The Correspondence of Thomas Jefferson
By Subject
MORAL SENSE / OF RIGHT AND WRONG
The want or imperfection of the moral sense in some men, like the
want or imperfection of the senses of sight and hearing in others, is
no proof that it is a general characteristic of the Species. When it
is wanting, we endeavor to supply the defect by education, by appeals
to reason and calculation, by presenting to the being so unhappily
conformed, other motives to do good and to eschew evil, such as the
love, or the hatred, or rejection of those among whom he lives, and
whose society is necessary to his happiness and even existence;
demonstrations by sound calculation that honesty promotes interest in
the long run; the rewards and penalties established by the laws; and
ultimately the prospects of a future state of retribution for the evil
as well as the good done while here. These are the correctives which
are supplied by education, and which exercise the functions of the
moralist, the preacher, and legislator; and they lead into a course of
correct action all those whose disparity is not too profound to be
eradicated. Some have argued against the existence of a moral sense,
by saying that if nature had given us such a sense, impelling us to
virtuous actions, and warning us against those which are vicious, then
nature would also have designated, by some particular ear-marks, the
two sets of actions which are, in themselves, the one virtuous and the
other vicious. Whereas, we find, in fact, that the same actions are
deemed virtuous in one country and vicious in another. The answer is
that nature has constituted
utility to man the standard and best of virtue. Men living in
different countries, under different circumstances, different habits
and regimens, may have different utilities; the same act, therefore,
may be useful, and consequently virtuous in one country which is
injurious and vicious in another differently circumstanced. I
sincerely, then, believe with you in the general existence of a moral
instinct. I think it the brightest gem with which the human character
is studded, and the want of it as more degrading than the most hideous
of the bodily deformities. I am happy in reviewing the roll of
associates in this principle which you present in your second letter,
some of which I had not before met with. To these might be added Lord
Kames,* one of the ablest of our advocates, who goes so far as to say,
in his Principles of Natural Religion, that a man owes no duty to
which he is not urged by some impulsive feeling. This is correct, if
referred to the standard of general feeling in the given case, and not
to the feeling of a single individual. Perhaps I may misquote him, it
being fifty years since I read his book.
to Thomas Law, 13 June 1814
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