class and caste, which is the negation of democracy.

Back of all the causes is the lack of idealismm in college teaching and training. This lack has been unfortunately emphasized by the prevailing ultra-scientific spirit, which is so immersed in the minutiae of things that it has lost grasp of the whole of things. All is analysis and dissection. The fear of hasty generalization, the fear of formulating uncertain truth, has gone so far that it has led to the extreme of rejecting all generalization and to the attitude of universal skepticism. This excessive half-science has shoved the humanities out of college, or else reduced them to its own methods. Science, not humanity, holds the boards. The result is a most natural one. While colleges have made immense gains in scientific knowledge, they have not advanced the nurture of the higher possibilities on the humanitarian side of character. This has led to a coldness in regard to the spread and progress of democracy. In short, the scientific spirit, in its present advancement, will study the minutiae of social conditions, but it will neither reach generalization as to these conditions, nor will it produce enthusiasm or emotion.

Let it be noted that the expression used above is "the scientific spirit in its present advancement." No one wishes to deny the great work of the scientific spirit both in its practical results and in its effort to correct loose vaporings. The point is that the scientific spirit as it is now interpreted has fostered a certain temper of mind. This temper of mind ignores the great truths and belittles the enthusiasms that make for the spread of justice and freedom.

So it is that the prevailing note of college teaching is diametrically opposed both to the enthusiasm and to the generalization of such a document as the Declaration of Independence. And hence it is that this great paper is almost universally discredited in college halls.

Such are some of the reasons, inherent in the inner influences of the present life of the higher institutions of learning, which hold them back from being in the advance line of the surely coming changes in economic and social conditons.

J. H. DILLARD.

EDITORIAL CORRESPONDENCE.

COLORADO.

Denver, Nov. 28.—It is difficult to describe the stress of political conditions in Colorado, and impossible to predict their outcome. All this cloud of trouble may blow over in a few weeks; but it is just as probable that the difficulties may culminate in some violent upheaval.

Attention is concentrated at present upon the Supreme Court of the State, which has undertaken to control the situation by means of injunction proceedings. This is the longest stride yet, in the direction of government by injunction. The local circumstances should be understood, therefore, wherever the dangers to popular government which that judicial innovation threatens are appreciated. My information regarding these circumstances is derived almost wholly from representative Republicans who are defenders of the course taken by the Colorado court, and principally, so far as the theory of the court proceedings is concerned, from Mr. John M. Waldron, one of the most astute and prominent lawyers of the State, under whose advice and active professional direction, as leading counsel for Gov. Peabody, the present injunction proceedings were begun and are being carried on.

It must be understood at the outset that the ballot in Denver has for years been monstrously corrupted. The corruption began with the Republicans, and was imitated and progressively improved upon by the Democrats. As to the beginning of this corruption by the Republican machine there is no dispute. The Republicans themselves freely admit it. Neither is there any dispute about its imitation by the Democratic machine. This is as freely admitted by the Democrats. If there is any dispute at all it is only as to whether or not the Democratic imitation has been worse in character than the Republican original. I am disposed to believe that it has been; not because the Democrats are worse than the Republicans, but because they were later in the line of this infamous progression.

At any rate there appears to be no room for doubt that it has long been customary in Denver to stuff registry lists, to connive at wholesale repeating, to substitute false for true ballots in the count, and in numerous other ways familiar to political heelers to falsify the legitimate vote. This custom has been advancing toward the perfection of shameless infamy. The frauds have not only been perpetrated by election officials, but they have been connived at by county officials to such an extent that criminal prosecutions for election offenses have been practically impossible.

Notwithstanding the shamelessness and shocking notoriety of these frauds, they do not appear to have outraged public sentiment—not as frauds. Some men of both parties have, indeed, freely and honestly denounced them because they were crimes, and regardless of whom they might help or hurt. But these objectors appear to have been in a hopeless minority. Theirs were only feeble cries in the wilderness. On the whole, those who have liked the electoral results of the frauds have been inclined to condone the means for the sake of the end, while those who have not liked those results have condemned the frauds all too evidently from partisan and not from civic motives. All through and on both sides the question has been, for the most part, only a question of whose ox was gored. The city itself seems to have been, in the civic sense, utterly debauched.

That was the situation when Mr. Waldron and his associates, just prior to the recent election, began in the Supreme Court of the State the equity suit which is the basis of the present proceedings.

This suit was begun in the name of the people of the State on the relation of the attorney general and against the election officers of Denver. It is in theory a suit by the people of the State for the protection of their reserved sovereignty. According to the theory of those who brought it, which I shall explain farther on, the people's sovereignty was assailed by the assaults upon the integrity of the voting franchise on which the sovereignty of all the American commonwealths rests.

Immediately upon bringing the suit an application was made for an injunction order against the election officials, and in support of that application it was charged, upon the basis of past experience, that force and fraud would probably be used at the approaching election to prevent a free, fair and open election in certain election precincts.

An argument on this application, summarily ordered, was had before the court; and at its conclusion, a few days prior to the election, the court granted an injunction order against the election officials, forbidding a great variety of things already criminal by statute, and with voluminous particularity commanding a faithful performance by those officials of all their statutory duties.

Among other things, in order to secure respectful regard for this equity process, simply in the execution of its equity

powers and without any express statutory right, the court appointed two persons for each voting precinct as officers of the court, to act as watchers at the election. They were authorized to wear conspicuously a badge inscribed "Supreme Court Watcher." This office is quite unknown to the laws of Colorado. It exists, if it exists legally at all, only as a special creation of the court under those loose general powers whereby equity courts appoint receivers, care-takers, etc.

In appointing these watchers the court assumed to clothe them "with all the powers" and to charge them "with the performance of all the duties prescribed by law with reference to statutory watchers"—the watchers allowed by statute to political parties; and the watchers so appointed by the court were required to report the manner in which in their respective voting precincts the election had been conducted and the count made. They were not authorized to interfere with the election in any other manner than as party watchers may.

After the election and upon the reports of these court watchers, persons charged with crimes against the election statutes were brought before the Court in contempt proceedings for violating this injunction order. Upon proof of election crimes several have been convicted of contempt and sentenced to fines ranging as high as $1,000, and to imprisonment for terms as long as a year.

The same persons are still subject, for the same acts, to conviction and full punishment as criminals under the statutes; which makes possible a considerable extension of punishment beyond the statutory limit, for what is in substance only one offense. Sympathy on that score would probably be wasted on these men; but it is impossible not to consider, with some concern for orderly republican government, the extra-legal potentialities of this new-fangled device for turning equity tribunals, with their vaguely defined powers, into supernumerary criminal courts.

That the men convicted of contempt in these cases were guilty of the statutory crimes charged is probably true. They were, indeed, denied a jury trial, the only way known to the Colorado law (Judge Lynch's law excepted) of determining criminal guilt; but the Supreme Court, composed of three judges, was unanimous in its concluclusions as to the criminal facts, although the Democratic judge refused to concur in the decision as to the jurisdiction of the court. This is significant of the truth of the accusations, because, while this judge is a Democrat, and the other two are Republicans, the whole proceeding is distinctly partisan, both in impulse and in purpose.

That phase of the situation cannot be ignored. The suit was begun under the advice and direction of the personal cabinet of Gov. Peabody, for the manifest purpose, only thinly veiled, of giving color of authority to the Supreme Court to count him back into office for another term if, peradventure, a majority against him should be small enough to be overcome by throwing out the vote of precincts returning adverse majorities and in which fraud had really or apparently been perpetrated.

To understand the animus of the equity suit in question recourse is necessary to the circumstances which made it possible to defeat Peabody, the Republican candidate for governor, in a State which gave Roosevelt, the Republican candidate for President, a heavy majority.

When the strike in the Cripple Creek region (pp. 328, 521) began, violence occurred which the mine owners, backed by the Citizens' Alliance, attributed to strikers, and the strikers attributed to mine-owners and the Citizens' Alliance.

The merits of the controversy need not be here considered. It is enough to say, by way of passing remark, that the local supporters of ex-Senator Bucklin, in his efforts to establish the single tax through home rule in taxation, by the constitutional amendment defeated two years ago (vol. v., p. 664), trace the beginning of the Cripple Creek trouble to the large vote which the labor unions cast for that amendment. They say that the plutocratic organization which fought the Bucklin amendment, and in fighting it encouraged and availed themselves of all the characteristic election frauds that the suit now before the Supreme Court has been begun ostensibly to suppress, abandoned that particular organization only to reorganize as the Citizens' Alliance for the destruction of labor unions in Colorado. This view of the matter finds some confirmation in the phraseology of the begging circulars which the Citizens' Alliance sent out last Fall (p. 435), but it is of little importance in the present connection, although not without interest.

The important facts are undisputed. Before any acts of violence out of the ordinary at the scene of the strike, the mine owners applied to Gov. Peabody for troops. Gov. Peabody furnished the troops, the mine owners agreeing to advance the expense of maintaining them. When the troops arrived on the ground they established martial law and protected the Citizens' Alliance in mobbing labor union men, in forcing the resignation of county officials under threats of assassination, in destroying labor union stores, and otherwise in maintaining a state of class anarchy the character of which is not now denied by Peabody's friends although they prefer to call it lynch law. The military themselves suppressed a labor newspaper, arbitrarily arrested and imprisoned men for no other known reason than that they were labor unionists, violently deported droves of them from the State for the same reason, and forced an "open shop" mine to suspend operations until its managers would agree to discharge its union men and employ only nonunionists. While this condition was maintained by Gov. Peabody at Cripple Creek, he was maintaining a similar condition at Telluride. Here the protection of the District (or circuit) Court was invoked in habeas corpus proceedings by Gov. Peabody's military prisoners; but the military resisted the court, even marching under arms into the courtroom and training cannon upon the courthouse, at the same time threatening with death any officer of the court who should attempt to execute its order for the release of a prisoner. Finding the local courts powerless, the labor unionists made an appeal to the Supreme Court of the State. This was in the case of Charles H. Moyer (p. 216), the president of the Western Federation of Miners.

It is conceded that Mr. Moyer had committed no crime, civil or military; but he was encouraging the strikers not to give up, so what could be done about it? That was the dilemma which Gov. Peabody had to solve. He solved it under the advice of Mr. Waldron, the same ingenious and forceful lawyer who is engineering the present injunction proceedings. Acting upon Mr. Waldron's advice, Gov. Peabody ordered the troops to arrest Moyer while he was at Telluride. They did so. Pursuant to the same orders they cast him into the "bull pen." All this was without warrant or accusation and solely on the plea of military necessity.

As the district court for the counties that include the Telluride region could not execute its writ of habeas corpus, the military authorities forcibly refusing to obey, an application for the writ in behalf of Moyer was made to the Supreme Court. This court issued the writ, and for a time it was supposed that the military would refuse to obey even the highest tribunal of the State. But better counsels prevailed. Whether the military would have released their prisoner had the final decision of the court been in his favor is doubted, for they produced the prisoner with great military display and pomposity; but Gov. Peabody was not forced to face such an alternative.

After argument one of the judges, the Democrat, was of the opinion that the governor has no power to arrest a citizen without legal cause, nor to suspend the writ of habeas corpus in his own unrestrained discretion. But the other two judges, both Republicans, held that when the governor declares any part of

the State or all parts in a state of insurrection, the courts from lowest to highest thereupon and thereby lose all power to inquire into the legality of the imprisonment of any person arrested by the governor's authority. So the court, by a majority of two to one, decided that the cause and circumstances of Moyer's arrest and imprisonment could not be inquired into. He was accordingly returned to the military "bull pen" at Telluride.

It may well be believed that the whole State was startled by this declaration and exhibition of irresponsible power. In comparison with the assertion of such a prerogative by the Republican governor, sustained by the two Republican judges of the Supreme Court, constituting a majority—[both being regarded as Peabody Republicans, although one is nominally a Democrat, as is Mr. Waldron]—election frauds in Denver, naturally enough, took second place in the minds of men to whom, on their own merits alone such frauds were abhorrent. I say naturally, because election frauds, however exasperating and injurious while they last, leave no injurious consequences; whereas the successful assumption of kingly prerogatives by constitutional executives, even if afterwards repudiated, operates as a precedent which permanently distorts the form and perverts the spirit of republican government. Autocracy by the agents of a republic leaves behind it autocratic scars; corruption by or of the people of a republic leaves behind it only a wholesome lesson.

It was the effect upon popular sentiment of Peabody's assumption of a kingly prerogative that insured his defeat at the polls. Doubtless there was fraudulent voting and fraudulent counting, but Peabody's defeat can be accounted for by other and better reasons.

He was the head and front of the kingly prerogative movement in Colorado, and as such he became the central figure of the campaign. Roosevelt received many a vote from Democrats, Republicans, socialists and labor unionists, which was cast against Peabody. Not only did labor union men vote against Peabody, but so did every one who felt the sting of his assertion of kingly prerogatives. The strength of this opposition was noted by the Republican machine; and the Republican campaign, only perfunctorily made for Roosevelt, was made with all possible vigor for Peabody. This kind of campaign may be explained by what is generally believed and probably is a fact, that the Peabody-Republican machine, together with a little cluster of plutocratic Democrats, the Denver traction crowd, the Colorado Fuel and Iron Co., the railroads, several large mining corporations, and kindred interests, are naturally affiliated and consciously allied.

It was as part of that campaign that the equity suit in the Supreme Court was instituted, purification of the ballot being evidently not even a secondary motive with the Peabody cabinet. Peabody's re-inauguration, whether or no and right or wrong, was the primary motive originally; retention of control of the Supreme court, since the adoption at this election of a constitutional amendment increases that court from three members to seven by adding new judges, has become the principal object now.

The key to the whole situation on the plutocratic side of it is in the appointment by Peabody and confirmation by the Senate of those two judges. Together with the two Peabody juiges already on the Supreme bench, they would make a majority of the newly-organized court.

This key seems to be within Peabody's grasp. Even if he retires from office, his present term continues for a week after the Senate is to organize. He can, therefore, appoint those two judges before his successor's term begins. Should the Senate confirm them, Peabody's appointees would be in place to maintain the plutocratic tendencies of the judiciary for which the present court has made precedents, no matter what policy the new governor might try to inaugurate. For the equity suit now pending would, if its principle is judicially established, enable the Supreme Court, in an equity suit brought in the name of the people on the relation of the attorney general or any other interested citizen, to issue an injunction against the governor himself if he were charged with acts or omissions destructive of the sovereignty of the people.

Whether Peabody's judicial appointees will be confirmed by the Senate before Alva Adams can be seated is the burning question in Denver.

It seems to be understood that the court as now constituted will not go so far as to count Gov. Peabody in. This would be usurpation so spectacular as probably to precipitate a violent revolution. But they may throw out the returns from some precincts as being tainted with fraud, and to such an extent as to give Peabody control of the Senate. That is what is feared by Democrats and expected apparently by the better informed Republicans.

Nor would it be difficult, if the court goes so far as to determine the results of the election under its equity process. The Senate consists of 35 members elected for four years. Every alternate two years 17 and 18 go out of office. It is the turn this year of the 17 to retire. Upon the face of the vote 9 of the Senators-elect are Democrats and 8 Republicans, which would give the Democrats a bare majority. One of the Democrats died last week. His seat belongs to a close district. If the governor calls a special election in December it is impossible to fortell which side will win. But either way the majority will be so narrow for the Democrats, at the best, that a few Denver precincts thrown out would shift the majority over to the interests, corporate and political, which Peabody represents.

The opinion seems to prevail that Mr. Waldron will be able to convince a majority of the present Supreme Court that they have the power in proceedings under the equity suit which they have decided to be within their constitutional jurisdiction, to act as a supervisory returning board and enjoin the counting of returns in precincts which they hold to be tainted with fraud. In this way, even if the result as to Peabody were not affected, and Adams were to become governor without further contest, a Peabody Senate might be secured, and through that a Peabody Supreme Court.

Lawyers generally will be amazed, if not incredulous, at the legal situation here indicated. Familiar as they have become with the judicial departure known as government by injunction, they are not prepared for what must seem to them so complete an overturning and confusion of the principles of political functions and equity jurisprudence.

In Denver itself, neither laymen however intelligent nor lawyers however well informed, seemed able to explain the anomalous situation. They realized that the Supreme Court had undertaken to govern the State by equity process, but could not explain how it had bridged the chasm between equity powers and political functions. What had happened had happened, but how it had happened they knew not. The mystery was clarified, however, in an interview with Mr. Waldron and his partner, both of whom were courteous, precise, lucid and confident in their explanations, while entirely candid as to the possible influence upon their prejudices of their political affiliations.

Their explanation of the equity suit is essentially the same, in my judgment, as the explanation of Moyer's arbitrary imprisonment. It is in execution of a kingly prerogative. Mr. Waldron makes a definite distinction between the equity powers of courts in cases involving individual rights, and the equity powers of the Supreme Court of Colorado in cases involving the reserved sovereignty of the people of the State. In individual cases, property rights must be in jeopardy before an injunction will issue, and no injunction can be issued to enjoin crime. Neither can an injunction be is-

sued in those cases if there is other adequate relief. But when the sovereignty of the people of the State is assailed, the principles of the king's prerogatives under old English law are evoked.

The king, when his prerogatives were assailed, could direct his chancellor to use any or all the machinery of his court to protect those prerogatives. So the people of Colorado, not as a political corporation having property rights to protect, but as a political sovereign having prerogatives to conserve, can come into the Supreme Court, as a tribunal of original jurisdiction invested by the constitution with the power, among other things, to grant injunctions, and demand an injunction, not for the protection of a candidate in any property right he may have in the office, nor for the protection of State property of any kind or in any way, nor because there is no other adequate relief; but solely for the conservation of the kingly prerogatives which American States derive from the common law of England—and this without regard to the fact that the act enjoined may be a crime. Upon the plea, then, that the debauching and falsification of the suffrage is destructive of the prerogatives of the people of a State entitled to a republican form of government, this bill in equity is presented to the court, and the court grants the injunction.

Only a moment's reflection is required to see how far-reaching this prerogative theory of government by injunction is, in its possibilities of centralizing political power in the judiciary. If the people, as the ultimate sovereign, once get into court, fictitiously, in an equity suit "ex relatione"—that is to say, on the complaint of an appropriate person that some prerogative of sovereignty is assailed—the court can, upon this theory, issue and enforce injunctions against any and everybody regarding any or every conceivable act, from private citizens charged with crime all the way up to legislator and governor charged with unconstitutional official purposes. Thus government by injunction would be perfected, Marshall's judicial policy would reach a logical conclusion, and Jefferson's fears of ultimate usurpation by an ambitious judiciary would be realized.

Even the constitutional separation of executive, legislative and judicial departments of government would prove ineffective. If a court of equity, on plea of protecting a kingly prerogative, can summarily convict officials for election crimes, as guilty of contempt of injunctions against those crimes, astute lawyers like Mr. Waldron will soon show it how to convict any other official, even a governor, for any other alleged malfeasance or nonfeasance in office, also summarily as for contempt of an injunction. The whole thing is dangerously revolutionary. But Gov. Peabody, Mr. Waldron and their associates are not responsible for beginning it. They are only carrying out the policy of government by injunction to its logical extreme. And they are carrying it out in the interest of the same kind of all-absorbing corporations under whose influence the policy was begun by President Cleveland's administration.

In the prerogative theory which Mr. Waldron advances, the doctrine of government by injunction first gets a logical foothold. That theory gives to the Debs case a spine of legal principle which it lacked before. In deciding the Debs case the Supreme Court of the United States gave no logical reason for their decision sustaining an injunction against the statutory crime of interfering with the mails. But Mr. Waldron, interpreting that case according to his prerogative theory, cites it as authority for the Denver injunction. In his view, the Federal Courts got their jurisdiction to issue an injunction against Debs upon the principle that he and his associates, by their alleged obstruction of the mails, were attacking a kingly prerogative of the Federal government, for the protection of which the government could call upon its courts of equity, as the English king might once have called upon his chancellor, to issue any writ in their quiver.

Another precedent upon which the Peabody forces rely to sustain their injunction proceedings is the Cunningham case, which was decided by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin in 1892. In that case an injunction was issued restraining a gerrymander made by the legislature, on the ground that the gerrymander was calculated to destroy the republican character of the State government, and was, therefore, subject to injunction from any court empowered to issue an injunction as a writ for the protection of sovereign prerogatives. It is conceded that this precedent was rejected by the Supreme Court of Illinois. But the explanation is made that the Illinois court rejected it, not because such an injunction for such a purpose might not properly issue from a court authorized to issue it, but because the Supreme Court of Illinois has no constitutional power to issue such injunctions. For the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, however, this power is claimed on the basis of the Cunningham case, and the constitution of Wisconsin, unlike that of Illinois, is the same in this respect as the constitution of Colorado.

Among those Republicans in Denver who are unable to justify these extraordinary equity proceedings which Mr. Waldron seems to have invented and two judges of the Supreme Court to have approved, are some who satisfy themselves with the plea of necessity. The Democratic prosecuting attorney, they say, has made it impossible to convict for election frauds by the ordinary processes of the criminal law. This plea of "necessity" may appeal also to others. But it is without force not only in itself, but also because a Republican was elected this year to the office of prosecutor of crimes. It would be easy enough, therefore, for the Republicans to prosecute the offenses of which they complain, without any usurpation of power by the Supreme Court, if honest elections instead of plutocratic power were really the object sought.

It is not probable that the action of the Colorado court in fining and imprisoning men ostensibly for contempt, but really for acts, which, if committed, are criminal, will be allowed to rest. Although the Colorado court has refused to allow appeals to the Supreme Court of the United States, holding that no Federal question is involved, writs of habeas corpus and certiorari from the U. S. Supreme Court will probably accomplish the result. The question is essentially one of jurisdiction. The Colorado court either has jurisdiction over these prisoners in this equity suit, or it has not. This question the Supreme Court of the United States will inquire into on writs of habeas corpus issued upon the principle of the Lange case, which it decided some 30 years ago.

As to the presence in the case of a Federal question, there are probably at least two such questions: (1) On Mr. Waldron's prerogative theory the question of republican form of government is involved; (2) on any theory whatever, the question of depriving citizens of the United States of their liberty without due process of law is involved, for these imprisonment proceedings are not due process of law unless Mr. Waldron's prerogative theory is right. There is, therefore, a fair prospect of an early adjudication by the highest court in the country of the advancing policy of government by injunction in this its most brazen form.

Meanwhile the State of Colorado is in a shiver of excitable expectation. Alva Adams, the Democratic candidate for governor, is preparing to take the office, and both Democrats and Republicans believe that blood will flow abundantly in the streets of Denver if Gov. Peabody resists him. What

will happen if the Supreme Court refrains from interfering with Adams, but undertakes to regulate the political complexion of the senate by any further novelties in equity jurisprudence, no one ventures even to guess. Apparently, however, that would not excite popular passion to the boiling point.

It is a relief to turn from this long account of circumstances which may possibly culminate in conflicts in Colorado more serious than the political and legal controversies that rack it now, to a State institution that is rapidly forging to the front as one of the great technical schools of the country. It is the Colorado School of Mines, established 30 years ago, and now under the presidency of Victor C. Alderson, formerly dean of the faculty at Armour Institute, Chicago.

This insitution is located at Golden, one of the oldest places in Colorado, about 15 miles from Denver, among the ragged but picturesque foothills of the Rocky Mountains. Its students are educated free, if residents of the State; non-residents pay a tuition fee. They come from the far East, as well as the far West; and foreign countries, also, are represented among them.

Looking in upon the 300 students, gathered in the common auditorium, in their class rooms, in the library, or in the laboratories, one gets the impression of mixing with a collection of workingmen at their work or in their unions. Although all grades of social and financial standing are represented here, every student appears in a workingman's working dress. The custom is enforced by the students themselves, who refuse to tolerate boiled shirts and white collars. However this custom may have originated, or whatever objection there may be to its enforcement even by the students themselves, it is a good custom. These young men are preparing to make high grade workingmen of themselves; and their clothing, in keeping with the work they are learning to do, gives an air of self-respecting democratic equality to the institution, which is not the least among its many attractive features. It affords a striking object lesson, moreover, of the fact that clothes do not make the man.

The school is supported by a State tax of one-fifth of a mill on assessed property, and is governed by a board of trustees appointed by the governor and confirmed by the senate. Dr. Alderson has drawn into the faculty a corps of specialists of exceptional abilities and acquirements, and under his administration the institution, beginning now to compete with the best in the country, has justly become an object of great local pride.

L. F. P.

NEWS

Week ending Thursday, Dec. 1.

Exciting reports from Denver regarding the political situation there (p. 535) have appeared during the week in the daily press. An explanation of the controversy and a statement of its progress down to the 28th will be found under the head of Editorial Correspondence on page 547. On the 28th it was reported that Gov. Peabody had decided to withdraw from the contest, but on the 29th he made a positive denial. Upon the face of the returns, as reported by the city canvassing board on the 29th, the vote in Denver for Adams, the Democratic candidate, was 33,577 and for Peabody, the Republican candidate, 28,667, a plurality in the city of 4,910 for Adams. The rest of the State gives Adams a plurality of about 5,000, making his plurality in the whole State about 10,000. The plurality for the Republican Presidential electors was in the whole State about 35,000. The latest development is the argument in the Supreme Court on the 30th upon the motion (p. 535) by Gov. Peabody's lawyers to throw out the total vote of Precinct 8 of Ward 7. In support of this motion Peabody's lawyers contend that the court's order relating to watchers was violated in that precinct, and that therefore the vote as a whole should be thrown out without an investigation to determine the number of legal votes cast and without opening the ballot box. No decision has yet been reported; but if the court orders the vote of this precinct to be thrown out the attorneys for Peabody are expected to demand similar action in respect to about 50 precincts in which it is charged that the court's order was violated. All these precincts gave majorities for Adams for governor, and by throwing out the returns it is hoped to overcome Adams's majority in the State. Control of the Senate is, however, probably the principal purpose and expectation.

It is now possible to record the full official vote of Illinois at the recent election (p. 535), the official canvass of the vote of Cook County having been completed on the 26th. For the entire State the full official returns for President and Governor are as follows:

	President.	Governor.
Republican	632,745	634,029
Democratic	328,006	333,982
Prohibitionist	34,759	35,389
People's	6,725	4,364
Socialist Labor	4,708	4,579
Socialist	69,225	59,060
Continental	830	780
Rep. plurality	304,739	300,047

Total Socialist vote:

1904	73,933
1900	11,060
1896	1,147

Full official returns from Indiana, reported on the 28th, are as follows on the Presidential vote:

Republican	368,289
Democratic	274,345
Prohibitionist	23,496
People's	2,444
Socialist Labor	1,598
Socialist	12,013
Republican plurality	93,944

Total Socialist:

1904	13,611
1900	3,037
1896	329

From Connecticut on the 30th the following official returns of the Presidential vote were reported:

Republican	111,009
Democratic	72,309
Prohibitionist	1,506
People's	495
Socialist Labor	575
Socialist	4,543
Republican plurality	38,100

Total Socialist:

1904	5,118
1900	1,937
1896	1,223

From Wisconsin, also on the 30th, the following are the official returns on the Presidency:

Republican	280,164
Democratic	124,107
Prohibitionist	9,770
People's	530
Socialist Labor	223
Socialist	28,220
Republican plurality	156,057

Total Socialist:

1904	28,443
1900	7,619
1896	1,314

Official returns of the Presidential vote of the two leading parties, in the States tabulated below, are compared in the same table with the Presidential vote of 1900:

	1904.		1900.	
	Roos.	Park.	McK.	Bryan.
Alabama	29,474	79,857	55,634	96,368
Arkansas	46,740	64,434	44,800	81,142
Connecticut	111,009	72,909	102,567	73,997
Delaware	23,705	19,347	22,529	18,858
Florida	8,314	27,046	7,419	28,260
Idaho	47,384	18,420	27,198	29,414
Illinois	632,745	328,006	597,985	503,061
Indiana	368,289	274,345	336,063	309,584
Kansas	210,873	84,800	185,955	162,601
Maryland	106,934	107,477	136,212	122,271
Missouri	321,447	295,847	314,091	351,922
Nebraska	138,558	51,876	121,835	114,013
Ohio	619,997	357,654	543,918	474,882
Oregon	60,453	17,457	46,526	33,385
Pennsylvania	840,949	337,998	712,665	424,232
South Carolina	2,271	52,863	3,579	47,223
Vermont	46,459	9,777	42,568	12,849
Wisconsin	280,164	124,107	265,866	159,285