

from the good name of the people who suffered the wrong and disgrace. He openly dispensed fabulous sums in political campaigns to secure the election of judges, legislators and executive officers favorable to himself, and secretly expended enormous sums in the halls of the national and state legislatures to secure the enactment of laws in the interest of his vast railway system.

These undeniable facts, which ought to be as startling as they are true, are not enumerated at this time to criticize the acts or to assail the memory of the uncrowned king who was deprived of his scepter by the hand of death. He was merely the product of a system in which such things were possible. His successor assumes the authority he abdicated, and the power he usurped from the people will be wielded as relentlessly as before, for the system in which that power was entrenched continues undisturbed. The facts are recalled not to condemn the dead magnate, but to awaken the thoughtful consideration of the American people.

Is it wise to permit one human being, or a small cabal of railway financiers, to exercise such unlimited and irresponsible control over a system reaching down to the minutest details of every person's material welfare? Is it sound policy for the state to leave in the hands of private individuals the control and princely revenues of a tax-gathering system which embraces the entire country, and is in its very nature an absolute monopoly?

The governments of other countries are gradually absorbing those functions and enterprises which are recognized as public utilities, and is it not time for our own people who have felt the evil effects of private and corporate ownership of railway transportation to mature some plan for the transfer of that ownership and its emoluments to the collective control of the people at large?—William H. Knight, in *Los Angeles Times* of Aug. 17.

AN ESTIMATE OF THE FILIPINOS.

The conclusion of a letter written by John T. McCutcheon to the *Chicago Record*, dated Manila, April 23.

From my personal experiences with the Filipinos—experiences covering the greater part of two years and the larger part of the Philippines and the Sulus—I have reached several deductions which at present I think are tolerably well founded. Perhaps if I had time I would change or remodel them.

The first is that I like the Filipinos. From the very first I have met with hospitality and kindness from them in every part of the islands. On nearly all of these occasions the people have had no other reason to be courteous and friendly except the impulse of inherent hospitality. About the only Filipinos I have had cause to disapprove of were the cab drivers in Manila, together with various house boys who at one time or another transferred my watch, money and other valuables from my home in Manila to some unknown place either in Manila or out of Manila. These I dislike.

But in most of my experiences with Filipinos in Manila and nearly all the provinces I have met a uniform degree of courtesy, which, whether assumed or natural, has prepossessed me in their favor. There has never been a house, however small, or a family, however poor, which has not hospitably placed itself at my service when conditions rendered such service most opportune and grateful. I have heard of scores of cases of treachery, but as a general thing I've found this treachery to have been directed at officials or people whom the Filipinos distrusted or had reason to dislike. This treachery has had its inception in conditions for which we cannot wholly blame the people, and the methods of exercising it may be partly excused when we reflect that the Filipinos have not reached an advanced state of enlightenment—that is, that the way to avenge a wrong is to carry the matter through several years of litigation instead of going out with a bolo and ending it all in one night.

Treachery, also, may vary with the point of view. When a native with a Remington shoots a soldier from his hiding place in the bamboos it is murderous treachery, but when the soldier goes out and shoots a Filipino it is merely another bandit killed and is called a praiseworthy stroke of enterprise. And when a local president whom we have appointed betrays to the Filipinos some prospective military expedition it is rank treachery from one point of view, but the Filipinos simply regard it as an evidence that the race is standing together in its fight against an outside invading race. It all depends upon whether we look upon the matter from the standpoint of people who have been getting the worst of it for several centuries or from the standpoint of a people who have had their

independence for a century or more of stupendous progress and enlightenment.

Another conclusion I've reached is that a higher state of education exists in the Philippines, excepting, of course, the Igorrotes, Negritos and Moros, than one can find in any other oriental country. From Albay province to Aparri you will find the greater part of the people uniformly able to read and write; you will find substantial stone buildings and imposing churches and schools in the most remote sections. A trip up the Ilocos coast is a revelation to the traveler, for he will find the valleys highly cultivated, the cities large and imposing and the people normally peaceful and fairly industrious.

The same conditions will be found existing in all sections of Luzon. You will find pianos where you have been led to expect breechcloths and savagery. You will find well-dressed people reading the native newspapers, and men who will discuss with you intelligently the problems of the islands. Only in the remote mountain districts will you find the half-naked savage who is used in the American comic weeklies to represent the typical Filipino. For this state of comparative enlightenment the church is responsible, for whatever we may say of the methods of the friars we must acknowledge that they have done a great work in educating the people—leaving the price out of the question.

Another conclusion I've reached is that with proper training the Filipino may be developed into a good man in any branch of business. He is receptive and imitative. I have seen most excellent maps and draughtings made by Filipinos. In the big banks and business houses high positions are held by them, and on the railway and steamship lines there are dozens of splendid native engineers and mechanics. In music, art, sculpture, medicine, law and literature; in technical vocations, such as architecture, wood carving, weaving, masonry, electricity and mechanical engineering; in sports, such as horse racing, cock fighting, boat racing, fencing, bicycling and various native sports, and in all sorts of clerical work there are many examples showing what may be made of the raw material if properly taught.

The Filipinos are great lovers of fast horses, and, like all eastern peoples, like ostentatious display. They dress their women beautifully, where

they have the means, and they love feasts and parades and balls and music. I am convinced that, naturally, the Filipino is domestic and peace loving, but as a general thing susceptible to the arguments of those of his race more intelligent than he. For this reason the leaders of the revolution have easily obtained thousands of recruits who break their home ties and go out and fight desperately without knowing exactly what they are fighting for.

And, finally, a few general conclusions may be summed up thus: That the Filipinos are inclined to be lazy; that they are pretty generally religious; that the women are virtuous, and that if the people can ever be convinced that the United States is sincere in its desire to benefit them they will make a very good class of citizens.

MR. BRYAN AND THE PEACE TREATY.

A letter written by Louis R. Ehrich, of Colorado Springs, Col., to the New York Evening Post, and published in the Post of August 10.

Senator Hoar has charged that Mr. Bryan gave his influence in behalf of ratifying the peace treaty with Spain, doing it in bad faith and with the expectation of making the Philippine question a political issue. Other writers and speakers have repeated the charge, with the added claim that Mr. Bryan's procedure deprives him of the right of justly criticising the unhappy consequences which flowed from an act in which he virtually cooperated.

Let us examine the facts and the accompanying evidence. I am no defender or apologist of Mr. Bryan. I fought his election bitterly in 1896, and I opposed his financial theories long before 1896. I am actuated solely by the spirit of fair play and justice.

On June 14, 1898, three weeks before Cervera's fleet was destroyed and two months before the fall of Manila, Mr. Bryan delivered an address in the Nebraska building of the Omaha exposition. These words, uttered so long before the administration policy had declared itself, assuredly give evidence of the prevision of the statesman and patriot. He said:

History will vindicate the position taken by the United States in the war with Spain. In saying this, I assume that the principles which were invoked in the inauguration of the war will be observed in its prosecution and conclusion. If, however, a contest undertaken for the sake of humanity degenerates into a war of conquest, we shall find it difficult to meet the charge of having added hypocrisy to greed. Is our national character so weak that we cannot withstand the temptation to appropriate the

first piece of land that comes within our reach?

To inflict upon the enemy all possible harm is legitimate warfare, but shall we contemplate a scheme for the colonization of the orient merely because our ships won a remarkable victory in the harbor of Manila? Our guns destroyed a Spanish fleet, but can they destroy that self-evident truth, that governments derive their just powers, not from superior force, but from the consent of the governed?

This was the first public expression on the subject of imperialism, uttered over two years before the electoral campaign of 1900. If Mr. Bryan, with the soul of a petty politician, had been desirous of entrapping the republican party into a dangerous political issue, would he not have kept silent?

The plenipotentiaries of the United States and of Spain affixed their seals to the peace treaty on December 10, 1898. Three days thereafter Mr. Bryan gave out the following interview at Savannah, Ga.:

Our people defended Cuba against foreign arms; now they must defend themselves and their country against a foreign idea—the colonial idea of European nations. Heretofore greed had perverted the government and used its instrumentalities for private gains, but now the very foundation principles of our government are assaulted. Our nation must give up any intention of entering upon a colonial policy, such as is now pursued by foreign countries, or it must abandon the doctrine that governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed. . . . Some think that the fight should be made against ratification of the treaty, but I would prefer another plan. If the treaty is rejected, negotiations must be renewed, . . . with the possibility of international complications. It will be easier, I think, to end the war at once by ratifying the treaty, and then deal with the subject in our own way. The issue can be presented directly by a resolution of congress declaring the policy of the nation upon this subject.

A month thereafter, January 9, 1899, (five days after the president had transmitted the treaty to the senate), Mr. Bryan published an article in the New York Journal, giving, as he says, "a few reasons why the opponents of a colonial policy should make their fight in support of a resolution declaring the nation's purpose rather than against the ratification of the treaty." After pointing out that the rejection of the treaty could be only temporary, because "the new senate will have a considerable republican majority," he gives the following as the weightiest argument:

The rejection of the treaty would be unwise, because the opponents of the treaty would be compelled to assume responsibility for the continuance of war conditions and for the risks which always attend negotiations with a hostile nation. The rejection of the treaty would give the administration an excuse for military expenditures, which could not be justified after the conclusion of peace, and the op-

ponents of the treaty would be charged with making such appropriations necessary. It must be remembered that, in case the treaty is rejected, negotiations must be renewed with an enemy whose ill-will is not concealed. Who is able to guarantee the nation against new dangers and new complications? . . . Our nation owes it to the nations with which we have dealings, as well as to the inhabitants of Cuba, Porto Rico and the Philippines, to announce immediately what it intends to do respecting the territory surrendered by Spain.

Within less than a week after the publication of this article Senators Bacon and Hoar each introduced resolutions in the senate declaring it the nation's policy to give complete independence to the Filipinos. On January 24 Senator Lodge said:

The treaty cedes the Philippines to us. It commits us to no policy, to no course of action whatever in regard to the Philippines. When that treaty is ratified, we have full power and are absolutely free to do with those islands as we please. . . .

Suppose we reject the treaty; what follows? Let us look at it practically. We continue the state of war, and every sensible man in the country, every business interest, desires the establishment of peace in law as well as in fact. . . .

The treaty commits the disposition of the Philippine islands to congress and to the ways and practices of peace. Its rejection leaves them in the sole power of the president, subject to the usages and practices of war alone.

On January 30 Senator Jones, of Arkansas (who certainly stands close to Mr. Bryan), pressed for a vote on the Bacon resolution. He was foiled, as were all further efforts in that direction, by senatorial tactics. The next day, January 31, Senator Platt, of Connecticut, said: "To defeat this treaty relegates us to a state of war legally. What will happen then no human being knows or can foresee."

The very day of the ratification of the treaty (February 6) Senator Allen said in the senate:

Because I shall vote for the treaty it does not follow that I am in favor of annexation. . . . If we open up the subject matter of the treaty we will, in my judgment, especially in the light of very recent events, incur the danger of European interference and European interventions. It is because we will have the power, when the treaty is ratified, of determining the form of government to be set up in the Philippine islands and in the other possessions that have come to us as a result of the war, without incurring any danger from abroad, that I shall vote for the ratification of the treaty.

Within eight days after the treaty ratification, Senator Bacon introduced the following amendment to the McEnery resolution:

Resolved further, That the United States disclaims and disposition or intention to exercise permanent sovereignty, jurisdiction or control over said islands, and assert their determination, when a stable and independent government shall have been erected therein, entitled in the judgment of the United States to recognition as such, to transfer to said government, upon terms