Natural Law and Moral Law
in the Teaching of
Henry George's Political Economy
Joseph Dana Miller
[Reprinted from Land and Freedom,
September-October 1938]
Joseph Dana Miller was during this period
Editor of Land and Freedom. Many of the editorials
published were unsigned. It is therefore possible that Miller was
not the author of this article, although the content is thought to
be consistent with his own perspectives as Editor. |
Without regard to the natural order, or any reference to natural
laws, among which economic laws are included, we may elect to try the
Great Iniquity, by which term Tolstoy has characterized the denial of
nan's equal right to the use of the earth, by the moral law. It is the
everlasting credit of Henry George as it is of Oscar Geiger, now
linked inseparably with his great mentor as the interpreter of our
philosophy, that both these men stressed the need for the observance
of the moral law in society. From this teaching the Henry George
School under its eminent director, Frank Chodorov, will not depart.
The identity of the moral law with the natural law is taken for
granted. Society cannot do things that are forbidden to the
individual. Society cannot transgress the right of property any more
than the individual can, and expect to escape the penalty. It is
preposterous to assume that there is one law for society and another
for the individual. Its sanctions are as binding on both. The amount
of tergiversation or excursions into the realm of metaphysics can
obscure this truth. To abandon it is to sacrifice the mainstay of our
argument. After all emphasis is laid upon the natural laws, the
ethical imperative calls aloud for recognition.
This concept, an inseparable part of our philosophy, dates from no
special period, now to be laid aside, and a so-called scientific
interpretation substituted. "The School of 1897" (why this
date?) is the School of Henry George and Oscar Geiger, and now of the
rapidly growing institution founded by the latter. But it is
unfortunate, besides being a trifle ridiculous, that a controversy
should have arisen over this point. At a time when there is a more
wide-spread knowledge of our philosophy than at any time since Progress
and Poverty was written; and which still remains the invulnerable
citadel of our teaching.
"The land is Mine and shall not be sold forever," and
similar injunctions were the teachings of the School of 620 B.C., or
thereabouts. It does not differ materially from the School of 1897
started by the followers of Henry George on or before that date. Its
teachings contain the moral injunctions for society of which this
seems to be the supreme command. It comes to us from the highest
authority that can be cited. It is a moral injunction of tremendous
solemnity. Of this Henry George and Oscar Geiger were supremely
conscious. It was an inseparable part of their preachment. The moral
law in society and the natural law were one and the same.
What consideration other than this did Tolstoy have in mind when he
referred to "The Great Iniquity?" He was thinking of the
moral law of which this was the supreme violation. What do we mean
when we say a thing is wrong or wrung from the right? What do we have
in mind when we say of some social arrangement or the law of man that
it is wrong? Do we not at once conceive of some violation of an
ethical principle. Is not this man's first reaction when we say it is
not just. "Justice the end, Taxation the Means," was
George's title to one of his most important lectures. It is mere
juggling with words to protest that that what we propose is only the
abolition of all taxation. We will, nevertheless, do what we set out
to do through the machinery of taxation, the instrument with which the
people are most familiar and which they are not likely to
misunderstand. Mr. George has given us reasons for discarding other
means, and these show him to have been a statesman as well as an
economist.
A Supplementary Word by C.H. Kendal
It is in no spirit of controversy that we again consider our old
friend, the moral law, as related to economic law, which was touched
upon in a recent issue of LAND AND FREEDOM.
We are wont to consider the marked contrast between law and what is
known as the common law, and the statutes. Basically law was
recognized in early concepts as natural law only. All other so-called
law was considered as manmade, viz., enactments or recorded precedents
or customs. Law carried its own penalty if violated. All else required
a specific penalty and human enforcement. Blackstone affirmed this in
his chapter on the nature of law in his
Commentaries, Vol. I, Chs., 2 and 3. Concerning the relation
of law to human enactments we quote as follows:
"This law of nature being coeval with mankind, and
dictated by God Himself, is of course superior in obligation to any
other. It is binding over all the globe in all countries and at all
times; no human laws are of any validity if contrary to this; and
such of them as are valid derive all their force and all their
authority mediately or immediately from this original."
We further quote from the same volume:
"No human laws should be suffered to contradict the
laws of nature.
On the contrary, if any human law should allow
or enjoin to so contradict a law of nature we are bound to
transgress that human law or else we must offend both the natural
and the divine."
In ignorance of the economic law has not society offended both? But
here is the source of sovereignty expressed in man through his
compliance with law, natural law. Ignorance is no excuse; the penalty
is inevitable. It requires only slight elevation of thought to realize
that in considering law as natural law we are dealing with invisible
and invariable principle. It is incessant and eternal and without
dimension; its invariable effects only, are registered through our
physical senses. From these effects we learn by trial and error, by
stumbling, falling down stairs, burnt fingers or electric shock.
Thereafter we recognize law but we can neither analyze or define it.
In so recognizing and in obeying law we register a good effect and so
consider it as positive and its violation an evil effect and negative.
As Georgeists we state a positive philosophy, an idea, technically, a
natural law, an eternal principle. It was its violation as perceived
by bad effects that led George and his predecessors to its discovery.
Reasoning therefrom the law was sought out and found. It was the
principle of equal rights, the invisible moral law itself, and then
its application expressed as equal rights to the source of all
external things, land. Tested, it was found good, not evil, and true,
not false. Its truth is worked out to mathematical exactness and to
that extent fulfils the requirements of science. Tested by its
violations the automatic visible results are always poverty, distress,
misery and crime and all that flows from these things. Given
invariable evil effects of the violation of the economic law and that
law itself, the essence of goodness and truth, wherein does it fail to
coincide with the moral law. Let any Georgeist discover if he can the
slightest violation of the moral law in the philosophy of Henry
George, let him find any intrusion of evil or falsity in the principle
which George enunciated. Humanity in its ignorance has failed to obey
the unchangeable economic moral law. The four horsemen still ride.
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