

demonstrated that unless an armaments' limitation treaty were to be drastically revised quinquennially, its provisions would speedily become obsolete owing to novel inventions and unanticipated improvements.

It is possible that even if our lugubrious forebodings proved correct, matters would not be as hopeless and depressing as before the war, with a League such as we have outlined. Who in his heart, however, would not rebel against the suggestion that war, bloody and ruthless, perhaps bloodier and more ruthless than ever, *must* be accepted as an ever-present Damocles sword hanging over our children and our children's children? What statesman would dare to cheer his people with such a heart-sickening prospect?

The truth is that not a few of our "practical" thinkers are inclined to be blandished by superficial analogies. Viscount Grey admits that "the analogy between States and individuals, or groups of individuals, is not perfect." If he could afford the time in these harassing days to probe this analogy with his piercing intellect, he would find that he had pricked a bubble. The analogy, he would discover, is grossly and gravely misleading. "During one hundred and twenty years," the *AMERICAN ADVOCATE OF PEACE* states in its July number, "the Supreme Court of the United States has handed down eighty-one decisions in cases between States, and in no instance has it employed force to hale a State before it, or to compel the observance of its decrees." And, to make the contrast complete the writer avers: "We all know that the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States against individuals can be and if necessary will be enforced by the police power, but we also know that decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States are not and never have been enforced in any such way. . . . Indeed, the Supreme Court of the United States does not even compel a State to appear before it."

This attitude towards States in a Union holds true of intra-territorial units generally. Great Britain, for example, contains thousands of such territorial units, some of them imposing as London and others extensive as Scotland, and yet the question of applying force to any of them (Ireland has never yet been properly assimilated), or their applying force to one another, has not even crossed the mind of the practical politician for generations. Assuredly, there is here a vital distinction, the consequences of which we cannot pursue here. Suffice it to add that the normal treatment of an individual offender in a civilized community is also almost infinitely superior to that meted out to a recalcitrant nation in war—especially in war as conceived by the German High Command. Territorial units can therefore be and are being governed without the menace or the application of force, and it should accordingly not pass the wit of man to devise a League of Nations which shall involve the complete eradication of militarism and armaments. It would be lamentable if the chances of a permanent peace were wrecked by a false analogy.

Here, as in almost all matters pertaining to internationalism, President Wilson has made a signally valuable contribution. He would, as I understand him, reduce the war establishments of every country to the preparations dictated by domestic or internal needs. This should mean, on the one hand, a slight strengthening of the existing police force along its own lines, and

on the other, the abolition of guns and other instruments of warfare, of fortresses, of the military hierarchy, of ministries of war, of soldiering or drilling—in short, of everything that renders war possible and effective. Then, when war has become but a sad memory, States will cease to suspect and lacerate each other and will be ready to co-operate in building the future City of the Light.

I appeal to my esteemed readers to combat the notion that there is a close analogy between individuals and territorial units, or that the carefully graduated and humane penalties of a civilized country even distantly resemble or suggest the anarchic savagery of warfare. Let us labor for a comprehensive League of Nations that shall disestablish war, liberate nationalities from alien control, and bless the world with a full-blooded international legislature, court, and administration.

DANGER IN POLITICO-ECONOMIC DOCTRINES ACCEPTED BY SIR EDWARD GRAY

By JACKSON H. RALSTON

THE much-discussed Lichnowsky memorandum has not, we believe, received the attention it deserves from one important point of view. We have been so very busy, with propriety, applauding the general position taken by Lichnowsky and the material light he has thrown upon the events immediately preceding the war, that we have neglected to observe that the memorandum reveals not alone the beneficent and pacific side of the character of Sir Edward Gray, but also the fact that Sir Edward still entertains, in certain respects, the archaic viewpoint of the average European public man as to the duties of the state in foreign affairs. Until the ideas tacitly accepted by him cease to control, wars will find their justification in attempts to command foreign markets.

The European conception, in its original sense, is stated by Von Jagow, the former German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in his comment upon the Lichnowsky memoir. He says "Even Prince Lichnowsky does not deny that we had there (in the Orient) great economic interests to represent; but today economic interests are no longer to be separated from political interests."

This represents the old, and, as we might have hoped, the dying conception. Its position is, first, get hold of a country through its economic interests, and next, control its political interests for the benefit of the economic. This has been the order of the day largely in the past—changed only when the sequence was reversed and political control was seized with the intent of using that control to develop economic profits.

Nevertheless, we find Sir Edward Gray and Prince Lichnowsky proceeding on behalf of their respective governments, to divide up parts of the world as the larger capitalistic interests of their respective countries might dictate, with the supreme thought in their minds that if a suitable division of economic control of the countries in question should be made, the chance of armed strife could proportionately be eliminated. This

very position was in itself a confession that the great danger of war between the two nations was to be found in the desire of Governments to seek for groups of capitalists new fields of exploitation.

The Lichnowsky memoir is filled with expressions indicating the old and war-breeding point of view of the several nations and their representatives. For instance, "from the outset, the British statesmen took the position that England had no interest in Albania, and, therefore, did not mean to let war come on this issue." This particular interest, the absence of which would prevent England from going to war, was, we may see, purely economic.

Speaking of Germany, Lichnowsky says, "As in 1878 and in 1908, we had placed ourselves in opposition to the Russian program, although no German interests were involved." The Balkans were then referred to and the interests again were economic.

Prince Lichnowsky says "In the year 1898 a secret convention had been signed by Count Hatzfeldt and Mr. Balfour which divided the Portuguese Colonies in Africa into economic-political spheres of interest as between us and England An agreement had been reached between us and England delimiting the interests of the two parties,"—this being in Portuguese Colonies with which neither England nor Germany, with any propriety, had political interests and should not have undertaken to enforce special economic rights.

Referring to the partition of Portuguese colonial possessions, the Prince says that "It was provided that in certain cases we should be authorized to intervene in the territories assigned to us for the protection of our interests"—in other words, political interference was to follow economic.

Referring to the negotiations which he carried on with England, Prince Lichnowsky says that "All Angola, as far as the 20th degree of longitude, was assigned to us, so that we reached the Congo territory from the South. Moreover, the valuable islands of San Thomé and Principe which lie North of the Equator, and therefore really belong to the French sphere of interest, were allotted to us—a fact which caused my French colleague to enter energetic but unavailing protests."

In this respect we find France claiming an interest, her title to which must, at least, have been doubtful, even though better, if better such a thing could be, than that of England and Germany.

The Prince finds that sincerity of the British Government was demonstrated by the fact that Englishmen, desiring to invest capital in the districts assigned to Germany under the new treaty, were referred to Germany "with the information that the enterprise in question belonged in our sphere of interest."

When the Prince comes to the consideration of the Bagdad Treaty, he finds that its real purpose "was to divide Asia Minor into spheres of influence, although this expression was anxiously avoided out of regard for the rights of the Sultan." The thing itself was not avoided but the expression of it was to be shunned.

We learn with interest that "all the economic questions connected with the German enterprise were regulated in substantial accord with the desires of the German Bank." It is hard to conceive in this day when the

rights of the common people are assumed to be paramount, that in determining a question of possible war and peace, a settlement should be controlled by the wishes of a bank.

Again we find that the Germans were to be admitted "to participation in Basra Harbor Works," and that they were given rights in the Tigris which had formerly been a monopoly of the firm of Lynch. The Prince finds that under this treaty Mesopotamia, as far as Basra, became a German sphere of interest without prejudice to certain older British private rights, while Britain was to control the coasts of the Persian Gulf and Smyrna-Aidin line, the French, Syria, and the Russians, Armenia.

It is to be hoped, and we firmly believe, that the entrance of America into the world War will change the viewpoint of every statesman. It has not been our fashion to threaten or make war at the behest of private interests. In our vocabulary there are no such words as "spheres of influence." We do not know what it is to have vital economic interests in another nation, and we cannot afford in the settlement which must follow the present conflict, to measure the rights and privileges of people by the desires of German banks or English or American capitalists. There can be no freedom of development in any nation over which another nation claims a right of economic priority or control. This lesson had not been learned by the statesmen of the world when the present conflict began. Of this the negotiations between Sir Edward Gray and Prince Lichnowsky afford abundant proof. If it shall be learned as the result of all this war has cost and will cost, the conflict will prove in the end profitable to mankind.

A NATIONALISTIC INTERNATIONALISM

By NICHOLAS MURRAY BUTLER

Now that the world clearly understands the issues raised by Germany when it made its furious and long-prepared attack on the world's peace and order in August, 1914, and now that the free nations have come to so thorough an understanding both as to their duty and as to their opportunity, the end of the war is plainly in sight. The most highly organized and ruthless militaristic system that the world has ever known is going down in ruins before free men armed in a just cause. The infatuated and militaristic Germany of the past generation has staked everything upon appeal to force and has lost. It may be that the older and better German spirit, that which nursed philosophers of vision and poets of wide human feeling, may reassert itself and in time blot out the horrid record which the past generation has made.

The map of the world will have a strange look to those who are only familiar with the names and boundaries of 1914. National aspirations that have long been held in check by tyrannous force will now come to realization; submerged and subject peoples who have been oppressed and preyed upon will now gain either their autonomy or their independence. The public opinion of the world has been educated in these four years as it might not have been in four hundred years of ordinary happenings.