

meets every two weeks in some large hall, usually the lecture hall of one of the big High Schools, and Mr. Damaschke, or another of the leaders of the party, gives the main lecture of the evening, following out a regular schedule for the study of economics. The main points of the theme are written on the blackboard, and discussion follows, the whole being planned and carried out on the line of a High School Upper class. The hall is filled to overflowing almost every meeting and scarcely a night that does not add one or two new members to the League.



## HERBERT SPENCER.

### THE STORY OF HIS RECANTATION.

*(For the Review.)*

BY HENRY GEORGE, JR.

During the morning of December 8, 1903, Herbert Spencer died on his little estate at Brighton, England, quietly and without pain, in his eighty-fourth year. As by his previously expressed wish, his body was reduced to ashes; and thus passed the expounder of the Synthetic Philosophy.

Spencer had set himself the most ambitious of all philosophical tasks: that of explaining, by a process of synthesis or building-up, the scheme of the world and all that is therein. He constructed a formula that he called the law of evolution, and which he believed explained the process of development of matter and mind; a process, in the words of William Henry Hudson, ranging from "the unrolling of a planetary system to the sprouting of a wayside flower; and from the genesis of intelligence to the latest variations of social life."

Spencer had in his first book, "Social Statics," more than fifty years ago, predicated a world, created by God, whose name he constantly used, and whose Divine Will, he asserted, constituted the natural order and the essence of social justice. When, later, Spencer began to build up, by what he assumed to be a purely scientific method, a universal philosophy, he declared the idea of God was merely a notion derived by savages from sight of their own shadows; that the origin of things, so far as men could know, was force; that back of that was the Unknowable; that beginning with force, matter and motion, and their integration and dissipation, brought forth all the physical things that we know; that from the mutations of matter and motion came also the developments of the mind; and that thus the process of evolution goes forward, until the reverse process of dissolution resolves things back to their beginning, force; when another cycle of the integration of matter and dissipation of motion begins.

Spencer's Synthetic Philosophy may satisfy those who are willing to follow what they believe to be strictly scientific methods. But to others it is as inconclusive as that philosopher's definition of his root word, evolution: "An integration of matter and a dissipation of motion, during which the matter passes from an indefinite, incoherent, homogeneity to a definite, coherent, heterogeneity, and during which the retained motion undergoes a parallel transformation." What causes the integration of matter and the dissipation of motion? Force. And who or what created force? That is unknowable. Thus it comes that Spencer's Philosophy merely means the expounding of materialism. The world, the solar system, stellar space—what are they? Matter and motion in their myriad mutations, working, working, working.

And what, then, is this thing we call humanity? The veriest flotsam and jetsam of physical forces—matter integrating, motion dissipating.

If, then, we begin with force and develop to what we are through changes of matter and motion, what, at the best, does human life amount to but a Summer's afternoon butterfly, a snail creeping across a log, a passing feathery cloud! Why should the more fortunate think of the toil and trouble of others; why should there be restraint, sacrifice, heroic deeds? If force is the genesis of all things that we can know, and if men themselves are but the creatures of force, would not the more fortunate but follow the law of their being if they made force the rule of social life, if they used force to obtain the satisfactions of desire? And what would this be but an adaptation of the law which Spencer says rules in the animal world below man—"the survival of the fittest?"

These are the conclusions that some will draw from Spencer's Synthetic Philosophy as expounded in his five grand divisions, beginning with "First Principles." All endeavors to explain it otherwise will to them be the making of distinctions that do not bear—be but the piling on of words.

On the other hand, to thousands and tens of thousands, Spencer has been a "guide, philosopher and friend." The more rational ones have thought that perhaps he went too wide of the old symbols; that he may have given his teachings too much the aspect of strict materialism inasmuch that since beyond a certain point human scientific inquiry cannot go, he had dismissed that from the formula of the scheme of things, as "Unknowable," and thus seemingly supported that phase of atheism, which, at start, making the negative declaration that the First Cause is shrouded in eternal mystery, so that none can say what it is, comes at last to its antonym, and makes the positive declaration that there is no God.

Yet large numbers of men have paid and will yet pay to Spencer the sincere homage due to one who awakens a realization of a stupendous and magnificent truth—the universal reign of law. To many such men this truth fills the heart and mind, and from the moment when it flashes upon them, all else appears unimportant by comparison.

This was not the supreme consideration with Spencer himself, however. The five grand divisions of his philosophy were: "First Principles," "the Principles of Biology," "the Principles of Psychology," "the Principles of Sociology," and "the Principles of Morality," or, as frequently described, "the Principles of Ethics." To this last division Spencer said "all the preceding parts are subsidiary." Of "the Principles of Morality" the final and most important part dealt with "The Ethics of Social Life: Justice."

According to Spencer, the first principle of justice gives "every man freedom to do all that he wills, provided he infringes not the equal freedom of any other man." In "Social Statics," the book from which his synthetic philosophy developed, Spencer deduced from this law of equal freedom "the right of each man to the use of the earth, limited only by the like rights of his fellow-men," \* \* \* "the maintenance of this right necessarily" forbidding "private property in land." And Spencer specifically declared: "However, difficult it is to embody that theory in fact, equity sternly commands it to be done."

Here, at beginning, was a philosophy that had its roots in the ground, that decreed that men should, as a fundamental right of their being, have equal access to nature upon which and from which they must subsist. Spencer declared this to be the corner-stone of Justice.

Yet in the final development of his philosophy, Spencer indirectly, evasively and with a great cloud of words, renounced this declaration and took means to justify private property in land.

What is all the philosophy in the world to the man who has hunger gnaw-

ing at his vitals? How great a mockery it is to discourse on Supreme Law and Order to men who are bereft of their inheritance in natural opportunities and who have to sell themselves into the veriest slavery to obtain subsistence? What can the principle of evolution seem like to those deprived of their natural rights but a merciless principle of force that seizes and crushes the many for the benefit of the few?

This is the great indictment against Herbert Spencer. In his early years he saw and plainly declared the truth of equal rights to the earth. In his later years he saw the same truth, but he denied it.

Herbert Spencer was born in the village of Derby, in the Midlands of England, on April 27, 1820. His health was delicate and he kept in the open air as much as possible and was not sent to school. His father, who was a school teacher, instructed the boy for a time himself and later gave him into the charge of Herbert's uncle, the Rev. Thomas Spencer, a clergyman in the Established Church. The boy showed a marked aptitude for mechanics and mathematics, and his studies were mainly in the direction of civil engineering. When 16 he invented and published in the *Civil Engineers' and Architects' Journal* a theorem in descriptive geometry, and he assisted his father in philosophical experiments. At 17 he began to earn his living as a civil engineer on the London & Birmingham Railway, under Charles Fox, who afterwards constructed the Crystal Palace. Young Spencer followed this vocation for eight or nine years, when an industrial depression threw him out of work. He returned to his father's roof for a while.

But he had before that published various articles in the *Civil Engineers' and Architects' Journal*, and these were succeeded by a series of letters on the "Proper Sphere of Government," in the *Non-Conformist* newspaper. The reception of these writings, even if small, together with his hard experience at engineering, determined Mr. Spencer to adopt literature for a living. In 1848 he obtained a position on the *Economist* newspaper, then under the management of its proprietor, Mr. James Wilson, M. P.?

This engagement lasted for four years, during the first two of which he wrote his first book, "Social Statics; or, the Conditions Essential to Human Happiness Specified, and the First of Them Developed." This book attracted some attention, although the extent of its circulation may be judged from the fact that fourteen years were required for the disposal of the first edition of only 750 copies. Nevertheless, Mr. Spencer was invited to contribute to the pages of the *Westminster Review*, which had been established in 1832 by Bentham, for many years had received contributions from James Mill, and to which, from 1835 to 1840, the latter's son, John Stuart Mill, had been chief contributor. This periodical is still flourishing in England and publishes so many articles advocating the Single Tax idea that that principle may be set down as one of the chief tenets of its teachings.

Five years after "Social Statics" appeared, Mr. Spencer published his second book, "The Principles of Psychology," preceded and followed by several magazine articles. In his "Psychology" he showed the principle of evolution as applied to the phenomena of mind. In 1860 he issued a descriptive programme for the development of a system of synthetic philosophy, in which the principle of evolution should be applied to all classes of phenomena. To this work all the rest of his life was devoted.

It is possible that this plan would not have been carried out had it not been for American support. For the British reception of Spencer's "Psychology" had been scarcely better than that accorded to "Social Statics," twelve years being required to dispose of less than eight hundred copies. Publishers were reluctant to undertake the printing of such slow-selling books. John Stuart Mill, who became interested in Spencer's plan, suggested getting up a guarantee

fund. But this Spencer did not find necessary, as an American publishing house, D. Appleton & Co. of New York, had become interested in "Social Statics" and the "Psychology." It welcomed the idea of the series of works, agreeing to pay a liberal royalty, and it was in the United States and through the Appleton publishing house that Spencer's books had very much the largest part of their circulation. D. Appleton & Co. have sold considerably more than one hundred thousand copies of his books, all told. With this American support, the English philosopher was enabled to make arrangements for the publication of his system of works in England.

Spencer obtained recognition in England only slowly. Yet his life soon fell in pleasant places. For years he spent much of his time at the Atheneum Club, and apparently its more conservative atmosphere wrought a marked change in the philosopher's social views. He had been a poor young man of but thirty, without embarrassing acquaintances among the class of "vested wrongs" when he had published "Social Statics." He had denounced in extended, explicit and emphatic language private property in land, naming specific cases of tyranny growing out of private ownership of the soil. But the Atheneum Club and Spencer's growing reputation as a philosopher brought acquaintanceships and friendships among the privileged, with the consequence that the uncompromising declarations of the poor young philosopher for equal rights in land melted away; giving place to such qualifications, "ifs and buts and excepts" as to leave land ownership strengthened in private hands and to keep nineteen-twentieths out of their birth-right.

To appreciate the change that occurred in Spencer it is only necessary to look at his earlier and some of his latter utterances touching rights in land. His earlier views were chiefly set forth in Chapter IX. of "Social Statics," entitled "The Right to the Use of the Earth," which right, he held, was equal among all men and was "immediately deducible from the law of equal freedom," the primary law of social ethics. Listen to the words of the young philosopher of 1850:

Given a race of beings having like claims to pursue the objects of their desires—given a world adapted to the gratification of those desires—a world into which those beings are similarly born, and it unavoidably follows that they have equal rights to the use of the world. For if each of them "has freedom to do all that he wills, provided he infringes not the equal freedom of any other," then each of them is free to use the earth for the satisfaction of his wants, provided he allows all others the same liberty. And conversely, it is manifest that no one, or part of them, may use the earth in such a way as to prevent the rest from similarly using it; seeing that to do this is to assume greater freedom than the rest, and consequently to break the law.

Equity, therefore, does not permit property in land. \* \* \* Supposing the entire habitable globe to be enclosed, it follows that if the landowners have a valid right to the surface, all who are not landowners, have no right at all to its surface. Hence, such can exist on the earth by sufferance only. They are all trespassers. Save by the permission of the lords of the soil, they can have no room for the soles of their feet. Nay, should the others think fit to deny them a resting place, these landless men might equitably be expelled from the earth altogether. \* \* \*

Passing from the consideration of the possible, to that of the actual, we find yet further reason to deny the rectitude of property in land. It can never be pretended that the existing titles to such property are legitimate. Should anyone think so, let him look in the chronicles. Violence, fraud, the prerogative of force, the claims of superior cunning—these are the sources to which those titles may be traced. The original deeds were written by the sword, rather than with the pen. \* \* \* Could valid claims be thus constituted? And if one act of transfer can give no title, can many? No: though *nothing* be multiplied forever, it will not produce *one*.

"But time," say some, "is a great legalizer." \* \* \* How long does it take for what was originally *wrong* to grow into a *right*? At what rate per annum do invalid claims become valid? \* \* \*

Whether it may be expedient to admit claims of a certain standing, is not the point. We have here nothing to do with considerations of conventional privilege or legislative convenience. We have simply to inquire what is the verdict given by pure equity in the matter. And this

verdict enjoins a protest against every existing pretension to the individual possession of the soil; and dictates the assertion, that the right of mankind at large to the earth's surface is still valid; all deeds, customs, and laws notwithstanding.

Not only have present land tenures an indefensible origin, but it is impossible to discover any mode in which land *can* become private property. \* \* \*

It does indeed at first sight seem possible for the earth to become the exclusive possession of individuals by some process of equitable distribution. \* \* \* But \* \* \* who are to be the allottees? Shall adult males, and all who have reached twenty-one on a specified day, be the fortunate individuals? If so, what is to be done with those who come of age on the morrow? Is it proposed that each man, woman and child shall have a section? If so, what becomes of all who are to be born next year? \* \* \*

Until \* \* \* we can produce a valid commission authorizing us to make this distribution—until it can be proved that God has given one charter of privileges to one generation, and another to the next—until we can demonstrate that men born after a certain date are doomed to slavery, we must consider that no such allotment is permissible.

Probably some will regard the difficulties inseparable from individual ownership of the soil, as caused by pushing to excess a doctrine applicable only within rational limits. This is a very favorite style of thinking with some. There are people who hate anything in the shape of exact conclusions; and these are of them. According to such, the right is never in either extreme, but always half way between the extremes. They are continually trying to reconcile *Yes* and *No*. *Ifs* and *buts* and *excepts* are their delight. \* \* \*

But it behooves such to recollect that ethical truth is as exact and as peremptory as physical truth; and that in this matter of land-tenure, the verdict of morality must be distinctly *yea* or *no*. Either men *have* a right to make the soil private property, or they *have not*. There is no medium. We must choose one of the two positions. There can be no half-and-half opinion. In the nature of things the fact must be one way or the other.

If men *have not* such a right, we are at once delivered from the several predicaments already pointed out. If they *have* such a right, then is that right absolute, sacred, not on any pretence to be violated. If they *have* such a right, then is his Grace of Leeds justified in warning off tourists from Ben Mac Dhui, the Duke of Atholl in closing Glen Tilt, the Duke of Buccleugh in denying sites to the Free Church, and the Duke of Sutherland in banishing the Highlanders to make room for sheep-walks. \* \* \*

“But to what does this doctrine, that men are equally entitled to the use of the earth, lead? Must we return to the times of unenclosed wilds, and subsist on roots, berries and game? Or are we to be left to the management of Messrs. Fourrier, Owen, Louis Blanc & Co.?”

Neither. Such a doctrine is consistent with the highest state of civilization; may be carried out without involving a community of goods; and need cause no very serious revolution in existing arrangements. The change required would simply be a change of landlords. \* \* \* Instead of paying his rent to the agent of Sir John or his Grace, he would pay it to an agent, or deputy agent of the community. Stewards would be public officials, instead of private ones; and tenancy the only land tenure. \* \* \*

A state of things so ordered would be in perfect harmony with the moral law. Under it all men would be equally landlords; all men would be alike free to become tenants. \* \* \* Clearly, therefore, on such a system, the earth might be inclosed, occupied and cultivated, in entire subordination to the law of equal freedom.

No doubt great difficulties must attend the resumption, by mankind at large, of their rights to the soil. The question of compensation to existing proprietors is a complicated one. \* \* \*

But with our perplexity and our extraction from it, abstract morality has no concern. Men having got themselves into the dilemma by disobedience to the law, must get out of it as well as they can; and with as little injury to the landed class as they may.

Meanwhile, we shall do well to recollect, that there are others besides the landed class to be considered. In our tender regard for the vested interests of the few, let us not forget that the rights of the many are in abeyance; and must remain so, as long as the earth is monopolized by individuals. \* \* \* It may by-and-by be perceived that Equity utters dictates to which we have not yet listened; and that men may learn that to deprive others of their rights to the use of the earth, is to commit a crime inferior only in wickedness to the crime of taking away their lives or personal liberties.

Reviewing the argument, we see that the right of each man to the use of the earth, limited only by the like rights of his fellow men, is immediately deducible from the law of equal freedom \* \* \* and that however difficult it may be to embody that theory in fact, Equity sternly commands it to be done.

This is the substance of the famous chapter of “*Social Statics*.” Spencer did not see the simple method of taxing rent into the public treasury; the word “land” in his mind seemed to mean what, singularly enough, it seems to mean to most of the English economists, namely, agricultural land; he did not make clear what he thought about compensation, although elsewhere he shows

that his words would have applied only to improvements and not to land; and he fell into a confusion toward the end of the chapter about *equal* rights and *joint* rights, two very different things. While all these may be shortcomings, (and they are fully examined in my father's history of Spencer's various utterances on the land question, under title of "A Perplexed Philosopher") the chapter is remarkable, nevertheless, for its clear and emphatic declaration that private property in land is wrong, "all deeds, customs and laws notwithstanding;" it waves aside all compromises, "all ifs and buts and excepts," and says that no matter what the cost, Justice sternly commands that equal rights to the land be observed, since that is requisite to the exercise of the first principle of justice, the principle that "every man has freedom to do all that he wills, provided he infringes not the equal freedom of any other man."

This was strong doctrine, but "Social Statics" had little circulation. Even had it had large circulation, the landed interests were not at that time roused to any sense of insecurity of their institution. Spencer, however, did not press his land doctrine. He was drawn off into a development of other phases of his philosophy. And so this land utterance lay dormant until the appearance, in 1879, of "Progress and Poverty," in which quotations were made from Chapter IX of "Social Statics." The remarkable circulation of "Progress and Poverty" and the Irish land agitation about that time brought the land question into hot and general discussion. In 1882 a cheap edition of "Progress and Poverty" appeared in Great Britain and had a phenomenal sale. The *London Times*, the *Quarterly Review* and other important journals and periodicals reviewed and criticised it. In the course of these comments the quotation from "Social Statics" came in for notice and at length Spencer was charged with attacking private property in land.

The Herbert Spencer of the 80's was not the Herbert Spencer of the 50's. The early Spencer had been a poor young man who had no regard for "the vested rights of Sir John or his Grace" and boldly asserted "the rights of the many." The later Spencer had made his peace with "Sir John and his Grace" and was anxious to help conserve their special privileges. Hence it was that Spencer in 1882 sent a letter to the *St. James's Gazette*, in which, with some shuffling, he said that the criticised statements on the land question were garbled quotations from a book written thirty-two years before, which book he had "since withdrawn from circulation in England."

The fact was that "Social Statics" had been printed from type, not stereotyped plate, so that after the exhaustion of the first edition, no more copies were printed in that country, the type having long since been distributed. But editions had been printed continuously in the United States from plates made there, and sheets of the American print had been sent to England to supply all British demands.

Nothing more was heard of the matter for half a dozen years. In November, 1889, Mr. John Morley, M.P., was interviewed by some of his constituents, among them Mr. John Laidler, a bricklayer, who spoke in behalf of nationalization of the land. Morley dissented and Laidler, in support of his own position, quoted passages from Chapter IX of "Social Statics." The *London Times*, published a report of the proceedings, and that turned public attention on Spencer's land doctrines again. This brought a long letter from Spencer to that newspaper. Again he shuffled. Among other things he said:

The work referred to—"Social Statics"—was intended to be a system of political ethics—absolute political ethics, or that which ought to be, as distinguished from relative political ethics, or that which is at present the nearest practicable approach to it.

One has only to refer to the foregoing extracts from "Social Statics" to see how misleading was this description of that book. "Equity does not per-

mit property in land " it said and in the plainest terms it declared that the first principle of justice—that every man has freedom to do all that he wills, provided he infringes not the equal freedom of any other man—could not be applied until the monopoly of land should be abolished and equal rights to it observed.

This Morley-Laidler incident and report in the *Times* led to letters from Professor Huxley and others, who wanted to know just what Spencer meant, none of them apparently having seen a copy of "Social Statics." Spencer noticed only Huxley, meeting him by evading the main points and raising other questions.

There the case rested for a while, during which Spencer got out a new edition of "Social Statics." But it was not a reprint of the old edition of 1850, which had been continuously published in the United States. The new "Social Statics" was "abridged and revised." Of it my father, in his full history of the whole matter ("A Perplexed Philosopher") said: "It has been disemboweled, stuffed, mummified, and set up in the gardens of the Spencerian Philosophy, where it may be viewed with entire complacency by Sir John and his Grace."

Of the old Chapter IX entitled: "The Right to the Use of the Earth," brief passages condemning Socialism and giving no idea of the significance of the former chapter were published and given the title of "Socialism."

About this time the final part of the last grand division of Spencer's Synthetic Philosophy was published. It was the part called "The Ethics of Social Life: Justice," that part to which all the rest of the philosophy led up. Chapter XI treated of rights to land and to light and air, which properly should be included in the term "land," but which were there treated as independent of it. The chapter was entitled "The Right to the Use of Natural Media." The limitations of space prevent the publication of the chapter in full here and the presentation of extracts would give no adequate idea of it. I shall content myself with offering my father's description of it ("A Perplexed Philosopher," Part III, Chapter VIII):

We are told that when private property in land did arise, it was habitually incomplete, since it was subject to the claims of the over-lord, the implication being that the ownership was subordinate to the head of the community; and that this conception survives alike in theory and in practice to the present time, since the state now takes land for public purposes after making due compensation to existing holders. The supreme power of the monarch having been replaced by the supreme power of the people, the people are now the supreme owners of the land, and may take it, if they please, on payment of full compensation. Thus, individual freedom has been reacquired with regard to land, and to-day, in the existing theory and practice of English law, and like their equal rights to light and air, the equal rights of all to the use of land are fully recognized.

\* \* \* \* \*

If we put the conclusion as to the right to the use of land to which Mr. Spencer thus comes in "Justice" in the same form which he uses in "Social Statics" we have this:

Given a race of beings having like claims to pursue the objects of their desires—given a world adapted to the gratification of those desires—a world into which such beings are similarly born, and it unavoidably follows that they have the right to use this world as soon as they have paid the full value of it to those of their number who call themselves its owners.

That this is not in any way an unfair or gratuitous condensation of Spencer's changed position in respect to equal rights of land may be seen by any who will examine for himself that philosopher's later writings. And let this examination be extended to the extraordinary "Appendix B" of "The Ethics of Social Life: Justice."

This "Appendix B" is a long supplement to the chapter on "The Right to the Use of Natural Media." Beginning with the assertion that private property in land had its origin through blood and iron" he endeavors to prove

the impracticability of doing justice to those who were originally robbed of their rights, or to their descendents. Who were the robbers and who the robbed, and who are their descendents? No one can tell. Hence "that bitter feeling towards the landed which contemplation of the past generates in many of the landless, is in great measure misplaced." But "even suppose that the present landowners are the posterity of those who spoiled their fellows, which in large part they are not," we must take account of that which the people at large "have received in the form of a share of the returns"—that is, of poor-law relief. The entire cost of the administration of the poor law "since the 43d Elizabeth (1601) in England and Wales" has been £734,000,000. That is, this £734,000,000 was "given to the poorer members of the landless class during three centuries" out of charges levied mainly on the land, for "a land owner, who is at the same time a Queen's Counsel, frequently employed professionally to arbitrate in questions of local taxation," estimates that at least £500,000,000 of this sum came out of land taxation.

In his articles (1884) on "The Coming Slavery" and "The Sins of Legislators," Spencer had declared that the poor-law charges had been borne not by the landlords but by the "diligent and provident laborer" and by the "half-pauperized laborer." But ignoring these, as he had ignored other earlier utterances, Mr. Spencer chose to assume in this "Appendix B." of "Justice," that if the landless had any claim to the land of England, it must be to "the land in its primitive, unsubdued state, furnishing nothing but wild animals and wild fruits;" and that against such a claim the landlords had "perhaps a larger claim," namely, the £500,000,000 (in round figures, \$2,500,000,000) which they had paid into the public treasury for poor-law relief to the landless. And then says Spencer, in recantation of his early declaration that "Equity does not permit private property in land":

When, in "Social Statics," published in 1850, I drew from the law of equal freedom the corollary that the land could not equitably be alienated from the community, and argued that, after compensating its existing holders, it should be re-appropriated by the community, I overlooked the foregoing considerations. Moreover, I did not clearly see what would be implied by the giving of compensation for all that value which the labor of ages has given to the land. While as shown in Chapter XI., [of "Justice"] I adhere to the inference originally drawn, that the aggregate of men forming the community are the supreme owners of the land—an inference harmonizing with legal doctrine and daily acted upon in legislation—a fuller consideration of the matter has led me to the conclusion that individual ownership, subject to state suzerainty, should be maintained.

Here is Spencer flat for "individual ownership" of land, and yet he says that he adheres "to the inference originally drawn, that the aggregate of men forming the community are the supreme owners of the land." What was that original inference, as expressed in "Social Statics in 1850?" Here are the words from that book:

Given a race of beings having like claims to pursue the objects of their desires, given a world adapted to the gratification of those desires—a world into which such beings are similarly born, and it unavoidably follows that they have equal rights to the use of the world. \* \* \* Equity therefore does not permit private property in land. \* \* \* The right of mankind at large to the earth's surface is still valid; all deed, customs and laws notwithstanding.

Soon after the appearance of "Justice," the final volume of Spencer's Synthetic Philosophy, my father reviewed all of Spencer's utterances on the land question in "A Perplexed Philosopher," and commenting on the English philosopher's recantation in Chapter XI of "Justice," ("The Right to the Use of Natural Media") my father then passed this heavy judgment:

Try Herbert Spencer by the ideas he once held—the idea of a Living God, whose creatures we are, and the idea of a divine order, to which we are bound to conform. Or try him by



what he now professes—the idea that we are but the evolutionary results of the integrations of matter and motion. Try him by the principles of “Social Statics,” or try him by the principles of “Justice.” In this chapter he proves himself alike a traitor to all that he once held and to all that he now holds—a conscious and deliberate traitor, who assumes the place of the philosopher, the office of the judge, only to darken truth and to deny justice; to sell out the right of the wronged and to prostitute his powers in the defence of the wronger.

Henry George wrote this in 1892. He died five years later, with no change of view as to Spencer. Spencer had up to that time neither directly nor indirectly taken notice of the charge, nor did he later. He lived for twelve years after this terrific arraignment. They were twelve years of silence on the land question.

“Say only good of the dead” is the ancient prescript, This can apply only to the private life of a man. Spencer was hailed as “the first philosopher of all time;” his works live after him. Because of that, posterity must quote his own words from “Social Statics,” written when he was a free man: “To deprive others of their right to the use of the earth, is to commit a crime inferior only in wickedness to the crime of taking away their lives or personal liberties.” And under this quotation posterity must write this sentence: “Herbert Spencer himself, when he was no longer a free man, aided and abetted this great crime.”



## THE WAITER.

(For the Review).

BY BOLTON HALL.

A lazy youth just loafed around holding down barrels at the corner grocery. Bye and Bye his uncle left him a farm, but he let it run to weeds. He said, “Why waste breath and energy in hustling when everything that others earn will come to him who waits?”

He didn't look for a place as a waiter; but he held things so well that he held the farm in the path of progress until he sold it out for a big price.

Moral: Remember thy Creator in the days of thy youth and get some of His land.

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“There is no man alive, however he may strive,  
 Allowed to own the work of his own hands.  
 Landlords and waterlords, at all the roads and fords,  
 Taking their tolls, imposing their commands.

Not until he is made the lord of his own trade,  
 Can any man be glad or strong or free;  
 There looms the coming war. Which captain are you for,  
 The chartered wrong, or Christ and liberty?”

*From Bliss Carman's "Lincoln" Ode.*

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“Go build a great city—a city without slums—a city of inspiration—a buoyant, hopeful, beautiful city—a city in whose glory we of the West and South can participate—a world city, hospitable and splendid, modern and prophetic, and when you have done that, behold! you will find your sister cities walking with even pace by your side, your rivals only in the ways of civic worth and civic beauty.”—Hamlin, Garland, “New York a City of Power,” in *Metropolitan Magazine*, for December.