

believes that Lodge was determined to put Wilson in a position where he would destroy his own League; thus discrediting himself and his party more effectively than if the Senate gave the coup de grace. Hence, he sought to construct reservations too strong for Wilson to accept but perhaps not too strong for Democratic Senators to stomach. He was disappointed when the treaty with reservations failed. He would have preferred that it pass and that then Wilson refuse to submit the reservations to the other parties. Lodge did not, like Borah, Johnson, Brandegee, and La Follette, entertain an irreconcilable fear of the Covenant. His was a subtler purpose which did not hesitate to sacrifice the nation and the world in the interests of his party and his pride.

Wilson is painted as a steadfast crusader, ready to spend the last ounce of energy to fulfil his pledge to the hecatombs of war dead. His achievement was prodigious. He made unfortunate compromises and political errors, but, had his health kept up, he would probably have won. He feared, however, that the reservations would be unacceptable to the Allies or would be added to by Lodge if he gave the word to the loyal Democratic Senators to vote for them. Probably he should have accepted the reservations, and possibly the Allies would have also done so—Lord Gray's letter suggested as much, but, on the other hand, the long negotiations over the Senate reservations to the statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice suggest a doubt. Wilson had confidence in the people, and they failed him. He appreciated the inevitable slump in idealism which would follow the war, and he knew that the only hope of a league lay in tying it with the peace treaties and striking while the iron was hot. Delayed by the machinations of personal and partisan animosities, the turn of the tide brought defeat in America; but the League of Nations which he founded survived, and another turn in the tide sees America moving ever closer to it.

Judgment of motives is difficult. The author skilfully documents his conclusions from the writings of the actors and groups and presents his incidents in a persuasive order. The reviewer recommends the book to students of history, of politics, and of ethics.

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THE SOCIETY OF NATIONS—Its Organization and Constitutional Development. By Felix Morley. Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1932. Pp. 678. \$3.50.

During its twelve years of existence the League of Nations has been the subject of numerous volumes of description, commendation, and criticism.

The present portly tome is the most recent addition to this literature. The author is not concerned with the international community in general (his book would have been better if he had been), but with the Geneva organization, which he has chosen to call by its French rather than by its English name. In spite of the flood of books on the League, there has been a genuine need for a comprehensive and authoritative analysis and evaluation of the Geneva experiment. This need is acutely felt both by specialists in international affairs and by others interested in the political complexion of a disordered world. Such a study would be at once a history of the League, a description of its evolving structure, a critical account of its functions from the point of view of international law and international politics, and a philosophical exposition of its place in the Western state system. An adequate work of this kind would do much to clarify the present confusion of thought regarding Geneva and to put the problem of world-unity through international organization in its proper context.

The size of Mr. Morley's volume and the attractive engraving on the outside wrapper of the half-completed League buildings on the shores of Lac Lemman hold out the promise that the author has at least done the job which has waited so long to be done. Here, surely, is an important book, published by one of the leading research institutes in America. Sir Eric Drummond's words of praise in the Foreword confirm this pleasant impression. Professor H. G. Moulton in his Preface raises the reader's hopes to an even higher level, for he assures him that Mr. Morley has not merely made a "complete examination of the origins, the establishment, and the functioning of the League" but has combined "the technique of the historian with that of the political scientist" in arriving at a discriminating evaluation. The author spent almost three years at Geneva, and his book represents "an unusual example of co-operative research." Finally, the author himself in his Introduction declares that he proposes to explain the League as a "human institution and a comprehensible political experiment."

The reader who takes these promises seriously will be speedily disappointed, for the high pretensions are in no sense fulfilled. If this be the result of "co-operative research," so much the worse for co-operative re-research. Mr. Morley has produced a readable volume, for he writes a reasonably lucid and flowing prose. He has gathered together a considerable number of interesting facts (most of which are already available elsewhere) and a small number of suggestive observations (none of which is part of any well-conceived interpretative synthesis). But his book is assuredly not *the* work on the League which one is led to expect. It is not

good history. It is not good politics. It is not good international law. It is certainly not good philosophy. It is, in truth, neither flesh, fish, nor fowl, but only a sprightly scribbling by a scrivener ill-trained for his task. The author starts out to tell what the League *is* rather than what it *does*. He attempts in reality to perform the latter task rather than the former, and he fails in both. There are no maps, no charts, no graphs to present the League system in simple form. There is nowhere any adequate bibliography or documentation for the specialist. There is nowhere any clear, incisive thinking about the subject matter for the layman. Not only does the work as a whole miss fire, but in none of its parts does it offer any accurate, scholarly presentation of any single phase of the League's agencies or activities. To the reflective observer of international organization, its shortcomings are as innumerable as they are discouraging. It is, in short, almost a model of what research should *not* be and of what should *not* be published as a result of research.

This failure is the more regrettable in that this pretentious work represents the first serious effort in America to present the League as a whole to American readers. That the book should have been published under such promising auspices is also discouraging from the point of view of the state of the social sciences in America. The fact that the Brookings Institution, which has in the past published so many excellent economic studies, should lend its name to such a publication indicates either that the depression is affecting the social studies more severely in standards of scholarship than in finances or (what is more probable) that the Institution is now, as in the past, extremely weak in the field of political science as it touches upon international affairs.

This unhappy state of things, however, is not entirely the fault of the Brookings Institution or of Mr. Morley. In a broader sense it is the result of the intellectual limitations which have thus far circumscribed every effort to describe and evaluate the League. These limitations are inherent in a political science which uses obsolete juristic formulas and the current symbols of collective irrationality to describe its phenomena instead of devising a systematic and logically integrated set of concepts in terms of which relationships of power in contemporary society can be subjected to accurate and adequate analysis. Without such concepts there can be little clear thinking about the efforts of governments to transform (or to *refrain* from transforming) the existing fabric of power-relationships between states from one of anarchy into one of order. It is easier to play with outworn verbalizations and symbolisms than to take thought and to strive toward a scientific and truly philosophical analysis of the process of politics on all its levels. Such an analysis would require a new vocabulary, a

new insight, a new mode of thinking about the patterns of power in the contemporary world. These things are the prerequisites of intelligent criticism of political experimentation and of successful political inventiveness itself. They are the *sine qua non* of that transvaluation of values, that revolution of attitudes, that invention of new patterns which alone can save a crumbling society from its own destruction. These qualities are lacking in Mr. Morley's book. They are lacking in all the contemporary literature of international organization. They are lacking among the statesmen at Geneva. These lacunae are perhaps omens of defeat in the now desperate attempt to apply organized social intelligence to the salvation of a disintegrating civilization.

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THE LITERARY MIND. By Max Eastman. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1931. Pp. ix+343. \$2.50.

Mr. Eastman addressed his observations on the literary mind to the general reader, the poet, the critic, and the teacher. But the book in its main thesis can hardly be as interesting to any other as it is to the professional, and particularly the professorial, reader. For in these latter years this manner of man has been passing through parlous times.

There are, of course, two sorts of professorial students of literature. One is occupied in mastering linguistics, establishing texts, determining facts of authorship, facts of biography, facts of literary history. To the degree to which he is absorbed in these activities to the exclusion of the enjoyment of literature or the interpretation of it, he may be left out of account at the moment. The other sort is concerned with the intangibles, truth and beauty; and in this pursuit he has found himself either in conflict with the text-establishing, fact-finding part of his own nature, or in the loosest of alliances with colleagues whose enthusiasms head in these directions. He has had an indeterminate status in the world of scholarship.

For the last ten or fifteen years, moreover, he has been uneasily aware of a growing certainty about themselves among the men in the laboratories. Physical scientists seemed to be top-of-the-heap among the Possessors of Certainty; next, the natural scientists, enviably though not absolutely secure; below these the social scientists, openly contemned by the others, but full of satisfaction in their developing techniques whether in terms of case systems or statistical surveys. All of them were saying "We can know only what we can measure," every one of them every day, and always audibly.