the chief responsibility for the inevitable horrors of crowding out those principles be saddled upon the victims of the laws that do it? Beneficiaries of perennial injustice should not escape, they must not escape, they ought to rise superior to so much as a wish to escape, that greater responsibility for social disaster which goes with their better opportunities for understanding the social injustice which causes social disasters, and their larger powers of education and influence for bringing that injustice peacefully to an end.

"Collectivism."

In an admirable address on "The Trend Toward Collectivism," delivered before the Chicago City Club and published in its Bulletin of April 19th, Professor Rauschenbusch makes a distinction which needs to be emphasized. By "collectivism" he means, as in this address he explains, "something larger than Socialism usually means." In its organized form, Socialism seems to him to be "only one section of a far larger movement;" and this larger movement he designates "by the word 'collectivism,' not because that is the ordinary use of the word, but simply in order to have an algebraic symbol for something we want to express." Socialists would probably shrink from regarding "collectivism" as larger than Socialism; and many persons who are not Socialists would be at least surprised to learn that Socialism and collectivism are not identical. nevertheless true that the movement or trend which Professor Rauschenbusch symbolizes as "collectivism" is larger than the Socialism which makes class-war its sine qua non, be that war considered as peaceable or as violent; it is also true that the idea he indicates with the term "collectivism" is not necessarily technical Socialism either in part or altogether. The trend toward collectivism, while socialistic as all things societary are socialistic more or less, is in some of its aspects not Socialist at all in any of the legitimate senses in which the term "Socialism" is now current.

But it may be that in his definition of what he means by "collectivism" Professor Rauschenbusch has fallen short of a precise definition of what he probably does mean. As it is difficult to believe that he is not as solicitous for private welfare and private rights as for public welfare and public rights, he may fail to guard his terms completely when he speaks favorably of "collectivism" as putting "emphasis on public welfare and

public rights rather than private welfare and private rights," and of increasing "the amount of public property as against private property." Of course emphasis may be placed upon public welfare and public rights without at all minimizing private welfare and private rights; and a desire to increase the amount of public property as against private property may be realized without in the slightest degree impinging upon just rights of private property. Yet criticism, even if only captious, might be made. We do not presume to speak for Professor Rauschenbusch, nor in any wise to substitute our phrases for his in the expression of his thought. For the purpose, however, of expressing our own thought, which we regard as quite in agreement with his, and to express it so as to prevent misapprehension, we offer this slight paraphrase of his explanation, as our statement of our own view: "Our proposition is that we are all moving in the direction of what we may call 'collectivism.' By 'collectivism' we mean the putting of emphasis on public welfare and public rights for the sake of private rights, and a desire to extend public ownership as against private ownership of public property." By this paraphrase we do not mean that "collectivism" has yet become thus definitely discriminating in its tendency. That would not be true. There is probably as yet no great sensitiveness to the importance, both to individuals in the mass and to the mass itself, of the distinction between private and public welfare, rights and property. But that this distinction indicates root differences, and that those differences should be clearly distinguished in promoting the manifest trend toward "collectivism," is of vital importance alike to public interests, to personal freedom, and to permanent progress.

Good Trusts and Bad.

This is the trust issue in Mr. Roosevelt's mind, as he discloses himself: Good trusts or bad trusts. President Taft interprets his policy as meaning that Mr. Roosevelt would by paternalistic methods determine between trusts, on the question of their goodness or badness, arbitrarily. We surmise not. Judged by the trusts he seems to like and has favored, Mr. Roosevelt's method is not arbitrary. He would seem rather to intend a distinction between the trusts that connive and fight and contract and conspire to choke competition, and those which are fortified by law, through their basic property holdings, against all effective competi-Take the Harvester and the Steel trusts for example. These appear to be in Mr. Roosevelt's category of good trusts. Yet they are the