

tion" appears from Washington dispatches to be proved to have been a true exposure. Instead of a surplus of \$219,000 for the fiscal year 1911, the deficit for that year is reported to be several hundred thousand dollars.



Boy Scouts.

One of the slipperiest places in the human mind is the spot where it mistakes form for substance. Here is where we slip when we kow-tow to a flag but stultify the lessons it symbolizes. We do it when we venerate the Bible as a printers' product but quote it in the Devil's cause. This is paganism—patriotic paganism the one, religious paganism the other. But the slipping may be in an opposite direction. If, for instance, we hate the wickedness of war, we may get to detesting military forms too blindly, merely as forms. Some such mental tendency may account for some rather thoughtless denunciations of the Boy Scouts.



It is true that the Boy Scouts, which originated in this country, was adopted and adapted in Great Britain by a professional soldier; but his object was not warfare, if we may believe his word. In his address on the subject in Chicago, Gen. Baden-Powell said: "I've seen enough of war to want to keep away from the military idea. Woodcraft, handicraft, and all those things are invaluable. First aid and all that goes with it is excellent; but the boys should be kept away from the idea that they are being trained so that some day they may fight for their country. It is not war-scouting that is needed now, but peace-scouting. The explorers, the pioneers, the persons who are always on the lookout to do something for the benefit of humanity, are the ones who count, and that should be the motto of every boy scout." In the United States, the head of the Boy Scouts not only never has been a soldier, but he is and has always been one of the most pronounced protagonists of peace to be found anywhere. We mean Dan Beard. Why object to Boy Scouts organized under such impulses and for such purposes, because they adopt some of the features of military training? Why should military forms be abhorred in so far as they serve to promote health, strength, alertness, readiness, skill, discipline, unified activities, antipathy for all unnecessary killing and eagerness to relieve suffering?



It may be replied that unwarlike forms would serve those purposes as well. But they might not;

if for no other reason, then for this: that in the animal stage of a boy's growth, military forms appeal to him. They appeal to him because, it may be, of the fighting blood that then courses through his restless system. And what can be better than to offer that fighting spirit an outlet which, while attracting him because of its military form, utilizes his energies in peaceful activities? And may it not also disgust him with the murderous spirit of warfare before he comes upon the stage with those who decide for or against war in times of national crises? In all things let us be cautious about getting our minds involved in the entangling alliances of substance and forms.



The Initiative and the Referendum.

The United States Supreme Court has bowed to it. Mr. Roosevelt has boosted it. Oregon and several other communities have adopted it. Ohio is on the verge of it. Senator Lorimer is against it. The Big Business Men's Association is waxing profane about it. President Taft threatens to use the Big Stick on it. All signs are favorable.



IS IT POSSIBLE TO GIVE THE PEOPLE TOO MUCH LIBERTY?

The question as stated is an absurdity, for it assumes that there is *somebody* or *someone* competent to give more or less liberty to human beings, and naturally this entity would be their Creator. It would be presumption to say that the Creator had given men too much or too little liberty, since that would be ascribable to faulty wisdom, and that is unthinkable as appertaining to the Deity. The question should probably have been put thus: "Is it possible for man to have too much liberty?"

And yet that seems equally absurd, for it resolves itself into this—Is it possible for man to have more than he wants?

His *natural* liberty is God-given, is unalterable, is inalienable, and is among those rights mentioned in the Declaration of Independence; and his *civil* rights depend upon his own volition. So whichever way we turn to ask questions about man's social or civil liberties, we must come back for an answer to man himself. God has launched the ship, but the sailing is left, without his intervention, in the hands of the sailors, his creatures.

The measures and boundaries of a man's liberty are his God-given rights, and the duties consequent upon those rights.

Thomas Paine divides the rights of man thus:

I. "*Natural Rights*: Those which appertain to man in right of his own existence," such as the operations of the mind, personal comfort, the pursuit of happiness, and so forth; these are immutable, and are limited only by their infringement of similar rights, inherent in others.

II. "*Civil Rights*: Those which appertain to man in right of his being a member of society."

By way of explanation, the same writer says, "Man did not enter into society to become *worse* than he was before, but to have his rights better secured. A man, by natural right, has a right to judge in his own cause, and so far as that right of the *mind* is concerned it is never surrendered, but what availeth it him to judge if he hath not the power to redress; he therefore deposits this right in the common stock of society, and takes the arm of society, of which he is a member, in preference to and in addition to his own. Society *grants* him nothing (note the word). Every man is a proprietor in society and draws on its capital as a matter of right." Whence the necessity of civil rights? First, men must mingle together, they are gregarious by nature; created so, no doubt. The first flocking tendency may have been due to a desire for mutual protection against wild beasts, or it may have been due to a desire for sexual relationship, or later, for companionship; whatever the cause may have been, the fact is patent. This association gave rise to *civil* rights. When man enters society, the natural rights which he relinquishes (we now quote again) "are those in which, though the right is perfect in the individual, the power to execute is defective."

All these statements are presented simply to show that the civil or social rights (call them as you please) have their origin—every one of them, and without exception—in man's agreement with his fellowmen. If he does not want to surrender any of his natural rights, he may hold himself aloof from society. He will then not infringe upon the rights of others, and his natural rights will remain unaffected and inalienable.



From what source then comes the idea that it is possible to give the people too much liberty? For that idea still exists. In fact, the framers of our Constitution seem to have held it, as the provisions of that document plainly show. Their writings, their speeches and their attitude toward their fellowmen, all indicate that they considered government as something *apart* from the people; *superior* to the people; capable of maintaining

itself and of granting privileges and favors to those under it. Plainly this preposterous stand, this ridiculous point of view, that a creator can make a creature superior to himself, is a relic of monarchy and of the "divine right of kings," and no true democracy can hope to exist continuously so long as it is tainted with this poison.

The *whole people* must be the government, or there is no democracy. *All* members of society must have a voice in the merging of their natural rights into civil rights; otherwise they will lose both. It therefore follows that no society of men can grant itself too much liberty, for if it cares to place restrictions upon itself, it can readily do so. If its laws are found to be too lax or too rigid, the remedy is always at hand.

Pursuing this thought a little farther, a nation is always *fit to govern itself*, for so long as the *people* comprise the *government*, they can have what they mutually care to have, or what they want. They may not govern themselves to suit others, but they may govern themselves to suit the individual subscribers to the compact, and no outside nation has a right to interfere, without good and sufficient cause; otherwise such interference becomes an invasion, and an intrusion upon the natural rights which that nation or society holds inviolate. It is as nonsensical to speak of a people granting themselves too much liberty, as it is to speak of a man giving himself too much money by taking it out of one pocket (being sure that the pocket is his *own*) and putting it into another. He cannot be richer, he cannot be poorer, but he can favor one of his pockets.



All this is upon the presumption that if men are to form social ties, they shall submit to what is commonly called the rule of the majority.

"Man has always a right to judge in his own cause; but as he cannot execute, he must surrender the right of execution to the society in which he has deposited a portion of his rights." Therefore, since no two persons are alike, no matter how similar they may be, there will always be differences of opinion, and these, by common consent, can be harmonized only by an agreement among men to abide by the decision of the majority. Majority rule does not necessarily prove right. But that is another subject.

HOWARD E. RANDALL, M. D.



Land never was private property in that personal sense of property in which we speak of a thing as our own, with which we may do as we please.
—James Anthony Froude.