# TRIUMPHANT PLUTOCRACY

**The Story of**
**American Public Life**
**from 1870 to 1920**

By

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Printed by THE ACADEMY PRESS
112 Fourth Avenue, New York City

Published January 1, 1922.

## IV. Money

My experiences with the world of affairs have convinced me that the power in our public life was exercised through the bankers. My study of banking showed me that the grip which the bankers were able to maintain on the economic system depended largely upon their ability to control money. There were two ways in which they exercised this control. One was by determining who should issue money. The other was by specifying its character. The bankers of the United States have been in a position to decide both of these questions in their own interest.

The Constitution of the United States says that the Congress shall have power to coin money, to regulate the value thereof and of foreign coins, and to fix the standard of weight and measures. The Constitution does not empower Congress to delegate the right to issue money to any person or combination of persons.

Yet the Congress has always delegated the right to issue money to the banks. The power thus conferred by Congress upon the banks to issue money has been used by the bankers to exploit and plunder the people of the United States.

While I was a member of the House of Representatives (1880) I had become acquainted with Peter Cooper of New York. The renewal of the National Bank charters was under discussion in the House at the time and of course the whole question of currency and of our economic system was covered in the debate. One day Peter Cooper of New York placed upon our desks a pamphlet dealing with the money question. I read this pamphlet with great interest, because Peter Cooper was called a "greenbacker" and was supposed to be in favor of what they called "fiat" money. Again and again throughout the debate his name had been mentioned and he had been abused by the speakers.

The foundation theory of Peter Cooper's pamphlet was that the law of supply and demand applied to money just as it applies to other commodities, so that an abundance of money would be registered in the rise in the price of all those things whose value is measured in terms of money. In other words, that the law of supply and demand (the theory that quantity affects price) applies to money as well as to corn, oats, and potatoes. Therefore, the proof of a too great abundance of money lay in the universal rise of prices; and, conversely, the proof of money scarcity was the universal decline in prices. Following this theory, it became evident that while the price of any one commodity would rise or fall, according to the variations in the supply of and the demand for that commodity, a general rise or fall of all prices indicated that money was too abundant or too scarce. Peter Cooper held that money was redeemed whenever it was exchanged by the possessor for the things which he desired more than he desired the money, and that there should be no other form of redemption. In other words, money should be issued by the government and its volume so regulated as to maintain a steady range of prices.

I was so interested in this pamphlet that I went to New York, made the personal acquaintance of Peter Cooper, and talked with him many times and quite fully upon social and economic questions. These talks, and the ideas which I had secured from my reading, convinced me that so long as the banks controlled the issue of money, they would be able to determine the economic life of the United States.

Shortly after my entrance into the Senate, the whole question was dramatized in the struggle over the free coinage of silver

The big business interests had become convinced that if the United States was to take her position as one of the great exploiting nations of the world she must follow the example of England — the world's premier empire—and establish a gold basis for the currency. It was in opposition to this policy of imperialism that we advocated the free and unlimited coinage of silver.

We were demanding that, in this respect, the United States should take a position worthy of her great traditions and refuse to strike hands with the international plunderers who were busy with their work of economic aggression in all parts of the world Those of us, who were opposing British or any other brand of imperialism, were, with equal insistence, demanding that the United States adopt a money system calculated to protect the borrower as against the lender, and so designed as to take out of the hands of private individuals the huge power that money-lending conferred.

Many of the leaders of American public life were urging that the United States must wait for England to move, but the absurdity of such a proposition was apparent on its face. Indeed, her leading statesmen declared that fact in so many words. Thus Gladstone is credited with the following statement in a speech to the House of Commons. (London Times, March 1, 1893):

"I suppose there is not a year which passes over our heads which does not largely add to the mass of British investments abroad. I am almost afraid to estimate the total amount of property which the United Kingdom holds beyond the limits of the United Kingdom, but of this I am well convinced, that it is not to be counted by tens or hundreds of millions. One thousand millions ($5,000,000,000) probably would be an extremely low and inadequate estimate. Two thousand millions ($10,000,000) or fifteen hundred millions than that, is very likely to be nearer the mark. ('Hear! Hear!') I think under these circumstances it is rather a serious matter to ask this country to consider whether we are going to perform this supreme act of self-sacrifice. I have a profound admiration of cosmopolitan principles. I can go a great length, in moderation (laughter), in recommending their recognition and establishment, but if there are these two thousand millions ($10,000,000,000) or fifteen hundred millions ($7,500,000,000 of money which we have got abroad, it is a very serious matter as between this country and other countries.

"We have nothing to pay them; we are not debtors at all; we should get no comfort, no consolation, out of the substitution of an inferior material, of a cheaper money, which we could obtain for less and part with for more. We should get no consolation, but the consolation throughout the world would be great. (Loud laughter.) This splendid spirit of philanthropy, which we cannot too highly praise—because I have no doubt all this is foreseen—would result in our making a present of fifty or a hundred millions ($500,000,000) to the world. It would be thankfully accepted, but I think the gratitude for your benevolence would be mixed with very grave misgivings as to your wisdom. I have shown why we should pause and consider for ourselves once, twice, and thrice before departing from the solid ground on which you have, within the last half century, erected a commercial fabric unknown in the whole history of the world—before departing from the solid ground you should well consult and well consider and take no step except such as you can well justify to your own understanding, to your fellow countryman, and to those who come after us." (Cheers.)

How could England be expected to abandon an economic system that was yielding hundreds of millions in yearly profits to her bankers and investors?

Again and again this issue has been raised at international conferences.

The first conference was held in 1867 at the invitation of France, and met at Paris on June 17, 1867. Eighteen of the principal European countries and the United States participated They voted unanimously against the single silver standard, and every nation participating in that conference voted in favor of the single gold standard but the Netherlands, and they also voted to establish the 25-franc gold pieces as an international coin.

The next conference met, at the invitation of the

United States, at Paris, August 16, 1878. Twelve countries were represented. Germany refused to send delegates. It was proposed by the United States, first, that it is not to be desired that silver shall be excluded from free coinage in Europe and the United States; second, that the use of both gold and silver as unlimited legal tender may be safely adopted by equalizing them at a ratio fixed by international agreement.

Then the convention resolved—what? Simply this, and nothing more: That the difference of opinion that had appeared excluded the adoption of a common ratio between the two metals, and then adjourned.

The next, or third, conference was called by France and the United States, and was held in 1881, nineteen countries being represented. The delegates from Sweden said that they had better reaffirm the declaration of 1878, and the conference reaffirmed that declaration and adjourned never to meet again. The declaration of 1878 was that the differences of opinion which had appeared excluded the adoption of a common ratio between the two metals.

The next conference was held at Brussels in 1892. At that conference the United States proposed, not the free and unlimited coinage of silver at any ratio, but simply this: The United States had at first sent an invitation to Great Britain, asking that government to join us in a convention to adopt both metals at a ratio to be agreed upon. Great Britain refused to accept the invitation to the conference to discuss the question of agreeing upon a ratio for the coinage of the two metals, but, when we changed the invitation so as to provide for simply meeting and discussing the question of the enlarged use of silver, Great Britain joined in the conference, and this was the program of the United States in the conference of 1892:

> That in the opinion of this conference it is desirable that some measure should be found for increasing the use of silver in the currency system of the nations.

That was all. No greater or broader resolution would be accepted by Great Britain. Neither would she join us in a conference to discuss the question of the ratio. But what more? Mr. Wilson, a delegate from Great Britain, immediately said:

> "Her Majesty's Government did not find it possible to accept an invitation conveyed in terms which might give rise to a misunderstanding by implying that the Government had some doubt as to the maintenance of the monetary system which had been in force in Great Britain since 1816."

Speaking of Sir Charles Freemantle and himself, he said:

> "Our faith is that of the school of monometallism pure and simple. We do not admit that any other than the simple gold standard would be applicable to our country."

Early in the session the leading delegate from Germany declared:

> "Germany, being satisfied with its monetary system, has no intention of modifying its basis. . . . In view of the satisfactory monetary situation of the Empire, the Imperial Government has prescribed the most strict reserve for its delegates, who, in consequence, cannot take part either in the discussion or in the vote upon the resolution presented by the delegates of the United States."

Germany, in that conference, then refused to discuss or vote one way or another upon a proposition simply for the enlarged use of silver.

Austria-Hungary, although represented in the conference, instructed their delegate to take no part in the conference, in its discussion or votes.

The delegate from the Netherlands declared:

"That Holland would not enter into a bimetallic union without the full and complete participation of England, is a part of the formal instructions furnished us by our government."

France made the same declaration practically; in fact, absolutely the same declaration, that she would not participate in any agreement unless England joined.

The convention adjourned to meet again at some future time, to be called again, some time within the then coming year, but it never reassembled. Afterwards, the Congress of the United States passed a bill providing for nine delegates to a monetary conference whenever we could find anybody who would confer with us; and we were unable to find anyone who would join in a conference and who would talk with us about this question, and the law lapsed by limitation of time.

The United States had become a capitalist nation—producing surplus wealth; exporting it in the form of goods and investment funds, living on the interest that these investments produced, and thus saddling upon the backs of the undeveloped countries of the world the burden of taking care of those nations which were rich enough to bind the poorer peoples to them by the lending of money.

The gold standard was a part of the harness that the eastern bankers had used to drive the western farmers. The fight was lost by the free silverites. The gold standard won the day and with that victory went the triumph of protection, the establishment of a trust-controlled government, the degradation of labor, and the assurance of plutocracy's power.

The Government of the United States has allowed interested parties—creditors and bankers—to manipulate its credit and volume of money in such a way as to produce panics and, by this means, to plunder those who toil. These panics have come at stated intervals.

M. Juglar (a French authority) has fully analyzed the three phases of American business life into prosperity, panic and liquidation, which three constitute themselves into a 'business cycle" which ordinarily occupies about ten years. These ten years may be apportioned roughly as follows: Prosperity, five to seven years; panics, a few months to a few years; liquidation, three or four years.

Here is a list, with dates, of all the panics in the United States during the last century, with the corresponding dates for France and England:

| France | England | United States |
|---|---|---|
| 1804 | 1803 | .... |
| 1810 | 1810 | .... |
| 1813-14 | 1815 | 1814 |
| 1818 | 1818 | 1818 |
| 1825 | 1825 | 1826 |
| 1830 | 1830 | 1829-31 |
| 1837-39 | 1836-39 | 1837-39 |
| 1847 | 1847 | 1848 |
| 1857 | 1857 | 1857 |
| 1864 | 1864-66 | 1864 |
| .... | 1873 | 1873 |
| 1882 | 1882 | 1884 |
| 1889-90 | 1890-91 | 1890-91 |
| 1894 | 1894 | 1893-94 |
| 1897 | 1897 | 1897 |
| 1903 | 1903 | 1903 |
| 1907 | 1907 | 1907 |
| 1913 | 1913 | 1913 |

What evidence could be more conclusive of the utter failure of a system of economic life than these successive breakdowns in the machinery of production and exchange? Yet here is the record upon which the present economic system must stand condemned in the eyes of every thinking human being—the record of disaster following disaster, with neither the inclination nor the ability, on the part of the masters of business life, to put a stop to these successive stoppages of economic activity.

The figures just cited show that, during the past century, panics have occurred in England and France at the same time that they occurred in the United States. These three countries are linked together by the "gold standard," and their governments are capitalistic governments—administered by the banks and creditor classes for the benefit, not of the people, but for the benefit of the rich. Furthermore, all three countries have the same, or about the same, distribution of wealth. In each of these countries the workers are robbed of what they produce by the same process. The creditor classes, through their privileges, are able to manipulate the money and credit through panics, so as to produce, first, a rise in prices—by expansion of money and credit, then a withdrawal of both, followed by a sudden drop in prices, and then liquidation. Or, in other words, a gathering-in of all property produced by toil. With the liquidation, the cycle is completed and there follows a new cycle of ten years more, of prosperity, panic and liquidation.

I have had an excellent opportunity to observe the effect of these successive economic disasters upon the producing class. I went to the Territory of Dakota in 1869 and located at Sioux Falls, near the northwest corner of the State of Iowa. At that time, all of the land in Dakota was owned by the Government and was subject to entry under the Homestead and Pre-emption laws, and could only be secured by actual settlers. The result of the panic of 1873 caused very many of these homesteaders to commute their homesteads, because the price of farm products had declined below the cost of production. As a result, the movement for farm tenancy was begun. The United States publishes no figures on farm tenure previous to 1880, but by that year the percentage of tenant farmers in the rich Middle West was for Illinois, 23.7 per cent; Michigan, 31.4 per cent; Iowa, 23.8 per cent; Missouri, 27.3 per cent; Nebraska, 18 per cent, and Kansas, 16.3 per cent.

The next great disaster to the producing classes culminated in the manufactured panic of 1893. Grover Cleveland had been elected President of the United States upon the tariff issue in 1892, and when he took office in 1893 he called a meeting of Congress for the purpose of repealing the purchasing clauses of the Sherman law of 1890, which provided that the Treasurer of the United States should purchase and coin not less than two million dollars' worth of silver and not more than four and a half million dollars' worth during each month, thus adding to the volume of circulating medium. The cutting-off of four and a half millions of silver by the repeal of the Sherman law purchasing clauses, with its consequent decline in the volume of money, proved disastrous. The prices of all farm products fell sharply, causing the ruin of the agricultural classes and a prolonged panic nearly as disastrous as that of 1873.

The members of the House of Representatives, who believed in bimetallism, called a meeting a day or two before Congress was to assemble, and 201 members of the House declared that they were in favor of both gold and silver as money, because there was not gold enough in the world to furnish a circulating medium. Two weeks afterwards, when the vote was taken in the House of Representatives on the bill to completely democratize silver by repealing the purchasing clause of the Sherman Act, one hundred of these members had been bought over, through patronage and money and party pressure, to the interests of the bankers, and thus the bill was passed.

The panic of 1893, resulting from this act, which involved a contraction of the volume of money and a reduction in prices, again drove large numbers of people from the land and reduced agricultural production below a remunerative point. As a result of this panic and the panic of 1873, the lands in Dakota, which had all been owned by the cultivators, passed into the hands of the mortgage companies, the banks, the creditors, so that in the county where I reside—Minnehaha County, South Dakota—52 per cent of the farms now are cultivated by tenants. Within my memory, every acre of land in that county belonged to the Government. Both in the panic of 1873 and in that of 1893 the results were the same. The owners and monopolists of money used their monopoly power to squeeze the small producer and to enrich themselves.

The panic of 1893 was followed by the discovery in South Africa of the richest gold deposit in the world and within the next few years these mines produced vast sums of gold to be used as money, and caused a rise in the price of everything that is the product of human toil.

These were the two outstanding economic disasters that occurred during my connection with public affairs. Both arose from similar causes and both produced like results—the concentration of wealth in the hands of the few; the bankruptcy of the small business man and of the farmer; unemployment, distress and lowered wages for the worker; crime, suicide and murder.

The great deposits of gold which had been poured into the currency of the world by the discoveries in California in the early fifties endangered the mortgage-holding classes of all the capitalist nations.

Chevalier, one of the most prominent financiers of Europe, published a book in which he contended that gold must be demonetized; that the continuous use of gold as money would work universal repudiation; that it was dishonest and wicked to pay debts in gold under such a flood as was coming from California and Australia. His voice was potent. Germany and Holland—creditor nations — closed their mints to gold and adopted the silver standard. Maclaren of England, representing the bondholders of the British Empire, made the same argument in the early fifties against the use of gold, which has since been used by gold standard contractionists for more than sixty years against the use of silver. In his argument in favor of the bondholders, Chevalier said:

> "Our neighbors on the Continent received the announcement of these remarkable discoveries in a different spirit. From the first they have considered them of the greatest importance and have expressed great solicitude for the maintenance of the standard value."

Immediately that the fact of a great increase in the production of gold was established, the Government of Holland—"a nation justly renowned," says M. Chevalier, "for its foresight and probity," discarded gold from its currency. "They may," says the same author, "have been rather hasty in passing this law, but in a matter of this nature it is better to be in advance of events than to let them pass us."

France appointed a monetary commission which considered the question of demonetizing gold for several years and, finally, reported that it was necessary to demonetize one or the other of the precious metals—that the supply was violating contracts by depreciating money with which debts were paid. Up to this time the creditor classes in England, France and the United States had accepted bimetallism. The rush of California gold endangered their monopoly. The discovery of the Comstock lode threatened to deluge the world with silver, and Mr. Lindeman, Director of the United States Mint, reported in London that there were fifteen hundred millions of silver in sight in one mine on the Comstock.

When gold became very abundant in the middle of the century, the creditor classes wanted to demonetize that metal in order to make money scarce. Then came the flood of silver, and they feared that more than gold.

John Sherman undertook the duty of carrying into effect in the United States the demonetizing of silver. John J. Knox, Comptroller of the Currency, a crafty, scheming, money-making individual, got up a codification of the mint laws. John Sherman introduced the bill, and continually talked about the silver dollar, the inscriptions on it, etc. But when the bill became a law it was found that there was no provision for a silver dollar in the bill, the trade dollar containing 120 grains taking the place of the silver dollar, and thus silver was demonetized, and it was made easy for the creditor classes of the world to corner gold and thus to control money.

How conscientiously this control over money has been exercised is indicated by the actions and utterances of the bankers themselves.

The American Colonies had been in the habit, for a number of years before the Revolution, of issuing what were then known as Colonial Treasury notes; the notes were made receivable by the several provinces for taxes. These Colonial notes being adopted by all the Colonies led to an unexpected degree of prosperity, so great that when Franklin was brought before the Parliament of Great Britain and questioned as to the cause of the wonderful prosperity growing up in the Colonies, he plainly stated that the cause was the convenience they found in exchanging their various forms of labor one with another by the paper money, which had been adopted: that this paper money was not only used in the payment of taxes, but in addition it had been declared legal tender. After Franklin explained this to the British Government as the real cause of prosperity, they immediately passed laws forbidding the payment of taxes in that money.

In 1862, the creditors of the United States, the Bank of England, sent the following circular to every bank in New York and New England:

> "Slavery is likely to be abolished by the war power, and chattel slavery destroyed. This, I and my European friends are in favor of, for slavery is but the owning of labor and carries

with it the care for the laborer, while the European plan, led on by England, is for capital to control labor by controlling the wages. THIS CAN BE DONE BY CONTROLLING THE MONEY. The great debt that capitalists will see to it is made out of the war must be used as a means to control the volume of money. To accomplish this, the bonds must be used as a banking basis. We are now waiting for the Secretary of the Treasury to make the recommendation to Congress. It will not do to allow the greenback, as it is called, to circulate as money any length of time, as we cannot control that."

In 1872, the ring of bankers in New York sent the following circular to every bank in the United States:

"Dear Sir: It is advisable to do all in your power to sustain such prominent daily and weekly newspapers, especially the agricultural and religious press, as will oppose the issuing of greenback paper money, and that you also withhold patronage or favors from all applicants who are not willing to oppose the Government issue of money. Let the Government issue the coin and the banks issue the paper money of the country, for then we can better protect each other. To repeal the law creating National Bank notes, or to restore to circulation the Government issue of money, will be to provide the people with money, and will therefore seriously affect your individual profit as bankers and lenders. See your Congressman at once, and engage him to support our interests that we may control legislation."

The panic of 1893 was a bankers' panic and in their interest and the ring of gambling bankers in New York sent out the following circular to every bank in the United States:

"Dear Sir: The interests of national bankers require immediately financial legislation by Congress. Silver, silver certificates and Treasury notes must be retired and National Bank notes upon a gold basis made the only money. This will require the authorization of from $500,000,000 to $1,000,000,000 of new bonds as a basis of circulation. You will at once retire one-third of your circulation and call in one-half of your loans. Be careful to make a money stringency felt among your patrons, especially among influential business men. Advocate an extra session of Congress for the repeal of the purchasing clause of the Sherman law, and act with the other banks of your city in securing a large petition to Congress for its unconditional repeal, per accompanying form. Use personal influence with Congressmen and particularly let your wishes be known to your Senators. The future life of National Banks as fixed and safe investments depends upon immediate action, as there is an increasing sentiment in favor of Government legal tender notes and silver coinage."

Mr. Alexander is right about the strength of the American banking system. Under the Federal Reserve Act the vast power of the thirty thousand American banks is concentrated in the hands of a little club with headquarters in Wall Street. This club holds in its hands the power to make or to destroy any business man in the United States; the power to make or wreck financial institutions and inaugurate panics; the power to issue credit, and even money. The bankers at the center of the financial web are endowed with the power of government.

The right to issue money is, as I have said, fundamental. This right is exercised by the New York

Bankers' Club, thinly disguised as the Federal Reserve Board. On November 3, 1920, the amount of Federal Reserve notes outstanding was $3,568,713,000.

What was the basis of this huge issue of paper money? Commercial paper!

The member banks were permitted to lend money (or credit) to their patrons; to take commercial paper in exchange for their loans; to deposit this paper under the authority of the Board and to issue currency against it. This currency was again loaned out, the paper re-deposited, etc., so that the Federal Reserve Bank of New York was able to earn, by this pyramiding of credits, over 200 per cent in the frugal year of 1920, in a market where the rate of interest never ran over 8 per cent on standard securities.

Through their authority over money and credit, the bankers thus became the arbiters of the business destiny of the United States. No one elected them. No one can recall them. There is no way in which they can be made the object of public approval or disapproval. They are as far above public responsibility as was William Hohenzollern in Germany before 1914. Self-elected dictators of American life, they make and unmake; they wreck and rule. They are the heart of business America; the center of the exploiting system that sits astride the necks of the people.

The United States emerged from the Great War with the best credit of any of the larger nations. Its wealth was the greatest; its income the largest, and its bank assets and resources exceeded those of any other country; but this very economic position, centered as it is in the hands of bankers, will be used by them to exploit the peoples of Latin America and Asia as they have, during recent years, exploited the people of the United States. Exploitation is the profession of the banker, and those in charge of the American banking institutions have the greatest exploiting opportunity that has ever come to the bankers in any of the modern nations.

The banks are again issuing circulars and in April or May, 1920, the order went out from New York, from this club which is our government, to all the Reserve Banks throughout the United States, to call their loans and to refuse credit on all the products of human toil not controlled by the combinations. The result has been, of course, the reduction in the price of everything that is produced in the way of food and raw material, and to a very low point, causing the ultimate ruin of all those who cultivate the soil. And it was not because there was not plenty of money, for there is more money several times over in circulation in the United States than ever before in our history. We have secured most of the gold of Europe, and I know of my own knowledge positively that these bankers are financing the bankrupt nations of Europe. For instance, they loaned France a hundred millions a few months ago, and within the last six months they have loaned Norway twenty millions. And so another panic is in progress.

The banking system of this country is so organized and constituted as to take from the producer the result of his effort; purposely so organized; organized with the intention of controlling the volume of money; contracting and expanding credit so as to produce a panic, or apparent prosperity, as suits the purpose of its organizers and managers.

This system of banking was the invention of Lord Overstone, with the assistance of the acute minds of the Rothschild bankers of Europe, and was so constructed as to enhance the importance of capital and overshadow the importance of toil. The system is one based upon a small volume of legal tender money, and the limit of this volume they would make as small as possible, in order that they may control it absolutely. Expansion by the issue of credit, not legal tender; contraction by the withdrawal of credit. Expansion that they may sell the property of the producers, which they have taken in with the last contraction, and then contract again in order to wreck the enterprising and once more reap the harvest of their efforts. This is the banking system of Great Britain, and the banking system of every gold standard country in the world today. It is the banking system of the United States. This is the system the Republican party is pledged to strengthen and perpetuate. There is no hope of relief for the people of this agricultural country in any possible thing the Republican party can or will do. In 1873, fearing that the volume of metallic money would become too large, these manipulators of panics, these gatherers of the products of other people's toil, set about to secure the demonetization of silver and make all their contracts payable in gold. The result has been, as the thinking ones of every nation agree, that in every gold standard country on the globe, agricultural prices have fallen steadily until we have reached a point where the cost of production is denied the producer. The present Federal Reserve law adopted by the United States is but a culmination of all the infamous banking systems ever invented by any age or people, and it has already produced the practical enslavement of the people of the United States.

Banking and the issue of money and credit are the duties of the sovereign and should be performed by the Government for service and not for profit, and for the equal good of the whole population. Section 8, Paragraph 5 of the Constitution of the United States says:

> "Congress shall have power to coin money, regulate the value thereof and of foreign coins. Congress is not by the Constitution authorized to delegate the power to any person or corporation."

The functions of money are created by law and are legal tender, a measure of value and, as a result, a medium of exchange, and the value of the unit of money depends upon the law of supply and demand, and the volume of money should be regulated so as to maintain a steady range of prices, and this can be done by the use of index number. No substance should be used as money that has any value besides its money value.

And, above all, no metal should be used that has a commodity value, as the volume of money is liable to be affected by hoarding and by being shipped away to other countries, and by being consumed in the arts. In fact, money should never be international. It is the most important tool that a nation can possess for the transaction of its business, and it is more idiotic to ship it out of the country to pay balances than it would be for a farmer to ship his implements, plows and reaper away and sell them for seed; or a manufacturer to strip his factory of its machines and sell them for raw material.