from circulation and panic prices prevail and misery runs riot in the community. Their will is potent in the councils of state and they decide the policies of cabinets. Nations go to peace or to war at their command and the welfare of continents depends on their will. They reign as supreme in the drawing-room as in the marts of trade and they control society with relentless hand. The church molds its creed to their belief and men's souls as well as their bodies are the slaves of the money power. Colleges receive their endowments from them, and the youth of the present generation, the fathers of the next, are trained in the social and political and economic ideas which the contributors to the college endowment approve, and have their ideas formed after the rich man's model.

No place seems free from their interference, no power sufficient to withstand their will.

Half a dozen men within easy telephone call of each other can meet on Wall street any afternoon and the American nation will sit still and wait till they adjourn.

Our fathers rose in their majesty and their might and fought a successful fight against the despotism of the king. The sons are made of no meaner clay than the fathers. Courage is not a thing of the past. The valiant man is not out of date and the people are really as powerful as ever—when they come to know it.

The struggle of our age and generation is not against the despotism of the king, but against the despotism of the dollar, and in any struggle for the amelioration of present conditions and the betterment of the lives and fortunes of the people, the sons of the men who stood behind the trenches at Bunker Hill, who went down to defeat and disaster but not disgrace at Long Island and Fort Washington, who followed the great commander in his campaign through the Jerseys and spent that long and weary and waiting, but all-important winter at Valley Forge, who stormed Bemis Heights and rode with Washington at Monmouth, who were with Greene and Morgan at Cowpens and King's Mountain and Eutaw Springs, and who witnessed the splendid triumph of our cause on the plains of Yorktown, will ever be ready, when the time comes, to

fight for financial and social freedom as they fought for political freedom a hundred and twenty-five years ago.

Do not misunderstand me. I am the surgeon diagnosing the wounds, not the mangled victim hovering between life and death. It is the general conditions, not the personal effect upon myself of which I complain. I have continued to steer my little boat with more or less success among the rocks that line the channel. I have even succeeded, they tell me, in harnessing my hundred-millionaire, crowned though he be, and making him pull as a tow-horse. Neither am I a prophet of evil. I do not believe that there is to be or that there is any need that there should be a military uprising among us. I do not think that the evils of which I have complained are evils that require blood-letting. They can be settled by men of peace and by peaceful methods. We have only to meet the enemy resolutely and they are ours. But just the same it requires a courage of no mean order to attack existing conditions. It requires leadership no less commanding than that of Washington, and followers no less devoted than those who followed him, to work out the salvation of the nation from the evils that now confront it.

PROPERTY AND MORALITY.

From an article on "Some Ethical Aspects of Ownership," by Prof. Richard T. Ely, in the *Cosmopolitan* for February, 1892.

Along with an alarming callousness about the rights of others, especially when those others are comparatively weak and defenseless, we have a growing body of men who desire to probe deeply their own consciences and to make their conduct square with the utterances of the "man within the breast." . . .

If it could be known how many people are, at the present time, more or less puzzled concerning ownership, and feel uneasy about their own position, all those who have not given thought to the matter would be astounded. It is rarely that one goes so far as to renounce one's private property, although such instances do occur; but doubt and uncertainty perplex many. Nearly all persons admit that private property has its legitimate place in the social order; but it is equally true that all who can be called normal in their moral nature recognize that private property has its limitations. What may I own? What may I not own? These are the puzzling ques-

tions. Every person with an ethical nature draws the line somewhere. May I own human beings? To this question diverse answers have been given, and the diversity of answers has led to much bloodshed in many lands and many ages. However, civilized men have at last, as an outcome of spiritual and physical conflict, reached a negative answer. It is felt that one man must not exist merely as a tool of another, without a definite end of his own, and that such existence is what slavery carries with it.

But may I own intoxicating beverages, and those forms of property which are connected with the traffic in intoxicating beverages? This question brings us into one of the great social conflicts of our day. Hundreds of thousands answer emphatically "No," and there are, too, hundreds of thousands who would shut out those who participate in such ownership from the sacraments of the Christian church, denying them the hope of heaven hereafter. On the other hand, there are hundreds of thousands who answer the question with an equally emphatic "Yes;" while between these two extremes we discover millions to whom the question is a troublesome one, suggesting no clear ethical answer.

But leaving this question, let us take up one which, to most people, demands a clear, unhesitating "Yes." May I own land? Yet we find thousands in recent years who say "No," and still a larger number of thousands who are more or less troubled by the question, having doubts in their mind. The writer recalls a case of a clergyman, to whom he was showing some suburban landed property and the beautiful views it afforded. This clergyman said: "I could not own this land." Subsequent conversation developed the fact that he had gone out of his way to avoid land-ownership in the neighborhood of a city, although it came naturally to him, and would have brought him large wealth. He had become imbued with the ideas of Henry George, and thought the private ownership of land not ethically allowable. . . .

Man's progress in material wealth, and all that goes with it, implies control and regulation of the requisites of production. Organized society establishes this control through the institution of property; and when, as in the case of land, the decision is in favor of private prop-

erty and not public property, the land is handed over to individuals as a social trust. It is to be well utilized, to furnish food and clothing to man, and sites for his dwellings. If we reflect on what this implies, do we not readily perceive that it throws a flood of light on the question: What may I own?

If private property is a trust from society, a social institution, an individual as an individual cannot change it. We must make use of external valuable things, and we are responsible as members of society, and not as individuals, for the institution of private property in its present form. It is not for the individual to change the institution of private property in land. If the individual thinks that some other form of landed property is better than the present, he may advocate a change, but then he must leave it to society to make this change or not.

But there is something more to be said than that. If private property is a social trust, has the individual a right to refuse that trust? Is it not incumbent upon the individual to show good grounds for such a refusal? Let us take for illustration our clergyman who was convinced that the private ownership of land was not consistent with justice. Might not society address him in this wise? "Private property in land is a social institution and is a social trust. Accept this trust and use it for the interests of society. You say that you think the public ownership of land in some form or another would be a good thing, but that is not something of which society has as yet become convinced. The social mind is not yet persuaded. Private property in land exists as a matter of fact, and it involves a trust—that is to say, not only a privilege but an obligation."

Is not this position sound? If our clergyman believes that nationalization, so called, of the land is in the interests of society, he may attempt to persuade others that such is the case, while at the same time he accepts the trust of private property in land. Is it not evident that if he refuses the trust, it may fall into the hands of less conscientious persons, who will not make so good a use of it as he can? If, indeed, he conscientiously believes that the great thing needed, the thing above all others, is the nationalization of land, let him use the income of his private landed property to advance his view. It is not our purpose to argue concerning the correctness of

his view; we simply take the case as an illustration.

The argument which has just been advanced applies manifestly to the ownership of gas stock, railway stock, telephone and telegraph lines, etc. Of course, it is an entirely different thing, and one which needs no consideration at present, when a man on account of his private interests refrains from an expression of his own opinion, or attempts to suppress the expression of opinion by others. . . . We must have the regulation afforded either by public property or by private property in the case of land, of gas supply, of railway services, etc. But it may be asked: Does the social theory of property carry, then, no limitations upon the rights of ownership? Take the case of gambling halls and resorts of vice in cities. Can a person who tries to regulate his conduct by ethical consideration own property which is used to promote gambling or other vices? Certainly not. Here we have not to do with simply a question of expediency. The question is not: Shall we have public or private ownership? It is not admitted that the pursuits just mentioned are desirable. What the ethically sound person wants in these cases is entire suppression, or the nearest possible approach thereto. Consequently, no one who attempts to govern his conduct by ethical considerations will participate in evil pursuits and occupations through ownership of property.

But to return to our question of the traffic in intoxicating beverages. May a person own property connected in any way with such traffic? The answer depends precisely upon the view which one takes of the liquor traffic. If we think it a necessary and desirable thing, and all that is wanted is moderation in the use of intoxicating beverages, then we cannot condemn the persons who own the property in which the traffic is carried on with an honest effort to avoid anything which promotes excessive indulgence. But if we say that this traffic in intoxicating beverages works evil and only evil, then we must condemn those who own property used for saloons, or otherwise consciously and purposely connected with the traffic in intoxicating beverages. . . .

It is hoped that what has been said will be helpful theoretically and practically in working out ethical aspects of ownership; and in conclusion, the following is offered in a tentative way as what may be called the ethical law of ownership: When the service or commodity furnished is socially desir-

able, private property in the goods connected with the traffic or business is ethically permissible, if legally allowed. When the service or commodity furnished is socially injurious, private property in the good connected with the traffic or business is reprehensible, whether legally allowed or not.

MAYOR JOHNSON'S WAY.

NO POLITICAL ASSESSMENTS.

Superintendent of Streets John Wilhelm was discharged by Director Salen at the instigation of Mayor Johnson, yesterday afternoon. Mr. Johnson stated that there were a number of reasons for Wilhelm's removal, but that the primary cause was that he had attempted to levy a political assessment in his department.

A few days ago Superintendent Wilhelm caused his secretary to make out notes to be sent to each employe of his department requesting an assessment of one per cent. of their salaries for campaign purposes, this fall. These notes were not taken in a kindly spirit by some of the jobholders, and a copy was presented to Mayor Johnson. The mayor at once sent for Director Salen and declared that Wilhelm must be decapitated.

As the mayor and Salen were leaving the city hall together they encountered Wilhelm on the sidewalk.

"You have been making trouble," said the mayor to Wilhelm.

"What do you mean?" asked Wilhelm.

"You tell him," said the mayor to Salen, as he stepped into his carriage.

Salen and Wilhelm went to the office of the director of public works, and Salen accused the superintendent of having attempted to levy a political assessment in spite of direct orders from the mayor that no assessments were to be raised. Wilhelm admitted the charge, and Salen announced that the mayor wished Wilhelm to hand in his resignation. Wilhelm flatly refused to comply with this request. He told Salen he had no reason for resigning, and said that if he wanted to get rid of him he would have to discharge him.

Salen attempted to reason with him, but without avail. He then told Wilhelm that he had better think the matter over. Wilhelm left Salen's office, and a short time later his discharge was upon his desk.

Mr. Johnson is very strongly opposed to political assessments of all kinds and had supposed that none were being levied under his administration. The mayor said that he had