Review of the Book
How Diplomats Make War
by Francis Neilson
Joseph Dana Miller
[Reprinted from the Single Tax Review,
January-February 1916]
A DINNER of radicals will be held at the Fifth Avenue Restaurant, 23d
Street and Broadway, on Wednesday evening, February 2. At this dinner
Mr. Edwards P. Ingersoll will read a poem, "The Goddess of
Liberty in Wall Street," an allegorical satire. There will be
speeches from. Single Taxers and others.
James M. Beck in his "The Evidence in the Case," which has,
in a short time, attained such a remarkable circulation, has presented
what is probably the settled judgment of America in placing the moral
responsibility for the European war on the Teutonic Allies; "of
Accuse," published anonymously in Switzerland, quite recently
presented to American readers, with passionate vehemence, throws upon
the German Chancellor and the war-mad Prussian military ring, the full
guilt of "The Crime of the Twentieth Century."
We have had reams of multi-colored State papers, and will have stacks
of books written in an endeavor to shift the burden of guilt from the
shoulders of one group of belligerents to the other, but these will,
in all probability, to the popular mind, tend merely to confirm the
dictum that "all men are liars."
To those who would seek causes rather than scapegoats this book will
be welcome. The author has the power of analysis and a mastery of his
subject, which he uses with telling effect in a terrific indictment of
the machinations of secret diplomacy.
The first three chapters take in a rapid survey of the development of
European diplomatic intrigue and the establishment of the ante-bellum
European balance of power since Napoleonic wars.
The treaties of 1839 and 1870 involving the neutrality of Belgium are
analysed and the shifting positions of the powers signatory to those
treaties are discussed.
Of Nietzsche the author says-
"The real influence of Nietzsche has not shown
itself in any of the actions of the German people up to the present.
They in no way appreciate his meaning of war - less, indeed, than an
English journalist. I see many soldiers; would I could see many
warriors! Uniform - they call what they wear; would it were not
uniform what they hide under it!' There is nothing even savoring of
the individualism of Nietzschce in German life."
Poor Nietzsche! We who read the daily papers have securely enthroned
him as the dens ex mackinaw of the German "Will to Power."
The author lays upon Great Britain much of the blame for the
debauchery of military expenditures in which practically all of Europe
indulged since 1905. We are given an edifying account of the Morroccan
imbroglio which set the world on edge when, in 1911, the
German cruiser "Panther" visited Agadir; of the secret
agreement made by Britain, France and Spain for the partition of
Morroco prior to the signing of the Act of Algeciras.
The writer shows that since 1906 "conversations" took place
between the French and British military and naval authorities, and
that the British government since that date was, to all practical
purposes, pledged by its Foreign Office to give France armed support
;n the event of war with Germany! And of these pledges Parliament was
in complete ignorance, and their existence was repeatedly denied by
the Government.
Then in August, 1914, came the storm' The fateful events crowded into
the few days before August 1st, 1914, are presented with dramatic
force. Of Sir Edward Grey's effort to avert the impending catastrophe
the author says: "Strove for Peace! Yes, that was true, and what
a striving! Bound hand and foot from the beginning to support France,
and working night and day for peace." France was pledged to
Russia, Germany to Austria, and once the spark was struck it was
inevitable that practically all the great nations of Europe would
become involved in the conflagration. This is the author's indictment
of secret diplomacy:"
"Diplomacy destroyed every bridge raised by
pacifists in the principal European States, to march the workers
into an international corps which would overthrow militarism and
bureaucratic rule. Diplomacy in dividing Europe into two hostile
camps stimulated militarism in all its branches; in each state it
fostered the vast international armament interests; it raised up a
literature of enmity and hatred and threw the fate of Democracy into
the hands of military and naval experts."
In concluding the chapter the author deals with "some practical
proposals" toward the solution of the problems which must be met
after the close of the war. He advocates placing all treaty-making
power in the hands of the parliament and depriving the foreign offices
of the power to bind the government to secret agreements. He says, "but
let it not be imagined that these changes will be sufficient to
preclude the possibility of war. The problems of armament and war are
not to be solved by merely making changes as are suggested above;
these problems lie deep, away down at the base of the social system.
It is opportunity that is required for the mass of men - equal
opportunity for all, indeed, if the problems of armament and war are
to be solved. There is no other way!"
This is, on the whole, the best contribution of permanent value to
the literature of the war up to the present time. It sheds a new light
on the sinister methods of secret diplomacy as practiced in the
chancellories of Europe;
"Whose game was empires,
Whose stakes were thrones,
Whose table earth,
Whose dice were human bones." Americans will do well to read
this illuminating story of the "Great Game," and profit by
it.-A. W.
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