

your future. In facing the duties of citizenship as patriots and lovers of liberty, temptations will beset your path. False philosophers and teachers are likely to appear at any step, and the seductive influence of money-gain to sing its siren song. It will need the vigilance of your faculties, sustained by educational strength, to withstand the trial and test. Over, beyond and above all, remember that there are different meanings for virtue and valor in individual and national life. Away with those words of misguided zeal: "My country, right or wrong!" Put in their place those other words of patriotic utterance: "My country, right—to be kept right; wrong—to be made right."

There is an eastern allegory that tells of those who attempt to climb an enchanted mountain for the talismen of power, as being assailed at each progressive step by every conceivable calumny and insult. If they falter, they fall as inert matter; but if one is found who presses forward, fearing neither death nor calumny, standing throughout for the eternal right, he transforms the faltering fallen into life, and as they crowd about him he becomes their leader.

May you, young friends, climb to the topmost height of the enchanted mountain, but, having grasped the talisman of power, wield it for the greatness of Texas, the glory of the republic! May you discover in your own educational advantages, that, after bread, education is the first want of the people; and, so imbued, strive to fulfill the public need by general diffusion of knowledge among the masses! May you, ever recalling the rise of the republic, avert its fall by striking, as at a deadly serpent, apostasy to the declaration of independence and the constitution of the union! May the spirit of education, blessing heart and mind, ever teach you that with the nation, as with the man, when honor's dead the life is dead! May you, finally, so shape your lives in the course of citizenship that all the ends at which you aim shall be your country's, your God's, and truth's! Then, indeed, though some supreme ambition may as the fabled apple turn to ashes at your touch; though it may be for you as with Cyrano de Bergerac to stand in the shadows as prompter for others climbing to kisses of Fame; you will yet in the final hour be able "to wrap the drapery of your couch about you, and lie down to pleasant dreams;" while, like him, above you there will wave

the white plume of a life's consecrated and exalted purpose.

#### OUR DUTY TO THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES.

There are two branches to any inquiry into the subject of the duty of the American government toward the Philippines. We must first determine what it ought if possible to do, and then what, under the circumstances, it can do.

No difficulty is presented by the first branch. When congress declared the attitude of the United States toward Cuba it determined in advance what its attitude ought to be toward the Philippines. To that declaration, then, let us refer.

It is the fourth clause of the joint resolution adopted by congress on April 18, 1898, and signed by the president on the 20th—the same resolution that recognized the independence of Cuba and by authorizing armed intervention brought on the Spanish war.

In unequivocal terms that clause disclaimed "any disposition or intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction or control over" Cuba, "except for the pacification thereof," and asserted the determination of the government, "when that is accomplished, to leave the government and control of the island to its people." Cuba alone was named. But that was because the circumstances at the time happened to have brought Cuba alone into consideration. By naming Cuba, under the circumstances, the declaration did not exclude like cases; on the contrary, it invoked in behalf of Cuba a principle of general application. An analogy may be found in the practice of the law courts. Legal principles which a court applies in one case it is expected to apply in every like case. If, for instance, it decides that under certain circumstances John Doe is entitled to his liberty, it must decide that Richard Roe is under like circumstances entitled to his. That would be a queer lawyer who objected to the applicability of Roe's case of a principle applied in Doe's, merely because Roe had not been mentioned. Legal principles do not depend upon particular instances. Neither do principles of national polity and international morality. The principle governs the instance, not the instance the principle. What instances do is to illustrate. So, when the United States disclaimed all purpose of sovereignty as to Cuba and promised independent self-government to her people, it illustrated a general principle—the principle of duty which American polity imposes upon the American government in its attitude toward alien

peoples whom circumstances happen to place within its power.

This was the very principle that President McKinley himself, in two preceding messages, had put impressively and almost in epigrammatic phrase. It was the beneficent principle, to quote his words, that "forcible annexation \* \* \* by our code of morality would be criminal aggression."

In the light of that elemental principle there can be no doubt of what the United States ought to do if it can. It ought to proclaim and promise as to the Philippines what it proclaimed and promised as to Cuba. It ought, in other words, to disavow "any disposition or intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction or control," except for the temporary purpose of pacification; and to promise that as soon as the country is pacified American authority shall be withdrawn and the independent self-government of the people recognized. Besides this, it ought to redeem the promise promptly, fully and in manifest good faith.

That is what the United States ought to do if possible. The other branch of the inquiry: What can it do under the circumstances? may not be so simple.

In one respect, however, the second branch obviously offers no greater difficulty than the first. Without any embarrassment the United States could at once proclaim its disavowal of sovereignty except for purposes of pacification, and promise to leave the Philippines to their people as soon as pacification is accomplished. There are no existing circumstances, except an indefensible and ignoble desire for forcible annexation, to interfere with that.

If such a disavowal and promise had been made at the beginning and faithfully observed the remainder of this branch of the inquiry would also be simple. Nothing would now stand in the way of fully redeeming the promise. For the Philippine people had already established a pacific government, which, by this time, could have been trusted with the destiny of the islands. This assertion is borne out by Gen. Anderson in his article in the North American Review for February, 1900, and by Leonard R. Sargent, in the Outlook for September 2, 1899. Gen. Armstrong tells us that the Filipino government ruled over nearly all the archipelago in the late summer of 1898. "We held Manila and Cavite," he says; "the rest of the island was held, not by Spaniards, but by the Filipinos. On the other islands the Spaniards were confined to two or three fortified towns." So there was then an effective government. And Mr. Sargent assures us that it was not only effective,

but also pacific. He was an American naval cadet, who, with a naval paymaster, Wilcox, spent two months of the fall of 1898 upon a semi-official investigation of the interior of Luzon. Writing to the Outlook about the trip, he said: "As a tribute to the efficiency of Aguinaldo's government and to the law-abiding character of his subjects, I offer the fact that Mr. Wilcox and I pursued our journey throughout in perfect security, and returned to Manila with only the most pleasing recollections of the quiet and orderly life which we found the natives to be leading under the new regime."

Had the United States fostered that regime it would long before this have encountered no legitimate risk in leaving the control of the Philippines to their people. But instead of fostering the government of which Aguinaldo was president, until it had inspired general confidence in the pacification of the archipelago, the United States deliberately set about destroying it.

To begin with, we refused civil treatment to its envoys. We then unceremoniously crowded its military forces off territory they are conceded to have conquered from the Spanish, without complying with its request for assurances that if in our treaty with Spain we should agree to withdraw from the Philippines we would first restore these particular places to the Filipinos. Meanwhile we negotiated with Spain for a treaty discriminating against the Philippines as compared with Cuba. Though we caused Spain to "relinquish" Cuba, we allowed her to "cede" the Philippines. The one she freed, the other she sold. After that, and without waiting for the treaty to become legally effectual by ratification, but while even our bare technical rights were still confined to Manila, we asserted absolute sovereignty over the whole archipelago. At the same time—and this was a month before the fighting began—we virtually declared war against the Philippine government, which until then had been pacific, by proclaiming our intention of putting that government down. Finally, we engaged its army in the opening battle of the war, a battle which, according to Gen. Otis's official report, "was one strictly defensive on the part of the Filipinos and of vigorous attack by our forces."

These circumstances divest the question of what the United States can do with reference to the Philippines as distinguished from what it ought to do if possible of some of its original simplicity. We cannot immediately turn the control of the islands over to the

people, because there is not now a pacific government to represent them. We have crushed the one they had. And in crushing their government and attempting forcibly to annex their country we have shattered their former confidence in the friendliness of our intentions. Whatever we do, therefore, in the direction of what we ought to do, must now be done as the temporary protector of a disappointed and consequently distrustful people.

But these disadvantages can be overcome. By proclaiming our disavowal of permanent sovereignty and our promise to leave the archipelago to a government of the people as soon as a pacific government of that kind is established we shall do much to revive confidence. No such promise has ever yet been made. Our whole behavior, on the contrary, has been that of a conqueror, bent on forcible annexation. We have, indeed, promised "stable government," but that is nothing better than the czar of Russia promises Finland. We have not promised either popular government or independence, both of which are involved in the principle of the Cuban resolution. Let us at once remedy this default. Having done that, our next step should be the rehabilitation of the local government as it existed at its capital of Malolos, when, according to Gen. Anderson, it ruled over nearly the whole archipelago, and according to Cadet Sargent it maintained peace and order. This step should be taken promptly. And afterward, when the local government shall have been thus restored and the general peace of the archipelago is thereby reasonably assured, our military forces should be withdrawn and the Philippine republic formally introduced by the United States into the family of nations. By adopting that course we should in some degree atone for our mistakes of the last two years, and, though it might be humiliating to our pride, it would be wholesome for our patriotism.

As to the wisdom of thus recognizing the independence of the Philippines, let it not be forgotten that we have it upon abundant evidence that the Filipinos, whom we are now engaged in subjugating, are as capable of self-government as the Cubans, to whom we have not only pledged self-government, but are actually beginning to concede it.—Louis F. Post, in Chicago Record of September 24.

Sewall—Is he a man to be trusted?

Crawford—Hardly. He writes campaign literature for six different political parties. G. T. E.

#### FLOOD-TIDE.

For The Public.

We have looked behind the curtain, we have learned the play by heart; For we watched each cunning actor through the triumph of his part When our sons, whose blood was cheapened at the presidential mart, To crime and death marched on.

We have felt the disillusion of the tinsel and the paint That could give us Diavolo in the likeness of a saint— We who read his treacherous fiat, with souls grown sick and faint— His war still marching on.

With our eyes on daily slaughter of his victims, white and brown, Blatant allies bid us hail him as the king our hands shall crown, When our boasted flower of freedom like a weed is trampled down, And greed goes marching on.

We have seen the slighted people leap from lethargy at last, Heard the shout of their awaking everywhere rise fierce and fast; For they know the nearing roll-call might have been their very last, With McKinley marching on.

While the schemers, clearly seeing they have shot beyond the mark, Up and down the land go whistling like a scared boy in the dark, We turn from their bray of conquest, to the tread of justice hark: Bryan goes marching on.

D. H. INGHAM.

Marke—Why are you so sure that he will not vote for Mr. McKinley?

Heeler—He says he won't.

Marke—Have you tried to point out the error of failing to support the administration?

Heeler—Yes; but he won't see.

Marke—Have you offered him ten dollars to buy a pair of spectacles that will enable him to see?

G. T. E.

"The powers are not at war with China—"

"Then the battles at Tientsin, Peit-Sang, Yang-Tsun and Peking illustrate the fact that peace hath her victories no less renowned than war."—Puck.

"I suppose," remarked the seeker after knowledge, "we will pursue the same policy in China as in the Philippines—the sword in one hand and the Bible in the other."

"Not exactly," replied the war department official. "The regulation uniform for Chinese service will have a large pocket for the Bible, leaving the other hand free to operate a machine gun."—Catholic Standard and Times.

#### BOOK NOTICES.

The first systematic history of the events culminating in the Philippine war—not dashed off by the mile on a race against time, after the manner of Murat Halstead, but written with painstaking care and conscientious regard for the verities—is "The Other Man's Country" (Philadelphia: J.