The Aims of Government
John Locke
[1690]
In his Two Treaties of Government, (1690) the
English philosopher John Locke suggests that the aim of
government is to provide liberty and security, but that the
citizens have a right to overthrow the government when it fails
to provide either. "Thus the community perpetually retains
a supreme power of saving themselves from the attempts and
designs of anybody, even of their legislators..." Locke's
influence on the founding fathers of the United States can
hardly be measured.
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Chapter 12:
The Legislative, Executive, and Federative Power of the
Commonwealth 143. The legislative power is that which has a right to
direct how the force of the commonwealth shall be employed for
preserving the community and the members of it. Because those laws
which are constantly to be executed, and whose force is always to
continue, may be made in a little time, therefore there is no need
that the legislative should be always in being, not having always
business to do. And because it may be too great temptation to human
frailty, apt to grasp at power, for the same persons who have the
power of making laws to have also in their hands the power to
execute them, whereby they may exempt themselves from obedience to
the laws they make, and suit the law, both in its making and
execution, to their own private advantage, and thereby come to have
a distinct interest from the rest of the community, contrary to the
end of society and government. Therefore in well-ordered
commonwealths, where the good of the whole is so considered as it
ought, the legislative power is put into the hands of divers persons
who, duly assembled, have by themselves, or jointly with others, a
power to make laws, which when they have done, being separated
again, they are themselves subject to the laws they have made; which
is a new and near tie upon them to take care that they make them
for the public good.
144. But because the laws that are at once, and in a short time
made, have a constant and lasting force, and need a perpetual
execution, or an attendance thereunto, therefore it is necessary
there should be a power always in being which should see to the
execution of the laws that are made, and remain in force. And thus
the legislative and executive power come often to be separated. 145.
There is another power in every commonwealth which one may call
natural, because it is that which answers to the power every man
naturally had before he entered into society. For though in a
commonwealth the members of it are distinct persons, still, in
reference to one another, and, as such, are governed by the laws of
the society, yet, in reference to the rest of mankind, they make one
body, which is, as every member of it before was, still in the state
of Nature with the rest of mankind, so that the controversies that
happen between any man of the society with those that are out of it
are managed by the public, and an injury done to a member of their
body engages the whole in the reparation of it. So that under this
consideration the whole community is one body in the state of Nature
in respect of all other states or persons out of its community.
146. This, therefore, contains the power of war and peace, leagues
and alliances, and all the transactions with all persons and
communities without the commonwealth, and may be called federative
if any one pleases. So the thing be understood, I am indifferent as
to the name.
147. These two powers, executive and federative, though they be
really distinct in themselves, yet one comprehending the execution
of the municipal laws of the society within itself upon all that are
parts of it, the other the management of the security and interest
of the public without with all those that it may receive benefit or
damage from, yet they are always almost united. And though this
federative power in the well or ill management of it be of great
moment to the commonwealth, yet it is much less capable to be
directed by antecedent, standing, positive laws than the executive,
and so must necessarily be left to the prudence and wisdom of those
whose hands it is in, to be managed for the public good. For the
laws that concern subjects one amongst another, being to direct
their actions, may well enough precede them. But what is to be done
in reference to foreigners depending much upon their actions, and
the variation of designs and interests, must be left in great part
to the prudence of those who have this power committed to them, to
be managed by the best of their skill for the advantage of the
commonwealth.
148. Though, as I said, the executive and federative power of
every community be really distinct in themselves, yet they are
hardly to be separated and placed at the same time in the hands of
distinct persons. For both of them requiring the force of the
society for their exercise, it is almost impracticable to place the
force of the commonwealth in distinct and not subordinate hands, or
that the executive and federative power should be placed in persons
that might act separately, whereby the force of the public would be
under different commands, which would be apt some time or other to
cause disorder and ruin.
Chapter 13:
Of the Subordination of the Powers of the Commonwealth 149. Though
in a constituted commonwealth standing upon its own basis and acting
according to its own nature--that is, acting for the preservation of
the community, there can be but one supreme power, which is the
legislative, to which all the rest are and must be subordinate, yet
the legislative being only a fiduciary power to act for certain
ends, there remains still in the people a supreme power to remove or
alter the legislative, when they find the legislative act contrary
to the trust reposed in them. For all power given with trust for the
attaining an end being limited by that end, whenever that end is
manifestly neglected or opposed, the trust must necessarily be
forfeited, and the power devolve into the hands of those that gave
it, who may place it anew where they shall think best for their
safety and security. And thus the community perpetually retains a
supreme power of saving themselves from the attempts and designs of
anybody, even of their legislators, whenever they shall be so
foolish or so wicked as to lay and carry on designs against the
liberties and properties of the subject. For no man or society of
men having a power to deliver up their preservation, or consequently
the means of it, to the absolute will and arbitrary dominion of
another, whenever any one shall go about to bring them into such a
slavish condition, they will always have a right to preserve what
they have not a power to part with, and to rid themselves of those
who invade this fundamental, sacred, and unalterable law of
self-preservation for which they entered into society. And thus the
community may be said in this respect to be always the supreme
power, but not as considered under any form of government, because
this power of the people can never take place till the government be
dissolved.
150. In all cases whilst the government subsists, the legislative
is the supreme power. For what can give laws to another must needs
be superior to him, and since the legislative is no otherwise
legislative of the society but by the right it has to make laws for
all the parts, and every member of the society prescribing rules to
their actions, and giving power of execution where they are
transgressed, the legislative must needs be the supreme, and all
other powers in any members or parts of the society derived from and
subordinate to it.
151. In some commonwealths where the legislative is not always in
being, and the executive is vested in a single person who has also a
share in the legislative, there that single person, in a very
tolerable sense, may also be called supreme; not that he has in
himself all the supreme power, which is that of law-making, but
because he has in him the supreme execution from whom all inferior
magistrates derive all their several subordinate powers, or, at
least, the greatest part of them; having also no legislative
superior to him, there being no law to be made without his consent,
which cannot be expected should ever subject him to the other part
of the legislative, he is properly enough in this sense supreme. But
yet it is to be observed that though oaths of allegiance and fealty
are taken to him, it is not to him as supreme legislator, but
supreme executor of the law made by a joint power of him with
others, allegiance being nothing but an obedience according to law,
which, when he violates, he has no right to obedience, nor can claim
it otherwise than as the public person vested with the power of the
law, and so is to be considered as the image, phantom, or
representative of the commonwealth, acted by the will of the society
declared in its laws, and thus he has no will, no power, but that of
the law. But when he quits this representation, this public will,
and acts by his own private will, he degrades himself, and is but a
single private person without power and without will; the members
owing no obedience but to the public will of the society.
152. The executive power placed anywhere but in a person that has
also a share in the legislative is visibly subordinate and
accountable to it, and may be at pleasure changed and displaced; so
that it is not the supreme executive power that is exempt from
subordination, but the supreme executive power vested in one, who
having a share in the legislative, has no distinct superior
legislative to be subordinate and accountable to, farther than he
himself shall join and consent, so that he is no more subordinate
than he himself shall think fit, which one may certainly conclude
will be but very little. Of other ministerial and subordinate powers
in a commonwealth we need not speak, they being so multiplied with
infinite variety in the different customs and constitutions of
distinct commonwealths, that it is impossible to give a particular
account of them all. Only thus much which is necessary to our
present purpose we may take notice of concerning them, that they
have no manner of authority, any of them, beyond what is by positive
grant and commission delegated to them, and are all of them
accountable to some other power in the commonwealth.
153. It is not necessary--no, nor so much as convenient--that the
legislative should be always in being; but absolutely necessary that
the executive power should, because there is not always need of new
laws to be made, but always need of execution of the laws that are
made. When the legislative hath put the execution of the laws they
make into other hands, they have a power still to resume it out of
those hands when they find cause, and to punish for any
maladministration against the laws. The same holds also in regard of
the federative power, that and the executive being both ministerial
and subordinate to the legislative, which, as has been shown, in a
constituted commonwealth is the supreme, the legislative also in
this case being supposed to consist of several persons; for if it be
a single person it cannot but be always in being, and so will, as
supreme, naturally have the supreme executive power, together with
the legislative, may assemble and exercise their legislative at the
times that either their original constitution or their own
adjournment appoints, or when they please, if neither of these hath
appointed any time, or there be no other way prescribed to convoke
them. For the supreme power being placed in them by the people, it
is always in them, and they may exercise it when they please, unless
by their original constitution they are limited to certain seasons,
or by an act of their supreme power they have adjourned to a certain
time, and when that time comes they have a right to assemble and act
again.
154. If the legislative, or any part of it, be of representatives,
chosen for that time by the people, which afterwards return into the
ordinary state of subjects, and have no share in the legislative but
upon a new choice, this power of choosing must also be exercised by
the people, either at certain appointed seasons, or else when they
are summoned to it; and, in this latter case, the power of convoking
the legislative is ordinarily placed in the executive, and has one
of these two limitations in respect of time:--that either the
original constitution requires their assembling and acting at
certain intervals; and then the executive power does nothing but
ministerially issue directions for their electing and assembling
according to due forms; or else it is left to his prudence to call
them by new elections when the occasions or exigencies of the public
require the amendment of old or making of new laws, or the redress
or prevention of any inconveniencies that lie on or threaten the
people.
155. It may be demanded here, what if the executive power, being
possessed of the force of the commonwealth, shall make use of that
force to hinder the meeting and acting of the legislative, when the
original constitution or the public exigencies require it? I say,
using force upon the people, without authority, and contrary to the
trust put in him that does so, is a state of war with the people,
who have a right to reinstate their legislative in the exercise of
their power. For having erected a legislative with an intent they
should exercise the power of making laws, either at certain set
times, or when there is need of it, when they are hindered by any
force from what is so necessary to the society, and wherein the
safety and preservation of the people consists, the people have a
right to remove it by force. In all states and conditions the true
remedy of force without authority is to oppose force to it....
156. The power of assembling and dismissing the legislative,
placed in the executive, gives not the executive a superiority over
it, but is a fiduciary trust placed in him for the safety of the
people in a case where the uncertainty and variableness of human
affairs could not bear a steady fixed rule. For it not being
possible that the first framers of the government should by any
foresight be so much masters of future events as to be able to
prefix so just periods of return and duration to the assemblies of
the legislative, in all times to come, that might exactly answer all
the exigencies of the commonwealth, the best remedy could be found
for this defect was to trust this to the prudence of one who was
always to be present, and whose business it was to watch over the
public good. Constant, frequent meetings of the legislative, and
long continuations of their assemblies, without necessary occasion,
could not but be burdensome to the people, and must necessarily in
time produce more dangerous inconveniencies, and yet the quick turn
of affairs might be sometimes such as to need their present help;
any delay of their convening might endanger the public; and
sometimes, too, their business might be so great that the limited
time of their sitting might be too short for their work, and rob the
public of that benefit which could be had only from their mature
deliberation. What, then, could be done in this case to prevent the
community from being exposed some time or other to imminent hazard
on one side or the other, by fixed intervals and periods set to the
meeting and acting of the legislative, but to entrust it to the
prudence of some who, being present and acquainted with the state of
public affairs, might make use of this prerogative for the public
good? And where else could this be so well placed as in his hands
who was entrusted with the execution of the laws for the same end?
Thus, supposing the regulation of times for the assembling and
sitting of the legislative not settled by the original constitution,
it naturally fell into the hands of the executive; not as an
arbitrary power depending on his good pleasure, but with this trust
always to have it exercised only for the public weal, as the
occurrences of times and change of affairs might require. Whether
settled periods of their convening, or a liberty left to the prince
for convoking the legislative, or perhaps a mixture of both, hath
the least inconvenience attending it, it is not my business here to
inquire, but only to show that, though the executive power may have
the prerogative of convoking and dissolving such conventions of the
legislative, yet it is not thereby superior to It.
157. Things of this world are in so constant a flux that nothing
remains long in the same state. Thus people, riches, trade, power,
change their stations; flourishing mighty cities come to ruin, and
prove in time neglected desolate corners, whilst other unfrequented
places grow into populous countries filled with wealth and
inhabitants. But things not always changing equally, and private
interest often keeping up customs and privileges when the reasons of
them are ceased, it often comes to pass that in governments where
part of the legislative consists of representatives chosen by the
people, that in tract of time this representation becomes very
unequal and disproportionate to the reasons it was at first
established upon. To what gross absurdities the following of custom
when reason has left it may lead, we may be satisfied when we see
the bare name of a town, of which there remains not so much as the
ruins, where scarce so much housing as a sheepcote, or more
inhabitants than a shepherd is to be found, send as many
representatives to the grand assembly of law-makers as a whole
county numerous in people and powerful in riches. This strangers
stand amazed at, and every one must confess needs a remedy; though
most think it hard to find one, because the constitution of the
legislative being the original and supreme act of the society,
antecedent to all positive laws in it, and depending wholly on the
people, no inferior power can alter it....
158. ...If, therefore, the executive who has the power of
convoking the legislative, observing rather the true proportion than
fashion of representation, regulates not by old custom, but true
reason, the number of members in all places, that have a right to be
distinctly represented, which no part of the people, however
incorporated, can pretend to, but in proportion to the assistance
which it affords to the public, it cannot be judged to have set up a
new legislative, but to have restored the old and true one, and to
have rectified the disorders which succession of time had insensibly
as well as inevitably introduced; for it being the interest as well
as intention of the people to have a fair and equal representative,
whoever brings it nearest to that is an undoubted friend to and
establisher of the government, and cannot miss the consent and
approbation of the community; prerogative being nothing but a power
in the hands of the prince to provide for the public good in such
cases which, depending upon unforeseen and uncertain occurrences,
certain and unalterable laws could not safely direct.... The power
of erecting new corporations, and therewith new representatives,
carries with it a supposition that in time the measures of
representation might vary, and those have a just right to be
represented which before had none; and by the same reason, those
cease to have a right, and be too inconsiderable for such a
privilege, which before had it. It is not a change from the present
state which, perhaps, corruption or decay has introduced, that makes
an inroad upon the government, but the tendency of it to injure or
oppress the people, and to set up one part or party with a
distinction from and an unequal subjection of the rest. Whatsoever
cannot but be acknowledged to be of advantage to the society and
people in general, upon just and lasting measures, will always, when
done, justify itself; and whenever the people shall choose their
representatives upon just and undeniably equal measures, suitable to
the original frame of the government, it cannot be doubted to be the
will and act of the society, whoever permitted or proposed to them
so to do.
