

all that constitutes him a creature made in the image of God—not his color, his birth, his fortune, all that is accidental and transitory in him. . . . We believe in the sacredness of individual conscience; in the right of every man to the utmost self-development compatible with the equal right of his fellows; and hence we hold that whatever denies or shackles liberty is impious, and ought to be overthrown, and as soon as possible destroyed.”

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The latter part of the quotation supplies for us the necessary conclusion to the idea of the first part, that is, to the idea of the value of man as man. For, in all who have the democratic mind toward others there must be the recognition of, and desire for, the right of each man to his best development, and the recognition of the further essential fact that this best development can only be attained in freedom. Here again the difference between the two minds, arising out of the primary difference as to where we lay the emphasis, continues to be a question of the object of emphasis. For, in reaching the best development, the democratic mind emphasizes freedom, the aristocratic mind emphasizes external discipline. It is not that the aristocratic mind altogether denies freedom, or that the democratic mind ignores discipline. But the democratic mind lays the emphasis on freedom, and when it helps, it helps without pharisaism or condescension, and when it disciplines, it disciplines with reluctance and without eclat. The aristocratic mind lays the emphasis on discipline, enjoys and displays the process, grants freedom with hesitation, and when it helps, no matter how wise and good the helping, can hardly avoid some register of condescension. It is not that the aristocratic mind intends to be pharisaical, or is conscious of its condescension. The trouble lies in the fact that the man of aristocratic spirit has allowed his mind, by birth and custom and environment, to put too much emphasis on the differences between his condition and the condition of the other man, and has not allowed his mind to go on to the deeper idea of man to man which lies below all differences.

J. H. DILLARD.

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Presbyterian Elder: "Nae, my mon, there'll be nane o' they new-fangled methods in Heaven."

Listener: "I don't know how you can be sure."

Elder: "Sure? Why, mon, gin they tried it, the whole Presbyterian kirk wad rise up an' gang out in a body."—Lippincott's.

INCIDENTAL SUGGESTIONS

THE BEST CHARTER FOR AMERICAN CITIES.

The best form of government for American cities is that which most conduces to intelligence in the determination of policies and to efficiency in their execution, while not sacrificing a jot or tittle of democracy.

European cities without number have long furnished us with examples of efficiency and intelligence in municipal government, but in most cases these governments have not rested on a fully democratic basis, including manhood suffrage.

Apart from the recent experiences in commission government, American cities in general have had governments neither as intelligent nor as efficient as the abilities of the people, shown outside of politics, would warrant us in expecting. And as to the democracy of our city governments, though thoroughgoing enough according to the specious test of the number of officials elected at the polls, it has been gravely defective when put to the true test of responsiveness to the will and care for the welfare of the people.

The commission form of government, combined with the Initiative and Referendum, means a long step forward towards greater intelligence and efficiency, and towards real instead of nominal democracy. But it is to be hoped that this type of charter will not be made into a fetish. If there is anything still better we want it. Once on a time civic reformers supposed that manhood suffrage would almost bring the millennium.

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Why is the Des Moines charter better than our old charters? And how could it be made better still?

One reason why it is better than the old charters is because, under it, the voters elect only officials important enough for them to know about, and few enough for them to know about, and because these few officials are given power enough to be held to account. This is the political principle that has recently been promulgated, in a brilliant campaign of publicity, under the name of "The Short Ballot."

Secondly, the Des Moines charter gives the people those guarantees of democratic government, the Initiative and the Referendum. These weapons may be awkward to handle, but they are good to wield once in a while when the people are hard pressed, and they are weapons of great potency when merely hanging on the wall, ready for use.

These two things, I take it, are the fundamental virtues of the Des Moines charter, and they are very great. Now for the imperfections.

One is that this form of charter does not provide quite the best mechanism for executive efficiency. To get the maximum efficiency you must have, for chief professional experts, men or women holding office indefinitely so long as they satisfy, not the whole electorate, but a small body of persons whose opportunities and experience especially qualify them

to judge. This is the way in which private corporations and many European cities secure efficiency. Let us not blink the teachings of experience.

Furthermore, the Des Moines Commissioners being the legislative body as well as the executive heads, their fitness for office must be determined quite as much by their opinions on policies as by their executive experience, ability and training.

This leads to what I consider the second imperfection of the Des Moines plan, namely: In the determination of policies the voters are on the horns of a dilemma. They may either let the little group of Commissioners determine a policy for them, or they may determine it themselves through the Initiative or the Referendum.

The first alternative is not democracy, because the Commissioners do not represent all considerable groups of voters, but only one chief group, or even only the dominating faction of one chief group. This results from the method of their election. Real democracy in the determination of policies means law-making that embodies the composite will of the whole people, freely expressed. The difference between the two methods is the same in essence as the difference between the legislation of a dictator chosen by majority vote and the legislation of a parliament.

Now for the second alternative, that is, for the voters to determine policies themselves by means of the Initiative and Referendum. Then they do indeed enjoy democracy, but to get democracy in this way they have to forego the very useful services in legislation of a representative chamber. These services, if the legislature or council is really representative, are of great value.

Unquestionably the thrashing out publicly of proposed legislation in representative chambers is a good practical process for which no equally efficient substitute has been found. On this point students of politics and men experienced in public affairs are agreed.

The Initiative and Referendum must be guarded jealously as a fundamental right and safeguard, but its use may be minimized by making the legislative chamber truly representative.

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To make a charter still better than charters of the Des Moines type, therefore, we have simply to retain the Initiative and Referendum, but to substitute for the Commission a single chambered representative council, numbering, say, from seven to twenty-one members, according to the size of the city. This council must truly represent all considerable groups of voters, and it must have sweeping powers, including that of the appointment and dismissal of the chief executive officers.

One chamber is enough. The two-chamber system, even in the largest cities, is a lumbering piece of anachronism, tending to delay and to divided responsibility.

The vital point is that the city council should truly represent all considerable groups of voters.

Here is where the difference between administration and legislation comes in. In the administrative functions of government we do not want representation of all views; we want consistent and unified action. That is secured by the appointment of strong

men with liberal salaries as heads of departments having full power to appoint and dismiss subordinates.

The case is different with the policy-determining functions of government. Here heterogeneity cannot be avoided. To try to avoid it is simply to flounder from one policy to another after each election, instead of progressing steadily and surely as the consensus of public views changes.

Real political wisdom does not require the voters to elect legislators of similar views because the latter are to be also administrators. It vests the legislative and administrative functions in different officials, whilst making the administrative officials subject to the will of the legislators in regard to the principle or policy on which administrative action is based.

Then comes the question, How can a city council be elected so as accurately to represent all groups of voters? The answer has been twice given by the cities of Johannesburg and Pretoria, in South Africa. In October, 1909, and again in October, 1910, each of these cities elected its council by the method of Proportional Representation known as the Hare system. Complete success resulted, and the general verdict of the South African press was unqualified approval. No attempt to describe Proportional Representation can be given here, but ample information is available.*

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In concluding, I urge on the many advocates of the short ballot idea that Proportional Representation is merely their own excellent principles carried to the logical end, and developed, in combination with one or two other principles, into a plan of government after their own hearts.

Do you want to bring the really strong men into office? The system of electing the Johannesburg Council has just that effect.

Do you want to lessen the scope for activity of professional politicians? Then use the Johannesburg method.

Do you want to bring out the present stay-at-home voter? Let him know that if he does come out his vote will really count, because if he misses his first choice he will surely hit his second or some subsequent one.

Now that the scope of city government is steadily enlarging, the best we can get is needed. What American city will win the lasting honor of inaugurating it?

CLARENCE G. HOAG.

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BANKING GRAFT AND DANGEROUS BANKING.

Indianapolis, April 29.

Some members of the new House of Representatives have "caught on" to the fact that the Aldrich monetary commission, besides being a part of the currency trust conspiracy, is a "graft" of the most pronounced character. It was organized to assist

*Such information may be got from William Hoag, 19 Milk street, Boston, Mass.; John H. Humphreys, 197 St. Stephens House, Westminster Bridge, S. W., London, England, and Robert Tyson, 10 Harbord street, Toronto, Canada