

an element of his peculiar myopia that he does not see what he is doing.

All of which principles Lowell has boiled down into two lines:

"You will have to get up early
If you want to take in God."

You can't get away from truth, whether you work for or against it. Now, as of old, "God maketh the wrath of man to praise Him."

JANE DEARBORN MILLS.

EDITORIAL CORRESPONDENCE.

Cleveland, O., Jan. 30.—The supporters of Mayor Johnson are already realizing that his defeat in the Fall elections was not so deplorable as it seemed at first. If Johnson had carried the State, the hard times that have now set in would have been charged to that result.

Did not Senator Hanna warn the working classes of Ohio that if they elected Johnson, or a Johnson legislature, they would lose their jobs? Did he not predict that the "good times" would go, turtle like, back into its shell, if it were even threatened with Johnsonism, and that they must "stand pat" and "leave well enough alone," or see the charity soup houses opened again? What a complete verification of that dire prediction the present hard times would have afforded had Johnson won. Even if he had only cut down the ordinary Republican majority, which was all his friends hoped for, the cry of "We told you so!" would have gone up in great volume from Republican throats.

But Johnson was overwhelmingly defeated. In fear of Republican prophecies of the business disasters Johnson would bring on, a host of deluded Ohioans voted against Johnson. He lost by a majority so large that the Republicans hopefully boasted that it would end his career. The legislature returned was Republican by a majority so enormous that the opposition has no voice in it. Everything went Hanna's way, and the Republicans and pluto-Democrats were jubilant.

But, all the same, workingmen are now losing their jobs, and charity soup houses have again made their appearance in Ohio. In some trades unions the "out-of-work" statistics are already as bad as in 1893.

Whether the Republicans are responsible for this unhappy condition or not, they cannot throw the burden of blame upon Johnson, as they would have done had he made even the faintest appearance of success at the elections. Whether they are, responsible or not, they have insanely invited the charge of responsibility for it, and they are being held to account. There is no more effective way of silencing Republican "rooters" in Cleveland to-day than by

reminding them of Hanna's campaign speeches. Precisely what he predicted as the result of a Johnson victory has followed his own victory. The burcoed workmen of Ohio are finding it out, and the business classes are shamefacedly acknowledging it.

The politico-industrial situation would be much more prominent even than it is, as a subject of popular discussion in Cleveland, but for the acuteness of the street car controversy here. This controversy, which began with Mayor Johnson's first mayoralty campaign, in 1901, and has gone through a variety of phases (p. 666), now bids fair, owing to several causes — principally to the defeat in Cleveland, last Fall, of the legislative candidates who represented Mayor Johnson's views on the street car question—to culminate in a compromise.

Mayor Johnson set out to establish in Cleveland a 3-cent-fare street car system, with universal free transfers, together with the reservation of a right to establish municipal ownership as soon as enabling legislation could be secured. This was the issue upon which he was elected Mayor in 1901 and reelected in 1903; and he fought for it without faltering or even suggestion of compromise until last Fall's elections. But when the voters of Cleveland then indicated, by their defeat of the legislative candidates whose election was known to be necessary to success in the street car fight, that possibly they were no longer in favor of an uncompromising policy, Mayor Johnson (who is a thorough believer in the referendum principle) concluded that he could not properly treat any further offers of compromise with the same unyielding persistence with which he had treated previous offers. Consequently, when compromise propositions were renewed, he responded with an offer to secure an expression of public opinion on any reasonable proposition that might be made.

In that spirit he has been engaged in compromise negotiations for about two months. But no conclusion has been reached, nor has he nor will he promote the final acceptance of any compromise which shall not first have had the sanction of intelligent public approval.

The present negotiations were opened by Horace A. Andrews, the president of the consolidated street car systems. Mr. Andrews is one of the few large capitalists of this era of boodle and graft, who are confiding enough to believe that "business" can be done honestly, and have moral stamina enough to hold out against doing it otherwise. The latter wholesome characteristic is sufficiently unique to make Mr. Andrews, who is still a young man, a notable figure in the high-business life of Cleveland. His discouragements have been as pronounced as they were surprising, but he is still faithfully struggling.

Since becoming president of the Cleve-

land street car companies Mr. Andrews has frequently endeavored to effect a compromise with Mayor Johnson, who has heretofore refused to consider anything short of 3-cent fare, universal free transfers and ultimate municipal ownership. Meanwhile, the Mayor was working to establish a 3-cent fare company, while the old companies were obstructing him with injunctions and other court proceedings. In this contest Mayor Johnson soon discovered that the wide ramifications and affiliations of the Cleveland street car interests would necessitate control of the legislature in order to win the street car fight. Once he succeeded in securing the legislative delegation from his own county. But the legislature was still strong against him. Nevertheless he fought on confidently, believing that with the support of his own locality an uncompromising victory would be only a matter of time. In the Fall of 1903, however, he was defeated at home as well as over the State, and then he listened to Mr. Andrews's pacific overtures.

Mr. Andrews, on his part, had been driven to make these overtures by the disastrous failure of some of the companies' plans for circumventing Mayor Johnson, and the probability of even worse disaster in the future. Six tickets for a quarter and universal transfers (voluntarily granted to head off Johnson) had resulted in greatly lessening the price of rides without increasing their number, thus diminishing the aggregate income by hundreds of dollars a day. They will be abolished if the compromise falls through. Johnson had procured the extension of expiring franchises of the old company for the new 3-cent-fare company, and had procured the passage of an ordinance immediately reducing all fares to 3 cents. Against this assault there was no buffer but a dubious question of law. Moreover, the new road had partly laid its tracks, and only the Winter season and an injunction prevented completion of the work. Therefore Andrews proposed negotiations for compromise.

With the legislature so overwhelmingly Republican, it may seem strange that he should be willing to compromise at all, and much more so that he should be willing to compromise on better terms than ever. But this is explained by his personal character, already referred to. While the legislature is Republican, and of the Hanna brand, it would not be inclined to strengthen Mr. Hanna's "savings bank" without sharing in the savings; and this is a kind of business in which Mr. Andrews will not participate. If the transaction cannot be clean he will have nothing to do with it. "I cannot get legislative relief," said he, "without boodle; and I will not consent to the use of boodle." This attitude of Mr. Andrews is very well known; and it is an open secret that unless he succeeds in effecting an honorable compromise he will have to yield

the presidency of his company to some one who is less squeamish about the use of boodle in the street car business.

The negotiations between Andrews and Johnson have as yet come to nothing definite. But some general possibilities may be outlined.

It is understood that whatever compromise may be acceptable to Andrews, Johnson and the city council, shall be subjected to an actual and fair trial for two or three months, at the end of which time the city shall decide whether to adopt it or not. Such decision will have to be made, of course, by the city council, but Mayor Johnson will use his veto if necessary to prevent final adoption until the people manifest their satisfaction in some way—by postal card referendum, mass meetings, or other unmistakable means.

The city having finally adopted the plan, the street car companies are to have the same additional time—two or three months—to determine by actual trial whether they will finally adopt it. The reason for giving this extra time to the companies is almost obvious. While the people will know very quickly whether they like the plan, the companies have not only to decide whether they like it but also have to calculate on its possibilities of profit or loss.

Upon that basis, Andrews proposes a zone within the city, inside of which zone the cash fares shall be 3 cents. Johnson urges that the 3-cent zone should coincide with the city limits. To that the objection is made that the companies are under contract with outlying towns to concede the same rates they concede to Cleveland; and that consequently, if they voluntarily grant a 3-cent rate to the whole city of Cleveland, they will have to grant a 3-cent rate to all the outlying towns, where distances are great and population sparse. Conceding the validity of this objection, Johnson concedes the reasonableness of the demand for a zone, but insists that its margin shall be only slightly within the city limits. Andrews, on the other hand, insists on a wide space between the 3-cent zone and the city limits. This is the vital point of contention at present. Johnson positively refuses to recommend any compromise whatever which does not contemplate a zone nearly coextensive with the city limits; while Andrews is as yet unable to bring his board of directors to the point of accepting a zone so large.

Although fares are to be 3 cents in the zone; riders who go farther are to pay 5 cents. They are also to pay 2 cents for transfers, excepting transfers to railroad stations. The effect would be that all rides within the zone—about 85 per cent. of the traffic—would pay only 3 cents. This would include riders who take transfers to railroad stations. But riders within the zone who take other than railroad station transfers would pay 2 cents extra, while those from without the zone would

pay 5 cents without a transfer and 2 cents extra (7 cents in all) with a transfer. To this 7-cent proposition Mayor Johnson objects. But not strenuously, because only about 3 per cent. of the riders would be affected by it. A rider who should ride through the zone to a place outside of it, would pay 5 cents, as now; but if it were necessary for him to change cars in this journey, as it sometimes would be, the transfer would cost him 2 cents extra. To avoid this, Mayor Johnson proposes a round-trip 10-cent ticket in such cases. This proposition, however, has not been accepted.

Johnson requires a stipulation for municipal ownership at the end of the proposed grant—20 years—and to his proposal in that respect the companies agree. The companies are in that case to be paid for their plant its cost value, less depreciation and plus 20 per cent. The 20 per cent. premium is inserted for the purpose of encouraging the companies to keep their plant in good condition to the end of the term. But nothing is to be paid for franchise value. No specific provision is made for municipal ownership prior to the end of the 20-year term. Mayor Johnson very wisely leaves that matter absolutely free from contract, so that it may be made subject to the police power of the legislature. It is his view that if a legislature can at any time be elected which will pass a municipal ownership enabling act in good faith it will also provide for the condemnation of franchises upon the principle of eminent domain. Consequently municipal ownership can be established whenever the people want it, and at a cost for damages which is limited fairly by the provisions of the proposed compromise, under which the franchise value will diminish as the 20-year period shortens.

As to the new 3-cent fare road, its promoters are under obligations to make no sale to the old companies without the city's permission. If a compromise is effected, that permission will be given. But any sale during the trial period mentioned above must be only tentative, to be abrogated if the compromise is not finally adopted. Otherwise the new road is to be free to sell or not; but transfers must be mutually accepted by all the roads.

Such is the general outline of the negotiations as far as they have extended; the principal point of difference, as noted above, being the extent of the 3-cent zone. Should the disagreement on that point be overcome, Mayor Johnson will doubtless recommend to the city council a two or three months' trial with a view to securing a popular verdict by the expiration of that time.

To this policy there is very strong opposition from two general sources—financial and political. And each of these two types of opposition may be divided into two or three different species.

The financial adversaries of the enter-

prise consist in part of street car riders who get petty advantages out of the free transfer system now in operation, by defrauding the companies, and in part of the owners of outlying land which will not be so valuable if a 3-cent zone is established within the city. Its political adversaries consist in part of Hanna politicians who "have it in for" Johnson on all occasions and at all costs, and in part of many of Johnson's own friends who "have it in for" the street car companies on all occasions and at all costs, and who, while they love Johnson some hate the street car companies more.

The most plausible argument they all advance is that Johnson would by any compromise recede from his original position. This he concedes. But he explains that he has always treated the question as one for the people of Cleveland, and not for himself to decide. The real question at this time, he contends, is not whether he is receding from a former position, but whether the people want the fight to go on uncompromisingly. In this fight they have been met with injunctions, with the "ripping" of their city government, with all manner of arbitrary obstacles that could not have been foreseen. A friendly legislature was absolutely necessary, and with full knowledge of that fact the people of Cleveland voted for an unfriendly one. What did that mean? Did it mean that a compromise is desired by the people? There is only one way of finding out, and that is by giving the people the best opportunity legally possible of passing upon a reasonably fair compromise. Therefore, although Mayor Johnson does not personally approve a compromise such as he is negotiating, he does approve of submitting it to the people of Cleveland by means of an actual trial for a limited time.

While opposition is vociferous, the probability is that it is by no means general. The opposition is of a kind that naturally expresses itself upon the least provocation; whereas the favorable sentiment is of the silent kind. Hence, to the observer who watches "letters to the editor" in newspapers and listens to the bustling "man in the street," it would seem that all Cleveland is opposed to Johnson in his effort to give the people what they want regardless of what he wants. But observers who have noted the ineffectiveness of the "letters to the editor," etc., type of public opinion, and who understand the essential character of the compromise Johnson is endeavoring to negotiate, are confident of the satisfactoriness of the outcome.

Should the compromise negotiations fall through, Johnson will go on with the fight. He will push the 3-cent road enterprise and the ordinances reducing all fares to three cents. On the other side, Andrews will doubtless be obliged

to make way for a boodle president, the tickets and transfers now in vogue will be abolished, and not only the courts but the legislature will be called upon to help the existing monopoly.

One of the mirror ill-results of Hannaistic legislation for Cleveland is the abolition of the power of paroling workhouse prisoners, which had vested in the mayor under the former municipal charter, and was supposed to have been reposed in the board of public safety under the new charter, but is now discovered to have been totally abrogated by that wonderful civic product of the combined business sagacity of Senator Hanna and Boss Cox.

Since Mayor Johnson came into office, Harris R. Cooley has had charge of the workhouse and through his wise and beneficent use of the parole has made of that institution an elevating reformatory instead of a degrading jail. His success has attracted favorable attention among the students of perology everywhere. Although his pardons and paroles were numerous, but few who received them were again convicted of crime—fewer than under the previous restricted system.

It was also Mr. Cooley's practice to parole prisoners who were held for fines alone. He maintained that this was imprisonment for debt, and that as it held in prison the man who could not pay his fine, while releasing the one who could pay, it was in reality punishment not for crime, but for poverty. Mr. Cooley's policy was especially effective with men imprisoned for not supporting their families. By means of the parole he secured this support in many cases apparently hopeless.

But now the Hanna-Cox code has taken away the power of parole, and the workhouse is overcrowded with prisoners who cannot pay fines and with thriftless heads of families whose effective desire to support wife and children is certainly not increased by imprisonment.

L. F. P.

Toronto, Ont., Jan. 31.—A pronounced advance in the popularization of single tax principles has been made by the Single Tax Association here, under the active management of Walter H. Roebuck. A series of successful popular meetings in the opera house, has followed in the Winter an equally successful street campaign during the Summer. Among the prominent opera house speakers have been Dan Beard, of New York; John Z. White, of Chicago, and Harris R. Cooley, of Cleveland. A growing roll of over 300 active paying members has been secured by the association; and some excellent civic agitation has been promoted through its efforts.

One important sign of the effectiveness of its work is the considerate reception given by the city council to an ordinance introduced by Dr. Noble for the

exemption from taxation of \$700 of the value of dwellings. This has brought the whole principle of the single tax into discussion.

Toronto furnishes many fine object lessons in unfair taxation. Most of these may be duplicated anywhere, but it is unique in its treatment of church property. Such property in the United States is exempt if used for purposes of public worship; in Toronto it escapes taxation, no matter to what use it is put. In consequence, some denominations, owning immense values in real estate used for residence and business purposes, and in vacant lots held only for the increase in value, are wholly free from taxation. While these instances make fine object lessons for agitating purposes, they indicate something of more importance. When the day for legislation in favor of the single tax arrives, it will be safe to count upon the opposition, bitter, relentless and powerful, of these extraordinarily favored land monopolists.

L. F. P.

Washington, D. C., Jan. 31.—That my exposure on the floor of the House of the rotteness of politics in Cincinnati has struck home, is clearly evident from the elaborate preparations by the two members from that city to reply to my accusation that that corruption is mainly due to the fact that for years the so-called Democratic party in Cincinnati has been a mere adjunct of Cox's Republican machine. It is also indicated by what took place in the House on December 28. The Cincinnati Post of the day before had a telegraphic dispatch from its correspondent here, stating that it was my intention to insert in the Congressional Record a statement drawn up by the Democratic candidate for prosecuting attorney last Fall, showing how the so-called "non-partisan" board of elections there had protected false registration while hounding whoever dared to expose or present evidence of repeaters who had registered. Late in the afternoon of the 28th, the Democratic leader yielded me time to make a few remarks on this subject, at the conclusion of which I was to make the usual request for unanimous consent to extend my remarks in the Record. This was to enable me to cover not only Mr. Oppenheimer's statement of illegal registration, but also part of an article from Frank Leslie's Monthly on George B. Cox, and two speeches in denunciation of Cox's methods delivered four and six years ago by one of the Cincinnati members (Judge Goebel) who, when replying to my speech on this subject, said that "the character of George B. Cox needed no defense by him." Upon concluding my brief remarks (delivered 26 hours after the time when the Post was being sold on the streets of Cincinnati, announcing that I was to insert these matters in the Record), I made the usual formal re-

quest for permission to extend my remarks in the Record so as to include the statement, speeches, etc. Was permission granted? Oh no! For the first time since Congress convened on November 9, objection to such a request was made. It was made by a member from Pennsylvania, not from Ohio, and was persisted in. I therefore at once gave notice that "hereafter there will be no more unanimous consents to extend remarks in the Record," and am awaiting the outcome with entire serenity. It would be interesting to know who inspired Mr. Palmer, of Pennsylvania, to object.

One subject has engrossed the thought of practically the entire membership all through the week. "Are we going to get extra mileage?" No matter what the subject publicly debated, the ever recurring question as men conversed on the floor was, what is the prospect of the extra mileage clause staying in the urgency deficiency bill as reported by the appropriations committee. Judging from the number of those who privately expressed their intention of voting for this "grab"—for that is the only word that adequately characterizes the provision in the appropriation bill to pay members a second mileage on the plea that this is the second session of the Fifty-eighth Congress—it appeared sure of adoption by at least two to one. Mr. Underwood, of Alabama, had been the only member of the committee to vote against reporting the clause to the House; and in the general debate he was the only member who discussed the subject, citing the action of previous Congresses against allowing such second mileage.

When the matter was reached late on the 29th, three-fourths of the members were in their seats. The discussion was renewed on the 30th, and at least 250 members were present—a most unusual number for a Saturday sitting. The one plea most frequently advanced was that the mileage was a part of the "compensation" of the members. In common with others I combatted this, contending that it was obviously intended to equalize the cost of reaching Washington, and that compensation must be the same for all members.

When the ayes and nays were called for, on Mr. Underwood's motion to strike the appropriation from the bill, almost as many stood up to oppose as to favor his amendment. Tellers being called for, probably one-half of those present immediately arose and formed in line to pass between the tellers. As soon as it was apparent that the amendment would carry, everybody hastened to get into the "band wagon;" and the "aye" line became two long and converging streams from both sides and consisted of nearly all who were in the House at the time. Not more than 20 remained in their seats. Even these