The Price Complex
versus
Fundamental Economics
Raymond V. McNally
[Reprinted from Land and Freedom,
January-February, 1934]
Ignorance of fundamental economics has brought this country to a
crisis in the struggle for recovery. Desperate attempts have been made
and are being made to repeal the economic laws by government fiat. To
such an extent has this been taking place that one cannot be censured
for imagining that in the very near future an effort will be made to
regulate the weather in order to help business. Evidently there is no
limit to the power and ingenuity of human beings. One of the "Brain
Trust" recently said that the theory that the law of supply and
demand maintained the economic balance without regulation had been
disproved by the depression. If that is so, why had it not been
disproved by former depressions? We have had several in this country
and the same phenomena had been observed in all of them. But the "Brain
Trust" prefers to look upon the present depression as something
entirely different, as having no similarity to anything that happened
in the past.
The Agriculture Adjustment Act and the National Recovery Act have
been wobbling badly and Administration officials have been very much
worried. Not realizing that their plans are based on false principles
and so were doomed to fail, they are surprised and perturbed by the
results. Of course, they are doing their best to compile the most
favorable statistics in order to impress not only the people but
themselves as well. They criticized the previous administration for
painting rosy pictures, but they have fallen into the same habit
themselves. A muzzle was placed on the Federal Reserve Board for fear
it would issue another unfavorable report. Interpretation of recovery
statistics has been restricted to one central agency under the direct
control of the President's own Executive Council.
The results of the government's plans could have been foreseen. As a
matter of fact, they were foreseen by those who had not lost sight of
fundamental principles. There was no need to experiment in order to
know the general results. A well-known British economist and
statesman, in an analysis of the recovery programme, wrote, "It
(meaning the United States government) is not under the deluusion
that, in the intricate complexity of the modern industrial system,
with a variety of economic forces interacting and pulling this way and
that, it is possible to foresee what the precise outcome will be of
each particular measure or even of the policy as a whole." This,
of course is absurd. A proper knowledge of economic laws will permit
one to predict the general result and frequently the precise result of
economic measures.
The Administration officials have been suffering from such a terrible
price complex that it has distorted their entire reasoning. By hook or
crook, they mean to raise prices. They have a regular bag full of
tricks. If one trick does not succeed, it is an easy matter to dive
into the bag and pull out another. While prices have risen
considerably since March of this year, they have not reached the 1926
level the level that will mean Utopia according to the Administration.
For the farmers, this would mean an average rise from the March level
of 130 per cent. Such a rise could not take place in a year under the
most favorable circumstances. It did not happen during the war when
other countries were forcing the farmers to the utmost to keep up with
their demands. It could only take place through outright currency
inflation.
But why should we go back to the 1926 level? All values have been
lowered since that time and producers can afford to sell at lower
prices today. Wages are lower, the cost of raw materials is lower and
overhead expenses are lower. Farm prices of course fell lower than
industrial prices. The reason for that is that industry curtailed
production when prices fell, but the farmers increased production.
Farm prices increased from March to July in a greater ratio than the
prices of other commodities, but since July the situation was
reversed. Nevertheless, the farmers' condition has improved but,
according to the inflationists, it is not good enough.
The majority of the farmers are not complaining about low prices.
Only those who are burdened with mortgages are suffering, because
their incomes are not large enough to permit them to pay their taxes,
interest and amortization. Those people who are obsessed with the
price complex, believe that if prices rose to the 1926 level, debtors
would be able to pay their debts. They assume that most of the debts
were contracted in 1926. Before recovery can set in, debts, of course,
must be liquidated. These debts were assumed largely in expectation of
greater wealth-production. It is not necessary that these debts be
liquidated in full before recovery can set in, but sufficient
liquidation must take place in order to bring them in line with the
productive power of industry or, in other words, in line with income.
However, the process of liquidation has been steadily taking place
through foreclosures, bankruptcies and compromise settlements. That
these debts are nearing the proper level has been evidenced by signs
of recovery which were first noticed at the end of May.
A great deal of the agitation for higher prices has been for the sake
of the farmers whose farms are heavily mortgaged. These mortgages are
being liquidated through foreclosure proceedings and eventually these
farmers, while they will have been reduced to tenancy, will be in a
position to produce, unhampered by heavy charges on their incomes.
However, the purpose of the drive to raise prices is to enable the
farmers to pay off their debts so they will not lose their farms. At
first thought, this would seem to be prompted by a noble sentiment,
but it is nothing of the sort. Why should these farmers be helped to
hold on to farms that they never really owned? After they are
foreclosed, they can operate as tenants at low rents and their
condition will be much better than before. The reason why they are so
keen about holding on to these farms is because they expect to make a
profit on them some day not as farmers but as speculators. The motive
behind the drive for higher prices then is not the desire to help
legitimate farmers but the desire to help speculators at the expense
of everybody else.
It is futile to prevent the trend toward tenancy in this country
among the farmers by supeificial measures. At the end of the last
century, one-third of the farmers were tenants. Today, more than half
are tenants. Farm lands are being concentrated more and more in the
hands of a few people. If farmers or those who wish to help them were
sincere in their desire that they should own their own farms as
legitimate producers, they would demand removal of the fundamental
cause of increasing tenancy namely, land speculation that inflates the
price of land and causes mortgages to pile up. Inflation of the
currency by an outright issue of paper money would be disastrous to
almost everyone, including speculators. Only a few lucky speculators
would be able to benefit from it. The creditors as individuals
probably outnumber the debtors as individuals. If prices of farm
products were doubled, the prices of industrial products would also be
doubled. There is no certainty that the prices of farm products would
rise higher than industrial prices and that farmers would be able to
pay off their debts. It is not higher prices that would pay off debts
but higher incomes, and higher prices would not necessarily mean
higher incomes. Inflation would lead to an orgy of speculation and
even if some of the old debts were paid, new debts would be
contracted. People would be encouraged to go into debt. Those living
on wages, salaries and fixed incomes would be driven to the point of
starvation. Incomes would not rise in the same proportion as prices,
demand would fall off, production would be checked, bankruptcies would
result, banks would fail and we would be plunged in to a worse
depression. Then we would have to start all over again.
So long as farmers remain subjective in their demand for equality,
they will not succeed. They must eventually realize that their
conditions cannot be improved by penalizing all other groups of
producers through price -fixing, process taxes, government purchasing
of commodities and currency depreciation. The fundamental cause of
their troubles is not peculiar to their cause but is at the root of
all economic troubles. They should ally themselves with other
producers in a common cause. Until they do this, their struggle for
equality will be futile because it is based on stupidity and
selfishness.
The farmers are not the only debtors. Farm mortgages in May were
estimated to be only about seven per cent of the total amount of
private and public debts which at that time were about
$134,000,000,000. The total amount of farm and urban mortgages were
about 29 per cent of the total. The balance consists of debts owed by
life insurance companies, real estate companies, investment trusts and
finance companies, public utilities, railroads, industrial conceins,
states, municipalities and the federal government. The greater part of
these debts were contracted because of inflated land values values
that were fictitious and which were dependent on greater
wealth-production. Such production could not have taken place for many
more years. It depended on a great increase in population and a great
increase in the invention and use of new machinery. The average
business man's attention is directed toward land only when mortgages
are involved or when funds are invested directly in land. When he
invests in corporate securities, he does not realize that in most
cases he is investing largely in land. The business analyst who takes
the view that too much money was invested in fixed assets, considers
land as just an asset and overlooks the fact that in the case of
railroads, pipe lines, public utilities and many large industrial
companies, land is the largest single asset. He does not appear to
realize that public franchises, for instance, are land not only in the
economic sense but in the legal sense. This type of analyst points out
and it is true that as a business increases in size, the tendency to
invest more and more in fixed assets, such as real estate and
equipment, becomes greater. The interest charges on mortgages, bonds
and long-term notes issued to finance this investment, and the
depreciation charges on these assets finally eat into the net income
when the expected increase in business does not materialize and
receiverships and bankruptcies result.
The point that is involved, however, is this: While assets, such as
buildings, equipment and fixtures depreciate in value from wear and
tear and obsolescence, land rises in value during a period of
increasing business activity. Therefore, increase in funded debts is
limited by this tendency toward depreciation of assets like buildings,
etc., but on the other hand, the tendency of land to rise in value
encourages the building up of the funded debt. If we keep in mind the
distinction between land and other tangible assets these other assets
being the product of labor and capital we shall be able to see clearly
the principal cause of the huge debt that has been burdening industry.
No one can do without land. In the economic sense, it consists of
farm lands, timber lands, oil lands, coal and mineral deposits, rights
of way, building sites and business locations. All producers depend on
it, if only for standing room. Therefore, there is a constant demand
for it and during a period of rising industrial activity, this demand
increases because more land is needed. As the price of it rises,
industry goes deeper and deeper into debt. This price cannot be
brought down by producing more land as in the case of commodities. Its
supply is limited and so its price continues to rise. Those who sell
land will not let it go at its natural value but anticipate its future
value. Those who issue bonds based on land assets, like the railroads
and public utilities, also anticipate this future value. For a while,
industry can absorb this increasing burden but finally it eats into
the returns to labor and capital. Labor and capital then cannot meet
the charges on the mounting debt and at the same time exist. It is at
this point that production is checked and the demand for land falls
off, causing its value to drop.
As this debt is based largely on fictitious values, it must be
liquidated by the wiping out of these values. The quicker this
liquidation takes place, the nearer we come to recovery. Industry
needs cheap land. All the artificial attempts that have been made to
prevent liquidation or to slow it up have retarded rather than aided
recovery.
The Home Loan Corporation activities and the refinancing of farm
mortgages, ineffectual as they may be, and the Reconstruction Finance
Corporation have contributed in the attempt to retard or prevent
liquidation. However, a great many people in this country want these
values maintained so as to protect their equities or investments based
on such values. Like a drowning man who grasps at a straw, they refuse
to face realities. They refused to recognize the fact that these
values have disappeared and so believe that if prices are raised to
the 1926 level, these values can be saved. But as I said before, it is
not higher prices that will pay debts but higher incomes. If all
prices were artificially raised, incomes would not be increased except
in a few individual cases.
A large supply of paper money thrown into the market by the
government would not increase production and employment as the
inflationists claim. There would be no gain in the general purchasing
power of the community, for the existing currency and bank deposits
would depreciate in value. The community would actually be poorer
because the additional money would not represent a corresponding
increase in real tangible wealth but a claim on wealth. It would have
the same effect as a tax on the community. In the last analysis,
commodities are exchanged for commodities but in this case commodities
would be exchanged for something that did not represent commodities.
If the prices of some commodities were artificially raised, as in the
case of farm products, the producers of those commodities would
receive higher incomes only temporarily because they would have been
secured at the expense of the com munity. Prices would eventually fall
again. Prices can only rise as a lesult of increased demand. It is low
prices that increase demand, not highei prices. Individual producers
should endeavor to keep pi ices as low as possible until the demand
increases thru the increased ability of people to produce, or in other
words, through increased employment, and then prices will rise
naturally.
The drive by the Administration for higher prices has produced some
strange inconsistencies. When prices rose under the NRA programme, for
instance, a warning issued, from Washington that they should not rise
too high. This is difficult to reconcile with the effort to raise
prices to the 1926 level by buying gold here and abroad at steadily
increasing prices. The President's gold policy has caused a great deal
of confusion and uncertainty. Business men have been limid about
making commitments or have planned their operations according to
erroneous ideas of what the results would be. A great deal of this
confusion has been due to ignorance of fundamental principles. While I
do not consider the money question as important as some people make it
out to be, currency tinkering retards business and I think it might be
wise to clear up some of the false impressions regarding it. It is
these false impressions that cause the money problem to be
overemphasized.
The popular belief is that if the value of gold is increased, the
dollar depreciates in value and prices rise. Thus, some business men
have been inclined to hold on to their stocks of merchandise believing
that in doing so they were making a good investment. This belief is
based on the idea that our paper currency in some mysterious fashion
derives its value from the gold reserves that have been available for
its redemption. But value is not a fluid that can be absorbed by
material objects. Since we left the gold standard, our currency has
not been redeemable in gold but yet our paper currency still has
value.
The value of our paper currency is its purchasing power. Its value in
terms of gold has no bearing on its value in terms of other
commodities. An increase in the supply of currency in circulation in
relation to the supply of commodities in the market would raise
prices. However, comparatively little gold has been bought and
therefore the increase in the number of dollars in circulation has
been too trivial to affect prices. While the value of the gold
reserves in the banks has increased and has put the banks in a
position to issue more currency and credit, this can only be done in
response to the legitimate demands of industry. Industry, however,
will not avail itself of this privilege until business improves.
Prices, therefore, will not rise except very slightly and then only
temporarily due to psychological reasons.
While the dollar has not depreciated in value in terms of commodities
inside the country, it has depreciated en foreign exchanges because of
its depreciated value in relation to the value of gold. Gold is not
used in domestic trade to any extent, but it is used to settle foreign
trade balances. When the dollar depreciates in terms of geld, it also
depreciates in terms of other currencies, because gold is the standard
by which the value of these other currencies is measured.
The claim is made that world prices will rise in terms of the dollar
and the result will be to raise prices in this country. This is not
true. Prices could only rise if the demand for these world commcdities
exceeded the supply, and there is no indication of that at the present
time. It is also claimed that we would gain an advantage in foreign
trade. The advantage we would gain would be only temporary. Exports
would tend to increase, but, on the other hand, imports would tend to
decline. As exports are paid for with imports, our advantage would not
last very long. Furthermore, it is not at all certain that we would
gain even a temporary advantage except in raw products. Other
countries could buy our law goods cheaper than before and could sell
finished products in other markets cheaper than we could. Failure to
recognize these facts led a British economist, considered by many
people to be the greatest in the world, to predict that when Great
Britain went off the gold standard in September, 1931, prices inside
that country would rise and she would gain an advantage over other
countries in export trade. Experience proved this prediction wrong and
he later admitted his error. This error would never have been made if
he had not lost sight of fundamental economic principles in his
intense concentration on a mere medium of exchange.
Facts are proving more and more every day that what controls prices
is not the supply and demand of money but the supply and demand of
commodities. One famous individual, who is more of an orator than an
economist, recently demanded to know how business could improve unless
the supply of money was increased. Evidently he believes this country
of ours was built up with money.
While the gold policy is not as dangerous as most of its critics have
claimed, it is futile as a means of raising prices. These critics say
that it will destroy government credit and compel the government to
issue greenbacks in order to finance its various recovery
undertakings. But why should investors lose confidence in federal
bonds? They would lose confidence in federal bonds if they thought
that the currency would so depreciate in value that the income from
these bonds would be smaller in purchasing power and that their market
value would fall as a result. If the dollar depreciated, people would
be more inclined to speculate than to invest. Believing that it would
was the principal cause it was purely psychological of the recent drop
in the value of federal bonds. Most of the false ideas about money
could be avoided if people had a proper conception of value. When they
realize and they eventually will that prices of commodities will not
rise as a result of dollar manipulation, the federal bond market will
be strengthened. England's experience bears this out. The government
then will not be compelled to issue fiat money. If greenbacks are
issued, it will be done deliberately because of the insane desire to
raise prices to the 1926 level. Then government credit would be
destroyed.
The depression was not due primarily to monetary causes and so no
monetary policy of itself will promote recovery. Artificially raising
prices will not bring about recovery. Only by increasing the natural
opportunities for employment can purchasing power increase and
business improve. However, arbitrarily raisirrg wages, as was done
under the NRA, does not increase the general purchasing power. Money
wages have risen but real wages have not. The new liberal economics
that is being taught embraces the theory that wealth must be
decentralized for the general welfare. Too rruch wealth is held as
capital, it is claimed, so that labor cannot buy back its own
products. Capital is considered as something that is sterile. This
idea ignores the dynamics of capital production. Capital is active and
is constantly going through a process of transformation. Funds used
for capital are part of the country's purchasing power.
Raising wages before the productive power of labor and capital
increases, only raises the cost of production, so that there is no
gain in purchasing power. High wages are the result of low cost of
production and low wages are the result of high cost of production.
Establishing minimum wages, shortening the hours of labor and
restricting the use of machinery, increase the cost of production,
curtail production and tend to lower wages in the aggregate. This
tendency can be counteracted only by an increase in the productive
power of labor that will make up for the taising of wages and the
shortening of hours. Such increase in productive power depends of
course on the free use of machinery. A natural rise in wages due to
the increased demand for labor would not increase the cost of
production because such a rise would proceed from greater
productiveness with the same amount of labor and capital in the same
number of hours. The amount of wages paid per unit would be less, but
the total amount of wages paid would be more.
The idea that concentrated wealth should be distributed among the
masses in order to increase the general purchasing power is behind the
public works programme. It is based on the false theory that
distributing the same amount of money among more people increases the
demand for commodities. Public relief projects, while they help the
individuals employed on them, must be paid for by industry. Thus, the
inciease in employment that results is secured at the expense of those
who are now employed. There would be no gain in the total demand for
commodities and of course prices would not rise. These projects are
financed by bond issues. These bonds are bought with funds that are
taken from industry and that go back into industry when construction
of these various projects get under way through the purchase of
supplies and materials and the payment of wages. Then in order to pay
the interest and to retire these bonds, industry will be taxed.
Industry is really lending money for the purchase of its own products
and then paying itself back through the medium of taxes. Relief
projects are a polite method of placing the unemployed on a dole.
A great many of these projects are being undertaken by the local
governments. Grants and loans are made to them by the federal
government. The indebtedness of these local governments is being
increased as a result. Thousands of municipalities are almost
insolvent and it does not seem very wise to add to their debts which
are said to amount to about $18,500,000,000. Furthermore, new issues
would tend to depress still further the market value of municipal
bonds.
Some of these public undertakings are self-liquidating. While they
will have to be financed by bond issues, this will not necessarily
mean additional taxes. However, for the present, it will entail the
transfer of funds from industry. If the banks absorb the bonds, their
position will be less liquid and this will result in restriction of
credit to industry. In order to make these projects self-liquidating
and self-supporting, tolls will have to be levied on industry. This
will result in increasing the cost of production of commodities or
reducing profits. While the purchasing power of those who are given
jobs on these projects would be increased, the purchasing power of
everybody else would be curtailed and there would be no general gain
if anything, there would be a loss.
Although some of these public works, both self-liquidating and
non-liquidating, would aid in wealth production by increasing the
productive power of labor and capital, the benefits resulting from
this increase would be absorbed by the increase in the value of land,
not only adjoining these projects but all over the country.
A rise in land values naturally follows renewed industrial activity
and it takes some time before it overtakes the rise in wages and
interest on capital. However, in the case of public works, the
increase in land values would be anticipated. Therefore, the rise in
land values would precede and not follow renewed activity. There is a
strong possibility then that industry would be strangled before it
could get started. The only gainers would be land speculators.
Producers would be hampered because they would have to pay higher
prices and rent for land than they do now. Not only that, producers
would be compelled to pay double tribute for the same thing. They
would have to pay higher prices and rents for land made more valuable
by these relief projects and on top of that would have to pay tolls
for the various services rendered by them. Many of them would be
forced to stop producing, resulting in increased unemployment and
lower wages, or would be shunted off on to inferior land where they
could barely make a living. The situation would be further aggravated
by some speculators holding land out of use entirely, waiting for a
greater rise in its value land that is required for production. More
unemployment would result, for unemployment is only the inability of
labor to apply itself to land, the source of all wealth. Most people
are engaged in the extractive industries, and the rest, who need land
for business sites, are engaged in modifying and shaping natural
products to make them suitable for the satisfaction of human desires
or in rendering services of various kinds to those who do the actual
producing of wealth.
The Secretary of the Interior recognizes the obstacle to production
that inflated land values present because he warned speculators not to
demand too high prices for the land that is needed by the Public Works
Administration. If it is true in the case of relief projects, it must
be true in the case of all production. Futile as his warning is, it is
at least significant of the fact that the Administration has some
glimmering of the part that land plays in our economic life.
It must also be pointed out that not only the federal government but
the municipalities would be forced to purchase land at inflated
prices. According to a report issued recently by Dun & Bradstreet,
Inc., land speculation was the primary cause of the financial
embarrassment of most cities. A rise in land values of course would
temporarily benefit life insurance companies, savings banks and
building loan associations; but as long as production was impeded,
theie would be no general prosperity.
When we consider all of these facts, is it any wonder that public
construction for relief purposes failed in both Germany and Great
Britain to bring back prosperity? We cannot borrow ourselves out of a
depression. Recovery can only proceed from liquidation of debts, not
from the piling up of debts.
Most business men have been puzzled by the postponement of recovery
because they did not know the fundamental cause of the depression.
Consequently, they looked to the government for some solution,
believing, rather foolishly, that it should be more intelligent than
they were. If the Administration has adopted measures that do not meet
entirely with their approval, the responsibility lies not with the
Administration but with these business men who had refused to think
seriously about social and economic problems.
Recovery, of course, will take place eventually whether we do
anything about it or not, through the gradual liquidation of debts,
making it easier for men to produce. It can be speeded up, however, by
lightening the burden of taxation on industry as much as possible and
increasing the opportunities for the employment of labor and capital
by giving them greater freedom of access to natural agents. As we
regard the situation of today, we should do so with the future in
mind. When this country finally emerges from the depression, most
people will forget what really caused it- -if they ever knew. But this
they should keep in mind: As recovery takes place, the foundation is
being laid for another crisis. Therefore, in considering remedies for
the present situation, they should bend their efforts towards removing
the fundamental weakness in our economic system which is the principal
reason for our huge, internal debt namely, land speculation.
|