Review of the Book

The Orthocratic State
by John S. Crosby

Alexander MacKendrick

[Reprinted from the Single Tax Review, March-April 1916]

To men of a reflective turn who are consciously breaking away from the trammels of the past and reaching out to the larger freedom which looms upon the horizon of life, there must at times occur the questions, What will be the ultimate forms of a Society founded upon righteousness? is there room in the conception of a free people for a compulsory form of government? is there any logical halting-place in the aspiration towards political liberty short of complete anarchy or the negation of all force in government and its replacement by internal guidance? is it "by Wisdom" (or our lack of it) that "Kings reign and Princes decree justice, that Princes rule, and Nobles and all the judges of the earth?" is there a place in that "far-off Divine event" towards which the whole creation moves for the thought of even the smallest infringement of spontaneous action, of the right of a man to manage his own life so long as he interferes, not with the similar liberty of others?' Below the surface-consciousness of most. men's minds a vague oscillation is constantly going on between the craving for complete deliverance from governmental; interference and the recognition that some interference will be for ever necessary; that government has a natural right to exist, some warrant in the constitution of human nature for a certain as-yet undefined measure of interference with liberty of action.

Many attempts have been made as Mr. Crosby has indicated in the book published since his lamented death, The Orthocratic State, to formulate a science of society which may serve as a basis for that art which men have practised since the dawn of human history, the art of managing one another's affairs. No such attempts have been entirely satisfactory, or have seemed to provide a statement of natural law on which the art of government might safely be based, as our mechanical arts are based upon their respective sciences. Yet by a healthy instinct or an intuitive perception of the truth, we have felt assured that such a justification in natural law for the existence of a State as distinct from a Society, is discoverable, and that it is not necessary to assume that the ultimate function of government is to go gradually out of existence. It seems to us that Mr. Crosby has come nearer to the discovery of the final justification for compulsion in government than any sociological writer we know of, and it may be that he has said the last word that need be spoken on the subject for a long time to come.

Though every so-called scientific "law" may be but a postulate forming part of a larger principle as yet unknown to us, its practical value as a guide to conduct may be incalculable. The Atomic theory as an ultimate explanation of matter, has been entirely superseded, yet its usefulness in laboratory experiment is as great today as when first promulgated. Though Mr. Crosby's discovery (for we must accord his postulate that title) may not be an ultimate truth, it will be of large value in rationalizing our conceptions of why a government exists, what it ought to do, and what it ought to refrain from doing. When one remembers the chaos of opinion that prevails on these points, ranging from that of the Socialist on the one hand, who would make the sphere of government co-extensive with all those activities by which men come into industrial relationships, to that of the philosophic Anarchist on the other, who claims the right of each individual to stand outside of the State if he desires to do so, the value of a postulate based on the nature of man as a social animal can hardly be over-estimated. It would indeed be well that both those classes of philosophers should explain by what right the first presumes to legislate forcibly for the good of his fellow-men, and on what ground the second claims the privilege to hold himself apart from the organized State. The scientific reason for compulsory State-interference, and the limits on the further side, of individual freedom, are stated by Mr. Crosby with succinctness and precision.

Assuming that those to whom the book is addressed have outgrown the condition of "subjects" and risen to the status of "citizens" it is always a valid question to ask, "what is it that we have appointed our governments for the purpose of doing? Did we put certain power into their hands for the doing of certain things and no other things, or did we place them in authority with carte-blanche instructions to do for us whatever to them seemed good?" This, as Mr. Crosby indicates is a vital question, and on our answer to it depends the conception we shall frame for ourselves of the goal towards which we ought as members of the State to be consciously striving.

Mr. Crosby appropriately points out the antithesis between society as a natural association growing out of the inherent tendency of men to combine and co-operate and the State as an artificial organization formed like an instrument for the regulation of conduct. "It is therefore," our author writes, "upon principles existing in the nature of things, upon the natural laws of society, that the State must depend for whatever warrant it may have for its existence or for the exercise of its power. It follows that an enquiry into the nature and function of the State involves consideration of the principles by which men should be guided in their conduct toward one another as members of that natural association with precedes and must be distinguished from, the artificial organization known as the State." Without attempting to follow Mr. Crosby through his inquiry as to the basis of natural rights, it may suffice to say that he draws the conclusion that the only inherent natural right discoverable is the right to life and liberty, the right to be left alone, the right of non-interference. This necessarily involves the right of self-defence when that right of free action is interfered with, but as the right of self-defence inheres not in one man but in every man it follows that liberty of action is limited by the similar liberty of all. But if one man cannot legitimately interfere with the freedom of another, can a number of men or even an organization calling itself a State, legitimately do so? And is the inherent right of self-defence against a State as indefeasible and inalienable as that against an individual man? Or can a State establish a moral basis for its claim to compel all to submit to its jurisdiction?

To these fundamental questions Mr. Crosby offers a reply which must commend itself to the seeker for basic truths. "If one man in defending himself against another thereby interferes with any natural right of still another, this last may justly defend himself against such interference however unintentional; and it will be found upon further consideration that it is the necessity for providing efficient defence against such interference, against unintentional aggression arising from individual self-defensive disturbance of public peace and order, that constitutes the only just warrant for the compulsion essential to the establishment of the State and the maintenance of civil power." The right therefore to protect ourselves against the disturbance of public order involved in the private settlement of disputes between our fellows, provides the moral reason for compelling all to become members of an organization which shall guarantee the liberty of each, and in addition assure all its members of protection from an atmosphere of strife and disorder.

The central idea round which Mr. Crosby's arguments revolve is contained in one sentence, "The most that the State can do for civilization and social progress is to mind its own business." To discover what that business is, and is not, is the obvious purpose with which the book has been written. Having found that the initial justification for compulsory government lies in the necessity for protection from the disturbances of public order involved in the private settlements of disputes as to infringements of primary rights, Mr. Crosby finds other three State functions growing naturally out of this initial State-function. These are, the protection of private property, the secure possession of which is part of the primary right to life and liberty; the discharge of services which are in their nature of a public character and cannot be performed by individuals, such as the making of public highways, the establishment of a medium of exchange or currency, and the holding of an equitable balance between men's rights to the use of Nature's bounty; and lastly, the maintenance of the State's own integrity and supreme power. We believe with the author, that under these four categories all the legitimate exercises of power on the part of a State may be classed, and that any action by government that will not fit itself into one or other of them must be regarded as illegitimate. With such a set of definite principles before us for delimiting the just functions of government, it is both interesting and instructive to consider as Mr. Crosby does in the chapter entitled "Abuses of civil power," the many and increasing number of governmental activities thrust upon us in these latter days which can find no justification under any of these four heads.

That most of our troubles in the political sense arise from over-government is now probably recognized by candid thinkers, and the presumption is strong that when an authority does the things it ought not to do, it will leave undone some of the things it ought to do. The first task therefore that should occupy the thoughts of those who would assist in the formation of public opinion is to come to a clear understanding of the directions in which our governments are "abusing civil power," or doing things in excess of their legitimate functions. That the "New Toryism" against which Herbert Spencer warned the British public thirty years ago as tending to displace the old idea of liberalism, is rapidly taking hold of the American mind, is very evident. We are drifting into the assumption that the purpose of a government is to "do things" for the good of the people. Out of the quickened sympathy for the under-dogs in the struggle for existence which our modern culture awakens, we are grateful to a government which takes the moral responsibility off our shoulders of righting wrongs - without first enquiring whether these wrongs are not due to governments having omitted to discharge one of those functions which alone can justify its existence. Having thus drifted from the moorings of fundamental principles and lost hold of the real reasons for a governments authority, there seems no assignable limit to the things we may permit a government to do, and so the political creed becomes ever more complex and the burden and confusion upon the shoulders of the citizen daily more intolerable. The "new toryism" is upon us, under whatever name it may masquerade, and if its tyranny is to be thrown off it can only be through a right understanding of the underlying science of man as a social animal, on which the art of government ought to be based.

In the light of the four legitimate functions of government postulated by Mr. Crosby, it is not difficult to perceive that a government such as that under which we now live, exceeds its rightful authority in many ways. It exceeds it when it attempts to promote morality among its citizens. This may seem a hard saying to many worthy people but a principle to be worth trusting must be trusted, even though it threaten to slay us. If we concede that the primary justification for a governments existence is that it may prevent aggression and preserve liberty, then it follows that a free man has a right to be immoral if in being so he does not trespass on the rights to life, property, and liberty of any of his fellows. As Mr. Crosby says,

"It is the aggression rather than the immorality with which the State has to deal, and with that for the purpose of peace and order only, and not for that of morality."

If this should seem like a counsel of despair, consolation should be found in the faith that if government sufficiently discharges its true function, that of securing to each of its citizens the inalienable rights to life, liberty and the pursuit of what they deem happiness, the natural tendency towards higher moral standards will assert itself under the stimulus of public conscience. It requires again, no elaborate argument to show that the State abuses its power when it interferes with the free-play of economic forces and in any way deprives a citizen of "a natural market" for his services or the products of his labors, or interferes with his right to purchase the products of other men's labor at their natural price, or when it compels one class of the community in the interests of another class, to pay a higher price for commodities than would be necessary under relationships of freedom. Governments can abuse their power when they set up what Mr. Crosby calls "artificial persons" or Corporations, endowed with privileges, powers, and immunities which do not belong to natural persons. When Corporations are entrusted with "public-serving functions" which government ought itself to perform without profit, the government falls short of its duty. When it creates Corporations for the performance of services that are not of a public character, it exceeds its legitimate function and disturbs that free-play of demand and supply of service on which industrial health so much depends.

As to our governments' sins of omission, we must differ with Mr. Crosby where in one sentence he assumes that "these are negligible because there is hardly any matter of interest susceptible to governmental interference that has not been made the subject of some sort of prohibitive, regulative or stimulative legislation." Our difference, however, is probably more apparent than real. For if, as Mr. Crosby admits, the second category of a government's duties includes that of securing to each citizen the possession of his own property, then it signally fails in the discharge of this duty when it omits to draw its revenue from what is obviously the right source, the value of its land-area and instead, confiscates the earnings of its citizens or part of those earnings. Nothing is more evident to the dispassionate and unbiased judgment than that there is an organic relationship and the need for a public income, and the corporate wealth which reflects itself in the value of the earth-space occupied by the governed people. They come into existence together as though by a pre-destined natural arrangement.

Wherever society has grown to such proportions as to require a government, land-value proportionate to its needs is there. Where there is no land-value there is no need of government and no public income required. When a population disappears, the land-value and the need of a government disappear together. Like the mother's milk, the wealth created by the people comes into existence just when the people require a government and remains so long as the need remains. Mr. Crosby makes clear in the latter part of the book, his conviction that governments have failed in their duty under the second category of functions. They have failed to produce an equilibrium of equity; a condition where the State would have access to its natural pocket-book, and where the individual would be absolutely secured in possession of his property, or all that he has produced, without diminution or subtraction of any kind. Our governments have failed to promote morality in that they have themselves been immoral in permitting and exercising an immoral use of the power entrusted to them.

If then, we admit the postulate that the initial justification for the coming into existence of a compulsory form of government is to be found in the necessity for preserving peace and order, and for securing each citizen in the possession of all his earnings, the further question arises, "what will be the ultimate justification for the permanent continuance of government after communities have become peaceable and orderly, and the citizen is secured in both his life and the undiminished products of his labor?" The reply is that the final, and, as far as we can see, the permanent function of government will be the provision of public service as postulated in the third category of functions, and, until nations have learned to live in amity together, the preservation of its power and integrity as postulated under the fourth category. When our race has been civilized in a true sense, and the need for police, military forces, and law-courts has disappeared, all that will remain to justify the continued existence of public authorities will be the administration of those services which in the nature of things individuals cannot do for themselves - the management of the public utilities, the preservation of an adequate currency or medium of exchange, and in general, the wise spending of the publicly created wealth which expresses itself in the value of the land.

Such a conception of the ultimate and irreducible function of government is we submit both reasonable and satisfying to the moral sense. It delivers us from the devil of socialism or the new toryism on the one hand, and the deep sea of anarchism or the unthinkable negation of government on the other. It rationalizes and moralizes our attitude towards the State. It suggests a long-sighted patience with the problems of the present, and a larger hope for the future. It contains no seeds of pessimism or despair, but only the promise of a brighter day when not even the government itself will be permitted to encroach upon the liberties or earnings of the humblest of its citizens. Readers of The Orthocratic State will feel themselves under a deep debt to its author for that greatest of services, the clarification of thought and the rationalizing of concepts; and the only remaining regret will be that the opportunity has for ever passed for the expressing of that gratitude to him who has so well earned it.