

plexioned, like all Lancashire people, full of the joy of life, the patron of Blackpool and the Isle of Man, their gigantic palaces of amusement and of the dance, she has to start life in the hot atmosphere of the mill while she is still a girl, and often she leaves there much of the brightness of the eye and the lightness of the heart with which she begins existence. You see her later on in life when she has become the matron with her large brood of robust girls and boys, staid, serious, but yet with the remnants of her girlish light heartedness in her passionate interest in politics. How well do I remember those meetings in Leigh, crowded with women all wearing the red ribbons of the Liberal party, full of enthusiastic faith in their principles, and giving to those who defended these principles an affectionate greeting that might well move the most impassive of men. This is the kind of constituency which it is worth representing, and Alderman Raffan is to be congratulated on holding such a seat. He has to fight not only the Tory but also a Labor candidate—one of those fratricidal conflicts which every friend of progress must always deplore.

I pass from the Liberal to the Labor benches. Here opinion is divided. Ramsay Macdonald and Keir Hardie have pronounced against the Single-tax theory, I believe, but it has strong advocates in George Barnes and some other of the Labor leaders.

Henry George found some ardent friends among the Irishmen in Great Britain. One of the first was Edward McHugh, then associated with the dockers of Liverpool and one of the leaders in the great strike that took place many years ago. I may now reveal the secret that it was he who was largely responsible for that uprising among the crofters of Scotland which has wrung from Parliament so many crofter acts within the last twenty-five years. Few realized that it was the quiet, soft spoken, almost fugitive figure of the Irish agitator which set the fuse to the magazine.

Richard McGhee was a companion and fellow official of Edward McHugh in the days of the dock strike. The two men are alike and yet different. They are both Scotch by birth, but the one is a Catholic and the other a Presbyterian, and, in spite of their fervid agreement, this difference of origin reveals itself in their temperaments. The kindest hearted of men, filled with the enthusiasm of humanity, he is the fiercest of controversialists. Like McHugh, all his passions go out into politics; he has never taken a drink throughout his whole life. But unlike McHugh he is an inveterate smoker. I have been his traveling companion more than once in the devastating labors of an American tour and a better traveling companion I never knew nor could know. Travel by night was the same to him as travel by day; a journey of a thousand miles no more fearsome than a journey of a hundred. He could rise at

any hour of the morning; he could stop up till any hour of the morning, smoking, it is true, innumerable cigars, but leaving the drinking to others—the drinking, but not the talking. McGhee, though, is not a man to be frightened or even worried because a few panes of glass are sacrificed to the rowdyism of those blind tools of the landlords, the “sweaters” and office seekers, who are lending themselves to the campaign against the emancipation of Ireland, and especially of the Irish workers. At by-elections McGhee has done splendid work. When this sturdy ultra-Protestant Ulsterman comes to deal with the ridiculous fears of religious persecution, which have done such hard work for the Orangemen in British elections, everybody is made to understand how grotesque the whole cry is, how grotesque and how insincere. The man addressing them, with his fierce words, his fearless aggressiveness, his strong Scotch accent, is not the man to lend himself to an arrogant and persecuting clericalism from any church or from any creed.

One figure finally I must describe briefly in this review of the leaders of the land tax movement. The Lord Advocate cannot be counted among the Singletaxers, but he is certainly an advanced land tax reformer. Alexander Ure is one of the marvels of our times. Head of a great and laborious department, an active member of the legal profession, whose work cannot be reached by a taxicab to the law courts in London, but involves a long journey to Edinburgh; an assiduous attendant at the House of Commons, he has yet found time to attend more meetings during the last few years than any man of his time. When he speaks he does not spare himself. What is important also is that the audiences do not spare him. As with the combined lucidity and keen analysis of his splendid Scotch intellect Ure unfolds the philosophy and the economics of land reform his audiences listen spellbound. It is to them the breaking of a new dawn and a new light, and they insist on his going on and on till sometimes he has spoken for two hours at a stretch and left his audience not tired but crying for more.



AN OPEN LETTER TO REVISERS OF CITY CHARTERS.

Ladies and Gentlemen:—

As you are investigating different charter plans with a view to recommending one for your city, I venture to address you in behalf of the plan advocated by some of the members of the American Proportional Representation League. The plan is clearly outlined in the recommendations of a group of Proportionalists who recently met at Tamworth, N. H. These recommendations are printed on page 117 of “Equity” for July, 1912. The plan is compared with the “commission plan”

in a short article of mine which was printed first in the English periodical "Representation" and which was reprinted in The Public of May 10, 1912.

According to this plan the city is governed by a truly representative council of, say, seven to fifteen members. This council determines policies itself directly, and it executes policies indirectly through administrative experts.

This plan is better than the "commission plan," in my opinion, (1) because a truly representative council is better fitted to determine policies than a commission elected as commissions ordinarily are, and, (2) because such a council is better fitted to choose and dismiss—to "hire and fire"—administrative officers than the whole body of voters is.

The plan is truly democratic, because the people's will is carried out far more accurately under it than under even the "commission plan." Democracy consists not in the *apparent* but in the *real* responsiveness of the government to the people's will. And the government would be more completely responsive to their will, in my view, under the plan I advocate than under any "commission plan," even one with the initiative, referendum and recall in their best forms.

The reason is really very simple: it is the same reason, essentially, as that which accounts for the fact that the general run of people can have their plumbing and doctoring done more nearly to suit them by engaging plumbers and doctors than by undertaking the plumbing and doctoring themselves. The general run of people can choose pretty well between a good plumber and a poor one, and between a good doctor and a poor one. Likewise, they can choose representatives pretty well, to undertake the rather delicate and experience-requiring business of legislating, if provided with an electoral mechanism by which they can choose the men they really want. Once these men the voters really want compose the council, that council is as much better fitted to "hire and fire" the chief administrators, and to legislate, than the voters are, as a doctor is better fitted to set a broken leg than a farmer is.



But perhaps you are skeptical about the possibility of providing a mechanism by which the people can choose representatives who will really represent them. If so, I think that skepticism would be dispelled at once if you saw a single election on the "Hare plan." I will try to describe such an election.

For the sake of vividness, let us imagine that all the voters are collected in a hall and that they number one thousand, exclusive of the candidates; let us also imagine that the voting is to be done without ballots and that the thousand voters are to elect ten representatives.

The chairman of the meeting, we may suppose,

requests each candidate to take his stand by one of the pillars of the hall, and requests every voter to vote by standing beside the candidate of his choice. The result is the formation of several groups of voters around as many candidates.

The chairman now announces that the voters may change their votes as often as they want to, and that when all are satisfied he will declare elected the candidates who are surrounded by the ten largest groups of voters. On hearing this announcement some of the voters who are supporting a popular candidate, say Mr. Root—I take well-known names, as they make the significance of the transfers clearer—discovering that his group will still be one of the largest in the hall even without their own votes, leave him and join the groups of their second favorites, Mr. Lodge and others.

As the group of Mr. Roosevelt also is unnecessarily large, some of his supporters leave him, a few to support Mr. La Follette, a few others to support Mr. Beveridge, and so forth. One of Mr. Roosevelt's supporters, going to aid the man of his second choice, Mr. La Follette, arrives after the latter's group also has become clearly more than large enough to elect him, whereupon the voter passes on to support the growing group of his third choice, Mr. J. R. Garfield.

At this point the chairman, perceiving that not all the voters understand just how to make their votes effective, announces that as there are 1,000 voters in the hall there cannot be more than ten groups as large as 91. He therefore ventures to suggest that voters who find themselves in any group in excess of that number, instead of remaining to swell that group uselessly, transfer their support to somebody else whom they favor and whom they can perhaps really help. And as for voters who find that the groups to which they have attached themselves are hopelessly small, they, he adds, would do well to transfer their votes likewise, so as to make them effective.

This announcement makes the matter quite clear to all, and there follows a brisk passing to and fro until all are satisfied. Then, when it is evident that no voter wants to change his position again, the several groups are counted. It is found that they are composed as follows: Root's, 91; Lodge's, 91; Roosevelt's, 91; La Follette's, 91; Beveridge's, 91; Dalzell's, 91; Bryan's, 91; Champ Clark's, 91; John Sharp William's, 91; Victor M. Berger's, 94; those of all other candidates together, 87. The ten men first named are then declared by the chairman to be elected as the ten representatives.

Such a system as this will be admitted, by anyone who thinks about it a little, to elect men who truly represent the voters. Its deepest point of distinction from our present system of representation, so called, is that the constituency of each representative is unanimous, whereas that of a

so-called representative under our present system often contains from forty to ninety per cent of voters who do not at heart support him at all. "Forty to ninety" sounds large; but in fact it does not exaggerate. Not only are our representatives at present actually voted against by all the voters at the polls except a plurality—which may be no more than thirty or forty per cent of the voters—but they *would* be voted against by many who vote for them, if voters were not afraid of "throwing away their votes" by voting for the man of their first choice. Under our present system a vote for any candidate does not necessarily indicate a desire on the voter's part to elect that candidate above all persons; it indicates only that, not being free to express his real preference without fear of throwing his vote away, the voter supports the candidate in question as being that one of *those who have any chance* whom he either likes best or dislikes least. It is not at all improbable that ninety per cent of the constituents of a councillor or of a member of the State Legislature, under our system of single-member constituencies defined geographically, may prefer someone else to him.

I myself have never but once so much as cast a vote for that person who was my first choice as representative in any legislative body, city, State, or national; and on that occasion the person for whom I voted was not elected. Under the Hare system I should always vote for the man of my first choice, and frequently I should actually help to elect him. Moreover, when I did not help elect him, I should help elect someone else whom I positively wanted to see elected, and should at the same time—quite nine times out of ten—have the satisfaction of seeing the man of my first choice elected by the ballots of others. The truth of these assertions is clearly proved to anyone who witnesses a Hare election and sees the votes counted.



I will now call attention to the differences between the election in the hall just described and a municipal election under the Hare system according to such rules as those arranged by Mr. Wm. Hoag, of Boston. The chief differences, indeed the only differences worth mentioning, are that whereas the voting in the hall is open and is indicated by the position of the voter, the voting at the polls in a municipal election would be secret and by ballot.

The advantages of secret voting over open voting need not be presented; that question is fairly well settled in this country, in favor of secret voting.

The advantages of voting by ballot over voting by standing in groups and changing position to make votes effective, require a few words of explanation. Even if the method of the hall were

not destructive of secrecy, it would not be nearly so satisfactory as voting by ballot. The method of the hall requires the voters themselves to understand the significance of the "quota," as it is called, of 91—to grasp the idea that they may make their will more rather than less effective by leaving a candidate of their first choice whom they cannot help and going to one of their second choice whom they can help, whereas the ballot permits them simply to record their preferences by marking the figures 1, 2, 3, etc., against the candidates of their choice and then to leave the making up of quotas or constituencies to election officers who do the transferring. In short, voting by ballot on the Hare plan, though it gives considerable clerical work to election officials, makes the work of the voter himself exceedingly easy.

This brings me to comment on the only objection that is likely to be made to the Hare plan for a large city by anybody who really understands the plan. The objection is that the scrutiny of the ballots, at the central point to which they must be taken after the count of the first choices at the precincts, will be a somewhat elaborate process where the number of ballots and the number of candidates are large. My comment on this is that even if it took many clerks two or three days to find out from the ballots who were elected, the bother and expense involved would be a bagatelle in comparison with the advantages of securing thereby a government at once sensitively democratic and extremely efficient.

Upon this matter of counting Hare ballots, the opinion of the British Royal Commission on Electoral Systems in 1910 was as follows: "It is probably safe to say that in a constituency where 60,000 or 70,000 votes are cast . . . the results should be declared, with efficient arrangements, in the course of the second day after the poll." And it should be borne in mind that this opinion was expressed of the Hare ballot as in force in Tasmania, not of the far simpler method embodied in Mr. William Hoag's rules.



A word about nominations. Nominations should be made as easy as possible, provided only that their number is kept down to convenient proportions. If fifteen candidates are to be elected, the rules about nominations should be framed with the intention of keeping the number of candidates down to, say, thirty or forty.



If your Board is wise it will, in my opinion, decide the question of what sort of charter it is to recommend on the merits of the plans considered rather than on the prestige of the persons who advocate any plan. Nevertheless it will do no harm for me to give you the names of some people who would sanction, if I understand their views cor-

rectly, what I have written in support of the Hare system of Proportional Representation as the key to good city government. Here are a few:

The Acting Town Clerk of Pretoria, South Africa, where the Hare system is used for the election of the council which rules Pretoria; John Stuart Mill; Earl Grey, until last winter Governor-General of Canada; Hon. William Dudley Foulke, President of the National Municipal League; Richard S. Childs, founder and secretary of the Short Ballot Organization; ex-Governor Lucius F. C. Garvin, Lonsdale, R. I.; Hon. Charles Francis Adams, Boston; The Rt. Hon. Sir John Lubbock (now Lord Avebury); The Rt. Hon. Lord Courtney of Penwith; Earl Cromer (formerly British ruler of Egypt); Professor Henry R. Seager, Columbia University; Robert Tyson, of Toronto, Secretary of the American Proportional Representation League; Professor John H. Vincent, Johns Hopkins University; W. S. U'Ren, Oregon City, Oregon; Hon. T. S. Malan, Minister of Education, South African Union; John S. van Reeseema, J. P., recently Town Clerk of Pretoria, South Africa.

John Stuart Mill, in his Autobiography, referring to the Hare system, writes thus:

This great discovery, for it is no less, in the political art, inspired me, as I believe it has inspired all thoughtful persons who have adopted it, with new and more sanguine hopes respecting the prospects of human society, by freeing the form of political institutions towards which the whole civilized world is manifestly and irresistibly tending [i. e., democracy] from the chief part of what seemed to qualify and render doubtful its ultimate benefits. . . . I can understand that persons, otherwise intelligent, should, for want of sufficient examination, be repelled from Mr. Hare's plan by what they think the complex nature of its machinery. But any one who does not feel the want which the scheme is intended to supply; any one who throws it over as a mere intellectual subtlety or crotchet, tending to no valuable purpose and unworthy the attention of practical men, may be pronounced an incompetent statesman, unequal to the politics of the future. ("Autobiography," edition of 1873, p. 259. Quoted in J. H. Humphreys' "Proportional Representation," Methuen & Co., London, 1911.)

John S. van Reeseema, J. P., formerly Town Clerk of Pretoria, South Africa, says in the South African Municipal Year Book for 1911 (pp. 400 and 404):

The single transferable vote has been adopted and successfully applied for the election of the Senate of the South African Union, the members of the Executive Committees of the Provinces, and during the last two years to the election of the Municipal Councils of Pretoria and Johannesburg. . . . There is no difficulty in carrying out the elections and the counting of the votes under proportional representation, and the elections in Johannesburg and Pretoria have shown that the voters readily understood the filling of the ballot papers.

Here are comments by Bloemfontein papers on the election of the Senators of the Union of South Africa in 1909:

From the Bloemfontein "Friend"—

The result has demonstrated the absolute fairness of the Single Transferable Vote.

From the Bloemfontein "Post"—

The system proved in practice as simple and accurate as it was scrupulously fair in character.



The plan of city government here advocated means the "Short Ballot." Indeed, it means the shortest ballot conceivable, for each voter's ballot is effective towards the election of only one person, namely, one councillor. All the chief administrative officers are "hired and fired" by the Council.

The plan here advocated conduces to maintain the interest of the voters. It tends to do away with the political apathy which shows itself in the conduct of many otherwise excellent citizens. Political apathy is manufactured by our present system of elections. Suppose you are a Democrat in a district which usually elects a Republican to the Council with 2,000 votes to spare. If you vote, you will reduce the plurality of the Republican to 1,999. But how much difference in the legislation of the Council does that make? On the other hand, if you are a Republican in the same district your vote swells the Republican plurality from 2,000, say, to 2,001. But what good does that do you? It has no perceptible effect on legislation. Moreover, three times out of four, perhaps, no one of the candidates who has any chance of being elected is the man you prefer above all others as your representative. And how much satisfaction do you get from helping one man who cannot really represent you against another worse one who cannot really represent you? The Hare system makes voting a pleasure, because it allows every voter to make his ballot *count one* towards the election of a man he *does want*.

The plan here advocated cannot be manipulated by politicians so as to thwart the people's real desires. It eliminates all the tricks of capturing nominations, dividing the decent public-spirited vote, etc., etc. How? By making perfectly useless the nomination of more men than the spoils-men can actually elect with their own ballots. If the spoilsmen really have ten per cent of the vote of a city, they will elect ten per cent of the councillors. *And they ought to elect their fair share.* More than their fair share they cannot elect. The Hare plan will certainly result in the election of councillors truly representative of all considerable opinion groups and interest-groups in the city; it will also be pretty sure to result in the election of persons superior to the ordinary run of voters in general ability and political experience.

The Hare plan makes primary elections unnecessary; for what primary elections do only partly and very faultily the preferential voting feature of the Hare plan does completely and almost perfectly.

The Hare plan makes the Recall unnecessary.

Initiative and Referendum provisions should be adopted as part of a city charter; but in any city with a council elected by the Hare system—or by any other of the better proportional systems—the Initiative and the Referendum would seldom if ever be used.

Bribery, whether by money, jobs, or favors, is made unprofitable by the plan here advocated. Under our present system, or under the "commission plan," where the vote between two parties is close it often pays to give large inducements for a few crucial votes that will turn the scale. Under the proportional or "effective vote" system it is necessary to bribe a whole quota of votes to elect corruptly one member.

C. G. HOAG.

Tamworth, N. H., September 1, 1912.

BOOKS

PEOPLE'S POWER.

Government by All the People: or the Initiative, the Referendum and the Recall, as Instruments of Democracy. By Delos F. Wilcox, Ph. D., author of "The American City," "Municipal Franchises," "Great Cities in America," etc. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1912. Price, \$1.50 net.

This book may be considered as supplementary to Oberholtzer's* on the same subject. The collection of facts by Oberholtzer furnishes a solid historical basis for Wilcox's treatise; and for the reactionary arguments in Oberholtzer, Wilcox supplies the antidote. Taken together the two books make a compact library—a very complete one with the addition of Beard and Schultz's "Documents"—on the Initiative, the Referendum and the Recall, each of which Dr. Wilcox explains and approves. His judgment of approval is not, however, of the "slapdash" order, as is Dr. Oberholtzer's judgment of condemnation. Wilcox takes up all the plausible objections, one by one, explains them fairly, allows for their weight fully, and answers them directly and convincingly. Nor are his arguments wearisome. He has brought not only his proved powers of cogent reasoning into the making of this book, but also his attractive literary style. In spirit, the work is that of a man who lays no claim to neutrality, but leaves the force of his argument to speak for itself, and who looks upon right government as representing both the want and the will of all the governed. Dr. Wilcox does not shrink from the difficulties, nor minimize them. He follows his argument for the Recall straight up to the judicial bench, and carries the whole subject into the domain of Federal government.

*See Public of May 3, 1912, page 426.

REASONS FOR LAND VALUE TAXATION.

100 Reasons for Taxing Land Values. By Chapman Wright and Arthur Withy. Price twopence. Published by the Midlands Land Values League, 20 Canon St., Birmingham, England.

A stanch old time Singletaxer writes: "You think there is but one cause for poverty; I know that poverty is a social disease." As proof he went on to show how comparatively little the whole sum of rent amounts to!

There are many such, who have been so busy working that they have not studied. To them this inexpensive volume will be more than useful. It shows, in some four hundred words each, the effect of taking the rental value of land upon Employment, Wages, Slums, Temperance and ninety-six others.

John Stuart Mill in "Liberty," a book perhaps more needed now by reformers than when it was written, says: "In general, opinions contrary to those commonly received can only obtain a hearing by studied moderation of language and the most cautious avoidance of unnecessary offense." Such is the character of the arguments presented in this little book. Vancouver, however, would have furnished a more modern instance of "Absolutely Satisfactory in Practice" than Senator Bucklin's report on New Zealand cited by the authors.

The profits of the sale of the booklet go to the Midland Land Values League.

BOLTON HALL.

BOOKS RECEIVED

—One of the Multitude. By George Acorn. Published by Dodd, Mead & Co., New York, 1912. Price, \$1.25 net.

—Primitive Christianity and Early Criticisms. By A. S. Garretson. Published by Sherman, French & Co., Boston. 1912. Price, \$1.50 net.

—Elementary Principles of Economics. By Irving Fisher. Third Edition. Published by The Macmillan Co., New York. 1912. Price, \$2.00 net.

—The Control of Trusts. By John Bates Clark and John Maurice Clark. Rewritten and Enlarged. Published by The Macmillan Co., New York. 1912. Price, \$1.00 net.

PAMPHLETS

The Darrow Case.

Plea of Clarence Darrow in his own Defense to the Jury that exonerated him of the charge of Bribery at Los Angeles, August, 1912. (With portrait. Los Angeles and San Francisco: Golden Press. Price 25 cents.) The classic jury speeches were stately in style, this is nervous; they were oratorical.