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HONDURAS — EL SALVADOR,
THE WAR OF ONE HUNDRED HOURS:
A CASE OF REGIONAL "DISINTEGRATION"

European observers have generally shown little interest in the armed conflict which, in July of 1969, set the Central American republics of El Salvador and Honduras against each other. This "soccer war," so dubbed because of the two qualification matches for the World Cup which set it off, seemed at first glance either a diplomatic incident that had become magnified out of all proportions by the overheated passions of the two tropical republics or perhaps even a quaint local quarrel that lamentably had degenerated. However, upon closer examination it becomes clear that the encounters, which lasted scarcely one hundred hours between July 14 and 19, 1969, and which set in opposition the forces of the two Central American republics, went far beyond the issues of a passing athletic rivalry, and even beyond the bounds of the two small Isthmus states.

Indeed, when hostilities broke out on July 14, 1969, they marked the first war between Latin American nations since 1941 and, considering its short duration, the bloodiest and most destructive struggle between states that the continent had seen since 1932. (1) Moreover, for the first time in its twenty-one years of existence, the Organization of American States was unable to prevent a crisis between Latin American states from

spreading beyond the diplomatic arena and breaking out into a full-fledged war. Why had the system for the peaceful solution of conflicts and the keeping of the peace, established by the Bogota Charter in 1948, been unable to limit the dispute and arbitrate between the parties; in short, why had it been unable to control an explosive situation? How had this war erupted, endangering as it did the regional security and economy of the Central American Isthmus, located in the backyard and the direct sphere of influence of its powerful guardian, the United States? These questions must be raised in order to understand the true international dimensions of the conflict. It might also be asked whether or not the war exemplified a new type of inter-American conflict in which tensions created by disparities in development and demographic potential have replaced disputes over mineral wealth. And perhaps we must look to the overlapping of regional organizations for security and economic cooperation in order to uncover the causes of the breakdown of peace initiatives that thus made this most unlikely of wars possible.

FROM CRISIS TO WAR: THE UNFOLDING OF THE CONFLICT

The war did indeed originate in a soccer match. (2) On June 8, 1969, in Tegucigalpa, capital of Honduras, El Salvador's national soccer team lost to the Hondurans in an elimination match for the World Cup. Certain deplorable incidents occurred between supporters of the two teams. The return match, which took place in San Salvador on June 15, resulted in a Salvadorian victory, which was followed by an unexpected outbreak of violence: hundreds of Hondurans who had travelled to support their team were attacked, and in some cases seriously wounded, by the crowd of Salvadorian fans.

The same day in various parts of Honduras, particularly in the countryside, armed bands attacked Salvadorian residents, pillaging their property and forcing them to flee or hide. In response to this violence, the government at Tegucigalpa

reacted feebly. It was even said that some of the local authorities had taken part in the "hunt of the Salvadorians," while police units had given a strong helping hand to paramilitary groups organized to terrorize the many Salvadorians living in Honduras and to provoke their mass flight. (3)

Thus it appears that the seriousness of the situation became so great as to cast doubts on the adequacy of explaining it simply as the outgrowth of counterposed sporting passions. Besides, the Honduran press and radio, instead of attempting to calm these passions, launched a virulent anti-Salvadorian campaign, amounting to a call for a pogrom. Also, on the eve of the first match, under a new agrarian reform program, about fifty Salvadorian families had been evicted from public lands they had been cultivating: only "Hondurans by birth" were to be allowed the benefit of this allocation of government lands.

The effects of these legal measures and supposedly spontaneous acts of intimidation were quickly felt. At the beginning of the month of July, close to 15,000 Salvadorians had already left Honduras to return to their native land, often under difficult conditions and without any of their possessions. For the most part, they were small peasants who had been precariously occupying small plots of public land.

During this time, the radio stations of the two countries launched a relentless "war of the airwaves," making use of every means for poisoning public opinion. On June 24 the Salvadorian government reported to the Organization of American States on the situation of its nationals in Honduras and demanded that an inquiry be conducted by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. Accusing Tegucigalpa of "genocide," El Salvador broke off diplomatic relations with Honduras on June 26. (4) Despite attempts at mediation by other Central American states, the two countries called up reservists and mobilized volunteers, and they concentrated their troops, ready for combat, along their borders. During the first days of July, frequent border conflicts and aerial skirmishes evidenced the growing tension on both sides. On July 4 Honduras denounced El Salvador's aggression to the OAS and demanded the assembling

of its deliberative body to consider the complaint. On July 14 El Salvadorian army units invaded Honduras. The government of El Salvador justified its offensive by the dilatoriness of the OAS and by the renewed violence in Honduras directed against Salvadorian immigrants. Proclaiming the attacks against its nationals as acts of aggression, El Salvador called upon the right of "legitimate defense" to back up its actions in ending the "genocide" being carried out by the Hondurans. (5)

The Salvadorian offensive did not appear unplanned. Two columns penetrated Honduras; the first, to the east, made its way through Amatillo towards the small city of Nacaome, 120 kilometers to the south of Tegucigalpa; the other, in the northwest, near the Guatemalan border, pushed through El Poy, the road to Santa Rosa, toward San Pedro Sula, the economic center of the country. At the same time, the few P-51 Mustangs of the Salvadorian air force bombed several cities to the south and west of Tegucigalpa, as well as military installations at the Tocontin airport, near the capital.

The element of surprise sought by the Salvadorian army, long recognized in Central America for its numerical and professional superiority, leads one to believe that the Salvadorian general staff had hoped for a rapid advance accompanied by occupation of the major cities. This mode of conflict — à la Israel, as it was said at the OAS — the only type technically and logistically possible for this tiny Central American republic, would place the Salvadorian government in a position of strength, if not to impose a covert protectorate on its vanquished neighbor, then at least to enforce the rights of Salvadorian emigrants and wrest assurances as to their future.

However, after having advanced about sixty kilometers into the Honduran interior on the northwest front and drawing near Nacaome to the east, the Salvadorian offensive came to a halt. The response of the Honduran army had not been strong, at least at the start; lacking competent troops in sufficient numbers, disorganized — some units lacked bullets and others provisions — demoralized by desertions (6), it required several days to regroup. Meanwhile, these weaknesses in defense were

in several places partially offset by an unexpected civilian resistance. However, weather and the rugged Honduran countryside played a major role in checking the Salvadorian blitzkrieg. The offensive, launched at the height of the rainy season, became bogged down in the mediocre road network of the "Switzerland of Central America." It is also likely that the bombing of economic targets by the World War II "Corsairs," which effectively constituted the Honduran air force, dampened the enthusiasm of the Salvadorian government. The attack by Honduran planes, on July 16, against the Acajutla petroleum refinery on the Pacific coast and the hydroelectric dam on the Lempa River, the two major power centers of the country, coincided with the halt of the Salvadorian troops.

On July 19 the belligerents effected a cease fire along the entire front, in accordance with a resolution passed the night before by the Council of the OAS, which was, no doubt, equalled in significance by the material impossibility of either side's continuing the battle. The fighting ceased mainly because of lack of munitions and fuel.

At that point, El Salvador occupied about 1,600 square kilometers in the border provinces of Ocotepeque, Lempira, and Valle, as well as about a dozen sites, which, except for the small city of Nueva Ocotepeque, were of minor importance. The OAS resolution, in accordance with the Bogota Charter, required the withdrawal of all troops to their respective countries. El Salvador, hoping to use the invaded territories as a pawn with which to gain guarantees with respect to the persons and property of its emigrants, refused to comply. The Council of the Organization of American States thereupon convened the thirteenth deliberative session of the ministers of foreign affairs of its member nations, which met in Washington from July 26 to 30. Its principal task was to force El Salvador to evacuate Honduras. After three days of futile bargaining and ineffective pressuring, and after the failure of a tripartite mediation commission (7), the government of El Salvador abruptly backed down on July 29, before the threat of a draft resolution presented jointly by twelve countries, which, in application of

articles 7 and 8 of the Inter-American Treaty of Mutual Aid (8), named El Salvador the aggressor and imposed upon it diplomatic and economic sanctions. El Salvador thus accepted the OAS's resolution and declared itself willing to "give discretionary powers to the ministers of foreign affairs" for obtaining guarantees with respect to its emigrants. The government of Honduras, designated by the Subcommittee on Human Rights in its official report to the OAS Council on July 23 as the party responsible for acts of violence directed against Salvadorians, agreed on July 30 to offer the immigrants certain assurances as to their future, which would henceforth come under the surveillance of the OAS. On August 4 El Salvador completed the evacuation of its troops, under the supervision of OAS military observers.

The losses from the War of One Hundred Hours were heavy. Besides uprooting the civilian populations of both countries, the hostilities, according to some sources, resulted in two to three thousand deaths. Destruction was great on both sides. The economic effects were disastrous. The government of Honduras banned any further trade with El Salvador. It closed the Pan American Highway, the main artery of the Isthmus and the natural passageway from El Salvador to Nicaragua, to all Salvadorian goods, thus more or less condemning its neighbor to economic strangulation. Some figures will suffice to depict the new situation: El Salvador, which had exported \$84.9 million worth of goods in 1968 to other Central American countries, saw its regional exports fall to \$35.2 million in 1970. (9) The deadlock between Honduras and El Salvador represents, moreover, a grave threat to the future of trade in the region as a whole.

THE CONTEXT OF THE CONFLICT

Inseparable Enemies

Neither geography nor history predisposed these two countries to war. El Salvador and Honduras, geographically

contiguous, are the only two Central American states to divide the Isthmus in a north-south direction. To the west, the miniscule El Salvadorian republic, almost totally surrounded by Honduras, has no Atlantic coast. Honduras borders the Pacific only along a small section of the Gulf of Fonseca — about 150 kilometers, as opposed to 900 kilometers along the Atlantic coast — but on the gulf there is not a single port; La Unión, in El Salvador, serves as its maritime outlet.

In contrast to the ethnic melange of the Central American republics, these two warring nations possess strikingly homogeneous populations; El Salvador and Honduras, mestizo nations, contrast strongly with their predominantly Indian neighbors, such as Guatemala, or those marked by a strong European immigration, such as Costa Rica. Along with these ethnic similarities, there is a singular absence of cultural or linguistic differences that might differentiate the populations. (10) This contributes greatly to the freedom of movement across their borders, leading to a significant intermingling of the populations, which furthers the erasure of the last traces of national separateness.

Never have national borders seemed more artificial or baseless than in this case. The Salvadorian immigrants in Honduras, numbering about 300,000, were superbly indifferent to borders up to June 1969. Many of them had passed over the border without any identification papers, and having thus settled down, had never dreamed of legalizing their situation, nor had they on that account been bothered by the authorities of the host country. In one area of Honduras, the *colón*, the Salvadorian monetary unit, circulated freely along with the *lempira*, the official currency of the country, while the illegal participation in elections by Salvadorian citizens was an accepted political practice; it was even rumored, after the war broke out, that the mayor and several town councillors of a major city were Salvadorian. (11)

Given these conditions, one might ask how the pure Honduran nationality could possibly be separated from the Salvadorian chaff, especially in a country which, by *jus soli*, automatically

grants citizenship to children born of foreigners living on its soil. Not to mention the patriotic zeal of certain officials, exposed after the war, who routinely issued Honduran papers, in good legal form, to all Salvadorian inhabitants on an isle in the Gulf of Fonseca claimed by Honduras, in exchange for their Salvadorian identification papers. (12) It would be impossible to imagine a more successful "integration of borders" or a more perfect community spirit; and one could certainly not envision a war between the two states.

Moreover, the political history of these two countries also seemed to pave the way, and to strengthen, this organic integration. In no other countries of the Isthmus is the nostalgia for the Central American Federation, dissolved in 1938, so deeply rooted as in the two nations linked so closely with the name of Francisco Morazán, hero of Central American unity, born in Honduras, president of El Salvador, for whom a province in each of the countries is named.

At the end of the unrest of the nineteenth century, the two countries allied themselves through several treaties of friendship and free trade. In 1921 a constituent assembly met at Tegucigalpa to form a tripartite republic (Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala), which, however, turned out to be short-lived. (13) And it was at San Salvador, on October 14, 1951, that the charter of the Organization of the Central American States (ODECA) was signed, a very weak institution for cooperation but the first step toward political unity. The first article of the Charter of San Salvador outlined the ODECA's main goal: "to ensure a peaceful solution to all conflicts that might erupt between its member nations." (14) A few years later, the five participating states of ODECA, following the European example, adopted an "empirical approach to the problem of Central American unity" and, abandoning diplomatic rhetoric once and for all, signed on June 10, 1958, at Tegucigalpa a multilateral treaty of free trade and economic development. Thus, the first step was the dismantling of tariff barriers; furthermore, the general treaty of Central American integration, drawn up at a meeting of the presidents of Honduras,

El Salvador, and Guatemala at El Poy, a Honduran village bordering on all three countries, and approved by the "five" between December 1960 and December 1963, laid the foundation for a Central American Common Market.

The dynamic nature of this integrative process and the efficiency of the joint institutions (Commission on Planning, Institute for Technological Research, Bank for Economic Integration) set up to promote the development of regional economies and the expansion of trade established the Central American Common Market, by 1968, as a permanent reality and an undeniable success. The political rivalries, the age old quarrels of the "Central American family" were absorbed into the closely knit fabric of irrevocable economic relations. A common destiny, which in the Old World was capable of disarming "hereditary enemies," could not help but tighten even further relations between nations that no major differences kept apart. That is, unless the logic of integration created new contradictions and brought to the surface new kinds of disputes.

Le Pot de Terre and le Pot de Fer

However, if their ethnic and political history draws Honduras and El Salvador together, demographically and economically they remain far apart.

The Republic of El Salvador, the smallest nation in continental Latin America, measures 20,935 square kilometers, nearly 10,000 square kilometers smaller than Belgium. Its population reached 2.3 million in 1950, 3.2 million in 1967, and should pass 5 million by the end of this decade (15): it has quadrupled in 75 years. With one of the highest birthrates in the hemisphere (46.9 per thousand), the population density of El Salvador is six times greater than the Central American average (155 inhabitants per square kilometer, as opposed to 26). This density level, rare on this sparsely populated continent outside of the Caribbean island states, is paralleled by an economic activity and vigor out of proportion to the country's small size.

Despite its rugged geography, 77 percent of the nation's

territory is cultivated. All of the usable land is tilled, including the mountain slopes and even the craters of extinct volcanos. Advanced mechanization, numerous irrigation works, and the use of modern agricultural techniques have transformed El Salvador into an important exporter of cotton and, above all, of coffee. Coffee exports in 1965 were smaller only than Brazil's and Colombia's.

One of the distinctive features of the Salvadorian economy is the "national" character of its agrarian sector; the main areas of production are in the hands of an indigenous managerial group that controls exports and does not hesitate to plow its profits back into the country's economy. The Salvadorian agrarian bourgeoisie — the most aggressive in Central America since the era of independence, when it held its own against the Mexican Empire of Iturbide — has, since 1930, engaged itself fully in the development of local industry. The existence of eight banks with Salvadorian capital and an active stock market bears witness to the country's financial vitality.

Aided by government encouragement and protection, Salvadorian industry has made strides all the more remarkable considering that the country possesses neither coal nor petroleum. In light of this, El Salvador has made a strong effort to develop sources of hydroelectric power; its plant capacity was quadrupled between 1951 and 1962 with the construction of the most powerful hydroelectric complex in Central America on the Rio Lempa. If we add to this a good highway network (16) and a large reserve of cheap manpower created by demographic pressures, it is not difficult to understand why El Salvador cuts a powerful industrial figure in the Central American world.

To be sure, in 1966 61.3 percent of its population was still rural, but the urban population has been increasing steadily; between 1950 and 1966 it rose from 19.9 percent to 38.7 percent. The percentage of the population actively employed in the agricultural sector fell to 55.5 percent in 1969. With the industrial sector share in the gross national product at 19.6 percent, El Salvador is the most industrialized country of Central America; for Latin America as a whole, it ranks above

Ecuador, Colombia, and Venezuela. El Salvador has three times the industrial plant of Guatemala (the largest country of the Isthmus), and it has the only metals industry. (17) To give an idea of how El Salvador compares with other Latin American countries of equal or greater population, we might point out that El Salvador produces five times as many shoes as the Dominican Republic, one-and-a-half times as much cotton cloth as Ecuador, and almost as much soap and detergent as Peru. Its index of industrial production (1963 = 100) has more than doubled between 1962 and 1967, going from 85 to 187. The composition of Salvadorian exports reflects this forward leap, which began with the establishment of the customs union: coffee and cotton, which made up more than 80 percent of the total before 1950 and 72.7 percent in 1964, has now fallen to 50.2 percent, while the share of manufactured products has risen from 9 percent to close to 20 percent. It is clear that such industry, within such narrow borders, would burgeon outward to ever wider economic spaces and that it has made the best use of the opportunities for expansion afforded by the Central American Common Market.

Honduras, nearly six times as large as its adversary, with its 112,088 square kilometers — equivalent to East Germany or Czechoslovakia — had a population of two-and-a-half million in 1967, with an average density of 20 inhabitants per square kilometer; however, we should bear in mind the barrenness of the northeast provinces between the Atlantic Ocean and the Nicaraguan border (Gracias a Dios, Olancho, and Colón), comprising 45 percent of the nation's land. In spite of the politically motivated assertions of the Honduran agricultural authorities that the "ecological, agricultural, and topographical characteristics of the country" do not permit cultivation of more than 17 percent of the land (18), one may consider Honduras sparsely and poorly exploited. An expert study of the FAO made a few years ago revealed that 90 percent of the good plains land was unused, and that in the most populated areas — for example, in the provinces along the Pacific Ocean — only 15 percent of the land had been cultivated, while the rest lay fallow or was being

used for large-scale grazing. (19) To be sure, large land-owners dominate the Honduran agrarian countryside, as they do in all the countries of the region; but, taking into account the weakness of demographic pressures, it seems quite clear that only the primitive level of agricultural techniques (20) has limited the expansion of family plots (21) devoted mainly to food crops, more than 60 percent of which are owned by those who work them.

Alongside the semisubsistence agriculture, the immense stretches of government owned forests and fallow land, and the large haciendas, with their low productivity, the large plantation sector presents a totally different face. Indeed, the Honduran economy rests upon the banana plantations of the north Atlantic coast and the Ulua Valley, cultivated by two North American companies, one of which is the powerful United Fruit Company. Between 1929 and 1934, Honduras was the world's leading banana exporter, and even today it still ranks second in Latin America, behind Ecuador. In 1967 bananas comprised 50 percent of total exports. The lands of United Fruit and of its ex-rival and current associate, Standard Fruit Company, cover over 200,000 hectares in the provinces of Yoro, Cortés, and Atlántida (of which, 160,000 belong solely to United Fruit). Though responsible for one-sixth of the national product, United Fruit employs only 2 percent of the employable population. (22)

The presence on Honduran soil of a foreign company with a well-established reputation as an "octopus firm" has not failed to leave its mark on every aspect of national life. If, at the end of the sixties, Honduras no longer represents the model "banana republic" that it was in 1954, when its government willingly opened its doors to the "revolutionary" forces encharged with punishing the Guatemalan government for its expropriation of United Fruit lands, it still possesses the essential features of a "penetrated" and highly dependent economic system. With a budget ten times smaller than the turnover of the Fruit Company on the continent and barely equal to the annual profits of the powerful North American firm, Honduras appears crushed by a prosperity which it is itself unable to

attain. If one also considers that of the country's two good ports, one (Tela) belongs to United Fruit, which also controls the railroads (Tela Railroad Company), maritime transport, telecommunications (Tropical Radio Telegraph), the major commercial bank and trust (Banco Atlántida), to say nothing of its role in related agricultural activities (stock raising, sugar refineries), it is not difficult to imagine the pervasive influence which this giant corporation can exercise over a tiny state.

The banana industry's influence is such that an "unfriendly" government would have little chance of staying in power (24), and, additionally, that influence is conspicuously and immediately felt beyond the governmental level. Besides limiting the government's ability to maneuver and make independent decisions, the primacy of the banana trust in Honduras has resulted in serious distortions in economic and social development. The concentration of wealth and major export revenues in the hands of a multinational firm that reinvests only a small part of its profits must bear much of the responsibility for the backwardness of Honduran agriculture and the low level of industrialization. (25) This situation, which discourages private domestic initiative, has checked the formation of an entrepreneurial bourgeoisie. The ruling class, restricted to commercial functions or directly tied to the banana companies, has played only a secondary role in the growth of an "outward-oriented" and dependent economy: the immense resources of forests and mineral deposits are still barely touched. The plantation system has stifled the development of the country.

Honduras is today the poorest country in the region. Its economy is essentially rural: 80 percent of its population is engaged in agriculture, which comprises 50 percent of its gross national product and nearly 90 percent of its exports. It has a notoriously poor road system — one-third of El Salvador's mileage. It is badly governed. Honduran efforts since 1963 to make up for this history of economic backwardness with regard to its Common Market partners have not been negligible, but the pace of development has remained slow and in no way comparable to the determined growth of its healthy neighbor.

THE TRUE DIMENSIONS OF THE CONFLICT

"An Explosive Structure"

The statistical prosperity of El Salvador, however, rests on a fragile social base. The feverish commercial life and impressive industrial thrust are not able to hide other, less flattering facts. The per capita income is lower than that of any other Central American country, with the exception of Honduras; and the ratio of illiteracy in the adult population is over 50 percent. For nearly forty years, emigration of unskilled workers and farm laborers has not halted. Despite rapid industrialization and a relatively high rate of economic growth — over 5 percent since 1950 — El Salvador remains plagued by emigration: approximately 300,000 Salvadorians left for Honduras in 1969.

There are underlying conditions that have led to this migration, which industrialization has been unable to check. First of all, Salvadorian overpopulation is completely relative. In fact, the surplus of labor, and therefore of population, is due solely to the system of agricultural cultivation. On the one hand, the seasonal nature of the export crops (coffee and cotton) creates high temporary unemployment in the countryside; according to some estimates, 33 percent of the agricultural workers are not permanently employed. (26) On the other hand, the evolution of the landholding system has for a long time been marked by an increasing concentration of land into large estates and the crumbling of the microfundia system. Indeed, since 1930 the amount of cultivated land area has not increased, and no more available land exists — the liberal legislation of the end of the last century effected the sale and abolition of all common and public lands. Between 1950 and 1961, the number of plots under direct cultivation dropped from 62 percent to 39 percent. In 1966 — the last census year before the conflict — 0.9 percent of the plots over one hundred hectares comprised 47 percent of the cultivated area, while 85.19 percent of the plots from one to five hectares made up 15.64 percent of the

total land area. Without carrying this analysis further, the disparity reflected in these figures is obvious. Thus it is the distribution of land that is at the heart of the population surplus, and the elimination of this surplus is a necessary condition for the stability of the entire agricultural system.

Industrialization, which should not, however, be overestimated, has been unable to absorb this excess manpower for at least two sets of reasons. The rapid industrial growth brought about by the import of foreign technology from Europe and North America, and often by business association or direct investments of international capital, has been nurtured by the use of raw materials or semifinished imported products and the use of highly capital intensive techniques. Added to this, industrial growth has coincided with a commercial and agricultural crisis that has affected primarily the cotton sector: the repercussions of the slump in the world cotton market in 1965-1966 (cotton's share in El Salvador's foreign trade fell from 20.6 percent to 6.4 percent in four years) caused an abrupt increase in unemployment and thus a fresh impetus to emigration to Honduras's unoccupied lands.

The rural poverty caused by unemployment and the microfundia system has its counterpart in the excessive concentration of large estates, large-scale trade, and finance. The popular image of the "Fourteen Families" in control of the national wealth conveys a notion of both the dualistic structure of Salvadorian society and the underlying social malaise which affects it. If latifundary and oligarchic structures are responsible for the relative overpopulation, the status quo can only be preserved, at least cost, by emigration. The expulsion of the Salvadorians from Honduras, if it had been total, would not merely have posed the problem of their reabsorption into the national community and economy; the closing of the Honduran border left the single choice, in the long run, between agrarian reform or violent revolution (27), and in the short run, between war with Honduras or complete revision of the socioeconomic structure. El Salvador is not so much overpopulated as congested; emigration is a necessary bloodletting that ensures the

continuance of its prosperity. Without this safety valve, the boiler would certainly blow up; aggression is part of the logic of what Gaston Bouthoul would call an "explosive structure." Besides promoting the "sacred union," which allowed other problems to be pushed into the background, the war was the ultimate means for maintaining the power of the ruling elites.

There is no Salvadorian official who does not remember the peasant uprising of 1932. Triggered in 1931, at the height of the world depression, by a slump in coffee prices, the revolt of the farm laborers was transformed into a revolutionary movement that shook the entire social system. (28) The repression that put an end to the peasant "commune" was fearsome: according to official military sources, it "resulted in no less than 24,000 deaths in a few days." (29) Since that time, the specter of peasant upheaval has haunted Salvadorian political life. It was at this same time that the mass migrations to neighboring countries first began: in the beginning, flight from repression; later, the "personal revolution" of landless peasants, which was officially encouraged by those in power, who hoped thus to export their social problems.

A War of Secession

Without losing sight of the motivations of the Salvadorian government in launching the War of One Hundred Hours, one should not underestimate the casus belli represented by the expulsion of the Salvadorians from Honduras. This must be analyzed in its social and economic context in order to make clear the extent to which the expulsion was a planned political act on the part of the Tegucigalpa government; that is to say, the extent to which Honduran officials had foreseen the international consequences of their position with respect to the Salvadorian minority.

The violence committed against the Salvadorians might still conceivably be attributed to an unfortunate overflow of sporting passions, in spite of all evidence which indicates the systematic nature of the attacks; however, the Agrarian Reform Law was

a "legal instrument" of the expulsion, which thereby lost any semblance of spontaneity. Article 68 of this law excluded foreigners, and therefore Salvadorians, from receiving state owned lands, while the appropriation and delimitation of reform area land allowed expropriation without indemnification from immigrants unable to prove Honduran nationality of public and common lands that they had brought under cultivation. (30)

To be sure, any sovereign state has the right to limit ownership of its lands to its own citizens, and a fortiori to exclude foreigners from the benefits of its social laws. But this does not at all detract from the fact that the Honduran government, while holding vast expanses of unoccupied and uncultivated land, chose the singular solution of reappropriating small plots of land already in use, and often well cultivated, while at the same time endangering the interests of foreign nationals without any sign of concern. Moreover, it is curious that the reform law in question, which left untouched the large estates and, more particularly, the cultivated and uncultivated lands of the North American banana companies, dated back to 1962: it had originally been promulgated by the "liberal" government of President Villeda Morales to limit the seizure from United Fruit of the arable lands that the company had not brought under cultivation. The new application of this law, conveniently altered and interpreted for use against the "foreign usurpers" (whose nationality had changed since 1962), seems to have been more an act of international politics than of internal political necessity, although it is also probable that the Salvadorians drew attention to it to divert public attention from their own country's real problems.

It is paradoxical in the twentieth century that a poor and underdeveloped nation — hardly a tropical paradise — should be the destination of large migrations of unskilled foreign workers seeking to improve their economic situation. Especially when the country which they have left enjoys a more advanced economy than the one which receives them.

What we see here are the seeds of a near colonial situation; the threat to national sovereignty could scarcely escape the

ruling circles of Tegucigalpa. It was not only that the Salvadorians "colonized," that is to say, occupied and reclaimed uncultivated lands, but also that a large proportion of them had entered Honduras "illegally," so that the Salvadorian minority continued to grow beyond the control of the Honduran government. The Honduran authorities were troubled as well by the ill-defined border between the two countries. For them, the reluctance of San Salvador to definitively settle the border dispute was an excuse for surreptitious expansion, a slow eating away of Honduran territory. (31) For the Hondurans, with an eye toward European historical precedents, there could be no doubt that the restless Salvadorians coveted the great Honduran expanses as a virtual Lebensraum, with the "fifth column" of immigrants facilitating the inevitable Anschluss.

It is true that the condescending attitude of the ruling Salvadorian circles toward their neighbor country reflected a feeling of superiority that reinforced Honduran fears. Judging the Hondurans "lacking in initiative and efficiency" (32), opposing the "laziness" of their neighbors to the industriousness and tenacity of their own citizens, some El Salvador officials come close to believing that the decisive contribution made by their country to Honduran development deserves some sacrifice of sovereignty on the part of Tegucigalpa, which, moreover, would also concur with the logic of regional integration. This was particularly so in the eyes of some government leaders, because of the courage required for Salvadorians to "abandon their mother country and venture into a land of political turmoil, covered with practically virgin forests" (33); according to one eminent jurist, the Salvadorians in Honduras in 1969 were in the same situation as the Belgians in the Congo in 1960, exposed to "persecutions, death, and cannibalism." (34) Even if one attributes these carefully placed remarks to Homeric insult, it is necessary to take into account the state of mind which they reflect if one is to fully understand the roots of the war.

Nor do the Hondurans, one suspects, have a very high opinion of their Salvadorian "civilizers." Mass immigration of poor

workers produces everywhere the same reaction; the Salvadorians in Honduras, despite their assumed superiority, do not escape this. If the catracho (Honduran) is lazy in the eyes of his industrious neighbors, the guanaco (Salvadorian) is a thief. The resourceful Salvadorians, restless in a preindustrial milieu, capable of adapting to anything and settling anywhere, and, with prior experience of commercial relations, monopolizing all the small trades, constitute, according to an official communiqué of June 1969, "the dregs of humanity" (35), for the "immense majority of Salvadorians" who arrive in Honduras "are poor people inclined to crime, if not already confirmed criminals" — such at least is the opinion which prevails in Tegucigalpa.

The more specific grievances brought against the Salvadorian immigrants cover a wide range, but certainly not wide enough to justify their mass expulsion, except as the Honduran government's response to its own administrative deficiencies and inability to regularize an uncontrolled immigration. (36) Thus, the Salvadorians have been charged with the crimes of using public services (hospitals, schools, etc.) without paying taxes and of receiving loans from official banks for their agricultural ventures. Since they constitute 30 percent of United Fruit employees, they have been reproached for unfair competition with Honduran workers and for lowering salaries by accepting conditions that domestic labor would refuse. Nevertheless, in a declaration of July 1968, the Central American presidents, in order to facilitate free circulation of property and persons among the countries of the Common Market and coordinate at a regional level freedom of residence, the right to work, and the exercise of professions, set down guidelines within which the problem of the Salvadorians in Honduras was to be solved.

In reality, although these popular resentments no doubt had a significant effect on the decisions of the Honduran government, one must look beyond these mundane animosities for the forces which motivated the Tegucigalpa leaders. These underlying forces are located in the realm of international relations, and in particular in the disequilibriums produced by the process

of Central American integration. El Salvador, for which the industrialization policy dates back to the Great Depression, has been the principal promoter of the Common Market. Wishing to extend its domestic markets, to widen its economic space in order to maintain a momentum shackled by the limitations of internal demand, El Salvador has been behind the majority of the initiatives aimed at the creation of a regional economic union. It has been both the mainstay and the chief beneficiary of the customs union. Thanks to the general treaty of integration and the gradual establishment of a common external tariff, Salvadorian industry in 1969 produced for a potential market of fifteen million consumers, comfortably sheltered from international competition. Along with this, Salvadorian exports to Central American countries advanced between 1960 and 1967 from 10.5 percent to nearly 40 percent of its total foreign trade.

But the other five member countries have not experienced a similarly spectacular growth. While in 1967 El Salvador and Guatemala, the most-developed countries, had a positive balance of trade of \$20.7 and \$23.6 million respectively, the Honduran balance of trade with other Common Market countries showed a deficit of \$17.3 million, while the deficit of Nicaragua reached \$23.8 million. (37)

The general feeling in Honduras was that the two least-developed nations of the region were contributing directly to the development of the other three, without any real return. Indeed, Honduras figured that its positive balance of trade outside of the Central American region was being used to wipe out the deficit in its balance of payments with the countries within the Common Market. Since it imported mainly manufactured products from Central America, the principal supplier of which was El Salvador, and since it paid more for these regional industrial products than it would have on the international market, in the eyes of the economic leaders of Tegucigalpa, Honduras was financing, in effect, Salvadorian industry. The lack of fiscal gain, for example, was one of many aspects of the consequences of the customs union denounced by Honduras: the latter, buying products manufactured within the Common

Market, no longer collected customs fees on these imports, while the raw materials or the semifinished products that went into the manufacture of these goods were subject to a tax that went into the treasury of the manufacturing country.

To be sure, there is no apparent reason why Honduras should not profit from the Common Market and industrialize in its turn. But in fact, as certain economists have noted, it is very difficult to maintain simultaneously a balanced development and a successful regional integration. Capital, irresistibly attracted by the most-advanced and best-equipped countries, tends to lead to concentration of industry in the most-developed regions or nations of a regional economic union, thus tending to exacerbate these initial disparities. (38) These distortions, the fruit of a liberal economic policy, were revealed in their full scope in 1966 when the problem of "integrated industries" arose, the equitable distribution of which would have allowed Honduras in particular its fair share of industrial development. It seems that the lively resistance of El Salvador and Guatemala, like the manifest hostility in North American financial circles to any supranational control, put a halt to this audacious proposal for economic harmonization. (39)

Thus, in Honduras a very active opposition to the Common Market took shape in the specific form of the refusal to accept Salvadorian economic domination. There developed between the two nations the classic antagonism between agrarian exporting interests and national industries that generally divides groups or economic sectors within a single country in the process of development. In the latter case, the imperatives of modernization and growth impose sacrifices in the name of national economic progress on those hostile to industrialization or nostalgic for free trade, while financial liaisons and transfers of investments facilitate the reconciliation of divergent interests. This can scarcely occur when the two parties are sovereign states.

Within the framework of the Common Market, technical correctives could have been applied. Nicaragua, for its part, called upon a safeguard clause in order to impose a compensatory

tax on certain products of regional origin. (40) But Honduras, fearing both Salvadorian territorial expansion and Salvadorian economic domination, reacted with a deliberate harshness. Refusing to accept indefinitely, on terms other than its own, the people and products that El Salvador exported, Honduras indirectly but resolutely broke with its too enterprising partner by "expelling" the Salvadorian nationals.

It would be too much to say that by provoking the flight of its Salvadorian residents, Honduras attempted to destroy the Common Market; but it is probable that by thus checking Salvadorian expansion and confronting the Salvadorian government with a serious problem, Honduras played its last card in order to negotiate an economic agreement with its neighbor from a position of strength. El Salvador's military response was the second stage in a war of secession whose inevitable result was the closing of Honduran borders to enemy goods prior to a cold-blooded "dis-integration" envisaged by Tegucigalpa and held up by it as a threat since 1968 to back up demands for a "restructuring" of the Common Market.

Since the War of One Hundred Hours, Honduras has de facto seceded from the Central American economic union. Its subsequent decisions to reestablish importation taxes on products from Common Market countries and to sign bilateral commercial treaties without concern for the rules of the economic community (41) have proved that it did indeed want to reevaluate its membership in a regional association that was unfavorable to its interests. It is significant that the negotiations aimed at settling the aftereffects of the conflict were twice adjourned following border incidents (42), although El Salvador wanted to bring them to a successful conclusion. The election on March 28, 1971, to the presidency of Honduras of the candidate most violently hostile to the Common Market, and the fact that the "sacred union" was realized by two rival parties — liberal and national — under a common economic program, says a great deal about the permanent nature of the Honduran secession that the war with El Salvador made possible.

THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM ON TRIAL

The conflict that arose between El Salvador and Honduras is of a type entirely new to Latin America. Its roots are buried in two phenomena whose appearance on the continent is recent: demographic explosion and regional integration. It is questionable, however, whether the novelty of the situation was so unsettling as to render the inter-American organization powerless to nip the hostilities in the bud or to resolve peacefully a serious but manageable dispute. It must be admitted that it is very difficult for any regional organization to restrain two nations on the brink of war who are resolutely refusing to make any concessions whatsoever, as was the case with these adversaries. If El Salvador hoped, by attacking Honduras, to re-establish the status quo and continue to profit as before from the facilities of its neighbor, the Honduran government quite possibly reckoned that it could only gain by maintaining a hard line with respect to the Salvadorian immigrants, the war being ultimately the surest means of freeing itself from Salvadorian domination. That having been said, one must still consider the OAS's dilatoriness in intervening in the conflict. It might perhaps be of value to search for the reasons for this.

The OAS is a cumbersome and complex administrative apparatus; however, bureaucratic inertia cannot by itself explain the feebleness and inadequacy of the Organization's response to the Honduro-Salvadorian crisis. In this respect, a simple review of the chronology of events is illuminating. On June 24 El Salvador brought its case before the Inter-American Commission on the Rights of Man; this body appointed a subcommission of inquiry which did not arrive on the scene until July 4. The two governments broke off diplomatic relations on June 26. On June 27 the Guatemalan, Nicaraguan, and Costa Rican ministers of foreign affairs offered to act as mediators and came to San Salvador and Tegucigalpa. On July 7 it was the Colombian government's turn to state its willingness to mediate, offering its aid to the three Central American ministers, while at the same time requesting that Venezuela provide

its good offices as well. Rafael Caldera, the president of Venezuela, issued an appeal to the two governments on July 9. Finally, on July 13 Mr. Galo Plaza, secretary general of the OAS, announced that in accordance with a request from the three Central American ministers presented through ODECA, an OAS mission had been appointed to give support to the tripartite commission and to establish a liaison between it and the inter-American organization. The OAS officials felt that the crisis should have a Central American solution, and that because of the "special circumstances" existing among the nations of the affected area, it was not the council's place either to intervene in the situation or to convene a deliberative session at the ministerial level. On July 14 the data of the Salvadorian offensive, the OAS Council, now functioning as a provisional deliberative body, agreed to send a peace commission to the scene. On July 18 they officially announced a series of binding resolutions with respect to a cease fire and troop withdrawal; it was not until July 26 that the meeting of the ministers of foreign affairs of the member nations took place in Washington.

The OAS's lack of firmness, its reluctance to intervene forcefully to prevent the conflict from degenerating, and later to put an end to the war, are somewhat surprising. (43) Certainly, one might consider as perfectly legitimate a desire by the OAS not to substitute itself for a subregional organization of unity and cooperation whose major function is the preservation of peace in its area of concern. If the tripartite Central American commission had managed to stem the crisis, ODECA would indeed have emerged strengthened. Intervention by the OAS, on the other hand, ran the danger of being taken as external interference in the affairs of the "Central American nation," and might, by aggravating a family quarrel, have had an unfortunate effect on the future of regional integration and the Common Market. Nevertheless, in light of its attempt to delegate one of its essential functions, one may ask what was the regional organization's actual role. Is it not true that the OAS, guided by its most powerful members and influenced by the cold war climate that reigned after the Cuban shock, has

had a tendency to play down differences arising between governments of the continent, as long as "extracontinental intervention" that might pose a threat to "free trade" and "democracy" is not involved? Thus the OAS conferred upon the Central American mediators, who were without power or prestige in the eyes of the parties concerned, the responsibility for settling a dispute which only the OAS itself could have influenced, one reason being that the conflict was a "particularist" one that did not threaten the social order of the disputants. In spite of charges of Marxism and communism, which appeared in the propaganda of both governments in an attempt to implicate Cuba in the crisis, the conflict remained far removed from the arena of East-West relations. (44)

We may also compare the OAS's actions with the United States' response to this crisis, which occurred in such proximity to its borders. In fact, throughout the crisis the United States never moved from a position of extreme caution, expressing a continuing desire to remain on the periphery of the dispute. It was only on July 16 that a spokesman for the Department of State, breaking for the first time his government's silence, affirmed United States support for the OAS and declared that in no case would his country accept a role as mediator. The American Department of State had many reasons for such discretion, even leaving out of account the more pressing problems that demanded its attention. Certain that the military insufficiencies of both sides would ensure a war of short duration, Washington could afford to sit it out: abandoning Johnson's "big stick," the "policeman of the continent" refused to restore order even on its own doorstep. Moreover, since subversion played no role in this conflict between two right-wing military regimes that had time and again pledged undying friendship with the United States, the Nixon administration could carry out without any danger, but with great show, its foreign policy of disengagement and of reduction of the country's international responsibilities. (45) This calculated indifference was also the best way for the United States to protect its important investments in both countries and to aid the survival of the

Common Market, which was favorably regarded in North American economic circles. The hypothesis cannot be ruled out a priori that the United States, favoring a return to the status quo in the area, was less fearful of the Salvadorian invasion than of the social disorders that might have resulted from the closing of the Honduran border to Salvadorian immigrants. (46)

After the OAS resolutions of July 18, the United States delegate to the OAS Council reasserted his country's position that it would play no role in the dispute, and he rejected any possibility of unilateral military aid to Honduras, even though the latter was a victim of aggression according to the Inter-American Treaty of Mutual Aid. President Nixon, who was to leave on a tour of several Asian countries at the end of the month, seemed unconcerned with the tensions building on the American Isthmus. Secretary of State Rogers, who was to accompany him on this trip, did not even attend the thirteenth session of the ministers of foreign affairs of the American states. Although the United States delegate took part in the "Committee of Four," which was charged with drawing up the draft resolution condemning El Salvador and imposing sanctions on it (47), the United States was not one of the twelve countries which presented these resolutions to the assembly.

This United States' desire to remain modestly in the background throughout the crisis and, in particular, to operate wholly within the framework of the regional organization, represented a definite political ploy. Given the "interventionist policy" of the last few years, most notably in the "Dominican affair," the United States by this stance was able to improve its image in the eyes of the OAS and inter-American opinion. But beyond this, the United States had been placed by Salvadorian diplomacy in a very awkward position vis-à-vis the regional organization. Had not El Salvador sent its soldiers into Honduras to protect the lives of its nationals, just as President Johnson, on April 28, 1965, sent several thousand "marines" into the Dominican Republic because the lives of American citizens were in danger and the Dominican authorities were not in a position to guarantee their security? The Salvadorians

did not hesitate to draw on this analogy, just as they had reacted bitterly once before to the OAS's refusal to give aid and support in response to a flagrant violation of the Charter of Bogota, thus illustrating, as if it were at all necessary, the fundamental imbalance of the inter-American system.

Must we therefore conclude that United States' domination of the OAS is so complete that the regional organization acts only when the political or strategic interests of North America are involved, while displaying a wait-and-see attitude bordering on apathy when Washington so decides? This would be tempting if it were not for the fact that the belated success of the thirteenth deliberative session of the ministers of foreign affairs was hailed in several American capitals as a victory for the Organization and proof of its effectiveness. (48)

* * *

As is true of all wars, the "soccer war" grew out of a fatal configuration of elements — of tensions — and of the explosive convergence of a variety of disputes at an international conjuncture favoring the opening of hostilities. This brief, local conflagration might be viewed as an aberration, a singular situation from which no lessons can be drawn. However, to the extent that the underlying causes of the Honduro-Salvadorian conflict present, as we have emphasized, an undeniably new aspect, one must ask if it signifies at least the possibility that a similar pattern of conflict might be repeated elsewhere in Latin America, if not a possible end to the *pax americana*.

Diplomatic circles in several South American nations, far from viewing the War of One Hundred Hours as an insignificant aberration generated by some political microclimate, have found in it aspects of a model of conflict applicable to other Latin American regions. The common factor in such situations is the presence in one country of a large colony of immigrants from a neighboring country, the two being unequal in wealth and development, and between which long standing border disputes exist. In no other case in Latin America does the country

of emigration enjoy a relatively more advanced development than the country receiving its surplus labor. The opposite pattern is the most widespread: a nation with a backward economy shifts its excess able-bodied population to its wealthier, more-developed, and less-populated neighbor. However, if disparities in development rarely operate in the same manner as in Honduras and El Salvador, problems created by immigration and foreign minorities are generally accompanied by territorial disputes and economic frictions that can easily evolve into an explosive situation.

One can easily understand why the governments of countries experiencing such problems took a particularly active role in reestablishing peace in Central America. Thus Argentina, whose rich unpopulated expanses attract a significant Chilean immigration, and wealthy Venezuela, which hosts a large colony of Colombian workers, were fully aware of the stakes involved in the "soccer war." The delegates of these two countries at the deliberative session of the OAS played a dominant role in drafting the resolutions imposing sanctions on the "Salvadorian aggressor." They wanted, by strongly condemning El Salvador, to prevent a precedent from being established for the successful, armed intervention by one country into the domestic affairs of another, on the basis of problems created by immigration. This was underscored in a statement submitted by Mr. Juan B. Martin, the Argentinian representative, to the meeting of the American ministers of foreign affairs, in which he stipulated that "the condition of immigrants is determined by the laws of the country in which they reside and under whose jurisdiction they find themselves." (49)

Thus the War of One Hundred Hours seems to have served as a warning signal for Latin America. It attracted attention to a type of conflict previously unknown on the continent; if it makes possible the avoidance of such inter-American wars in the future, it will not have been completely without purpose.

September 1971

Notes

1) In June 1941, the brief "War of Marañon" saw Peru and El Salvador fighting each other over the possession of certain Amazonian territories. Between 1932 and 1935, Paraguay and Bolivia fought the bloody "Chaco War," which left 125,000 dead and both countries exhausted. See Bryce Wood, "How Wars End in Latin America," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, November 1970, pp. 40-50.

2) The unfolding of the conflict was well reported by the international news agencies, the North American press, and above all, by the Latin American newspapers. For our account we have used primarily the dispatches of the AFP and the Prensa Latina, as well as articles by correspondents and special reporters for El Tiempo (Bogotá), La Nación (Buenos Aires), the New York Times, and the Washington Post (reprinted in the International Herald Tribune). We have also made use of the reports and resolutions of the Organization of American States and the official publications of the two disputants.

3) The Salvadorian government accused the Special Security Companies (S.S.C.) and "armed bands known under the name of Mancha Brava." See La barbarie hondureña y los derechos humanos (proceso de una agresión), San Salvador, Ministerio de Defensa, Prensa y Publicidad, 1969, p. 19.

The report of the Subcommittee on Human Rights considers in more general and diplomatic terms the same charges of participation by local officials and the responsibility of national authorities. See "Informe preliminar de la Subcomisión sobre violaciones de derechos humanos en Honduras y El Salvador," III, 1-6 (reprinted in Estudios Centro-Americanos, San Salvador, November-December 1969, pp. 517-18.

4) The accusation of "genocide," an essential point in the Salvadorian diplomatic brief, was the focus of an official legal study. See Manuel Castro Ramirez, Manuel Arrieta Gallegos, Arturo Zeledón Castrillo, Genocidio en Centroamérica: estudio jurídico-penal del "Caso Honduras", San Salvador, Publicaciones

de la Secretaria de Información de la Presidencia de la República, July 23, 1969, 20 pp.

5) The most developed exposition of the "right of a nation to defend its nationals living outside of its borders" is found in La barbarie hondureña, op. cit., pp. 17-24. This argument, on weak legal ground, was unsuccessfully put forward at the OAS meeting of the ministers of foreign affairs. See "Proyecto de resolución propuesto a la O.E.A. en 30 de julio de 1969 por El Salvador," published in Estudios Centro-Americanos, November-December 1969, p. 522.

6) H. J. Maidenberg, "Salvador-Honduras Flare-Up Follows Cease Fire Accord," New York Times, July 18, 1969; "A Victory for the OAS," Newsweek, August 11, 1969, p. 32.

7) Made up of representatives from Colombia, Paraguay, and Peru.

8) Article 7 provides that "action with a view to reestablishing peace [acción pacificadora] will be taken into consideration in the determination of the aggressor"; Article 8 enumerates various actions that might be taken against the aggressor.

9) "Central America: The Recovery of Regional Relations," Bank of London and South America Review, December 1970, p. 672.

10) With the exception of residual groups of Indians and villages populated by blacks on the Atlantic coast.

11) Rafael Leiva Vivas, "Desorganización y expansión," Extra (Tegucigalpa), September 1969, p. 29.

12) Amilcar Santamaria y Zaldana, "Amapala, puerto del Pacifico," Extra, September 1969, p. 9.

13) For a history of the abortive attempts at Central American union in the twentieth century, see Thomas L. Karnes, The Failure of Union; Central America, 1824-1960, Chapel Hill (N.C.), The University of North Carolina Press, 1961, p. 218.

14) "L'Union centre-américaine et la charte de Salvador," Notes et études documentaires, 1585, November 1951, p. 5.

The treaties and conventions relating to regional economic integration are analyzed and commented upon in Felix Fernandez-Shaw, La integración de Centroamérica, Madrid,

Editura Cultura Hispánica, 1963, 1,086 pp.

15) All statistics and figures are taken from América en cifras, Washington, Unión panamericana, Secretaria general de la O.E.A., Departamento de estadística, from which we have consulted the following volumes: 1967, Situación demográfica: estado y movimiento de la población; 1970, Situación económica: I, Agricultura y ganadería; II, Industria; III, Comercio y transporte.

With respect to El Salvador, we have also made use of "Documentación estadística de los problemas socio-económicos del Salvador," in Estudios Centro-Americanos, November-December 1969, pp. 499-508.

For a comprehensive understanding of the demographic and economic potential of the two countries, one can usefully refer to John D. Martz, Central America: the Crisis and the Challenge, Chapel Hill (N.C.), The University of North Carolina Press, 1959, pp. 80-108 and 112-24; as well as F. D. Parker, The Central American Republics, London, Oxford University Press, 1964, pp. 158-74 and 196-211; and the monograph published by Documentation française, "Les républiques du Honduras et du Salvador," Notes et études documentaires, 3193, May 21, 1965, 40 pp.

16) The road mileage is high for the region: 8,398 kilometers of roads, of which 982 kilometers are paved. The Pan American Highway crosses El Salvador from north to south, thus linking it to Guatemala and to Nicaragua (via Choluteca in Honduras). The major cities are connected by railroad to Guatemala, where Puerto Barrios serves at the Atlantic outlet for Salvadorian trade.

17) See William H. Pierson, "Some Aspects of Mining and Manufacturing in Central America," in A. Curtis Wilgus, The Caribbean: The Central American Area, Gainesville (Fla.), University of Florida Press, 1961, p. 148.

18) Statement made by Mr. Rigoberto Sandoval, director of the National Agrarian Institute (I.N.A.), to Manuel Gamero, "Politica agraria después de la guerra," Extra, September 1969, p. 5.

19) J. H. L. Joosten, Informe al gobierno de Honduras sobre planeamiento de la agricultura, Rome, F.A.O., March 1952, cited by Roger D. Hansen, Central America: Regional Integration and Economic Development, Washington, National Planning Association, 1967, p. 13 (Studies in Development Progress, No. 1).

20) According to a North American study made in 1959, five-sixths of the plots did not have plows. Out of 117,000 units of less than ten hectares, ten had electricity, and none possessed a tractor; out of the total number of plots, there was one plow for every 4.3 units. Vincent Checchi, Honduras: A Problem in Economic Development, New York, Twentieth Century Fund, 1959, p. 52, cited in R. D. Hansen, *op. cit.*, p. 14.

21) See Instituto de Investigaciones Económicas y Sociales, Estudio socio-económico del municipio de Limón, Tegucigalpa, Facultad de ciencias económicas, Universidad nacional autónoma de Honduras, 1965, 104 pp. This study of a municipality in the province of Colón indicates the great availability of unoccupied lands which Honduras still enjoys and the mediocre utilization of its cultivated areas.

22) Stacy May and Galo Plaza, The United Fruit Company in Latin America, Washington, National Planning Association, 1958, p. 151 (U.S. business performance abroad).

23) [There is no Note 23 in the original article — P.F.B.]

24) This was most notably the case of the constitutionally elected president Ramón Villeda Morales, whose social policies upset United Fruit, the country's major employer. He was ousted in 1963 by Colonel Osvaldo López Arellano after attempting to put through a law permitting taxation of uncultivated lands. See William S. Stokes, "Honduras: Problems and Prospects," Current History, January 1966, p. 23.

25) In 1966, Honduras possessed 506 industrial plants employing 20,827 persons. To take only one example, its production of cotton fabric was one-tenth that of El Salvador.

26) Atilio Vieytes, "La emigración salvadoreña a Honduras," Estudios Centro-Americanos, November-December 1969, p. 399.

27) Already in 1960, at a time when the flow of surplus labor

to Honduras was not at all threatened, Harry Kantor wrote with respect to El Salvador: "If something is not done to destroy the almost feudal land tenure system, a violent explosion will take place." Harry Kantor, "Contemporary Government in Central America," in A. Curtis Wilgus, The Caribbean, op. cit., p. 111.

28) For a Marxist interpretation of this movement and the role of the Communist Party in the uprising see Roque Dalton, El Salvador (monograph), La Habana, Enciclopedia Popular, 1965, pp. 121-23.

29) Gregorio Bustamante Maceo, Historia militar del Salvador, San Salvador, Ed. Ministerio del interior, 1957, p. 107.

30) See the statement made by the director of the National Agrarian Institute already cited and the "photocopy" of a letter of expulsion sent by the Institute to a Salvadorian resident, in La barbarie hondureña, op. cit., p. 19.

31) See Honduras, Oficina de Relaciones Públicas de la Casa Presidencial, Agresión salvadoreña contra la república de Honduras, Tegucigalpa, August 1969, p. 3.

32) Roberto Lara Velado, "El futuro de los Salvadoreños en Honduras," Estudios Centro-Americanos, November-December 1969, p. 453.

33) La barbarie hondureña, op. cit., p. 11.

34) Roberto Lara Velado, op. cit., p. 452.

35) Honduras, Oficina de Relaciones Públicas de la Casa Presidencial, Comité cívico pro-defensa nacional, "Verdaderas raíces del conflicto entre Honduras y El Salvador: el partido de futbol y las relaciones económicas," June 30, 1969, multi-graph, p. 2.

36) The treaty on immigration signed at San Miguel by El Salvador and Honduras on December 21, 1965, and put into effect on January 25, 1967, provided for the expulsion, from that date forward, of "nationals of the other signatory country who have not completed the required formalities for establishing residence." This treaty remained a dead letter until June of 1969, due to the passive attitude of the Honduran government, which, as the report of the OAS Subcommittee on Human

Rights notes, "has not shown, for the most part, any interest in demanding the fulfillment of the required formalities." For the text of the treaty, see Revista mexicana de sociología, May-June 1970, pp. 631-38.

37) Bank of London and South America Review, op. cit., p. 673.

38) See Roger D. Hansen, op. cit., p. 57.

39) The convention relating to "integrated industries" provides for a regime of protection, exemption from duties, and various financial advantages for technologically advanced industries producing within the Common Market. See F. Fernandez-Shaw, op. cit., pp. 781-89, and H. Graillet, "La longue marche de l'Amérique latine vers l'intégration," Revue française de science politique, June 1969, pp. 633-34.

40) Strictly speaking, there is no safeguard clause in the treaty of integration; however, Nicaragua's decision was accepted, although not without a heated response by the other member nations.

41) "En peligro el Mercado Común centro-americano," El Tiempo (Bogotá), January 5, 1971.

42) The discussions between the two parties, which opened in January 1970, following the meeting of Central American ministers of foreign affairs at Managua, were suspended because of border violations; likewise, the reconciliation agreement concluded on April 27, 1971, at the OAS conference at San José de Costa Rica coincided with violent clashes between armed troops of the two countries.

43) Diplomats familiar with the inter-American organization publicly expressed their astonishment in comparing the celerity and firmness of the OAS in previous crises — particularly that which set Honduras and Nicaragua against each other in 1957 — with its stance in July 1969. See Eduardo Augusto Garcia, "La paz y la seguridad en el sistema inter-americano," La Nación (Buenos Aires), July 31, 1969.

44) According to Salvadorian propaganda, the director of the Honduran Agrarian Institute was a Marxist, while the "hand of international communism" was visible in the subversive

accusations brought by Honduran officials against the power of the "Fourteen Families."

A news item, released in Washington on July 27 and picked up by a news service, alleged an offer by Fidel Castro to send 25,000 reinforcements to Honduras. The next day the Cuban minister of foreign affairs categorically denied the dispatch, calling it "mad" and making clear that this "war between two lackeys of the United States" was of no interest to Cuba.

45) See Leslie Manigat, "Les Etats-Unis et le secteur caraïbe de l'Amérique Latine," Revue française de science politique, June 1969, pp. 671-72. Honduras under General Osvaldo López Arellano seems much more concerned with aligning itself with the United States than does El Salvador under the colonels; for proof, one need only look at the participation of a Honduran contingent, in May 1965, in the "Inter-American Peace Force," "multilateral" cover for the United States' armed intervention in the Dominican Republic.

46) This "leftist" Honduran interpretation was thoroughly developed by Mario Virgilio Carias, "Análisis sobre el conflicto entre Honduras y El Salvador," Revista mexicana de sociología, May-June 1970, pp. 549-657, with a rather unconvincing argument.

47) Argentina, the United States, Guatemala, and Venezuela.

48) See "Un conflicto que probó la eficacia de la O.E.A.," La Nación (Buenos Aires), August 2, 1969.

49) La Nación (Buenos Aires), July 31, 1969.

Translated by Michel Vale