Robert R. Livingston's Reasons against a Land Tax
Beverly McAnear
[Reprinted from the Journal of Political Economy,
Vol. 48, No. 1 (Feb., 1940), pp. 63-90]
INTRODUCTION
Among the papers of William Smith, Jr., in the New York Public
Library, there is a manuscript essay in the hand of Judge R. R.
Livingston, second lord of Clermont and a leader of the Livingston
party from I759 to I775. To this paper William Smith, Jr., added the
title, "Mr. Robt. R. Livingston's Reasons agt a Land Tax. "[2]
Unfortunately, the manuscript is undated, but probably the paper was
written about I752.[3]
In writing this essay Livingston's prime purpose was to defend the
non-taxation of privately owned but completely undeveloped land in New
York. Since great quantities of land owned by wealthy New Yorkers were
still unimproved in 1752 -- and in this category fell thousands of
acres held by the Livingston family -- the judge was seeking to
protect a privilege of great value to his own class and his own
family. In the course of this defense Livingston discussed the proper
bases of taxation, finally reaching the conclusion that one of the
wisest methods to raise governmental revenue was by an income tax
graduated according to the ability of the taxpayers to meet the
levy.[4] But with this analysis he was not content; he continued to
defend the manorial system of landholding as a social and political
bulwark for the people of New York and an economic blessing for the
mother-country. This system, he asserted, was being endangered by the
political ambitions and economic greed of the merchants, warfare to
him unfortunate but not surprising, for he believed the rivalry
between economic classes to be the mainspring of politics. The essay,
therefore, is of prime importance for its plea for an income tax, for
its definition and application of the economic interpretation of
politics, and for its commendation of the New York system of land
grants -- praise almost unique in literature of the period. Likewise
it is of great interest because New York history of subsequent years
reveals that this document is, at once, a description of one force
driving a leader and a class into political revolt and, again, a
statement of governmental policy which Livingston's party to some
slight extent eventually put into practice.
In reading Livingston's essay, the reader must remember that in New
York the provincial land tax was in fact a rate placed upon the
several counties and each county collected its share under the
individual methods of assessment and collection established by law for
that county. Under these several systems of tax administration, no
county in the province seems to have assessed unimproved land prior to
1753, and though after that date some of the southern and more
populous counties required taxation of all land,[6] none of the
northern counties prior to the Revolution permitted assessment of
undeveloped land.[7] This exemption, originally customary but later
ordered by statute,[8] resulted from several factors. In part it
represented the political power of the great landholders, operating
either through their votes in the legislature or through pressure
exerted upon county officials.[9] Again, statutory provisions for
taxation of undeveloped property in Albany County and New York City
reveal that the lack of plats of survey often made it impossible to
ascertain the ownership of a given tract, and collection of a levy was
therefore impossible.[10] Since tax collectors held office for a year,
a tax which could not be promptly collected could, in effect, never be
collected." Finally, it would appear that there was popular
prejudice against the taxation of unimproved land because nearly every
property-holder possessed some undeveloped acreage.[12]
Against these exemptions there was objection, ably summarized by a
writer in the
New-York Gazette, revived in the Weekly Post-Boy of
November 11, 1751. So well did this essayist express the arguments of
those demanding reform that R. R. Livingston may well have been
rebutting this essay. The primary premise of the Post-Boy
correspondent was the unfair burden of taxation placed on the
merchants, who, he claimed, were each required to pay L40-L50 a year
in property taxes and L400-L500 a year in duties on his goods. Nor
could these duties be passed on, for the price of goods was fixed by
scarcity and not by the amount of taxes paid on them. Then there was a
second group of taxpayers-the yeomanry. A yeoman might own 500 acres
of improved land and adequate stock; yet he would be forced to pay
taxes of only L5 or L6 a year. Finally there was a group of great land
barons who paid nothing on holdings of 30,000 acres of unimproved
land. To remedy this situation, the essayist proposed that all good
land in the province be required to pay a provincial tax of one penny
an acre, all bad land one farthing an acre. Such a tax he defended on
the grounds that it would yield revenue-estimated at L35,416 annually
-- large enough to meet all the demands upon the provincial
government. Nor would the burden of such a tax be unduly heavy, for a
landowner who leased 10,000 acres would receive an income of L1,000 a
year rent, while the taxes would amount to only a little more than
L4I. Finally, the essayist urged the reader to remember that the
landowner had the advantage of the increased capital value of his
lands.
The writer then turned to consider possible objections. He considered
the argument that it would be unfair to tax poor lands and replied
that poor lands usually were pine barrens and produced valuable
timber. He admitted that the proposed tax, added to the royal
quitrent, would in some instances be a double tax, but he denied that
the amount or number of instances of double levies would be important.
Finally, he disclaimed any intention of distressing the land barons:
he urged that they were men of great wealth and therefore had "the
largest Share of Power ....... Certainly it was fair that such men
should pay taxes in proportion to their estates and "not load the
Poor and Industrious with the Taxes .. . " And surely the land
barons were prosperous enough, unless their estates were "attacked
with those violent Distempers of Luxury and Extravagance, which will
inevitably bring on a Mortgage, which is seldom or ever removed, but
by the most diligent Application, or some surprising Turn of Fortune."
The taxes proposed in the Post-Boy would have meant ruin for
the manorial lords, and in 1752 they had good reason to fear such a
revision of the tax structure of the province. James DeLancey, the
leader of the majority party, had proved himself to be devoted to the
interests of the New York City merchants's and already he had financed
all the costs of King George's War by property taxes.[14] It was this
threat of tax reform, so fully explained by Livingston in the
following document, that was one of the forces impelling the
Livingston family to wean the northern manorial lords away from the
DeLancey party. And the Livingston clan had other grievances against
James DeLancey. The family had lost valuable offices as a result of
the feud between Governor George Clinton and DeLancey, and the latter
showed little appreciation of the sacrifice's Furthermore, by I752
Massachusetts was beginning to contest the eastern claims of the lord
of the Manor of Livingston, and the assembly and the governors of New
York-among them James DeLancey -- were to show little zeal in
defending the claims of the Livingston family.[16] The fear of tax
reform, anger over the loss of offices, the desire to protect land
claims, all caused the Livingstons of Clermont in December, 1751, to
plan open battle against James DeLancey. An alliance was offered to
Governor Clinton and his supporters, who accepted, only to have the
bargain nullified at the will of the head of the Livingston family,
the lord of the Manor of Livingston.[17] But other members of the
Livingston family were becoming restive, and the lord of the manor
became ever more fearful of his eastern boundary. By 1752 agitation
for the new party was well launched;[18] by 1754 the Livingstons had
gained a respectable following in the assembly;[19] in the elections
of I761 they gained a scant, though unreliable, majority of the
representatives.[20] This document therefore is a clear-cut statement
of one set of forces impelling a man to lead a successful political
revolt.
The document also foreshadowed party policy of the Livingstons in
years to come, for, in a limited field of taxation -- the levy for the
maintenance of roads -- the Livingston party applied the thesis,
argued by R. R. Livingston in the following document, that taxes "ought
to be equal in proportion to their [the taxpayers'] several
Abilities....." Under the basic act of 1703 -- and subsequent
amendments -- the maintenance of roads was provided for in great
measure by the labor of residents who, whether freeholders or not,
were subject under penalty of fine to be called to work on the
highways for not more than six days a year.[22] These payments for
fines were, until the introduction of an additional poll tax in
1760,[23] the only sources of income available to the road
commissioners for purchase of materials for road construction or
repair. Thus, until 1764[24] the basic levy for highways was in every
county a poll tax, either in services or in cash. Objection to the
unfairness of this levy on polls was one of the early tenets of the
Livingston party on the grounds that a poll levy was unfair to the
poor and therefore inequitable,[25] and, after this party gained
virtual control of the assembly in 1761, reform was gradually
undertaken. The first step was to change the basis of levy from polls
to property, a reform caused by the desire of some counties for funds
to hire artisans and to purchase materials,[26] and of other political
subdivisions to pay all costs of highway maintenance.[27] To transfer
the cost of the maintenance of the roads from a poll levy to a
property tax obviously placed a heavier burden on the wealthy, and
that such would be the effect of the tax was clearly recognized at the
time. Thus, in the instance of Albany and Tryon counties the revision
was extended to a graduated scale of taxation by which the rate of the
levy on the most wealthy taxables was one-third higher than that on
the poorest taxables.[28] The defense of this policy is suggested by
the Ulster act of 1770, which directed that the levies for the road
tax be made "with due respect .... to the comparative Abilities
of the Inhabitants therein assessed ..."[29]
A second type of reform of the highway levy was the creation of
regulations which would place upon the wealthier a heavier share of
the road work. Two methods were pursued to achieve this end. One
device was to require that resident freeholders or householders should
be forced to work twice as many days as non-property-holding tradesmen
or laborers.[30] Another method was prescribed for Albany and Tryon
counties in 1772. For just as this act had placed a heavier incidence
of taxation upon the wealthier, so did it provide a graduated scale by
which the larger property-holders were forced to assume a greater
number of working days. Thus a man assessed for a property valuation
of L50 was annually liable for 8 days' work, whereas a man assessed
only L5 was assigned 3 days. This system of taxation was levied in
order that the maintenance of the highways "may be as equitably
proportioned BETWEEN the Inhabitants .... as the Nature of the Case
will admit."[31] This note of social justice was stated even more
clearly in an Ulster act of similar content: "According to the
said [expiring] Act no Difference is made between the Rich and the
Poor; but they are (contrary to common Justice) obliged to work every
Year an equal Number of Days. ....[32] Thus the reform of the support
for road maintenance was persistently based on the principle that the
wealthier should bear a heavier share of the burden because of their
superior ability to pay and because of the demands of "common
Justice." It will be noted that those acts which stated those
principles most fully -- in theory and application -- were acts
extending to Ulster, Albany, and Tryon counties. These were counties
which, from 1761 to 1775, were represented by assemblymen pledged to
the Livingston party and their representatives were therefore only
putting into effect R. R. Livingston's opinion that taxation should be
graduated according to ability. Furthermore, it is noteworthy that the
more sweeping reforms were constituted after 1769, a year in which the
Livingstons met a crushing defeat at the polls throughout the
province. Clearly, these adaptations of the tax structure were being
developed by the Livingstons as one of the several programs by which
they hoped to gain popular support at the next election.[33]
By accepting an economic interpretation of politics as the basic
premise for his argument, Livingston was simply summarizing New York
political thought; his statement is unique among the New York
materials only because of its clarity of statement and precision of
application. The theory was accepted without question by New York
political commentators that self-interest -- personal, occupational,
class, partisan -- was the basic control over men's political
judgments.
An essayist of 1753 wrote: " 'Tis true, every Man ought to
promote the Prosperity of his Country, from a sublimer Motive than his
private Advantage: But it is extremely difficult, for the best of Men,
to divest themselves of Self-Interest .... A propagandist for paper
money in 1729 considered the probable reaction to his proposal by the
farmer, the artisan, the lawyer, the money-lender, the merchant, the
great landowner; he was able to decide the opinions of these several
groups by adopting the premise "that Men are always powerfully
influenced in their Opinions and Practices by what appears to be their
particular Interest."[35]
In 1726 Cadwallader Colden, writing upon the proper methods of
taxation, indicated in pungent terms his certainty of class interests:
I would ask .... in what country .... the whole Burthen
[of taxes] was taken off the Poor, and laid on the Rich: Is it not
generally the Rich that lay Taxes, and do they not constantly take
care not to Overburthen themselves? It is true they are often Chosen
by the Poor, but have they not always found out ways to keep them
Dependent, either by their Hopes or their Fears? so that they are in
effect, at the Command of the Rich, tho' they may think themselves
ever so much at their own Disposal. Can they expect to be proof
against the deep Designs of men .... whose Interest is so highly
concerned to avoid a heavy Load themselves, and to shuffle it off
upon others ... [36]
Luminously, Peter R. Livingston, a leader of the Livingstons,
revealed the weight of economic gain in party disputes, when his
father chided him for demagogery and fomentation of religious
intolerance: Am Sorry to find that you think the present Parties are a
Striving [?] whether the Church or Meeting shall rule. it is by no
means so. But the DeLancyes are striving[?] their utmost to make our
famaly rediculous and to keep them out of all Posts of Honour or
Profit and are determined to oppose every thing and every body that
they support which is too hard to bear.[37]
Thus the force of economic pressure in politics was to the mind of
the contemporary New Yorker a constant-the prevailing attitude had
been summed up in 1709 by an obscure English officer: "Interest
that governs all the world, tyrannizes at New York."[38] In their
discussions of the clash of economic interests, the New York
pamphleteers at times differentiated between the demands of the rich
and poor, and beginning in 1734 occasional references were made in the
political literature to the middle class.[39] These appeals to class
political action were more apt to be based upon prejudices or
relatively minor annoyances than upon divergent economic programs.[40]
The wealthier argued that they were better qualified to rule than
their poorer fellows; if the poor would elect the wealthy to office,
the rich would insure the material prosperity of the poor. Naturally,
it followed that, once the wealthy were elected to the assembly, the
representatives should rely upon their own judgments and not be
subject to the pressure of the electorate. Therefore the wealthy
opposed the publication of the votes of the representatives and open
sessions of the assembly.[41] On the other hand, the middle-class
leaders urged that the rich gained their political power by applying
pressure upon debtors and those with whom they traded and hired and,
to maintain this influence, were anxious to defeat proposals to
inaugurate the secret ballot.[42] These pamphleteers were little
impressed by claims that the wealthy inherently possessed the ability
to rule, and, in addition, they questioned the morals of the rich and
urged that the moneyed men, recognizing their superior powers of
self-defense through flight, "the Force of Money, and Powerful or
rich Relations," would be more susceptible to abuse of power than
would be men of the middle class. To the contrary, "the middling
People, the Farmers, Shop-keepers, and Tradesmen .... , had ample
political abilities and were the most honest and moral class in the
community. Upon them was placed the bulk of the burden of the
financial support of the government and the defense of the province,
and they too had property to protect against tyranny or invasion.[41]
Not until about 1750 did there appear an urban and a rural
proletariat. The rural proletariat consisted of a number of farmers of
the counties east of the Hudson who were either tenants-at-will or who
held short-term leases. These men demanded, preferably, outright
ownership of their land or, failing to gain fee simple, lifetime
leases. This agitation flared up in Dutchess County from 1749 to 1753
on the Pawling and Beekman estates, from 1753 to 1758 on the Manor of
Livingston, and from 1765 to 1768 on the great estates in Dutchess and
Westchester counties. The anger of the tenants was expressed in
refusal to pay rents, in ejectment by mobs of those tenants accepting
leases for higher rents, in riots against the landlords, and in votes
for candidates opposed to the land barons.[44] The New York City
proletariat appeared as a result of a sharp transition of the pattern
of production in New York after 1748, a shift which at once placed the
skilled artisan completely beneath the control of a master and which
likewise brought into the city a large number of unskilled day
laborers -- men who worked for a wage approximately 50 per cent less
than that of the artisans.[45] This heterogeneous group signalized
their growth of numbers by rioting against a devalorization of English
pence, a reform which bore heavily on the poor,[46] and the hard times
of the 1760's brought complaints of low wages and high prices.[47]
Tenants complained against statutes which prevented subleasing of
rooms in rented houses and against excessively stringent building
codes,[48] and the artisans of the city complained that small claims
could not be collected as easily in the city as in the other
counties.[49] Charges were made that poor and rich were forced to
serve the same length of time in road work, the city watch, and the
militia, and that therefore the poor were in effect taxed
excessively.[50] Stress was laid on these grievances during political
campaigns, and while neither urban nor rural proletariat ever
developed a comprehensive political program, yet during the pre-
Revolutionary years their restlessness was played upon by conservative
and radical, Livingston and DeLancey, as the several groupings of the
propertied classes each in turn sought the support of the Sons of
Liberty.[51] That such political manipulation might involve a
political and social revolution men of property became aware, and on
the very eve of the Revolution James Duane wrote a clear expression of
the fears that the wealthy politicians had of their propertyless
supporters:
I am much pleased that young Mr. Livingston is raising a
company in the Manor. I wish he may extend his View's further, in
the only plan, which, independent of the grand Contest, will render
landed property Secure. We must think in Time of the means of
assuring the Reins of Government which these Commotions shall
subside[. Licenciousness [?] is the natural Object of a civil afar
[sic] discord and it can only be guarded against by placing the
Command of the Troops in the hands of Men of property and Rank who,
by that means, will preserve the same Authority over the Minds of
the people which they enjoyed in the time [?] of Tranquillity.[52]
Part
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