A Defense of the Unearned Increment Tax
Marion Mills Miller
[A response by M.M. Miller to an editorial orignally
published
in The Square Deal, Toronto, April 1915. Reprinted from the
Single Tax Review, 1921]
EDITORIAL IN THE SQUARE DEAL
"The idea that the increased selling value of land should be
appropriated for public purposes looks upon the face of it as a
sound economic proposal. It seems as though a value such as this,
manifestly created by the people, should be taken by the people for
public purposes. To many people this is synonymous with Single Tax,
but it is far from the case. This idea in so far as it applies to
the increased selling price of land is based upon a misconception
and as a practical measure it will do harm to genuine reform.
In the first place, the selling price of land, when not a
speculative price, is simply the annual rental, or production, after
taxes have been paid, capitalized at the current rate of interest.
Thus, a lot which rented for $50 a year and taxes, money being worth
five per cent., would sell for $1,000. If the rental increased to
$100 it will sell for $2,000. It is evident that this is a
prospective value, not a tangible one. For if, through any change in
circumstances, such as the migration of population, or loss of
productiveness, or even increase in the amount of taxes, by which
the annual net production is lessened, the selling value will
decline. Should the State levy an increment tax and take, say, the
whole or even half the increase, they would be levying not on
present production, but would be placing a mortgage on future
production, which labor would have to pay.
Such a measure would tend to increase the monopoly of land instead
of reducing it, for if the tax was only paid when the land was sold
it would operate to prevent sales and also to force up the price,
and if exacted periodically it would be considered so great a
handicap as to be next to impossible to collect if the percentage
taken was high and the increase in value great. Relief would be
certainly sought for from the Legislature and inevitably granted,
and except for an increase in the public revenue we would be no
better off.
Nay, we would be worse off, even if relief was not granted, for
land monopoly would then be shared by the State, and though the
community got a share in the plunder, all the evils of land
monopoly, low wages, idle land, and restricted employment would
remain. While the socialistic tendencies of the times, coupled with
the fact that the Government were partners in the matter, would make
land monopoly harder to be got rid of than under the present system.
The Single Tax is a different measure, and has for its object not,
primarily, the right adjustment of public revenues, though that is
involved in it, but to restore the right of all to the use of the
earth. It would produce ample revenue for all public requirements,
and that with the minimum of cost and without burdening industry;
but these are the least of the benefits. It would destroy the
monopoly of land and make labor free. By taking the annual rental of
land in taxation all unused land would be forced out of the hands of
speculators and become immediately available for productive
purposes. As a result all land rents would fall and there would be
an immediate increase in the demand for labor, and wages would rise.
This, of course, would hit the monopolists hard. All who were living
without working would find their power of taking the earnings of
others through special privilege disappear. No one would then seek
employment in vain. A man would no longer have to pay a large
[amount] before he could get an unimproved farm to work or a vacant
lot to build on. Any vacant land could be got for paying the annual
rental value, and there would be no taxes. This would solve the
labor problem, the land problem, and the taxation question, and
there is no other way to do it.
A RESPONSE FROM MARION MILLS MILLER
As a number of prominent Single Taxers uphold the view here expressed
that the unearned increment tax would tend to increase the monopoly of
land, I feel it my duty to express my opinion that this is not true,
but, on the contrary, that it would diminish such monopoly, and to
state my reasons for this contention.
Before doing so, I wish to express my hearty approval of all that the
editor of the
Square Deal, says of the nature and results of the Single Tax,
and my acceptance of his statement of what the unearned increment tax
is, and his declaration that it is not synonymous with the Single Tax.
I claim, however, that it is a partial application of the principle of
the Single Tax, and, as such, has all the virtues of such an
application and is open only to those objections which apply to any
other partial application of the principle, such as the taking by the
Single Tax of only a part of the annual economic rent.
The chief objection to the latter process, or "Single Tax
limited," as it is called, is that, by the remission of the other
taxes, and the forcing of formerly idle land into use, the productive
power of land is so greatly increased that the annual return to the
owner is greater than it was before the Single Tax was laid, even
after the amount of the tax has been deducted. Nevertheless, this
increase of wealth is also shared by the laborers and the capitalists
(owners of labor products applied to the creation of wealth), and
therefore the "Single Tax limited" is in every way an
improvement on former conditions, granted that nothing else is wrong
with our economic system (such as, for example, our money) which would
give unjustly acquired wealth an opportunity to purchase oppressive
power.
By the taxing body, or government, it might be agreed, tacitly or
expressly, with the landlords, to retain the Single Tax at the rate
which causes the maximum increase of annual rental value, and of its
capitalization, the selling value of land, especially as it has been
found that the amount of taxes so received is sufficient to pay public
expenses of the kind heretofore incurred by the government. It may be
proper to call this agreement a "partnership in land monopoly."
Nevertheless, it is a monopoly partly shorn of its present power to
oppress labor and capital. Such a partnership between the government
and the landlords now exists, and so there is no new oppression
brought into operation by the Single Tax, but, as shown, the old
oppression is lessened. Otherwise Single Taxers would be compelled to
drop their present programme of agitation for the removal of one
oppressive tax on labor and capital after another, with consequent
gradual increase of the tax on economic rent, and to demand the
instant removal of all the oppressive taxes and the instant imposition
of a tax on economic rent equal to its entire amount. "The whole
hog or none" would then be our motto. It is well that nature does
not work in such an anomalous manner -- that economic laws on the
contrary reduce such an ultimatum to an exhibition of childishness and
perversity.
But, it may be urged, we do not want to have the operation of the
Single Tax stop at the point of the greatest return to the landlords;
we wish to have the rate of the tax increased at least to the
percentage of diminishing returns to the landlords, and, if possible,
to the percentage when there will be no return to them at all. How can
we entirely destroy the partnership between government and landlords?
In answer I would say that the tendency of advancing civilization is
to increase expenditure for public purposes, and the need of greater
revenue will inevitably cause the taxing government to take more and
more of annual economic rent, which though the amount remaining in the
hands of the landlords is lessened apace, is correspondingly augmented
in its aggregate by increasing public improvements, population, etc.
Then too there are organized interests both of a capitalistic
enterprise and special kinds of labor which are opposed to the landed
interest, and with which the government, even considered as a
political ring, can as profitably to itself in single cases, and more
profitably in the aggregate, enter into partnership. Indeed, in their
totality these interests form the interests of the people, opposed
only to one interest, that of landlordism. Development of democratic
government, the rule of the people, by such reforms as direct
legislation and equal suffrage will combine with the need for greater
public expenditure, and the demands of class interests possessing
political influence to break up the alliance of government and the
landlords, and to advance toward the Single Tax ideal.
Now I claim that the same objections and these only apply in the case
of the unearned increment tax, and the same causes prevail and the
same remedies are available to destroy whatever partnership might
result between the government and the landlords.
I admit that, from a scientific point of view the unearned increment
tax is an unnecessary tax, since the application of the Single Tax
beyond the point of diminishing returns to the landlords will
accomplish more simply and effectively its results. But it may be a
more practical tax in that its adoption by the people will be more
readily obtained than that of the Single Tax. The term "Single
Tax" is an obscure and unattractive one -- it doesn't define its
essential nature, nor does it present any argument in its favor. Even
"land-value tax," a proposed substitute, while the term is
more definitive, doesn't present any reason for its adoption. But "unearned
increment tax" is both definitive and persuasive. It assumes, and
the assumption is granted by the acceptance of the term, that the
possessors of the value taxed have no moral right to it.
For the sake of fairness as well as for economic comparison it must
be assumed that, as in the case of the Single Tax, all public revenues
are to be raised from the unearned increment tax. What will be the
result? The opponents of the tax, represented by the editor of the
Square Deal, admit that it will take value created by the people for
the use of the people, and, by inference, since the tax cannot be
shifted, will correspondingly reduce the value of the land for
purposes of exchange by private owners.
But, say they, this value is prospective and not tangible, and the
tax would therefore be placing a mortgage on future production, which
labor would have to pay. This I deny. Suppose the tax were laid to the
extent of taking all the increase of land value (capitalized rent),
would not this wipe out all the prospective or speculative value? Who
would than speculate in land? And, in so far as it approaches this
point, the tax will diminish this prospective value. In short, the
critic is blaming upon the tax the results of not applying it --
making sins of omission sins of commission. Granting, however, the
critic's contention, cannot the same be said of our present inadequate
tax upon economic rent, and also of the Single Tax when this is
limited to the rate that will produce the maximum of land value,
prospective as well as present? Indeed, the "Single Tax limited"
and the unearned increment tax are essentially and practically the
same thing. This is true because the capitalization of a value does
not change the character of the economic results in taxation. If it
was land value before capitalization, it is land value after it, and
obects the same laws of the incidence of taxation with like results.
If it was a privilege value before, it remains so afterwards, subject
to the same increase or diminution by taxation. And privilege value is
always speculative value. The editor of the Square Deal writes
as if he thought economic rent was the actual excess of productivity
over that at the margin of cultivation, the "tangible" value
he calls it, and not the potential, and that it did not become
potential or speculative until it was capitalized into land value.
Would he not tax vacant lots? If by "tangible" value, he
means actual rental value (not economic), does not this exist in the
case of the capitalized actual rent, to be secured from long leases in
which the lessee takes a speculative chance? This potential value
differs from year to year, and, under the Single Tax, would be
assessed accordingly. A logical application of the unearned increment
tax would cause the annual increases in the capitalized value of this
rent to be annually assessed also. The proposal that assessments
should be made only upon sales or at long intervals may be rightly
criticized as unjust to the community, but this is a matter of
programme and not principle, as it is also in the case of the
uncapitalized economic rent. From the standpoint of expediency it is
admitted that in every respect but, perhaps, securing popular
approval, the Single Tax is better than the unearned increment tax.
The editor of the Square Deal says that the unearned
increment tax, if exacted annually, would be considered (evidently by
the landlords) so great a handicap as to be next to impossible to
collect, if the percentage taken was high and the increase in value
great. Does not this objection, if admitted, exactly apply in the case
of the Single Tax also? Desire not to pay, without the power to resist
payment, is inoperative, and neither tax, since both cannot be
shifted, presents any new means of resistance. Relief would certainly
be sought for from the Legislature, he says. Is not this what the
opponents of the Single Tax threaten? And is it not as idle a threat?
And then, what becomes of the critic's argument of partnership of the
government in land monopoly in the case of the unearned increment tax,
if the land monopolists are certain to resist the tax and overthrow
it? Would they not rather endorse a system which he says "would
make land monopoly harder to be got rid of than under the present
system?"
There is another argument, advanced by other opponents of the
unearned increment tax than the editor of the Square Deal,
that it would work so well that the people would be inclined not to
accept the better Single Tax. The very statement of this fear, I
think, refutes itself, for the new principle in it, indicated by its
name, the return to the community of values created by the community,
would be so apparently the cause of its working well that the people,
especially as the need of new revenue increased, and the tax had been
raised beyond the point of diminishing returns to the landlords, and
still did not suffice for desired public expenditure, would seek to
apply the principle in its radical, scientific, more practicable and
more productive form, the Single Tax, and would be enabled, by the
weakening power of the landlords, to put it into execution.
I do not advise Single Taxers to drop their work for the full remedy
in order to secure the half one, except in cases where this is clearly
an obtainable measure, and the Single Tax is not. Even then there will
be enough advo- cates of the unearned increment tax outside of Single
Tax ranks to secure its adoption. Our duty is to educate the people in
sotmd economic prin- ciples. But such education is not advanced by
opposing soimd economic principles as principles, when they are
presented in the form of legislation of which we do not approve. We
should oppose the forms only. The term "unearned increment"
cannot be too widely used, or the principle it represents, of taking
the community values for community purposes, be too strongly endorsed
for the good of the cause. "Names are things." Get the
people into the habit of using correct terms, and they will think
correctly. Single Taxers have done far more and better work in this
respect than most of them realize.
Thirty years ago, when I became a convert to the Georgian economy,
the people in general were unfamiliar with the term "unearned
increment," as with most of the terms used in that economy. The
catchwords of Socialism were much more in vogue. Yet, owing to
persistent education by Single Taxers, joined with the inherent and
easily understood truth in their doctrines, and the appeal to the
moral sense in their economic terms, these latter are generally
accepted, while Socialistic terms, such as "class consciousness,"
"surplus value," etc., have dropped back to the position of
shibboleths of a narrow school of economic thought, and are rarely
heard outside of such connection. Now acceptance of terms leads
inevitably to acceptance of the doctrines involved in them. From the
propagandist standpoint, therefore, we should fight for the retention
of that logically apt and rhetorically effective term, "unearned
increment," and even try to broaden its meaning to present all
phases of its essential principle. As used by its coiner, John Stuart
Mill, and by economists since his day, it applies only to the increase
of the capitalized value of annual economic rent. We should strive to
have it apply also to economic rent itself, an unearned increase of
wealth to the landowner, in which case the objection of those who
would oppose the moral implication in the present use of the term by
asking, "How about the unearned decrement?" would appear as
palpably absurd as it is really so, since the "decrement"
would be clearly seen to be a minus quantity, and the term would
resolve itself into an "Irish bull."
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